24CA2072 Marriage of Pittman 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2072 Douglas County District Court No. 23DR30656 Honorable Andrew C. Baum, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Taylor J. Pittman,
Appellee,
and
Christina D. Pittman n/k/a Christina L. DeMichelis,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Meirink and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
The W Law, Emily Warren, Jon Eric Stuebner, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Christina D. Pittman n/k/a Christina L. DeMichelis, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 The district court dissolved the marriage of Taylor J. Pittman
(father) and Christina D. Pittman n/k/a Christina L. DeMichelis
(mother), and it entered permanent orders (1) allocating parenting
time and decision-making; (2) dividing the marital property;
(3) ordering father to pay future maintenance and child support
(but denying retroactive awards); (4) allowing the parties to file an
amended joint tax return; and (5) declining to award mother’s
unpaid attorney fees. Mother appeals various aspects of the court’s
permanent orders. We affirm except as to the portion of the court’s
order allowing father to offset his child support obligations against
various debts mother owed him.
I. Background
¶2 The parties were married in 2019 and had two daughters, G.P.
(born in 2020) and L.P. (born in 2022). Father petitioned for
dissolution of marriage in August 2023. Mother was represented by
counsel from August 2023 until June 2024, at which point she
proceeded pro se. A permanent orders hearing occurred on
September 23 and 24, 2024. The district court issued the
dissolution decree after the hearing. It then issued written
permanent orders on October 18, 2024, and amended written
1 permanent orders on January 16, 2025. We address mother’s
challenges to the permanent orders below.
II. Educational Decision-Making
¶3 Mother first contends that the district court erred by depriving
her of the right to make appropriate educational decisions for the
children and contends that the district court violated her due
process rights by restricting her ability to object and present
evidence. We discern no error.
A. Relevant Facts
¶4 The parties’ children were both under five years old when the
court issued permanent orders. G.P. was diagnosed with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD), and her condition requires specialized
behavioral care, occupational therapy, and speech therapy. During
the dissolution proceeding, mother assumed much of G.P.’s and
L.P.’s care in the marital home(s).
¶5 At the permanent orders hearing, the district court made
findings concerning decision-making and parenting time.1 It
1 Consistent with the recommendations of the child and family
investigator, the court allocated parenting time in phases, and father’s parenting time increased with each phase. The court also detailed a process and timelines for the parents’ communication.
2 acknowledged that G.P.’s ASD required her to have additional
support services. It also recognized that both parents fully
supported all aspects of G.P.’s therapy and that the parents and
G.P.’s therapy providers jointly agreed to focus on that therapy,
rather than placing G.P. in school for the 2024-2025 school year.
¶6 Guided by section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (b), C.R.S. 2025, the
district court addressed the applicable factors before allocating joint
decision-making to both parents for “all major issues including
health and medical care, orthodontics, mental health, education,
religion, and extracurricular activities.” However, when the
children were in the care of a particular parent, that parent could
make day-to-day or routine decisions about the children.
¶7 As relevant to mother’s appeal, the court’s January 16, 2025,
amended permanent orders acknowledged mother’s request that the
children attend private school. It also noted father’s concerns
about the financial burdens associated with a private school
setting. While the court did not prohibit a private school option
indefinitely, it concluded that until both parties had paid the
marital and separate debt allocated to them, a private school option
was not feasible. The court also set a target date of twenty-four
3 months to pay off the debt (excluding mother’s student loan debt)
so that the parents could then revisit a private school option.
B. Legal Principles
¶8 The district court has broad discretion over the allocation of
parental decision-making responsibilities. In re Marriage of Morgan,
2018 COA 116M, ¶ 23. We will not disturb the court’s decision
absent a showing that the court acted in a manner that was
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or that misapplied the
law. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45. And we will
uphold the court’s decision when the evidence supports it. In re
Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007); see Van
Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12 (reviewing factual
findings for clear error).
¶9 Section 14-10-130(1), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “the person
or persons with responsibility for decision-making may determine the
child’s upbringing, including his or her education.” (Emphasis
added.) Where joint decision-making is allocated, both parents are
“persons with responsibility for decision-making [who] may
determine the child’s . . . education.” Id. But when those parents
cannot responsibly discharge their duty to make a particular
4 decision, a court is sometimes left with no alternative but to do so.
