NO. 84-09
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAbJA 1984
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF PIUS H. ROHRICH, Petitioner and Appellant,
and MARIAN ROHRICH, Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant:
John F. Iwen, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent: Howard F. Strause, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 23, 1984 Decided:
Filed: dUi1 0 :&+
- Clerk Mr. , J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the Court.
This case comes an appeal from two orders of the
District Court, Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County,
o r d e r i n g t h e husband t o pay t h e w i f e $1,000 i n i t i a l l y and
$ 1 , 2 5 0 p e r month t h e r e a f t e r f o r t e m p o r a r y m a i n t e n a n c e u n t i l
all i s s u e s were resolved in the dispute, and designating
March 3 , 1983 as t h e v a l u a t i o n d a t e of t h e c o r o p o r a t e s t o c k
of the parties for the purpose of dividing the marital
assets. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o g a v e t h e w i f e t h e r i g h t t o
c h o o s e w h i c h s t o c k s h e would r e c e i v e a s p a r t o f t h e p a r t i e s '
property division. We affirm.
The parties were married on June 28, 1948. The
h u s b a n d f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n on March 3 0 , 1 9 8 2 .
On May 2 8 , 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r e d t h e husband t o
pay the wife $750 per month during the pendency of the
d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings and excluded t h e husband from the
f a m i l y hone. On A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d
t h e h u s b a n d i n c o n t e m p t f o r f a i l i n g t o a b i d e by i t s o r d e r o f
28, 1982. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h e h u s b a n d h a d b r o k e n
into the family home and threatened the wife with a
revolver. The p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n came on f o r h e a r i n g
o n November 18, 1982, and o n March 3, 1983, the District
Court e n t e r e d its f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w .
The findings and conclusions that are pertinent to this
appeal included the following; t h a t t h e w i f e was u n a b l e t o
support herself; t h e h u s b a n d worked s t e a d i l y f o r W a s h i n g t o n
C o n s t r u c t i o n Company and e a r n e d $ 6 4 , 1 9 6 . 9 5 i n 1981; taking
i n t o consideration t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of the parties,
t h e t i m e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e w i f e t o be t r a i n e d and e d u c a t e d for employment, the a g e of the parties and the husband's
a b i l i t y t o pay, t h e w i f e s h o u l d r e c e i v e $750 p e r month f o r
three years; due to the violent nature of the parties'
r e l a t i o n s h i p i t would b e b e s t i f t h e r e was no f u t u r e c o n t a c t
between the parties; the parties owned numerous shares of
corporate stock; i n r e t u r n f o r t h e w i f e g i v i n g up h e r r i g h t
t o maintenance payments the wife would receive the first
$ 2 5 , 0 0 0 i n v a l u e o f s t o c k and i f t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d n o t a g r e e
on the value of the stock it would be sold and divided
accordingly; it was not necessary to award the wife
m a i n t e n a n c e b e c a u s e s h e was b e i n g g r a n t e d a g r e a t e r s h a r e o f
the marital assets; the parties would execute all
instruments necessary to carry out the provisions of the
decree; t h e w i f e was awarded a $ 2 7 , 8 3 7 l o a n t h a t had b e e n
made t o t h e p a r t i e s ' children. N e i t h e r p a r t y a p p e a l e d from
t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n .
On March 1 3 , 1983, t h e w i f e made a motion that the
D i s t r i c t Court hold t h e husband i n contempt f o r f a i l i n g t o
comply w i t h t h e decree of dissolution. The w i f e ' s m o t i o n
was s u p p o r t e d by an a f f i d a v i t i n which t h e w i f e a l l e g e d t h a t
t h e $ 2 7 , 8 3 7 t h a t had b e e n l o a n e d t o t h e c h i l d r e n and which
was awarded t o her by t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n had b e e n
transferred to the parties' s o n who l i v e d o u t s i d e Montana.
