24CA2196 Marriage of Palominos Correa 03-05-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2196 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR30495 Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Daniel Palominos Correa,
Appellee,
and
Carolina Aranis Jimenez,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Tow and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026
Daniel Palominos Correa, Pro Se
Ian Griffin, Aurora, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Carolina Aranis
Jimenez (wife) and Daniel Palominos Correa (husband), wife appeals
the portions of the permanent orders concerning the property
division. We affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s
permanent orders and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2013 in Santiago, Chile. Notably, the
parties’ Chilean marriage certificate stated that they “agreed to a
total separation of assets” marriage. At the permanent orders
hearing, two witnesses with expertise in Chilean matrimonial law1
testified that this meant the parties “elect[ed] to have their property
treated separately” and that a Chilean court would award the
property to the party in whose name the property was titled.
¶3 After they married, the parties lived in Chile for several years.
During that time, they purchased six apartments in Chile, all of
which were titled in wife’s name only (the disputed Chilean
apartments). The parties then moved to Colorado at some point
1 One of the expert witnesses represented wife in the Chilean
divorce proceedings; the other was related to wife. The court accepted the witnesses as experts over husband’s objection. Husband doesn’t appeal the court’s decision.
1 between 2018 and 2020. Thereafter, they purchased a home and a
timeshare, both of which were jointly titled.
¶4 In April 2023, husband filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage. The district court held a permanent orders hearing in
September 2024. At the hearing, wife argued that the parties’
Chilean marriage certificate constituted a valid agreement to keep
any asset titled in one party’s name separate, even if the asset was
purchased during the parties’ marriage. Thus, she argued that all
six disputed Chilean apartments were her separate property and
should not be included in the court’s division of the marital estate.
In contrast, husband argued that the Chilean marriage certificate
was not a valid agreement and that the disputed Chilean
apartments were marital property because they were purchased
during the parties’ marriage.
¶5 At the end of the hearing, the court dissolved the parties’
marriage. The court later entered permanent orders. It found, as
relevant here, that the disputed Chilean apartments were marital
property. It also excluded a 2013 Mercedes from the marital estate,
finding that husband had sold the vehicle to a relative. The court
then valued the parties’ property and distributed it, awarding wife
2 $469,739, or roughly 51%, of the marital estate, which included one
vehicle and all six disputed Chilean apartments. The court
awarded husband $442,780, or roughly 49% of the marital estate,
which included one vehicle, the parties’ marital home, and their
timeshare.
¶6 On appeal, wife contends that the district court made several
errors in dividing the parties’ marital property. Specifically, she
argues that the court erred by (1) finding that the disputed Chilean
apartments were marital; (2) excluding the 2013 Mercedes from the
marital estate; and (3) miscalculating the value of several of the
parties’ assets.
II. Property Division Framework and Standard of Review
¶7 A district court has great latitude in equitably dividing a
marital estate in such proportions as it deems just. See § 14-10-
113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M,
¶ 28. Before dividing a marital estate, a court must determine
whether an asset is marital and subject to division, or whether it is
separate and not subject to division. § 14-10-113(1); see Medeiros,
¶ 49; In re Marriage of Cardona, 2014 CO 3, ¶ 12. Then, it must
value the property as of the date of the decree or the date of the
3 hearing on disposition of property if such hearing precedes the date
of the decree. § 14-10-113(5); Cardona, ¶ 12.
¶8 In equitably distributing the marital property, the district
court must consider all relevant factors, including the contributions
of each spouse; the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
the economic circumstances of each spouse; and any increase,
decrease, or depletion in the value of any separate property during
the marriage. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d); In re Marriage of Balanson, 25
P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). The overall property division must be
equitable, but it does not have to be equal. In re Marriage of Wright,
2020 COA 11, ¶ 3. “The key to an equitable distribution is
fairness,” which depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo.
1988)).
