Marriage of Neifert

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0228
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0228 Marriage of Neifert 05-28-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0228 Douglas County District Court No. 22DR30844 Honorable Daniel Warhola, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Rebecca A. Aardal,

Appellee,

Mark B. Neifert,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 28, 2026

Sherr Puttmann Akins Lamb PC, Tanya L. Akins, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Radeff & Hart, PC, Andrew Hart, Lakewood, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case between Mark

B. Neifert (husband) and Rebecca A. Aardal (wife), husband appeals

the district court’s order that interpreted the previously entered

permanent orders and clarified the division of a profit-sharing

account. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In February 2024, the district court (February Court) dissolved

the twenty-five-year marriage. It adopted a transcript of its oral

ruling as its written permanent orders. The February Court divided

the approximately $2,200,000 marital estate and allocated to

husband a disproportionate share of the marital equity in lieu of

awarding him maintenance. The court ordered that the “difference”

for husband’s “disproportionate amount” was “$360,000,” and so,

“he gets $360,000 more than 50/50.” The court directed the

parties to use a Charles Schwab profit-sharing account to pay

husband this disproportionate share.

¶3 The parties later requested a status conference to clarify the

February Court’s ruling. The parties explained that, to equalize the

marital property division, husband would receive $246,155 from the

profit-sharing account. However, they could not agree on how

1 much more the February Court allocated to him for his

disproportionate share of the marital estate, and, as a result, the

amount of the profit-sharing account he was entitled to receive.

¶4 Husband argued that he was entitled to an additional

$360,000 from the profit-sharing account. In his view, the

February Court allocated half of the marital estate (about

$1,100,000) to each party and then allocated him an additional

$360,000 from wife’s share. That is, the court allocated him

approximately $1,460,000 of the total marital estate and allocated

wife the remaining $740,000. Thus, he argued that he must receive

$606,155 from the profit-sharing account — $246,155 plus an

additional $360,000.

¶5 Wife argued that husband was entitled to a total of only

$426,155 from the profit-sharing account. She explained that the

February Court allocated him a difference of $360,000, which

meant that he was entitled to an additional $180,000 from the

profit-sharing account (after the $246,155 equalization payment).

She continued explaining that, by receiving an additional $180,000,

husband received about $1,280,000 from the marital estate and

wife received the remaining $920,000. She argued that this

2 allocation effectuated the February Court’s order for husband to

receive $360,000 more.

¶6 At the December 2024 status conference, a different district

court judge presided over the case (December Court) and sided with

wife. The December Court determined that “looking at the

[February] Court’s order on its face and dividing the property

accordingly results in [wife] giving [husband] $180,000 on top of the

equalization payment.” The December Court explained that the

permanent orders directed husband to “walk away with $360,000

more” and that by giving husband an additional $180,000 from the

profit-sharing account, wife’s portion of the marital estate decreased

by $180,000, which resulted in a difference of $360,000. The

December Court then ordered husband to receive $426,155 from

the profit-sharing account.

II. Discussion

¶7 Husband contends that the December Court erred by

interpreting the February Court’s permanent orders and concluding

that he would receive only $426,155 from the profit-sharing

account. He argues that the December Court’s interpretation was

inconsistent with the plain language of the permanent orders,

3 conflicted with the February Court’s findings and conclusions, and

caused an inequitable disposition of the marital estate. We

disagree.

A. Governing Legal Standards

¶8 We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a court’s

order. See Andrews v. Miller, 2019 COA 185, ¶ 8; Blecker v. Kofoed,

672 P.2d 526, 527-28 (Colo. 1983).

¶9 When doing so, our goal is to determine and give effect to the

court’s intent. See Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d

373, 376 (Colo. 2000); see also Blecker, 672 P.2d at 528 (noting

that an appellate court interprets an order to effectuate the district

court’s intent by applying the same rules of construction as when

an appellate court interprets a statute or contract). To determine

that intent, we look to the plain language of the order. See Ad Two,

9 P.3d at 376; In re Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 861 (Colo.

App. 2003). In doing so, we must construe the order in its entirety

and in harmony with the generally accepted meanings of the words

used. See Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376; Crowder, 77 P.3d at 861.

4 B. Analysis

¶ 10 At the permanent orders hearing, wife asked the court to deny

husband maintenance because she could not afford to pay it and

independently meet her reasonable needs. Instead, she proposed

that the court allocate him about fifty-five percent of the marital

equity (which she said was $1,208,390) and allocate her the

remaining equity (which she said was $995,609). Wife asserted

that her proposal resulted in a difference of $212,781 in the marital

equity allocated to each of them.