The w i f e a l s o a l l e g e d that s h e had not received her $750
maintenance payment for the month of February, 1983, as
r e q u i r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r o f May 2 8 , 1982. On
June 10, 1983, the parties entered into a stipulation
whereby the husband would receive the asset denominated "Loan t o c h i l d r e n . . ." i n r e t u r n f o r which t h e w i f e would
be awarded an equal amount in value of corporate stock. Subsequently, the parties c o u l d n o t a g r e e upon a d a t e f o r
v a l u a t i o n of t h e s t o c k . The w i f e a r g u e d t h e s t o c k s h o u l d b e
valued as of March 3, 1983, the date of the decree of
d i s s o l u t i o n , whereas t h e husband a r g u e d a l a t e r d a t e s h o u l d
be used. As a result, t h e w i f e moved t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o n
J u n e 20, 1983, t o hold a hearing t o determine t h e d a t e of
valuation of the corporate stock for purposes of
distribution. At about t h e same time t h e wife asked the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o r e q u i r e t h e husband t o pay h e r i m m e d i a t e l y
the sum of $1,000 until a hearing could be held on the
matter. According t o her accompanying affidavit the wife
a l l e g e d s h e had n o t r e c e i v e d any m a i n t e n a n c e p a y m e n t s s i n c e
January, 1 9 8 3 ; t h e w i f e had b e e n f o r c e d t o l i v e on w e l f a r e
benefits; and the husband had encouraged the parties1
c h i l d r e n n o t t o cooperate i n t h e d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s
by n o t s i g n i n g s t o c k t r a n s f e r o r d e r s . Based upon t h e w i f e ' s
a f f i d a v i t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on August 1 2 , 1983, i s s u e d a n
e x p a r t e o r d e r r e q u i r i n g t h e husband t o immediately pay t h e
w i f e $1,000 f o r temporary maintenance.
H e a r i n g s were h e l d o n J u l y 1 9 and S e p t e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 8 3 ,
f o r t h e p u rp o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d a t e o f v a l u a t i o n of t h e
corporate stock. From testimony presented at those
hearings, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued an o r d e r on S e p t e m b e r
29, 1983, i n which it determined that the s t o c k would b e
valued as of March 3, 1983, the date the District Court
handed down the original decree of dissolution. In its
o r d e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t o v a l u e t h e s t o c k on
any other date "would have the e f f e c t of undermining the
e q u i t i e s which [ t h e District Court] b u i l t i n t o its order. "
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had e n t e r e d i n t o a n agreement whereby t h e husband had a g r e e d t o r e c e i v e
as an asset the loan to the children in the amount of
$28,489 ( t h e o r i g i n a l amount p l u s i n t e r e s t ) i n e x c h a n g e f o r
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NO. 84-09
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAbJA 1984
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF PIUS H. ROHRICH, Petitioner and Appellant,
and MARIAN ROHRICH, Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant:
John F. Iwen, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent: Howard F. Strause, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 23, 1984 Decided:
Filed: dUi1 0 :&+
- Clerk Mr. , J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the Court.
This case comes an appeal from two orders of the
District Court, Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County,
o r d e r i n g t h e husband t o pay t h e w i f e $1,000 i n i t i a l l y and
$ 1 , 2 5 0 p e r month t h e r e a f t e r f o r t e m p o r a r y m a i n t e n a n c e u n t i l
all i s s u e s were resolved in the dispute, and designating
March 3 , 1983 as t h e v a l u a t i o n d a t e of t h e c o r o p o r a t e s t o c k
of the parties for the purpose of dividing the marital
assets. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o g a v e t h e w i f e t h e r i g h t t o
c h o o s e w h i c h s t o c k s h e would r e c e i v e a s p a r t o f t h e p a r t i e s '
property division. We affirm.
The parties were married on June 28, 1948. The
h u s b a n d f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n on March 3 0 , 1 9 8 2 .