¶9 Determining how to weigh the relevant factors and equitably
divide the marital estate is within the district court’s sound
discretion, and we won’t disturb a court’s property division orders
absent a showing that it abused that discretion. In re Marriage of
Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶¶ 64, 67. A court abuses its discretion when
its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or
4 based on a misapplication of the law. Id. at ¶ 65. We review the
court’s application of the law de novo. C & C Invs., LP v. Hummel,
2022 COA 42, ¶ 29; see Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo.
2008).
III. Determination that the Chilean Apartments Were Marital Property
¶ 10 Wife first contends that the district court erred by determining
that the disputed Chilean apartments were marital property rather
than her separate property. To get there, she argues that the court
erred by failing to apply Chilean law to determine whether the
parties’ Chilean marriage certificate constituted a “valid agreement”
under section 14-10-113(2)(d). She asserts that under Colorado’s
choice-of-law approach, the court should have applied Chilean law
to determine whether the agreement was “valid.” And she points
out that at the permanent orders hearing, two expert witnesses
testified that under Chilean law, the parties’ marriage certificate
would be treated as a valid agreement to keep their individually
titled property separate.
¶ 11 We agree that the district court erred by failing to conduct a
choice-of-law analysis before determining whether the parties’
5 marriage certificate was a “valid agreement” under section 14-10-
113(2)(d). But, as explained below, we don’t have enough
information to determine whether the court erred by ultimately
applying Colorado’s substantive law to evaluate the validity of the
agreement.
A. The “Valid Agreement” Exception
¶ 12 Generally, all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage is presumed to be marital property. § 14-10-113(2); In re
Marriage of Blaine, 2021 CO 13, ¶ 17. However, a spouse can
overcome the marital property presumption by establishing that one
of the exceptions under section 14-10-113(2) applies. Blaine, ¶ 17.
As relevant here, property is not marital if the parties entered into a
“valid agreement” to exclude that property from the marital estate.
§ 14-10-113(2)(d); In re Marriage of Bartolo, 971 P.2d 699, 700
(Colo. App. 1998).
¶ 13 The term “valid” is not defined in section 14-10-113, nor is it
defined anywhere else in the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act,
§§ 14-10-101 to -133, C.R.S. 2025. In re Marriage of Zander, 2021
CO 12, ¶ 17. The supreme court has construed the term “valid” to
mean “something that is effective and enforceable under the law”
6 that was in effect at the time the parties entered into the agreement.
Id. at ¶¶ 11 n.5, 17. This brings us to the primary question in this
case: When parties enter into an agreement in another state or
country that one party asserts excludes property from their marital
estate, should a Colorado district court apply Colorado law or the
law of the other state or country to determine whether the
agreement is “valid” for purposes of 14-10-113(2)(d)?
B. Choice of Law for Determining the Validity of Agreements Executed Outside of Colorado
¶ 14 The parties’ marriage certificate is dated 2013. The then-
operative Colorado Marital Agreement Act (CMAA), §§ 14-2-301
to -310, C.R.S. 2013, provides no guidance regarding whether to
apply Colorado’s or Chile’s law to determine the agreement’s
validity. But Colorado’s general conflict-of-laws approach does.
¶ 15 Under this approach, which is consistent with the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement), Colorado
courts must “apply the law chosen by the parties [within their
agreement] unless there is no reasonable basis for their choice or
unless applying the chosen [jurisdiction’s] law would be contrary to
the fundamental policy of [Colorado].” Target Corp. v. Prestige
7 Maint. USA, Ltd., 2013 COA 12, ¶ 14; see Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of L. § 187 (A.L.I. 1971).