In re Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶¶ 36-38.
C. Discussion
¶ 10 Mother argues that the district court erred by tying the
children’s educational options to the parents’ debt repayment. She
disagrees with the court’s decision about where the children will be
educated. But the court’s findings enjoy record support, so we
cannot disturb them. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330; see also In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 28
(recognizing that we may not reweigh the court’s resolution of
conflicting evidence).
¶ 11 Mother testified that she wanted both children to attend
private school. She elaborated on the resources available at
Compositive Primary, a private school. Father countered that his
main objection to private school was that he and mother lack the
funds to pay $20,000 annually per child — or $40,000 for both
children — to attend private school. He also relied on the fact that,
in anticipation of the 2025-2026 school year, G.P. had an
individualized education plan to address her specific needs, which a
public school had to abide by, while the private school could choose
5 to send G.P. home for behavioral issues. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.137(a)
(2024) (“No parentally-placed private school child with a disability
has an individual right to receive some or all of the special
education and related services that the child would receive if
enrolled in a public school.”). Moreover, father testified about the
family’s debt, including their unsuccessful attempts to manage that
debt. Even with the generous tuition assistance mother now
invokes, citing the child and family investigator’s report, this family
was simply in no position to incur the added expense of private
school tuition for either child. Mother’s own brief acknowledges
that the parties’ debt exceeds $177,000. The debt included credit
card debt, tax liability, and mother’s student loan balance (and
excluded loans from family members and attorney fee debt for both
parties).
¶ 12 Thomas is instructive here. There, a division of this court
recognized that when the parents “reach[] an impasse in making a
major decision they [are] obligated to make together,” the district
court has the authority to break “a parental deadlock between joint
decision-makers.” Thomas, ¶¶ 36, 38; see also In re Marriage of
Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 285 (Colo. App. 2006) (upholding an order
6 granting the mother the authority to obtain therapy for the children
because it resolved a longstanding dispute).
¶ 13 Seeing no reason to depart from the holding in Thomas, we
reject mother’s contention that the district court erred by not
allowing her to dictate where the children attend school when both
parents could not agree. Notably, the court did not foreclose the
parents’ ability to revisit the private school issue after they paid
their considerable debt (marital and separate but excluding
mother’s student loan debt). The prospective component of the
court’s order is not challenged here, so we need not address it. See
Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 (noting that under the party
presentation principle, parties “are responsible for advancing the
facts and arguments entitling them to relief” (quoting Greenlaw v.
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))).
¶ 14 To the extent mother raises other challenges to the court’s
decision regarding the children’s education, she does not show how
the federal education laws she references conflict with or displace
Colorado law concerning families and children. See, e.g., § 14-10-
104.5, C.R.S. 2025; see also Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis
Pub. Schs. v. R.M.M., 861 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 2017) (federal law
7 “limits the obligations a state owes to disabled children enrolled in
private schools”). On appeal she now offers other options the
district court should have considered, but she did not present all
those options to the district court. See Bertoia v. Galaxy Mgmt. Co.,
2025 COA 55, ¶ 40 (new arguments may not be raised for the first
time on appeal).
¶ 15 Regarding her claim that she was not afforded due process,
regrettably many Colorado families do not have the benefit of two
days’ worth of the court’s time. The court generously afforded this
family a two-day permanent orders hearing, perhaps in part to
accommodate mother’s pro se status.2 Under the circumstances —
and absent an offer of proof during the hearing about what evidence
mother proffered and was not allowed to present — we cannot
conclude that she was deprived of due process in any way. See
Galiant Homes, LLC v. Herlik, 2025 COA 3, ¶¶ 50-66.
¶ 16 Each side had equal time, and in the time that remained, the
court invited mother to present anything else she wished the court
2 While the court gave mother leeway, it was ultimately her
responsibility to follow the court’s rules at the district level and on appeal. See Yadon v. Southward, 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App. 2002) (pro se parties must adhere to the court rules).
