Marriage of Roberts

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0373
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0373 Marriage of Roberts 03-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0373 El Paso County District Court No. 23DR30740 Honorable Amanda J. Philipps, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Patricia Roberts,

Appellee,

and

Aaron Ray Roberts,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Freyre and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 20, 2025

KHM Attorneys at Law, PLLC, Alexander Masterson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Law Office of Dailey & Pratt, LLC, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Patricia Roberts

(wife) and Aaron Ray Roberts (husband), husband appeals those

portions of the permanent orders concerning the property division

and maintenance. We affirm the judgment and remand the case for

further proceedings on wife’s request for appellate attorney fees.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2010. In 2024, the district court

dissolved their marriage and entered permanent orders.

¶3 In dividing the marital property, the district court excluded

from the marital estate a house in Texas (Danvers) that wife had

owned before the marriage. The court found that the parties sold

Danvers to wife’s parents in 2012 in exchange for $30,000 and

wife’s parents’ agreement to pay the remaining $39,800 balance of

the mortgage (the 2012 agreement). The court explained that

although the title and the mortgage remained in wife’s name, it was

the parties’ clear intent to transfer ownership to wife’s parents.

¶4 The district court divided the marital assets — including

approximately $200,000 of equity in the marital home — roughly

equally. But it allocated most of the marital debt to husband,

including around $214,000 in student loans that husband had

1 incurred while obtaining a master’s degree. The court awarded wife

$800 per month in maintenance for six years and eleven months.

II. Property Division

¶5 Husband argues that the district court erred by (1) excluding

Danvers from the division of the marital estate; and (2) allocating

husband’s student loans to husband on the ground that wife would

not benefit from them, while also awarding wife maintenance based

on husband’s income. We perceive no abuse of discretion.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The division of marital property requires a three-step analysis.

LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3, ¶ 63. The district court must

(1) determine whether an interest constitutes property; (2) if so,

classify the property as marital or separate; and (3) value and

equitably distribute the marital property after considering the

factors in section 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024. Lafleur, ¶ 63.

¶7 An equitable division of the marital estate need not be equal.

In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3. In reaching an

equitable division, the district court must consider all relevant

factors, including each party’s contribution to the acquisition of the

marital property, the value of each party’s separate property, each

2 party’s economic circumstances, and any increases or decreases in

the value of separate property during the marriage or the depletion

of separate property for marital purposes. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d).

¶8 The district court has considerable latitude to determine an

equitable division based on the facts of each case, and we will not

disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion, which occurs

when the court acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or

unreasonable manner, or when it misapplies the law. See In re

Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001); In re Marriage of

Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5. We review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and will only set them aside if they have no

record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.

B. Danvers

¶9 Husband asserts, alternatively, that (1) Danvers was marital

property, either in its entirety or to the extent it increased in value

during the parties’ marriage; or (2) Danvers was wife’s separate

property that should have been considered as an economic

circumstance in dividing the marital estate. We are not persuaded.

3 1. Additional Background

¶ 10 It was undisputed that wife acquired Danvers before the

parties’ marriage. In the 2012 agreement, husband and wife agreed

to sell Danvers to wife’s parents for $69,800, consisting of $30,000

in cash and $39,800 in payment of the remaining mortgage

balance. Wife’s parents also agreed to pay for insurance and taxes

on the home. The agreement provided that wife would remove her

name from the property “[u]pon mortgage payment completion.”

¶ 11 Wife testified that, for several years, her parents paid the

mortgage and property taxes in accordance with the 2012

agreement. She also testified that her parents acted as the owners

of Danvers, including by renting out and managing the property.

¶ 12 In 2017, wife’s parents were prepared to pay off the mortgage.

But at that time, the parties needed funds to pay down their credit

card debt. Therefore, according to wife, rather than pay off the low-

interest mortgage, wife’s parents verbally agreed to pay the $19,500

mortgage balance to the parties in exchange for wife’s assumption

of responsibility for the mortgage payments (the 2017 agreement).

Wife testified that husband was aware of this arrangement.

4 ¶ 13 Although wife never transferred the Danvers title to her

parents, she explained that she never saw the need to do so, given

her familial relationship with her parents, the 2012 agreement, and

the low-interest rate on the existing mortgage. Wife’s mother

confirmed wife’s description of the 2012 and 2017 agreements and

similarly testified that, in reliance on those agreements, she had

acted as an owner of Danvers, including by renting it out, paying

associated expenses, and mitigating a flood on the property.

¶ 14 The district court credited wife and her mother and found that

the parties’ “clear intent” was to transfer ownership of Danvers to

wife’s parents under the 2012 agreement. The court also found

that wife’s parents had acted as owners of the home since 2012 and

that the 2017 agreement was a loan from wife’s parents, with

repayment made through wife’s mortgage payments. The court

therefore found that while Danvers was wife’s separate property

going into the marriage, no portion of it remained marital property

(or wife’s property) because it had been sold to wife’s parents.