¶ 16 When parties have not expressly chosen the law to govern
their agreement, Colorado courts must apply the law of the
jurisdiction that has the most significant relationship to the
agreement. Mountain States Adjustment v. Cooke, 2016 COA 80,
¶ 19. To determine what jurisdiction has the most significant
relationship, a court must consider five factors: (1) the place of
contracting; (2) the place of negotiation; (3) the place of
performance; (4) location of the subject matter of the contract; and
(5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties. Id.; Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of L. § 188. And it must do so within the context of section
6 of the Restatement, which lists general factors relevant to the
choice-of-law inquiry. See ITT Specialty Risk Servs. v. Avis Rent A
Car Sys., Inc., 985 P.2d 43, 47 (Colo. App. 1998); see also Wood
Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 601 P.2d 1369,
1372 (Colo. 1979) (“In analyzing which [jurisdiction] has the most
significant relationship, the principles set forth in Restatement
(Second) sections 6 and 188 are to be taken into account.”
8 (footnotes omitted)). Thus, a court must also evaluate (1) the needs
of the interstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies
of the forum state; (3) the relevant policies of other interested
jurisdictions and the relative interests of those jurisdictions in the
determination of the particular issue; (4) the protection of justified
expectations; (5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law; (6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (7)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L. § 6.
¶ 17 After a court has determined what jurisdiction has the most
significant relationship to an agreement, it must then apply that
jurisdiction’s substantive law to resolve any substantive legal
disputes. See BlueMountain Credit Alts. Master Fund L.P. v. Regal
Ent. Grp., 2020 COA 67, ¶¶ 11-12.
¶ 18 We discern no reason to depart from this approach when
determining the choice of law in a dispute over the validity of a
marital agreement because such agreements are construed and
treated in the same manner as other contracts. See In re Estate of
Gadash, 2017 COA 54, ¶ 40. Indeed, the Uniform Premarital and
Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA), which replaced the CMAA in
9 2014, see Ch. 239, sec. 1, §§ 14-2-301 to -313, 2013 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1159-64, specifically directs courts to apply Colorado’s choice
of law approach when faced with an out-of-state agreement that is
silent about the governing law. See § 14-2-304(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025
(where the marital agreement doesn’t effectively designate the
governing law, the court should determine validity by applying “the
law of this state, including the choice-of-law rules of this state”).
¶ 19 Thus, to determine the validity and enforceability of an out-of-
state marital agreement when the agreement doesn’t contain a
choice-of-law provision, the court must first determine which
jurisdiction has the most significant relationship and apply that
jurisdiction’s law.2
2 Our conclusion doesn’t conflict with the supreme court’s analysis
of the “valid agreement” exception in In re Marriage of Zander, 2021 CO 12, or In re Marriage of Blaine, 2021 CO 13. In both cases, the supreme court held that for an agreement to be “valid” under section 14-10-113(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025, it must meet the requirements of the Colorado statutes governing premarital or marital agreements that were in effect at the time the parties entered into the agreement — either the CMAA or the UPMAA. See Zander, ¶¶ 18- 20; Blaine, ¶¶ 18-20. However, the choice-of-law question was not raised in either case. Thus, we assume that Colorado law applied when evaluating the validity of those agreements. And when Colorado law applies, the validity of an agreement to exclude property from a marital estate is controlled by the Colorado law that was in effect at the time the parties entered into the agreement.
10 C. Application
¶ 20 In its permanent orders, the district court acknowledged wife’s
argument that the court should apply Chilean law to determine
whether the parties’ marriage certificate constituted a “valid
agreement” under section 14-10-113(2)(d). Nonetheless, the court
didn’t conduct a choice-of-law analysis before determining that the
Chilean marriage certificate didn’t constitute a “valid agreement”
under section 14-10-113(2)(d). Instead, the court found that the
marriage certificate didn’t “meet any requirements for a valid
prenuptial type of agreement” because it wasn’t signed, didn’t
indicate that the parties exchanged financial disclosures, and didn’t
contain “conspicuous language.” Thus, as best we can tell, it
appears that the court looked to Colorado’s current statutory
framework — the UPMAA — to determine whether the parties’
alleged agreement was “valid.” See § 14-2-306, C.R.S. 2025 (all
premarital or marital agreements must be in a record and signed by
both parties); § 14-2-309(1)(d), C.R.S. 2025 (a premarital or marital
agreement is not enforceable if one of the parties did not receive
adequate financial disclosures before signing the agreement); § 14-
2-309(3) (a premarital or marital agreement is not enforceable if it
11 does not contain a notice of waiver of rights, the language of which
must be “conspicuously displayed”).