On May 2 8 , 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t Court o r d e r e d t h e husband t o
pay the wife $750 per month during the pendency of the
d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings and excluded t h e husband from the
f a m i l y hone. On A u g u s t 1 6 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d
t h e h u s b a n d i n c o n t e m p t f o r f a i l i n g t o a b i d e by i t s o r d e r o f
28, 1982. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h e h u s b a n d h a d b r o k e n
into the family home and threatened the wife with a
revolver. The p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n came on f o r h e a r i n g
o n November 18, 1982, and o n March 3, 1983, the District
Court e n t e r e d its f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w .
The findings and conclusions that are pertinent to this
appeal included the following; t h a t t h e w i f e was u n a b l e t o
support herself; t h e h u s b a n d worked s t e a d i l y f o r W a s h i n g t o n
C o n s t r u c t i o n Company and e a r n e d $ 6 4 , 1 9 6 . 9 5 i n 1981; taking
i n t o consideration t h e f i n a n c i a l resources of the parties,
t h e t i m e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e w i f e t o be t r a i n e d and e d u c a t e d for employment, the a g e of the parties and the husband's
a b i l i t y t o pay, t h e w i f e s h o u l d r e c e i v e $750 p e r month f o r
three years; due to the violent nature of the parties'
r e l a t i o n s h i p i t would b e b e s t i f t h e r e was no f u t u r e c o n t a c t
between the parties; the parties owned numerous shares of
corporate stock; i n r e t u r n f o r t h e w i f e g i v i n g up h e r r i g h t
t o maintenance payments the wife would receive the first
$ 2 5 , 0 0 0 i n v a l u e o f s t o c k and i f t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d n o t a g r e e
on the value of the stock it would be sold and divided
accordingly; it was not necessary to award the wife
m a i n t e n a n c e b e c a u s e s h e was b e i n g g r a n t e d a g r e a t e r s h a r e o f
the marital assets; the parties would execute all
instruments necessary to carry out the provisions of the
decree; t h e w i f e was awarded a $ 2 7 , 8 3 7 l o a n t h a t had b e e n
made t o t h e p a r t i e s ' children. N e i t h e r p a r t y a p p e a l e d from
t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n .
On March 1 3 , 1983, t h e w i f e made a motion that the
D i s t r i c t Court hold t h e husband i n contempt f o r f a i l i n g t o
comply w i t h t h e decree of dissolution. The w i f e ' s m o t i o n
was s u p p o r t e d by an a f f i d a v i t i n which t h e w i f e a l l e g e d t h a t
t h e $ 2 7 , 8 3 7 t h a t had b e e n l o a n e d t o t h e c h i l d r e n and which
was awarded t o her by t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n had b e e n
transferred to the parties' s o n who l i v e d o u t s i d e Montana.
The w i f e a l s o a l l e g e d that s h e had not received her $750
maintenance payment for the month of February, 1983, as
r e q u i r e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r o f May 2 8 , 1982. On
June 10, 1983, the parties entered into a stipulation
whereby the husband would receive the asset denominated "Loan t o c h i l d r e n . . ." i n r e t u r n f o r which t h e w i f e would
be awarded an equal amount in value of corporate stock. Subsequently, the parties c o u l d n o t a g r e e upon a d a t e f o r
v a l u a t i o n of t h e s t o c k . The w i f e a r g u e d t h e s t o c k s h o u l d b e
valued as of March 3, 1983, the date of the decree of
d i s s o l u t i o n , whereas t h e husband a r g u e d a l a t e r d a t e s h o u l d
be used. As a result, t h e w i f e moved t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o n
J u n e 20, 1983, t o hold a hearing t o determine t h e d a t e of
valuation of the corporate stock for purposes of
distribution. At about t h e same time t h e wife asked the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o r e q u i r e t h e husband t o pay h e r i m m e d i a t e l y
the sum of $1,000 until a hearing could be held on the
matter. According t o her accompanying affidavit the wife
a l l e g e d s h e had n o t r e c e i v e d any m a i n t e n a n c e p a y m e n t s s i n c e
January, 1 9 8 3 ; t h e w i f e had b e e n f o r c e d t o l i v e on w e l f a r e
benefits; and the husband had encouraged the parties1
c h i l d r e n n o t t o cooperate i n t h e d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l a s s e t s
by n o t s i g n i n g s t o c k t r a n s f e r o r d e r s . Based upon t h e w i f e ' s
a f f i d a v i t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on August 1 2 , 1983, i s s u e d a n
e x p a r t e o r d e r r e q u i r i n g t h e husband t o immediately pay t h e
w i f e $1,000 f o r temporary maintenance.