8 to consider. She chose to use her remaining time to argue that she
should have been awarded funds to hire counsel and that father
should be ordered to pay her unpaid attorney fees (the balance due
before her attorney withdrew). She offered no other exhibits or
testimony. See id. at ¶¶ 65-66.
¶ 17 All told, mother and father reached an impasse in making a
major decision they were obligated to make together — how to
educate their children. Because they could not resolve the dispute,
the district court appropriately exercised its authority to do so. See
Thomas, ¶¶ 36-38. We therefore discern no error.
III. Child Support and Maintenance
¶ 18 Mother next contends that the court erred in its child support
and maintenance determinations because it (1) failed to impute to
father all income he earned; (2) improperly imputed income to her;
(3) omitted child care expenses; (4) granted father a $583 monthly
credit for extraordinary expenses; (5) offset various debts against
father’s child support and maintenance obligations; (6) denied her
retroactive maintenance and child support; and (7) ordered the
parties to file joint tax returns. We largely disagree with her
9 contentions but conclude that the court erred by allowing father to
offset his child support obligation against debts mother owed him.
¶ 19 Following a two-hour temporary orders hearing, the district
court ordered father, on a temporary basis, to pay mother $3,530
monthly in child support and $3,625 monthly in maintenance for a
total of $7,155 each month (paid in weekly installments). Later,
based on the evidence presented at the two-day permanent orders
hearing, the court observed that mother and father lived well
beyond their means during the marriage and now face a “crushing
mountain of debt.”
¶ 20 To meet his temporary obligation, father added two jobs to his
regular job. At the permanent orders hearing, father testified that
he did not plan to continue working three jobs. Father’s primary
full-time job grossed $13,212 per month. Mother disclosed that she
earned $1,222 per month from part-time work (twelve to sixteen
hours per week). Both parties referenced their monthly expenses
and debt.
10 B. Standard of Review
¶ 21 We review maintenance and child support orders for an abuse
of discretion because “the issue of the [parties’] financial resources
is factual in nature,” but we review de novo whether the trial court
applied the correct legal standard to its factual findings. In re
Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo. App. 2011); see also In
re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1213 (Colo. App. 2011) (child
support); In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28
(maintenance).
¶ 22 Whether a party is “voluntarily underemployed” presents a
mixed legal and factual question under section 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV),
C.R.S. 2025. People in Interest of J.R.T. v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474,
476-77 (Colo. 2003). We defer to the district court’s factual findings
if they are supported by the record and review its legal conclusions
de novo. In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 9.
C. Legal Principles
1. Calculating Maintenance and Child Support
¶ 23 The court addresses maintenance after dividing the marital
assets and debt. See In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 31;
see also § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025. Section 14-10-114(3) details
11 the process a trial court must follow when considering a
maintenance request. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 13.
The court must first make findings concerning (1) the amount of
each party’s gross income; (2) the marital property distributed to
each party; (3) each party’s financial resources; (4) the reasonable
financial need established during the marriage; and (5) whether the
maintenance award would be deductible for federal income tax
purposes. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see Wright, ¶ 14.
¶ 24 After making these initial findings, the court must determine
“the amount and term of the maintenance award, if any, that is fair
and equitable to both parties.” § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II); Wright, ¶ 15.
The court need not make explicit factual findings about each factor
in section 14-10-114(3)(c), which governs the amount and duration
of maintenance, as long as the record shows that it meaningfully
considered the factors and it provides us with a clear
understanding of the basis for its decision. Wright, ¶ 20.
¶ 25 “After calculating the maintenance award, the court may
determine child support obligations.” In re Marriage of de Koning,
2016 CO 2, ¶ 22. To determine the amount of a child support
award, the court must consider several factors, including — as
12 relevant here — both parents’ financial resources. § 14-10-
115(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025.
2. Determination of Parties’ Income
¶ 26 The district court generally determines child support and
maintenance based on the parties’ gross incomes. § 14-10-
114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c) (maintenance); § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I) (child
support). “Gross income” means income from any source and
includes potential income for a party who the court finds is
voluntarily underemployed. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I), (IV); § 14-10-
115(3)(c), (5)(a)(I), (5)(b)(I). However, gross income does not include
“[i]ncome from additional jobs that result in . . . employment of . . .
more than forty hours per week or more than what would otherwise
be considered to be full-time employment.” § 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C);
§ 14-10-115(5)(a)(II)(C).