¶ 21 We conclude that the district court erred by not conducting a
choice-of-law analysis before determining whether the parties’
Chilean marriage certificate constituted a “valid agreement” under
section 14-10-113(2)(d). And although a court’s ultimate choice-of-
law determination is a question of law that we review de novo, see
Mountain States Adjustment, ¶ 13, its analysis of the factors under
sections 6 and 188 of the Restatement requires factfinding — a
function we cannot engage in as an appellate court. See Carousel
Farms Metro. Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 2019 CO 51, ¶ 18
(noting that trial courts make factual findings while appellate courts
pronounce law); see also People in Interest of J.L., 121 P.3d 315,
318 (Colo. App. 2005) (“[W]e cannot make factual findings of our
own.”).
¶ 22 Because the district court didn’t conduct the choice-of-law
analysis, it didn’t make any factual findings related to sections 6
and 188 of the Restatement. Without those findings, we can’t
determine which jurisdiction’s law — Colorado’s or Chile’s — the
court should have applied to determine if the parties’ marriage
12 certificate constituted a “valid agreement” for purposes of excluding
property from the marital estate under section 14-10-113(2)(d).
Consequently, we can’t determine if the court erred by finding that
the disputed Chilean apartments were marital property.
¶ 23 We acknowledge that the district court stated that it didn’t
matter if the disputed Chilean apartments were “marital or not”
because its overall division of property would be the same either
way. Specifically, the court found that even if the apartments were
wife’s separate property, its overall division of property would still
be equitable because wife would have significantly more separate
property at her disposal, which would be considered part of her
economic circumstances. But without more specific findings about
this alternative conclusion, we can’t say that the error was
harmless. See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 38 (When a trial court erred by
classifying certain property as marital, the error wasn’t harmless
despite an alternative finding that the division would remain the
same even if the property was separate; the court didn’t make
sufficient findings to explain how the separate property “as merely
an economic circumstance would result in a division of marital
13 property that [was] identical to one in which such property [was]
considered to be marital property.”).
¶ 24 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the permanent orders
concerning property division, and we remand the case for the
district court to conduct a choice-of-law analysis before determining
whether the parties’ marriage certificate constituted a “valid
agreement” under section 14-10-113(2)(d).
IV. Determination that the 2013 Mercedes Was Not Part of the Marital Estate
¶ 25 Wife also contends that the district court erroneously excluded
a 2013 Mercedes from the marital estate. Although we have
concluded that the court erred in determining whether the parties’
property was marital or separate, that conclusion has no bearing on
whether the court erred by excluding the 2013 Mercedes from the
marital estate. Thus, we address this contention on the merits. We
conclude that the court did not err because the record supports its
findings about the vehicle and its conclusion that it wasn’t part of
the marital estate because neither party owned it at the time of
dissolution.
14 ¶ 26 “Only the marital property existing at the time of dissolution
[i]s available for distribution.” In re Marriage of Lockwood, 971 P.2d
264, 267 (Colo. App. 1998). And a spouse is free to dispose of
property, including marital property, during a marriage without the
other spouse’s permission. See In re Marriage of Schmedeman, 190
P.3d 788, 791 (Colo. App. 2008). Thus, absent a finding that a
spouse dissipated the property in anticipation of the dissolution or
engaged in other conduct constituting economic fault, the property
may not be included in the marital estate. See id.; Lockwood, 971
P.2d at 267.
¶ 27 Here, the district court found that the 2013 Mercedes was not
a marital asset because “credible evidence [showed] that [the]
vehicle was sold to a relative.” Indeed, husband testified that, in
2021, he sold the 2013 Mercedes to his sister. He testified that his
sister paid him a total of $10,000 for the vehicle and that he
deposited those funds in the parties’ joint bank account.
