Marriage of Patel CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 8/24/26 Marriage of Patel CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of NAMITA and 2d Civ. No. B351488 MONESH PATEL. (Super. Ct. No. 21FL00320)

(Santa Barbara County)

NAMITA PATEL,

Appellant,

v.

MONESH PATEL,

Respondent.

Namita Patel (wife) appeals an order reducing spousal support from Monesh Patel (husband). Wife argues the reduction in spousal support was not authorized by law, was not supported by the evidence, and violated the parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA). Wife also challenges the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The parties were married in 1991 and separated in 2021.

In 2022, the parties entered into a MSA that was incorporated into their judgment of dissolution. The MSA addressed the division of assets, equalization payments and spousal support. Husband was required to pay spousal support of $6,000 per month through May 2025. From June 2025 through November 30, 2028, support would be reduced to $3,000 per month. All support obligations terminate after November 30, 2028. The parties agreed spousal support would be paid until the earliest of: 1) death of husband or wife, 2) remarriage of wife, 3) November 30, 2028, or 4) further order of the court. The MSA also granted wife the right to rent husband’s separate property condo in Santa Barbara for the below market rent of $3,000 per month for four years. Wife received approximately $1.5 million in liquid assets under the MSA.

In February 2025, husband filed a request for order seeking termination of spousal support. Husband argued wife had a decreased need for support because she was cohabitating with her romantic partner, had liquid assets of $2.3 million dollars and was earning over $100,000 per year in investment income. As such, wife was able to pay expenses maintaining her marital standard of living without any support. Husband pointed out that wife did not work and made no efforts to obtain employment. Husband also asked the trial court to require wife to vacate the condo by May 2025.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing in October 2025. Husband testified that he was 62 and a half and still working. His net income was $16,500 per month. Husband had several investments valued at $2.7 million. He wanted to retire

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but could not do so until his spousal support obligations ended and he could sell the condo.

Wife testified that at the time of dissolution, she had no income and had monthly expenses of approximately $6,700. In connection with the divorce, wife received $1.5 million in retirement and investment accounts under the MSA, and an additional $500,000 from husband that was not identified in the divorce judgment, for a total of $2.1 million in assets.

By the time of trial, wife was 59 and half. Wife testified her monthly expenses had increased to $7,736, which she attributed to isolated health care costs, car expenses, and modest increases to spending on entertainment and vacations. Wife had almost $2.3 million inclusive of interest earned on her assets and she received over $100,000 in investment income annually. After paying her basic expenses, wife had over $4,000 per month.

Wife testified that she had been cohabitating with her partner, Marc Vraciu, since approximately September 2022. Wife and Marc both testified that Marc contributed a thousand dollars or less toward wife’s monthly expenses and did not pay any rent. Wife acknowledged that she previously told husband that she and Marc shared “all expenses.” Wife and Marc considered moving out of the condo in 2025 to live somewhere less expensive but had not decided where to live.

Wife testified that she has a master’s degree and expertise in marketing. She has not had full-time work since 2001 and has had only sporadic consulting jobs with nominal income. Wife testified that she has not attempted to obtain employment since at least 2022 because she does not believe she needs to work.

Marc testified that he has a securities license and is an investment broker, but he does not currently work. Marc

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provides investment management services to wife as a benefit of their relationship.

After three days of trial, the trial court issued an oral ruling. Wife was permitted to remain in the condo until April 2026, and husband would continue paying spousal support at $3,000 per month through that date. Commencing May 2026, wife was ordered to vacate the condo and spousal support was reduced to $1,000 per month. The court ordered continuation of spousal support at the reduced amount through November 2028, at which time all spousal support obligations terminate pursuant to the parties’ MSA. The court denied wife’s request for $60,000 in attorney fees.