¶ 27 If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the
court must calculate child support and maintenance based on the
parent’s potential, not actual, income.3 § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV); § 14-
3 “Potential income” is “the amount a party could earn from a full-
time job commensurate with the party’s demonstrated earning ability.” In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 26
13 10-115(5)(b)(I). A party is voluntarily underemployed if the court
finds they are “unreasonably for[]going higher paying employment
that [they] could obtain.” Martinez, 70 P.3d at 476.
D. Analysis
1. Parties’ Income
¶ 28 The court awarded the marital home (Cedar Circle) and an
Infinity vehicle to mother. The home had $65,000 in net equity,
and the car was valued at $15,000. The court also allocated
$28,900 in credit card debt to mother. The court awarded father
his retirement accounts, a Volvo vehicle, and significant debt. It
valued the retirement accounts at $52,000, the Volvo at $4,000,
and the debt at approximately $75,500.
¶ 29 After explaining that it was applying the operative statute and
cases, the court made the following factual findings:
• Father’s gross monthly income for maintenance purposes
was $13,212 based on his full-time employment at TJX.
The court acknowledged that it could not factor
additional jobs into the calculation.
• Mother’s monthly income was $1,222 based on part-time
work of twelve to sixteen hours per week. The court
14 declined to find that mother was voluntarily
underemployed, noting that she was enrolled in an
Executive Masters program in Health Administration. It
also refused to impute the $68,000 per year she earned
before the children were born.
• Recognizing that it could only credit father for uninsured
extraordinary medical expenses of over $250 per child
per year, the court accepted that father’s out-of-pocket
medical insurance expenses were $7,000 annually or
$583 monthly ($7,500 in actual expenses less $250 per
child).
• Based on its calculations, the court concluded that father
owed mother $896 per month in child support. Starting
November 1, 2024, it ordered father to make two equal
monthly payments into the Family Support Registry.
¶ 30 Applying the statutory maintenance factors, the court also
awarded mother $3,414 per month in maintenance for fourteen
months. In making this award, the court acknowledged that father
would need to work more than forty hours per week for the duration
15 of maintenance to meet the obligation.4 The court also recognized
that, with a graduate degree, mother should be able to increase her
earning potential (beyond what she had earned in the past).
¶ 31 Mother argues that the district court improperly imputed
$1,222 of monthly income to her, despite her enrollment in a
graduate program and her caretaking responsibilities, which
included caring for a child with a disability. But she does not
appear to fault the court’s finding that she was not voluntarily
underemployed. Because she was not underemployed, the court
was required to consider her actual gross income, not her potential
income. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(a)(II), (8)(c)(IV); § 14-10-115(3)(c),
(5)(a), (5)(b)(I). And because mother’s actual monthly income was
$1,222, this was the proper calculation. Accordingly, we reject her
contention that the court improperly imputed income to her.
¶ 32 Mother also contends that the district court erred by failing to
consider father’s multiple jobs, mistakenly limiting its calculation of
4 Father has not cross-appealed the district court’s orders, so we do
not address this component of the order. See Koinis v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 97 P.3d 193, 197 (Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that an appellee “must file a cross-appeal in order to raise a contention that, if successful, would increase its rights under the judgment or order being reviewed”).
16 his income to one full-time job. She contends that this affected the
maintenance award. But the maintenance statute explicitly
instructs courts, when determining a party’s gross income, not to
consider “[i]ncome from additional jobs that result in” work beyond
forty hours per week or that is greater than full-time employment.
§ 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C). Therefore, the district court could not
consider father’s additional income in its maintenance calculations.
See § 14-10-115(5)(a)(II)(C) (same for child support).
2. Child Care Expenses
¶ 33 Mother contends that the district court erred by failing to
include child care expenses in its child support calculations. As
relevant to mother’s challenge on appeal, she testified that the
parties hired a nanny for the children. While the child support
mother received following temporary orders included the nanny
expenses, mother did not testify or produce evidence at the
permanent orders hearing about the amount of those expenses.