Additionally, he clarified that he still insured the 2013 Mercedes for
his sister but that she paid him for her portion of the insurance
every month.
15 ¶ 28 We acknowledge, as wife points out, that husband admitted
that he had never transferred the title of the 2013 Mercedes to his
sister. But the district court heard that testimony and still found
that husband had sold the vehicle to his sister without any finding
that he improperly did so to dissipate his assets in anticipation of
the dissolution. And we cannot reweigh the evidence. See In re
Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (“It is the
responsibility of the trial court as the trier of fact to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and
weight of the evidence.”); see also In re Marriage of Evans, 2021
COA 141, ¶ 45 (“We are not at liberty to re-evaluate the conflicting
evidence and set aside findings supported by the record.”).
¶ 29 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by
finding that husband had sold the 2013 Mercedes to a third party
and, thus, excluding it from the marital estate.
V. Valuation of the Parties’ Assets
¶ 30 Wife contends that the district court erroneously valued the
disputed Chilean apartments, two other Chilean apartments that
were wife’s separate property, the parties’ marital home, the
vehicles, and the timeshare.
16 ¶ 31 A court must value the parties’ property to equitably divide the
marital estate. See Wright, ¶ 4 (The court is “required to find the
approximate current value of all property owned by the parties.”).
The court may base its values on an expert’s testimony, the parties’
testimony, documentary evidence, its own calculations, or a
combination thereof. See In re Marriage of Nevarez, 170 P.3d 808,
812 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Medeiros, ¶ 41 (“[T]he court may
select the valuation of one party over that of the other party or
make its own valuation . . . .”).
¶ 32 However, it is the parties’ duty to present the district court
with the data needed to allow it to value the property. In re
Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 815 (Colo. App. 2007). And “any
failure by the parties in that regard does not provide them with
grounds for review.” Id.
A. Chilean Properties
¶ 33 Wife contends that the district court erred in its valuation of
eight Chilean properties: the six disputed Chilean apartments and
wife’s two separate, premarital apartments.3 If the district court
3 Husband doesn’t appeal the district court’s classification of wife’s
premarital apartments as her separate property.
17 determines that the disputed Chilean apartments are marital after
conducting a choice-of-law analysis on remand, it will need to value
those properties as of the date of the permanent orders hearing.
Accordingly, we will address wife’s challenges with respect to those
properties. But regardless of the district court’s ultimate
classification of the disputed apartments as marital or separate, it
will need to reconsider its division of marital property in light of the
parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the remand
proceedings. In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶¶ 17-18. For
this reason, we need not address wife’s arguments relating to the
valuation of her two premarital properties.
¶ 34 The district court adopted husband’s estimated values of all
six disputed Chilean apartments. In doing so, the court found the
following:
• Each of the four “Carmen” apartments that were
purchased during the marriage was worth $106,881; two
had an outstanding mortgage balance of $11,152, and
two had an outstanding mortgage balance of $25,000.
• Each of the two “San Francisco” apartments that were
purchased during the marriage was worth $110,332,
18 and both had outstanding mortgage balances of
$21,282.4
The record supports these findings.
¶ 35 At the permanent orders hearing, husband testified about the
value of each disputed Chilean apartment. But wife objected,
arguing that husband’s testimony was inadmissible because he did
not own any of the properties or have the requisite personal
knowledge to value them.5 On appeal, citing In re Marriage of
Plummer, 709 P.2d 1388 (Colo. App. 1985), wife reiterates this
contention. But we disagree with wife’s interpretation of
Plummer — we do not interpret it to hold that a lay witness may
never testify to the value of property they don’t own.