2. Analysis

¶ 15 We first reject husband’s suggestion that Danvers was marital

property in its entirety. Marital property means “all property

5 acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” § 14-10-

113(2) (emphasis added). The district court found, and husband

does not dispute, that wife acquired Danvers before the marriage,

meaning that Danvers was her separate property. See id. It was

also undisputed that title to Danvers and the corresponding

mortgage remained solely in wife’s name during the marriage, thus

precluding any presumption of a gift to the marriage. See In re

Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 4 (recognizing that property

placed in joint ownership during the marriage is presumed to be

marital property). Husband does not develop any argument as to

how his signature on the 2012 agreement somehow converted

Danvers to marital property. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v.

Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 44 (declining to consider

undeveloped and conclusory arguments), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.

¶ 16 We also reject husband’s contention that wife retained an

interest in Danvers, and correspondingly, that some portion of that

interest was marital property. Husband stakes this claim on his

argument that the unwritten 2017 agreement was void under the

statute of frauds, either because it was a material modification of a

contract for the sale of land, see § 38-10-108, C.R.S. 2024; an

6 agreement that could not be performed within one year, see § 38-

10-112(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; or a promise to answer for the debt of

another, see § 38-10-112(1)(b). As a result, husband maintains

that wife could declare her parents in default of the 2012 agreement

for not paying the Danvers mortgage and reclaim the property.

¶ 17 But even assuming the 2017 agreement violated the statute of

frauds — a point we do not decide — that agreement would still be

enforceable because wife and her parents substantially performed

under that agreement. See Laleh v. Johnson, 2017 CO 93, ¶ 24

(noting that we can affirm on any ground supported by the record).

¶ 18 Section 38-10-110, C.R.S. 2024, provides that “[n]othing in

[the statute of frauds] shall . . . abridge the powers of courts of

equity to compel the specific performance of agreements in cases of

part performance of such agreement.” Thus, a court may enforce

an otherwise invalid oral contract when there is part performance

that is “(1) substantial; and (2) required by, and fairly referable to

no other theory besides that allegedly contained within the oral

agreement.” Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 108 (Colo. 1995).

¶ 19 An oral promise may also be enforced based on promissory

estoppel when there is (1) a promise; (2) that the promisor

7 reasonably should have expected would induce action or

forbearance by the promisee; (3) on which the promisee reasonably

and detrimentally relied; and (4) that must be enforced in order to

prevent injustice. Am. Pride Co-op. v. Seewald, 968 P.2d 139, 142

(Colo. App. 1998); Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53, ¶ 32.

¶ 20 We conclude that the district court’s findings were sufficient to

support the enforceability of the 2017 agreement under either the

partial performance doctrine or promissory estoppel. As the district

found, wife’s parents substantially — indeed, fully — performed the

2017 agreement by paying the $19,500 mortgage balance to the

parties and ceasing further payment of the mortgage. And wife

substantially performed by making the mortgage payments. We see

no reason the parties would have taken these actions other than

the existence of the oral agreement. See Nelson, 908 P.2d at 108.

¶ 21 Similarly, the district court’s findings were sufficient to

establish that wife’s parents reasonably relied on the 2017

agreement — not only by paying the mortgage balance to the parties

and stopping their mortgage payments, but also by maintaining and

managing Danvers as their own property — such that the promise

must be enforced. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d

8 714, 716 (Colo. 1996) (recognizing that “[a] promise that is binding

pursuant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a contract, and

full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is appropriate”).

¶ 22 Moreover, even if the 2017 agreement were not enforceable,

that would not make wife the owner of Danvers. The district court

found, with record support, that the parties sold Danvers to wife’s

parents in 2012. The 2012 agreement required wife’s parents to

pay the remaining mortgage and provided that upon completion of

those payments, wife would remove her name from the title. But

nothing in the agreement provided that ownership of Danvers would

revert to wife if the mortgage payments were not made — or if, as it

happened, they were made in a lump sum directly to the parties.

¶ 23 Thus, the district court did not err by finding that wife did not

have an interest in Danvers, even if her name remained on the title.

A party in a dissolution proceeding has a property interest only to

the extent the party has “an enforceable right to receive a benefit.”

In re Marriage of Cardona, 2014 CO 3, ¶ 26. And because the

parties had transferred ownership of Danvers to wife’s parents, wife

had no enforceable right with respect to Danvers. Indeed, by the

time of the permanent orders hearing, the parties had both already

9 received — in the form of $30,000 in 2012, $19,500 in 2017, and

the payment of the Danvers mortgage and other expenses in the

interim — all the benefit to which they were entitled. It follows that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to consider

wife’s putative interest in Danvers as an economic circumstance for

purposes of its equitable distribution. See § 14-10-113(1)(c).

¶ 24 We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by declining to treat Danvers as marital property or

otherwise to consider Danvers in dividing the marital estate.

C. Allocation of Student Loans

¶ 25 We next reject husband’s challenge to the allocation of his

student loans to him alone. Husband contends that the district

court made contradictory findings by allocating to him the full value

of the student loans because wife would not continue to benefit

from the resulting increased income, while awarding wife

maintenance based on the increased income. We disagree.

¶ 26 A party’s student loans obtained during the marriage are

considered marital debt. In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 6.

But that does not foreclose a district court from allocating

responsibility for the loans entirely to the party who incurred them.