Father contends that this issue is unpreserved because mother
failed to present evidence of child care expenses at the permanent
orders hearing, but she requested child care expenses in the
parties’ joint trial management certificate and in a proposed child
17 support worksheet. While she may not have proved her entitlement
to those expenses, she directed the court’s attention to the matter
such that it had an opportunity to rule on the issue. Dill v.
Rembrandt Grp., Inc., 2020 COA 69, ¶ 24.
¶ 34 Father testified that until June 2023, he worked remotely full
time and mostly watched the children during the day with
occasional help from the nanny.5 Mother, who was afflicted with
postpartum depression, would mostly be in her bedroom. At some
point, the maternal grandparents provided child care, so father
could be more attentive to work.
¶ 35 While it would not have been unreasonable for the court to
include some amount of child care expenses in a child support
award, it was mother’s burden to prove the amount she historically
paid and anticipated needing. See In re Marriage of Connerton, 260
P.3d 62, 67 (Colo. App. 2010) (District courts “may only consider
child care expenses that were actually incurred.”); see § 14-10-
5 Father also challenged the reasonableness of any claimed child
care expenses. According to him (1) mother only claimed she was working eight hours per week; (2) her parents provided a significant amount of free child care; and (3) mother’s educational program only required her to be at the school one weekend per semester with all other instruction provided online.
18 115(9)(a) (“Net child care costs incurred on behalf of the children
. . . shall be added to the basic obligation . . . .”). There was
evidence that mother was enrolled in online classes and presumably
could not attend to the children then. But mother also testified
that her parents provided child care during her classes, and she did
not testify that she paid her parents for that child care. See W.
Denv. Feed Co. v. Ireland, 551 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Colo. App. 1976)
(even if no direct evidence contradicts a witness’s testimony, the
trier of fact need not accept the testimony as establishing the truth
of facts to which it is directed).
¶ 36 To the extent mother’s brief relies on the worksheets she
supplied, she does not point to exhibits or testimony substantiating
the expenses she claimed. Given the evidence presented at the
permanent orders hearing, we cannot conclude that the district
court abused its wide discretion by not including child care
expenses as part of the child support award to mother. See
Connerton, 260 P.3d at 67 (concluding that the district court did not
err by declining to include “child care expenses . . . that were
speculative and not actually incurred”).
19 3. Extraordinary Medical Expenses
¶ 37 In addition, mother avers that the court erred in crediting
father $583 for the children’s monthly extraordinary medical
expenses in its child support order. See § 14-10-115(10)(h)(II),
C.R.S. 2024 (authorizing child support credits for annual uninsured
medical expenses above $250 per child).6 Father’s testimony
addressed his request for these expenses, and mother did not cross-
examine him regarding this request. Indeed she testified that she
wanted father to “take on” the children’s health insurance and
made a similar request in the trial management certificate. And the
court’s medical expenses credit was directly tied to the children’s
health insurance costs.
¶ 38 Because mother did not indicate to the court that she objected
to father’s receiving the monthly credit, we will not review this
contention of error. Credit Serv. Co. v. Skivington, 2020 COA 60M,
¶ 22 (“[W]e don’t consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.”). We also decline mother’s invitation to review the issue for
plain error. Unlike in criminal cases, no rule requires plain error
6 The statute no longer includes a $250 limit. § 14-10- 115(10)(h)(II), C.R.S. 2025.
20 review in civil cases. In re E.R.S., 2019 COA 40, ¶ 35. We review
unpreserved arguments for plain error “only in the rare civil case,
involving unusual or special circumstances — and even then, only
when necessary to avert unequivocal and manifest injustice.” Id.
(citation modified). Because this is not one of those rare cases, we
do not review mother’s unpreserved argument.
4. Offsets Against Child Support and Maintenance
¶ 39 Mother next argues that the district court erred by allowing
father to offset certain expenses against his child support and
maintenance obligations. We agree in part. The court included the
following in the written permanent orders:
• It awarded a vehicle to father and ordered mother to pay
father $8,453 for insurance payments she received
related to the vehicle. If she did not transfer that amount
by a specific date, the court allowed father to offset his
child support and maintenance payments against the
amount mother owed.