4 As we understand it, the parties referred to the apartments as
“Carmen” or “San Francisco” based on the streets on which they were located. 5 Although wife objected to husband’s testimony about the value of
each Chilean property, she didn’t object to his testimony about the estimated mortgage balance for each of the six apartments purchased during the marriage. Husband testified that he believed the mortgage balances he listed in the joint spreadsheet were accurate because they were based on statements he received from wife. Although unclear, it doesn’t appear that wife challenges the court’s findings about the mortgage balances on appeal. But even if she did, we would discern no error because those findings were supported by husband’s testimony.
19 ¶ 36 In Plummer, the husband claimed that he should be allowed to
provide a lay opinion of the value of the wife’s separate property
because any increase in the value of that property was marital, and
thus, he was considered an “owner” of that property. 709 P.2d at
1389. A division of this court disagreed with the husband’s
argument, noting that the husband’s “interest” in the increase in
value of the wife’s properties was limited and didn’t automatically
qualify him to give an “owner’s opinion” of the value of the
underlying properties. Id. at 1390. Moreover, the Plummer court
noted that the husband’s personal knowledge of the properties was
limited — his testimony about the property values was based on
looking at “certain unnamed books” that contained information
about property values, and he had never even entered at least one
of the properties he sought to value. Id. at 1389-90. Thus, the
Plummer division concluded that the husband’s testimony was
inadmissible because he did not have “the personal knowledge of
the [separate] properties in question [or] an owner’s continuing
interest in the value of the properties.” Id. at 1390.
¶ 37 Here, unlike Plummer, the record shows that husband had
extensive personal knowledge about the disputed Chilean
20 properties. Specifically, the district court found, with record
support, that husband’s testimony about the values of the disputed
Chilean properties was admissible because (1) those properties
“were purchased with [husband’s] assistance during the marriage,”
and (2) husband had personal knowledge of the properties because
he had managed them for several years, which included signing
leases, working with tenants, and making repairs to the properties.
In other words, husband “had the means to form an intelligent
opinion, derived from an adequate knowledge of the nature, kind,
and value of the property in controversy.” Id. at 1389 (citing City &
County of Denver v. Hinsey, 493 P.2d 348, 350 (Colo. 1972)). Thus,
even if husband was not qualified to give “an owner’s opinion” of the
values of the disputed Chilean properties, Plummer, 709 P.2d at
1390, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by allowing
husband’s testimony because he established a sufficient foundation
for the testimony regardless of his status as an owner or nonowner.
See CRE 701; cf. Hinsey, 493 P.2d at 350-51 (concluding that two
nonowner witnesses couldn’t provide lay opinions regarding the
value of certain properties, but only because they didn’t have the
knowledge to do so, not because they were nonowners).
21 ¶ 38 Moreover, we note that while wife repeatedly claimed that she
was the sole owner of all the Chilean apartments, she didn’t provide
the court with any testimony about their values. In fact, the record
shows that throughout the entire case, wife only provided estimated
values for two of the disputed Chilean apartments in one of her
financial affidavits. To the contrary, husband provided estimated
values for all the disputed Chilean apartments, both through his
testimony and by listing them in his financial affidavits.
¶ 39 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court
didn’t abuse its discretion because (1) husband’s valuation
testimony was admissible based on his extensive knowledge of the
disputed Chilean apartments; (2) it was within the district court’s
discretion to select husband’s valuations over wife’s in relation to
the two disputed Chilean apartments that wife valued in her first
financial affidavit;6 and (3) the court valued the other disputed
6 Notably, in wife’s first financial affidavit, she valued one of the
disputed Chilean apartments at $107,938. Thus, if anything, wife actually benefited from the district court’s selection of husband’s estimated value of that apartment — $106,881 — because it was lower than wife’s. In other words, regardless of whether the disputed Chilean apartment was separate or marital property, wife received an asset that she claimed was worth more than what the court calculated.
22 Chilean apartments based on the only evidence available to it —
husband’s testimony and financial affidavits. See Medeiros, ¶ 41
(the court may select one party’s valuation over that of the other
party); In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892-93 (Colo. App.