10 Id. at ¶ 9. A court does not abuse its discretion by finding that a

party’s student loans should be solely that party’s responsibility

where the party’s degree was earned later in the marriage and will

primarily benefit that party. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Faulkner,

652 P.2d 572, 574 (Colo. 1982) (holding that court may consider

parties’ future earning capacity when allocating marital debt);

Wright, ¶ 3 (noting that property division need not be equal).

¶ 27 In allocating the student loans to husband, the court properly

found they were marital debt. But it reasoned that wife only

benefited for a “brief period of time” from husband’s increased

earning capacity arising from his advanced degree and that she was

“not going to benefit to the same degree post-dissolution as

[husband].” The court further explained that husband was earning

$190,000 per year, while wife was earning only a third of that.

¶ 28 The district court’s findings are supported by the record, and

its allocation of the debts to husband was not an abuse of

discretion. Husband testified that his advanced degree contributed

to a $90,000 increase in his annual income. Although the record

does not reflect when husband earned the degree, wife testified that

he was attending school in 2017, and his student loan statements

11 indicated that he was incurring debt into 2019 — just five years

before the parties’ marriage dissolved. Moreover, husband was

forty-three years old at the time of the permanent orders, giving him

decades to benefit from his increased earning capacity. Under

these circumstances, where the degree will “primarily benefit”

husband, the district court acted within its substantial discretion

by allocating the student loans entirely to him. Morton, ¶ 9.

¶ 29 We disagree with husband that the allocation was inconsistent

with the award of maintenance to wife. The court’s observation that

wife would not benefit from husband’s increased earning power to

the same degree as husband post-decree was correct. While

husband’s income increased by $90,000 per year, wife will receive

maintenance of just $800 per month for a total of six years and

eleven months. Notably, the court did not award wife the full

guideline amount of maintenance based on husband’s income.

Instead, it deviated downward substantially — from $2,200 per

month to $800 per month — because “[husband] is taking on a

substantially larger portion of the marital debt post-decree.”

12 III. Maintenance

¶ 30 Husband further contends that the district court abused its

discretion or otherwise made insufficient findings when awarding

wife $800 per month in maintenance. We again disagree.

¶ 31 We review the district court’s maintenance award for an abuse

of discretion. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35. Although the court must

follow the statutory process and consider the relevant factors in

section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2024, it need not make specific factual

findings on each factor, so long as its findings are “sufficiently

explicit . . . to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the

basis of its order.” Wright, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).

¶ 32 In awarding wife $800 per month in maintenance, the district

court considered the parties’ respective incomes and generally

credited the expenses reflected in wife’s sworn financial statement,

which the court found demonstrated a need for maintenance.

Conversely, the court found that husband’s sworn financial

statement, which reported a monthly shortfall of more than $3,000

per month, was not credible. In particular, it found that husband’s

unexplained $2,450 monthly vehicle payment and $3,300 in

combined monthly dining and grocery expenses were excessive.

13 ¶ 33 The court also noted that it had limited evidence concerning

the parties’ marital lifestyle and recognized that both parties were

relatively young and capable of working well into the future.

¶ 34 The district court then considered the guideline maintenance

amount of $2,200 per month but expressed concern about

husband’s ability to pay that amount given the significant debts he

had been allocated. The court therefore deviated downward from

the maintenance guidelines based upon those debts.

¶ 35 Given the district court’s detailed findings, we are satisfied

that the court considered all relevant statutory factors when

awarding wife maintenance. See Wright, ¶¶ 12-17. And we

disagree with husband’s suggestion that the district court did not

consider the unequal property division when awarding wife

maintenance, given that the district court specifically deviated

downward from the guideline amount of maintenance by $1,400 per

month in recognition of the substantial debt allocated to him.

¶ 36 Finally, we reject husband’s contention that the district court

failed to account for an unspecified increase in his expenses arising

from his refinance of the marital home as part of the marital

property division. Husband does not cite, and we have not found,

14 anywhere in the record where he presented this argument to the

district court. Nor does husband identify any evidence in the record

to support his insinuation that he could not afford any resulting

increased financial obligation. See Krejci, ¶ 23 (holding that parties’

failure to present sufficient evidence to the court does not provide

grounds for reversal); Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v. Transamerica

Premier Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996) (“[I]t is not the

duty of the reviewing court to search the record for evidence to

support bald assertions.”), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1997).

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 37 Wife requests an award of her appellate attorney fees under

section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024, on the ground that husband’s

appeal lacks substantial justification. We deny this request.

Although husband did not prevail, his appeal was not so lacking in

substantial justification as to warrant an award of attorney fees.

See In re Marriage of Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be

awarded only in clear and unequivocal cases when the appellant

presents no rational argument, or the appeal is prosecuted for the

purpose of harassment or delay.”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.

15 ¶ 38 Wife also requests her appellate attorney fees under section

14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024. Because the district court is better

equipped to resolve the factual issues regarding the parties’ current

financial resources, we remand for the district court to consider

wife’s request. See In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 30.

V. Disposition

¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for further

proceedings concerning wife’s request for appellate attorney fees.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.