• It ordered father to pay a joint tax debt in full and offset
mother’s half ($2,671) against father’s maintenance
payments. If that offset was insufficient to cover
21 mother’s half after her fourteen-month maintenance
terminated, father could then offset any remaining
balance from his child support obligation.
• It awarded Cedar Circle to mother, ordered her to
refinance all encumbrances to her name only within six
months, and ordered father to continue paying the
various encumbrances on the house until mother
refinanced or sold the home, which he could offset
against his maintenance obligation.
• It categorized certain litigation costs as “non-marital
debt” but allocated the costs equally between the parties,
ordering father to offset mother’s half of the costs
($7,997.50) against his child support and maintenance
obligations.
¶ 40 In post-trial motions, mother argued that father could not
offset his maintenance obligation against the tax liability and that it
22 was generally improper to offset this obligation against other debts.7
We conclude that the court erred by allowing father to offset debt
against his child support obligation. However, any claimed error
with respect to the offsets against his maintenance obligation was
harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61.
¶ 41 The court could not properly offset father’s child support
obligation against other debts because child support is “for the care
of the child” and is a right belonging exclusively to the child. In
Interest of Baby A, 2015 CO 72, ¶ 40. “Therefore, the support must
go to the children’s daily care and cannot be used for expenditures
made for the parent.” Id.; see also Hall v. Hall-Stradley, 776 P.2d
1166, 1167 (Colo. App. 1989) (“[A] parent who owes a duty of child
support may not offset that obligation against a personal judgment
that parent may have against the custodial parent.”). And although
“a setoff against arrearages may be appropriate if . . . no harm will
result to the interests of the children,” In re Marriage of Wisdom,
7 The parties agree that this issue is preserved, but mother did not
supplement the record with her post-trial filings raising the issue. See McLellan v. Colo. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 COA 7, ¶ 27 (appellants must designate the appellate record). However, we may take judicial notice of records in related proceedings. Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64; CRE 201.
23 833 P.2d 884, 887 (Colo. App. 1992), an order regarding arrearages
is not the same as an initial support order, see In re Marriage of
Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 23 (distinguishing a principle applicable to
an initial obligation from principles applicable when a party
defaults on their support obligations). We therefore reverse the
portion of the court’s order allowing father to offset the above costs
against his child support obligation.
¶ 42 However, even if the court improperly offset costs against
father’s maintenance obligation, any error was harmless. See
C.R.C.P. 61. First, with respect to Cedar Circle, the court
determined that father could only offset costs for Cedar Circle’s
encumbrances until mother transferred the home and
encumbrances to her name, and it acknowledged that father’s
payments would reduce mother’s monthly need. Therefore, the
offset aligned with the maintenance statute’s purpose of ensuring a
fair and equitable award, “based upon the totality of the
circumstances” by applying “all relevant factors, including . . . the
recipient spouse[’s] [ability] to meet . . . her needs.” § 14-10-
114(3)(c)(I), (3)(e). Additionally, because father conveyed Cedar
Circle to mother in November 2024, which he was only required to
24 do after she refinanced, the record suggests that this offset applied
for (at most) one month.
¶ 43 Next, with respect to the $8,453 in insurance proceeds, any
offset against maintenance was similarly harmless. The court gave
mother thirty-five days from the date of its initial permanent orders
to transfer the money to father. Therefore, the offset was not
automatic but was conditional upon mother meeting the court’s
deadline. On appeal, mother does not contend that she failed to
meet this deadline such that any offset actually applied. So she
fails to allege that she suffered any harm from this portion of the
court’s order. See C.R.C.P. 61.
¶ 44 Finally, as to the offsets applicable to mother’s half of the
litigation and tax expenses, these are costs that mother would have
owed father regardless of any offset. Had the court not applied the
offset, mother would have presumably used father’s maintenance
payments to reimburse him for those costs. Therefore, the court’s
award simply eliminated the inefficiency of requiring father to pay
mother, only for her to repay him with the same money. And,
contrary to mother’s assertion, the offsets did not reduce her award
to $0. Excluding the time value of a monthly payment, the court’s
25 total maintenance award was $47,796 ($3,414 times fourteen
months). The highest potential offset amount was approximately
$22,622 (assuming a one-month mortgage offset of $3,500).