¶ 11 The February Court acknowledged that an equal allocation of

the marital estate allowed each party to receive about $1,100,000

and that, before it considered maintenance, such an equal

allocation was equitable. The February Court then considered

husband’s maintenance request. It found that he had

demonstrated a need for maintenance and that he was seeking

around $3,000 per month. But it found that a $3,000 per month

maintenance obligation “would financially break” wife and that she

would be unable to meet her reasonable needs while paying

maintenance. The February Court then determined that, in lieu of

5 maintenance, it would allocate husband a disproportionate share of

the marital property.

¶ 12 The February Court acknowledged that wife proposed a

disproportionate allocation that would have given husband an

“extra $212,781,” but the court determined that its allocation

needed to be “more than she propose[d].” It explained that “if [it]

had ordered spousal support, [maintenance] would’ve been $3,000

per month” for ten years, which would amount to “$360,000.” The

court found that wife’s proposed allocation was “short by

[$]147,219.” The court ordered “that in addition” to wife’s proposal

for an “extra $212,781,” it “add[s] to that . . . $147,219. . . . So[,]

[its] order for the disproportionate amount is that [husband] has to

get $360,000.” It then concluded, “the Court’s order is [that] the

difference needs to go up to [$]360,000[;] . . . my order is that he

gets $360,000 more than 50/50.” And it said that “to accomplish

that you take the difference out of the Charles Schwab profit

sharing account.”

¶ 13 Husband argues by ordering him to get “$360,000 more than

50/50,” the February Court allocated him approximately

$1,460,000 of the marital estate, which was $360,000 more than

6 half the value of the marital estate. He thus argues that he was

entitled to an additional $360,000 from the profit-sharing account.

However, when we review the totality of the February Court’s ruling,

his interpretation falls short.

¶ 14 When making its ruling, the February Court focused on the

difference between the amount of marital equity allocated to each

party. In particular, the February Court relied on wife’s proposal as

a starting point, noting that she proposed giving husband $212,781

more marital equity than wife. The court then added $147,219 to

that amount to get to a “difference” of $360,000. If, as husband

contends, the February Court intended to give him an additional

$360,000 from the profit-sharing account, the court needed to add

$507,219 to wife’s proposal. It did not. Thus, a plain reading of the

permanent orders reveals that the February Court’s

disproportionate allocation directed that husband receive

approximately $1,280,000 of the marital estate and that wife receive

approximately $920,000. See Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376; Crowder, 77

P.3d at 861. The December Court therefore correctly determined

that, after husband received $246,155 to equalize the property

7 division, the permanent orders entitled him to an additional

$180,000 from the profit-sharing account.

¶ 15 Still, husband argues that this interpretation was inconsistent

with the February Court’s findings and conclusions which indicated

that he receive a $360,000 lump sum payment for maintenance. To

be sure, the February Court acknowledged that maintenance of

$3,000 per month was appropriate, which would have allowed

husband to receive $360,000 during the ten-year maintenance

term. But the February Court declined to award such a

maintenance obligation because it “would financially break” wife.

The February Court then ordered a disproportionate allocation that

resulted in a $360,000 “difference”; it did not order a lump sum

maintenance payment.

¶ 16 But even if we were to assume that this purported

inconsistency created an ambiguity, we still think the record

supports the December Court’s interpretation of the order. Indeed,

as explained above, the record reveals that the February Court’s

reliance on wife’s proposal to determine a disproportionate

allocation demonstrates that the court intended to give husband an

overall difference of $360,000, not a lump sum payment. And the

8 final allocation under the December Court’s interpretation is

substantially similar to wife’s proposal as modified by the February

Court in its hearing.

¶ 17 Lastly, husband contends that the December Court’s

interpretation led to an inequitable disposition of the marital estate.

But the December Court did not allocate the marital estate. It

interpreted the February Court’s property division. And its

interpretation is in accordance with the plain language of the

February Court’s permanent orders. Although husband disagrees

with the allocation, it is too late for him to now appeal the February

Court’s determination on the equitable property division. See

C.A.R. 4(a)(1) (providing that a notice of appeal must be filed

forty-nine days after the entry of the judgment being appealed); In

re Marriage of James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8 (“The timely filing of a

notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate

review.”); see also Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910, 912 (Colo. 2002)

(recognizing that a judgment not appealed becomes final and

binding on the parties).

9 ¶ 18 The December Court therefore did not err by interpreting the

February Court’s ruling and ordering husband to receive $426,155

from the profit-sharing account.

III. Disposition

¶ 19 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.