2003) (a trial court must value the parties’ property based on the
evidence available to it). Moreover, wife’s failure to provide any
valuation evidence, at least in relation to four of the disputed
Chilean apartments, doesn’t provide her with a basis to attack the
court’s valuation of those properties. See Krejci, ¶ 23; Zappanti, 80
P.3d at 892-93.
¶ 40 Last, to the extent wife argues that the district court erred by
taking judicial notice of the Chilean exchange rate to value the
Chilean properties, the argument is unpreserved. At the hearing,
husband asked the court to take judicial notice of the exchange
rate, and wife stated she believed that the appropriate exchange
rate was the rate provided by the Central Bank of Chile. The court
then took judicial notice “of the exchange rate as listed by the
Central Bank of Chile as of today, September 25th, 2024, for any
exchange value rates that need to be determined by the [c]ourt in
this matter.” Thereafter, wife did not object. Thus, we decline to
23 address any argument by wife on this issue. See CRE 103(a)(1); see
also Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325 (Colo.
2009) (“In order to properly preserve an objection to evidence
admitted at trial, a timely and specific objection must appear in the
trial court record.”).
¶ 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in valuing the disputed Chilean apartments.
B. Other Marital Property Valuations
¶ 42 Our conclusion that the court erred by classifying the disputed
Chilean apartments as separate property does not dispose of the
issue of whether the court erred in its valuation of the parties’ other
marital property because such property must be valued as of the
date of the decree or the date of the hearing on disposition of
property if such hearing precedes the date of the decree. § 14-10-
113(5). Accordingly, we consider wife’s valuation arguments related
to the marital home, the vehicles, and the timeshare.
1. Marital Home
¶ 43 The district court found that the value of the parties’ marital
home was $745,000 with an outstanding mortgage balance of
24 $442,035, making the equity in the home $302,965. The record
supports this finding.
¶ 44 First, the parties stipulated that the outstanding mortgage
balance was $442,035. Second, husband testified that he believed
the home was worth $728,000. Wife then testified that she believed
the home was worth more than husband’s estimate because he did
not account for the finished basement, extra bedroom, or yard
improvements. And, although wife did not specifically testify to the
home’s value, she listed its value as $760,000 in the parties’ joint
spreadsheet.
¶ 45 We conclude that the court’s valuation was reasonably based
on husband’s testimony about the estimated value of the home in
conjunction with wife’s testimony about the home’s improvements.
See Krejci, ¶ 23 (we will not disturb a district court’s determination
of the value of marital property on appeal “if it is reasonable in light
of the evidence as a whole”).
¶ 46 We reject wife’s argument that the district court erroneously
relied on husband’s testimony about the estimated value of the
home because it was “based solely” on an online estimate from
Zillow, a real estate website. “The rationale underlying an owner
25 being allowed to testify as to the value of his own property without
being qualified as an expert is that an owner has extensive
knowledge of the property and a heightened awareness as to its
value.” Plummer, 709 P.2d at 1389-90. And here, as noted by the
district court, husband’s estimated value was based on his
knowledge as an owner of the home who had lived there for several
years.
¶ 47 True, an owner’s lay opinion of the value of their property
must be based on “proper considerations.” Id. at 1389. But we see
no reason why it was improper for husband, as an owner of the
home, to consult Zillow or other similar real estate websites to help
him formulate his opinion of the home’s value. Cf. Krajeski v.
Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 48 n.10 (noting that an owner may
estimate the value of their property unless it appears that they have
no realistic idea of its value and that an owner may consult Zillow
to establish their estimated value). Rather, husband’s reliance on
Zillow as part of the basis for his lay opinion of the home’s value
goes to the opinion’s weight, not its admissibility. See Vista Resorts,
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 117 P.3d 60, 70 (Colo. App.
2004); see also Olivera v. Rude-Olivera, 411 P.3d 587, 592-93
26 (Alaska 2018) (stating that the adequacy of the foundation of an
owner’s opinion of the value of their property and the weight to be
afforded to such an opinion are considerations for the fact finder).