¶ 45 Our decision is guided by the different rationales underlying
the maintenance and child support statutes. See In re Marriage of
Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 23 (explaining that, unlike child support,
“maintenance is not awarded as a matter of right”). Accordingly, we
affirm the maintenance offsets but remand to the district court to
correct its order by removing any offsets for child support. If the
court finds that father offset any amount of his child support
obligation, he must reimburse mother only for those amounts.8
5. Retroactive Child Support and Maintenance
¶ 46 Mother claims she is entitled to retroactive child support and
maintenance. She alleges that she requested $50,085 in retroactive
support from August 8, 2023 (when father filed for dissolution)
through February 1, 2024 (when the court issued temporary
8 Because father was required to make child support payments into
the Family Support Registry, it is unclear from our record whether he ever took offsets against child support. On remand, the court can hear argument and/or evidence on this issue. See § 26-13- 114(10), C.R.S. 2025 (copies of payment records maintained by the Family Support Registry are admissible as proof of payment).
26 orders). She primarily cites policy reasons to support her request.
She also references father’s extended absence following a suicide
attempt and her asserted need to resort to public assistance. We
also reject father’s contention that this issue was unpreserved;
mother requested retroactive child support and maintenance, which
the court’s permanent orders addressed and denied.
¶ 47 Soon after filing for dissolution, father provided notice,
through counsel, of the temporary orders hearing set for January
31, 2024. That the hearing could not occur sooner was beyond his
control. Nonetheless, he told mother, who remained in the marital
home, to ask him if she needed funds. Mother did not directly
respond to his request, but she requested child support and
maintenance through counsel.
¶ 48 Her early efforts in the case were largely directed toward
restricting father’s access to their children, but the parties later
agreed that father would have a phased parenting time structure.
At the January 2024 temporary orders hearing, the court ordered
father to pay child support ($3,530 per month) and maintenance
($3,625 per month). Father continued paying the temporary
maintenance and child support until the court issued its permanent
27 orders, setting child support at $896 monthly and maintenance at
$3,414 monthly for fourteen months.
¶ 49 Until the court issued temporary orders, both parents were
responsible for supporting their children. See In re Marriage of
Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 10. The court exercised its wide discretion in
declining to make a retroactive award. See Wells, 252 P.3d at 1213
(reviewing child support orders for an abuse of discretion). In its
permanent orders, the court also noted that, as to retroactive child
support and maintenance, mother “did not develop her argument
with any evidence . . . other than some general questions about
[father] allegedly not giving her money before temporary orders.”
Because the evidence supports the court’s decision, we reject
mother’s argument.
¶ 50 Finally, while mother argues that the child support award is
incongruent with the parties’ pre-dissolution lifestyle, this “is only
one factor for the court to consider, which does not lock the child
into a single standard of living until emancipation.” In re Marriage
of Nimmo, 891 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 1995). The court considered
the parties’ pre-dissolution standard of living under section 14-10-
115(2)(b)(III), but it noted that they lived well beyond their means
28 and incurred significant debt. Because the record supports the
court’s findings, we will not disturb them. Garrett, ¶ 9.
6. Joint Tax Return
¶ 51 For the 2023 tax year, mother filed a tax return separately
from father. Because she claimed the children as her dependents,
she realized a $10,780 tax refund. Father incurred a $26,000 tax
liability because he could not file as married filing jointly. He asked
mother to work with him to amend the tax return to married filing
jointly to minimize the tax liability.
¶ 52 Mother argues on appeal that the district court could not
require her to file jointly with father. While that may be so, it does
not mean that the court could not consider the impact of her filing a
separate tax return on the marital estate in its property division.
See Cohan v. Cohan, 372 P.2d 149, 151 (Colo. 1962) (a court may
consider the effect of state and federal income taxes); In re Marriage
of Lafaye, 89 P.3d 455, 461 (Colo. App. 2003) (same).
