Marriage of Schulte

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0545
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0545 Marriage of Schulte 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0545 Kit Carson County District Court No. 21DR30005 Honorable Carl S. McGuire III, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Keith Raymond Schulte,

Appellant,

and

April Danielle Schulte,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Freyre and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026

Epstein Patierno, LLP, Wendy J. Smock, Robert W. Voorhees, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage appeal, Keith Raymond

Schulte (father) appeals the district court’s judgment restricting his

parenting time. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Father and April Danielle Schulte (mother), who divorced in

September 2021, have five children together. As part of their legal

separation agreement, the parties stipulated that the children

would be in the care of mother “at all times that the children are

not with their father” and in the care of father at “all times that

[they] are not with their mother” (original parenting time plan). This

arrangement was characterized by both parties and the court as 50-

50 or “roughly equal” parenting time. But the arrangement was

fluid, with mother having the children during school when father

was working, and father taking them when he had time. When the

original parenting time plan was adopted, both parties resided in

the town of Flagler.

¶3 Approximately two years after the divorce, in January 2024,

father filed a motion concerning parenting time disputes pursuant

to section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025, alleging that mother had

moved to Colorado Springs with the three younger children (the

1 younger children) in violation of the original parenting time plan. In

March 2024, the court held a hearing on father’s motion, at which

mother testified that she continued to reside primarily in Flagler

and only lived in Colorado Springs when the children were with

their father. The court also heard testimony that father had not

been sober while caring for the children and that one of the younger

children had been injured in father’s care. After the injury

occurred, the younger children left father’s home with one of the

older children, and father sent mother threatening texts and

voicemails.

¶4 The court ordered that the original parenting plan be

maintained for the two oldest children. But it required father to

have the younger children on alternating weekends over a four-

week period, from Friday afternoon until Sunday afternoon. For

these visits, father was required to provide sobriety tests once on

each Friday, and twice on each Saturday and Sunday. The court

also adopted the parties’ safety plan for parenting time, which

included paternal grandmother “be[ing] in the home from 4pm to

8am during the week,” when the older children were home from

school, and “the entirety” of the younger children’s stay on the

2 weekend. After the four weeks, the original, unsupervised

parenting time plan would resume, but father was to complete

random sobriety testing in addition to testing before each Monday

exchange of the children.

¶5 In April 2024, before father’s parenting time returned to the

original schedule, mother filed a motion to restrict father’s

parenting time pursuant to sections 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) and 14-10-

129(4), C.R.S. 2025. She alleged that father was not complying

with sobriety testing or parenting time supervision. She also

alleged that, while he was intoxicated, father had allowed the two

older children access to marijuana gummies. The court

immediately required father’s parenting time to be supervised by “a

mutually-agreeable third party or by a licensed mental health

professional or agency.” Mother also requested that the court

appoint a child legal representative (CLR) for the children, which the

court did.

¶6 The court continued the hearing on the motion to restrict so it

could hold an in camera interview with the children. The in camera

interview occurred in June 2024.

3 ¶7 Over two days in October and November 2024, the court held

the hearing on mother’s motion to restrict. Afterward, the court

ended the supervision requirement for the two older children and

imposed an every other week schedule for their parenting time with

father. But it concluded that returning the younger children to the

original, 50-50 unsupervised parenting plan “would place the

children in an environment that would endanger their physical

health or impair their emotional development,” and it ordered a

“step-up plan” to increase father’s parenting time with them to

every other weekend unsupervised. Parenting time was to be

supervised, initially, by paternal aunts and uncles and then would

become unsupervised. Father would continue sobriety testing for

four months and, after that, he would have to complete a sobriety

test only at mother’s request.

¶8 Father filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to C.R.C.P.

59, which the court denied.

II. Restriction of Father’s Parenting Time

¶9 Father argues that the district court incorrectly applied the

best interests standard when it entered its order restricting his

parenting time. We perceive no error.

4 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 The district court has discretion to determine parenting time,

and we will not disturb its decisions absent an abuse of discretion.

See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007)

(discussing parenting time modification). Whether the court applied

the correct legal standard is a question we review de novo. In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.

¶ 11 Section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), commonly referred to as the

endangerment standard, applies to all motions to restrict parenting

time. It reads,

The court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development. In addition to a finding that parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development, in any order imposing or continuing a parenting time restriction, the court shall enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the restriction.