H e a r i n g s were h e l d o n J u l y 1 9 and S e p t e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 8 3 ,
f o r t h e p u rp o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d a t e o f v a l u a t i o n of t h e
corporate stock. From testimony presented at those
hearings, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued an o r d e r on S e p t e m b e r
29, 1983, i n which it determined that the s t o c k would b e
valued as of March 3, 1983, the date the District Court
handed down the original decree of dissolution. In its
o r d e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t o v a l u e t h e s t o c k on
any other date "would have the e f f e c t of undermining the
e q u i t i e s which [ t h e District Court] b u i l t i n t o its order. "
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had e n t e r e d i n t o a n agreement whereby t h e husband had a g r e e d t o r e c e i v e
as an asset the loan to the children in the amount of
$28,489 ( t h e o r i g i n a l amount p l u s i n t e r e s t ) i n e x c h a n g e f o r
giving the wife $28,489 i n value of stock. The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t had been informed t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n ' s l o a n had been
invested in an interest b e a r i n g a c c o u n t and t h e r e f o r e the
h u s b a n d c o u l d c o l l e c t t h e i n t e r e s t o n t h e $ 2 8 , 4 8 9 f r o m March
3, 1983. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t n o t e d t h a t t o a l l o w t h e h u s b a n d
t o a l s o r e c e i v e t h e b e n e f i t s from any i n c r e a s e i n t h e v a l u e
of stock s i n c e March 3, 1 9 8 3 would i n e f f e c t g i v e him a
double benefit. The District Court said it took into
consideration the fact that the husband was g a i n f u l l y employed and had a much greater ability to build up an
estate before he retired than did the wife. Thus, the
D i s t r i c t Court ordered the stock immediately divided with
t h e w i f e e n t i t l e d t o c h o o s e $25,000 and a n o t h e r $28,489 i n
s t o c k a s t h a t s t o c k was v a l u e d o n March 3 , 1 9 8 3 . I t is from
t h a t o r d e r and t h e A u g u s t 1 2 , 1 9 8 3 o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e w i f e
temporary maintenance t h a t t h e husband a p p e a l s .
The h u s b a n d r a i s e s two i s s u e s o n a p p e a l :
(1) Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n on A u g u s t
12, 1983 t o award ex parte temporary maintenance to the
wife?
( 2 ) Did the District Court have jurisdiction on
September 29, 1983 to designate March 3, 1983, as the
v a l u a t i o n d a t e o f t h e c o r p o r a t e s t o c k and g r a n t t h e w i f e t h e
r i g h t t o c h o o s e t h e c o r p o r a t e s t o c k s h e would r e c e i v e ? I n i t i a l l y , t h e husband a s s e r t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s
w i t h o u t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o award t h e w i f e temporary m a i n t e n a n c e
o n A u g u s t 1 2 , 1 9 8 3 b e c a u s e a c o u r t c a n n o t amend a j u d g m e n t u n d e r R u l e 5 2 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. w i t h o u t h o l d i n g an e v i d e n t i a r y
hearing . On Nay 28, 1982, the District Court ordered the
husband t o pay $750 p e r month d u r i n g t h e pendency o f the
proceedings. The h u s b a n d f a i l e d t o comply w i t h t h a t o r d e r
and was held in contempt on A u g u s t 16, 1982. After the
decree of dissolution was entered on March 3, 1983, the
wife, by a f f i d a v i t , i n d i c a t e d t h e h u s b a n d had a g a i n f a i l e d
t o make a t e m p o r a r y m a i n t e n a n c e payment and, i n addition,
had a c t e d t o d e p r i v e h e r o f t h e $27,837 awarded h e r i n t h e
decree of d i s s o l u t i o n . Thus, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was f a c e d
with a situation i n which the i n t e n t of its orders, i.e.,
t h a t t h e w i f e be maintained pending f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e
matter, was not being carried out. Accordingly, i t was