¶ 53 The court included the tax liability in calculating the parties’
debt. It also characterized the liability as marital debt that could
have been avoided. Mother then had the option of (1) working with
father to amend the return to reduce their marital tax debt or (2)
29 forgoing receipt of child tax credits for both children for all future
tax filings. If she opted to amend, the court allowed the parties to
each claim one child on their respective future tax returns.
¶ 54 So although mother asserts that she was compelled to file an
amended tax return, it was one of two options the court offered.
That she chose to amend the tax return rather than to forgo
splitting the child tax credits does not undermine the court’s order.
IV. Mother’s Attorney Fees
¶ 55 Mother moved for attorney fees, requesting amounts she owed
before her attorney withdrew. The court denied her motion but
allowed her to renew her request at the permanent orders hearing.
At the hearing, mother asked for $34,000 in attorney fees, and the
court denied her request in its permanent orders. It reasoned that
mother “receive[d] overall net positive property, while [father]
receive[d] net debt,” and father had been paying $3,625 in
temporary maintenance, a portion of which mother could have used
to pay her fees. It also noted that mother’s earning potential would
increase significantly after she completed her graduate program.
Mother now argues that the court abused its discretion by denying
her request. We perceive no error.
30 ¶ 56 In domestic relations cases, district courts have discretion to
order a party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees “after
considering the financial resources of both parties.” § 14-10-119,
C.R.S. 2025. We review a court’s decision under this section for an
abuse of discretion. See Davis, 252 P.3d at 538.
¶ 57 “Courts must consider a request for fees ‘in light of [section
119’s] equitable purpose,’” which includes ensuring that “neither
party suffers ‘undue economic hardship’ as a result of the
dissolution.” de Koning, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). Under the statute,
courts may “equitably apportion costs and fees between parties
based on relative ability to pay, and courts have great latitude . . .
to craft attorney fee orders appropriate to the circumstances in a
given case.” Davis, 252 P.3d at 538. The focus is on overall
economic circumstances, not just the parties’ incomes. Id.
¶ 58 The court considered father’s substantial debt and ongoing
maintenance and child support obligations, and it also considered
mother’s impending increase in earning potential. Importantly, the
court had to consider “undue economic hardship” with respect to
both parties, not just mother. de Koning, ¶ 23 (citation omitted).
31 Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying mother’s request for attorney fees.
V. Judicial Bias
¶ 59 Mother raises several arguments alleging judicial bias and
punitive orders but concedes that she did not object or file post-trial
motions concerning these alleged errors. For the same reasons
explained in Part III.D.3, we decline to consider her unpreserved
arguments. See E.R.S., ¶ 35.
VI. Father’s Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 60 Father requests appellate attorney fees, arguing that mother’s
appeal is substantially frivolous, groundless, and vexatious. We do
not assess attorney fees against pro se parties unless “the party
clearly knew or reasonably should have known that [her] action or
defense, or any part of the action or defense, was substantially
frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”
§ 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. 2025. An appeal is frivolous only in “clear
and unequivocal cases when the appellant presents no rational
argument, or when the appeal is prosecuted for the sole purpose of
harassment or delay.” Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO, LLC, 2025
COA 8M, ¶ 106 (citation omitted); see also Black v. Black, 2020
32 COA 64M, ¶ 133 (“A claim is groundless if there is no credible
evidence to support” it and vexatious if “brought or maintained in
bad faith.” (citation omitted)).
¶ 61 Although we reject most of mother’s contentions on appeal, we
cannot say that she presented no rational argument or appealed in
bad faith. See Black, ¶ 133. Her appeal appears to arise from a
concern for her own financial well-being and that of the parties’
children, not bad faith or harassment. And she primarily cites
relevant legal authority, supporting her contentions with record
citations. While most of her arguments were unsuccessful, there is
no evidence that she knew or should have known that her appeal
was frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. § 13-17-102(6). We
therefore deny father’s request.
VII. Disposition
¶ 62 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to the district court to correct the portion of its
permanent orders allowing offsets against father’s child support
obligation.
JUDGE MEIRINK and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.