In other words, the district court must first find endangerment and

then must make specific findings supporting its decision to impose

5 or continue a parenting time restriction. In re Marriage of Thorburn,

2022 COA 80, ¶ 38.

¶ 12 Section 14-10-129(4) allows a parent to obtain a parenting

time restriction on an emergency basis. Upon filing a sufficient

section 14-10-129(4) motion, a court must set an emergency

hearing within fourteen days and any parenting time occurring in

that time must be supervised. Thorburn, ¶ 40. Once a hearing is

held, the court applies section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I)’s general

endangerment standard. Id. Father does not contest that the court

satisfied the requirements of section 14-10-129(4).

B. Analysis

¶ 13 In its order, the court cited section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) and

correctly indicated that it could not restrict father’s parenting time

“unless it [found] that the parenting time would endanger the

[younger] children’s physical health or significantly impair their

emotional development.” The court also correctly stated that it

needed to make “specific factual findings supporting that

restriction.” The court then granted mother’s motion and continued

restrictions on father’s parenting time with the younger three

children. The court included a step-up plan to end supervision and

6 to ultimately provide father with every other weekend parenting

time with them.

¶ 14 It found that returning “to a 50[-]50 parenting plan would

place the [younger] children in an environment that would endanger

their emotional development.” It then made specific findings,

supported by the record, justifying an ongoing restriction of father’s

parenting time. These findings included the following:

• Father has a “longstanding” history of alcohol abuse.

• In January 2024, one of the younger children was injured

while in father’s care and, when that injury occurred, father

had been drinking.

• Father drank alcohol in the car while driving the children.

• Father sometimes passed out drunk on top of or near the

sleeping younger children.

• 50-50 contact with father would overwhelm the younger

children, who have spent “more time with [m]other, even

before the motions were filed.”

¶ 15 These findings support the court’s conclusion that father’s

parenting time could be restricted pursuant to section 14-10-

7 129(1)(b)(I). The court applied the proper endangerment standard

and did not abuse its discretion in reaching its conclusion.

C. Additional Related Arguments

¶ 16 Father also argues that the court’s use of phrases such as “the

[c]ourt believes” instead of “the court finds” forces us to conclude

that it made no specific factual findings as required by section

14-10-129(1)(b)(i) and C.R.C.P. 52. We disagree. Although the

court did not always use the word “find,” it explicitly stated that it

needed to make findings and pointed out the record evidence it

determined to be credible and upon which it was basing its ruling;

no “magic words” were necessary for us to determine its findings on

appeal. See City and Cnty. of Denver v. Indus. Comm’n, 690 P.2d

199, 203 (Colo. 1984) (findings of evidentiary fact involve “the raw,

historical data underlying the controversy”); see also People v.

Wilson, 2015 CO 54M, ¶ 19 (so long as the record supports their

rulings premised on findings of fact, district courts are not required

to use “magic words” for their decisions to be upheld on appeal).

¶ 17 Father further argues that the court improperly applied a best

interests standard. True, the court explicitly relied on section 14-

10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring a court to allocate parental

8 responsibilities according to the child’s best interests), when it

created the step-up plan for the younger children “to get back to

more normal contact with their father.” But given that the court

had already determined that the younger children’s emotional

development would be impacted by a 50-50 parenting schedule with

father pursuant to the endangerment standard, the court’s later

application of a best interests standard in reaching the same

conclusion did not prejudice father. See Jimerson v. Prendergast,

697 P.2d 804, 807 (Colo. App. 1985) (defect is harmless error when

no prejudice is alleged). It is, therefore, harmless. Id.

III. In Camera Interview Transcript

¶ 18 Father alleges that the district court erred, violating his right

to due process, when it did not allow him to access a transcript of

the children’s in camera interview before its hearing on mother’s

motion to restrict. He claims that “the transcript forms a critical

component of the evidentiary record.”

¶ 19 To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must give the court

fair notice of an objection to allow the court a “meaningful chance

to prevent or correct the error.” People v. Smalley, 2015 COA 140,

¶ 81 (citation omitted). Father never notified the district court

9 about any constitutional or procedural concerns with the court’s

handling of the in camera interview. Father’s request for a record

pursuant to section 14-10-126(1), C.R.S. 2025, was for a summary

or a transcript — and the district court provided a summary.

Similarly, father never argued to the district court that the CLR’s

presence at the in camera interview implicated his due process

rights and necessitated the release of a transcript. As a result,

father did not alert the court to the contentions he now raises —

that only a transcript could suffice — and the court did not have an

opportunity to address it.

¶ 20 Because father did not preserve his contentions on this issue,

we will not address it further. In re Marriage of Ensminger, 209

P.3d 1163, 1167 (Colo. App. 2008) (declining to address an

argument raised for the first time on appeal).

IV. Conclusion

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE KUHN concur.