In connection with its ruling, the trial court discussed the parties’ finances and ability to pay, their ages, husband’s desire to retire, Marc’s failure to contribute to monthly rent, the fact that wife had invested her assets wisely and received income from her investments, and wife’s failure to obtain employment. The court directed husband’s counsel to prepare a statement of decision. No statement of decision is included in the record on appeal.

The trial court issued an order after trial stating that the court’s reduction of spousal support was based in part on wife’s failure to become self-supporting and husband’s plans to retire. With regard to attorney fees, the order stated, “it would be inequitable for Husband to pay Wife need-based attorney fees due to the litigation tactics and unreasonable settlement positions of Wife’s prior counsel . . . .”

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DISCUSSION Standard of review

A trial court’s order of spousal support will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 479-480.) The denial of attorney fees is likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 469 (Nakamoto & Hsu).) When conducting an abuse of discretion review, factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and the trial court’s application of law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious. (In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529.)

Substantial evidence supports the existence of changed circumstances warranting modification of support Spousal support is intended to permit a supported spouse to afford reasonable expenses consistent with the marital standard of living. The party seeking modification of spousal support must demonstrate a material change in circumstances since the last support order. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, 575.) Changed circumstances exist where there is a decreased need for support. (In re Marriage of McCann (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.) Cohabitation generally decreases the need for support because of shared expenses and economies of scale. In recognition of this, the law creates a rebuttable presumption that there is a decreased need for spousal support (and thus a change in circumstances) where the supported party is cohabitating with a nonmarital partner. (Fam. Code, 1 § 4323.)

1 All statutory references are to the Family Code.

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It was undisputed that wife was cohabitating with Marc.

As a result, the presumption applies and it was wife’s burden to prove that her need for support had not decreased. The evidence offered by wife was that her basic expenses had increased $1,000 and Marc contributed approximately $1,000, such that her need for support remained the same.

The trial court was not required to accept this evidence in satisfaction of wife’s burden. Wife’s increased expenses were mainly attributable to isolated medical events, car issues, vacations, and entertainment and there was no competent evidence establishing the expenses would necessarily continue into the future. Thus, even a monthly contribution of $1,000 from Marc could decrease wife’s need for support.

There was also evidence that Marc’s contribution to the household was greater than $1,000, as there was testimony that he shared in the payment of “all expenses,” and he provided investment services that appear to have yielded fair returns for wife. Wife’s decision to allow Marc to live in the condo without paying half the rent was not explained, and both wife and Marc were professionals who could have worked to contribute to their household but simply chose not to. The trial court did not err in finding that wife failed to rebut the presumption that her need for support decreased as a result of her cohabitation with Marc.

Wife contends the trial court misapplied the law by relying on her investment income as evidence of changed circumstances. The record does not establish the court’s finding was based on wife’s investment income. Moreover, other evidence, such as wife’s cohabitation with Marc, was sufficient to support the court’s finding of changed circumstances. Even if the court relied in part on wife’s income from investments, which included income

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from assets that were not part of the MSA, this was not error. (In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 927 [increased value of assets can establish changed circumstances]; compare In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 400 [changed circumstances cannot be based exclusively on accessibility to and imputed value of returns earned in retirement account awarded to supported party in dissolution].)

For similar reasons, we reject wife’s argument that the trial court erred by considering her lack of employment without giving her a Gavron warning. A Gavron warning is a discretionary advisement to a supported spouse that they are expected to work to become self-sufficient. (§ 4330; In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705, 712.) The purpose is to prevent the spouse from being blindsided by a reduction in support when the spouse was unaware they were expected to work.

Here, while the trial court considered wife’s failure to work, there is nothing in the record that establishes wife’s lack of employment was the sole basis for the court’s finding of changed circumstances. Moreover, wife should not have been surprised by the expectation that she become self-supporting. Husband’s request for order alerted wife that her lack of employment was at issue. The MSA also required termination of all support by November 2028, so wife was aware that she could not count on support indefinitely. Finally, the court’s finding of changed circumstances is supported by wife’s cohabitation alone. On this record, no formal Gavron warning was necessary.