¶ 48 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court
didn’t abuse its discretion in valuing the marital home.
2. Vehicles
¶ 49 Wife next argues that the district court erred by adopting
husband’s proposed values of two vehicles: a 2019 Mercedes SUV
(awarded to wife) and a 2019 Mercedes coupe (awarded to
husband). She argues that her proposed valuations were based on
the vehicles’ fair market values while husband’s valuations were
not.
¶ 50 Both parties presented evidence of the vehicles’ values. Thus,
the district court had the discretion to select husband’s valuation
over wife’s. Medeiros, ¶ 41. And we cannot reweigh the evidence on
appeal. See Evans, ¶ 45; see also In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA
94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled
confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”).
27 3. Timeshare
¶ 51 Next, wife argues that the district court erred by adopting
husband’s proposed value of the Cancun timeshare instead of hers.
Again, we disagree because both parties presented evidence of the
timeshare’s value, and it was within the court’s discretion to choose
husband’s valuation over wife’s. See Medeiros, ¶ 41.
VI. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 52 Wife seeks an award of appellate attorney fees under C.A.R.
39.1, arguing that husband committed a “fraud upon the [district]
court” in violation of C.R.C.P. 11 and section 13-17-102(2), C.R.S.
2025. Specifically, she asserts that husband “patently misled” the
district court by “knowingly concoct[ing the] factually groundless
argument” that the parties did not sign their Chilean marriage
certificate. And she asserts that husband’s alleged fraud “ought to
entitle [her] to attorney fees and costs in this appeal.” We disagree.
¶ 53 First, wife urges us to consider a document she filed with her
opening brief — purportedly the signed Chilean marriage
certificate — that does not appear in the certified appellate record
and was not presented to the district court. But we cannot
consider documents or information outside of the appellate record.
28 See In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App.
2006) (“Only facts appearing in the record can be reviewed . . . .”).
¶ 54 Second, nothing in the record indicates that wife did not have
the opportunity to present the allegedly signed Chilean marriage
certificate to the district court.
¶ 55 Third, in light of the fact that wife had not proffered a signed
version of the document to the district court, wife merely speculates
that husband recalled — and his counsel knew — that the
certificate was signed but intentionally misled the district court to
believe it was not. She points to nothing in the record to support
this serious allegation against husband and his counsel.
¶ 56 For these reasons, we deny wife’s request for fees based on the
alleged “fraud upon the court” in violation of C.R.C.P. 11 and
section 13-17-102(2).
¶ 57 Wife also requests appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-
119, C.R.S. 2025, arguing that she is unemployed and that there is
a disparity between the parties’ incomes. She points us to the
parties’ financial affidavits to support this argument. We direct the
district court to address this request on remand because it is better
equipped to determine the factual issues regarding the parties’
29 current financial circumstances. See C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of
Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 54.
VII. Remand Instructions
¶ 58 On remand, the court must conduct a choice-of-law analysis
to decide what substantive law applies before determining whether
the parties entered into a “valid agreement” to exclude property
from the marital estate under section 14-10-113(2)(d). Based on
that decision, the court must reconsider whether the disputed
Chilean apartments are marital or separate.
¶ 59 If the court determines that the disputed Chilean apartments
are marital, it should use the same property valuations for those
apartments that it found in its permanent orders. See In re
Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 26. Regardless of
whether the court determines that the disputed Chilean apartments
are marital or separate, the court must reexamine the entire
property division on remand based on the parties’ current economic
circumstances. See id.; Krejci, ¶¶ 17-18.
¶ 60 Moreover, if necessary, the district court may also reconsider
the maintenance award based on the new property and debt
allocations and the parties’ economic circumstances at the time of
30 the remand proceedings. See Capparelli, ¶ 2; see also Nevarez, 170
P.3d at 815 (noting that property division and maintenance are
inextricably intertwined).
¶ 61 Last, the court must consider on remand wife’s request for
appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119.
VIII. Disposition
¶ 62 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.