within the District Court's discretion to qrant the wife
temporary maintenance. I n S t a t e ex. ?-?.cGt tsc r e l . -Ka-%+ v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 5 4 7 , 582 P.2d 7 7 2 , t h i s C o u r t s a i d :
"The U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t now i n e f f e c t i n Montana g i v e s t h e D i s t r i c t Court a u t h o r i t y t o provide temporary o r d e r s f o r s u p p o r t and m a i n t e n a n c e t o a spouse. S e c t i o n 48-318, R.C.M. 1947 [now S e c t i o n 40-4-106, MCA]. Nothing i n t h a t S t a t u t e r e s t r i c t s t h e power o f the D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o r d e r s made b e f o r e judgment. I n f a c t , it is s p e c i f i c a l l y provided t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g o f such an order does not prejudice t h e r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s a t 'subsequent hearings i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g , ' w h i c h would i n c l u d e a n appeal. "
Thus, t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e i n d i c a t e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had
jurisdiction to grant the wife temporary maintenance on A u g u s t 1 2 , 1983.
Next, the husband argues the District Court was
without jurisdiction on September 29, 1983 t o designate
March 3 , 1 9 8 3 a s t h e v a l u a t i o n d a t e o f t h e s t o c k and g i v i n g t h e wife t h e r i g h t t o choose her stock. The h u s b a n d a s s e r t s
t h e March 3 , 1 9 8 3 d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n was a f i n a l j u d g m e n t
a n d c o u l d n o t b e amended o r m o d i f i e d e x c e p t by m o t i o n made
w i t h i n t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n t h e Montana R u l e s
of C i v i l Procedure.
First, we n o t e t h a t t h e husband participated in the
J u l y 1 9 , 1983 and September 1 6 , 1983 h e a r i n g s i n which t h e
District Court determined the date of valuation for the
corporate stock. Second, it has been held that the
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or c l a r i f i c a t i o n of a judgment ambiguous o r
u n c e r t a i n upon i t s f a c e i n v o l v e s n e i t h e r a n amendment o f i t s
terms n o r a c h a l l e n g e t o i t s v a l i d i t y . S t i e l e r v. Stieler 127 (Minn. 1955), 70 N.W.2d m,. In the present case, the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r of September 29, 1983 c l a r i f i e d t h e
March 3, 1983 d e c r e e of dissolution. The March 3, 1983
decree of dissolution failed to designate the date upon
w h i c h t h e c o r p o r a t e s t o c k would b e v a l u e d a n d b o t h p a r t i e s
moved the court t o determine t h e appropriate date of the
valuation. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y r e l i e d upon L i p p e r t
v. L i p p e r t (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 627 P.2d 1 2 0 6 , 38 S t . R e p . 625 and
Krause v. Krause (Mont. 1982), 654 P.2d 963, 39 St.Rep.
1809, i n holding that the assets s h o u l d be v a l u e d a t t h e time of the dissolution hearing. Moreover, the District
C o u r t d i d n o t m o d i f y o r amend t h e d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n by
authorizing the wife, i n t h e September 29, 1983 o r d e r , to
choose her stock. Again, t h i s was a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the
o r i g i n a l d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n i n w h i c h it was s t a t e d t h a t
t h e w i f e h a d no v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s a n d was n o t q u a l i f i e d f o r
even t h e most minimal jobs. A s t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n Thomas
v . Thomas (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 617 P.2d 1 3 3 , 3 7 S t . R e p . 1710, " . . since neither party made a timely appeal of the original findings and decree, the parties are bound by it, unless an appropriate proceeding is maintained subsequent hereto for clarification of the findings and decree." Thomas, supra at 1714. A £ f irmed.
We concur:
Chief ~ u s t i c e -