Reduction of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion In exercising its discretion to modify a spousal support order, the court considers the criteria set forth in section 4320. The criteria include the supported party’s contribution to the

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career of the supporting party; the parties’ ability to pay; the parties’ respective needs based on the marital standard of living; the parties’ obligations and assets; the duration of the marriage; and the parties’ ages and health. (§ 4320, subds. (b)-(f), & (h).) The court also considers the extent to which each party’s earning capacity is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, the supported spouse’s ability to engage in gainful employment, and the goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. (Id., § 4320, subds. (a), (g) & (l); In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491, 496.) In addition to specific factors, a court takes into account the “balance of the hardships” to the parties and “[a]ny other factors [it] determines are just and equitable.” (§ 4320, subds. (k), (n).)

The trial court reduced wife’s spousal support from $3,000 to $1,000 for the last 30 months that wife was entitled to receive support. With no statement of decision, we imply findings to support the court’s order and presume the court followed the applicable law. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)

The reduction is supported by the evidence. The parties are both near retirement age, but wife is three years younger than husband. Husband works and wants to retire; wife can work but does not and has not worked in years. Wife is cohabitating with a partner who also chooses not to work. Wife has significant assets and receives investment income. Wife can pay the expenses to maintain her marital standard of living and still has $4,000 left over each month. Reducing spousal support by $2,000 per month was not an abuse of discretion.

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Wife argues the trial court failed to consider her health issues or the increased rent she would have to pay once she moved out of husband’s condo. But wife did not introduce evidence supporting that her health has any significant bearing on her support, nor did she introduce evidence that her rent would increase or even indicate where she planned to live.

Wife also argues any reduction in spousal support violates the MSA. There is no merit to this argument. The MSA expressly provides that spousal support is subject to termination by the court.

Denial of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion Wife requested $60,000 in need-based attorney fees under section 2030. Husband brought a competing motion for sanctions related to inappropriate litigation tactics by wife and her pre-trial counsel, which included a detailed record of counsel’s abusive conduct. The trial court denied both motions.

The trial court explained that it would be inequitable to require husband to pay attorney fees given that wife’s former counsel over-litigated the case, used high pressure tactics and took positions that did not invite reasonable discussions of how the case could be resolved. The court implied that wife could afford to pay her own fees and that requiring wife to do so was an appropriate sanction for the wasteful litigation tactics. In essence, the court treated the request for fees and the request for sanctions as a wash.

Wife argues the trial court erred by failing to make required findings under section 2030 as to the parties’ disparity in income and ability to pay before ruling on the request for fees. We agree the findings required under the statute were not clearly articulated by the court. But this failure alone does not warrant

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reversal. Wife must establish the error was prejudicial and that a more favorable result would have been reached had the findings been made. (In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1051.) She has not done so.

Wife relies exclusively on the income disparity between the parties. Income disparity is a consideration but is not dispositive. In fashioning a fee award, courts must do what is just and reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account the same factors that govern spousal support determinations. (§ 2032, subds. (a) & (b).) Courts may also properly consider the impact of bad faith litigation tactics. (Nakamoto & Hsu, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 469.)

Here, both parties had over $2 million in assets and husband worked while wife chose not to work. The trial court found wife’s counsel employed improper tactics and that it would be inequitable to force husband to pay for wife’s choices. In light of these facts, wife has failed to show that she would fare any better had the court made the required findings.

Wife also argues In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470 supports her position that the trial court was required to award her attorney fees. She offers no discussion of its holdings, and our review of the case yields nothing that supports wife’s position.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Husband shall recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MCKAIG, J.*

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

* Judge of the Ventura Superior Court assigned by the

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

Colleen K. Sterne, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Namita Patel, in pro. per., for Appellant. Monesh Patel, in pro. per., for Respondent.