24CA0428 Marriage of Navarro-Garfio 03-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0428 Weld County District Court No. 22DR1335 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Irma Felipa Navarro-Garfio,
Appellee,
and
Susano Morales Lopez,
Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 20, 2025
Weibel Zacheis & Greenfield, LLC, Kristin M. Zacheis, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
The Bagley Law Firm, LLC, Brian J. Bagley, Samuel T. Townsend, Lakewood, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Susano Morales Lopez, appeals the district court’s order
affirming the magistrate’s determination that a common law
marriage exists between him and Irma Felipa Navarro-Garfio. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Procedural History
¶2 Morales and Navarro-Garfio were in a relationship from 2010
until 2022. In 2022, Navarro-Garfio filed a petition for dissolution
of marriage. Morales filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging
that a common law marriage could not be established. A magistrate
held a hearing and orally ruled that a common law marriage existed
between the parties. The magistrate did not issue a written, dated,
and signed order, but Morales petitioned the district court for
review of the oral finding of a common law marriage under
C.R.M. 7. The district court adopted the magistrate’s finding, and
Morales Lopez appealed to us.
¶3 After reviewing the briefs in this case, we suspected that we
may not have jurisdiction over this appeal and issued a show cause
order directing Morales to explain why the appeal should not be
dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. See People v. S.X.G.,
2012 CO 5, ¶ 9 (“Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we
1 have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, we may raise jurisdictional
defects sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties have raised
the issue.”). Morales timely filed a response to the show cause
order. After considering the response, we vacated oral arguments.
We now dismiss the appeal.
II. Analysis
¶4 This court only has jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgments. See C.A.R. 1(a); § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also
Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 249 (Colo. 2006). A final
judgment “ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving
nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do except to execute
the judgment.” Musick, 136 P.3d at 249 (citation omitted).
¶5 A finding of common law marriage, by itself, does not
constitute a final judgment or order. In re Marriage of Armstrong,
515 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Colo. App. 1973) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(f)) (An order determining a common law marriage existed
was not final when “it did not end the suit and decided only one of
the several issues which had to be resolved in connection with the
petition for a decree of dissolution.”). Such a finding is one step in
the process of dissolving a marriage that is followed by the entry of
2 permanent orders and a decree of dissolution. See id.; see also
Nguyen v. Lai, 2022 COA 141, ¶¶ 12-14 (dismissing an appeal of a
decree invalidating a marriage for lack of final judgment when the
district court had yet to divide the parties’ property).
¶6 Here, the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s
finding that a common law marriage existed only resolved one part
of the dispute; it has not entered permanent orders or a decree of
dissolution. Under these circumstances, there is no final judgment
for us to review. See Armstrong, 515 P.2d at 1153; In re Marriage of
Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶7 In his response to the show cause order, Morales contends
that we should view the magistrate’s finding of a common law
marriage akin to a declaratory judgment claim that can be treated
as a final judgment. See C.R.C.P. 57 (Declaratory judgments “shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.”). We are
unpersuaded.
¶8 Neither party asserted a claim for declaratory judgment
regarding the status of their marriage. And we decline to adopt
Morales’s argument that such a claim is implied in Navarro-Garfio’s
petition for dissolution of marriage simply because the magistrate
3 had to find that a common law marriage existed to proceed to
dissolve the marriage.
¶9 But even if we treated the finding of common law marriage as
a declaratory judgment claim (and assumed such a claim was
proper), we would still not have a final judgment. See Musick, 136
P.3d at 249. To constitute a final judgment in an action involving
multiple claims against multiple parties, an order (or a combination
of orders) must fully and finally resolve all claims against all
parties. See Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31, ¶ 10 (“A judgment is
typically not ‘final’ until the court has ruled on all outstanding
claims.”); Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Colo. 1986)
(“[C]laims adjudicated early in the litigation must await the final
determination of all issues, as to all parties, before a final and
appealable judgment can be obtained.”).
¶ 10 Notably, C.R.C.P. 54(b) permits a court in an action involving
multiple claims against multiple parties to “direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties” when certain conditions are satisfied. Certification under
C.R.C.P. 54(b) operates as “an exception to the general rule that an
entire case must be decided” before a judgment is final. Harding
4 Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Colo. 1982). But the
district court did not certify the common law marriage finding as
separately appealable under C.R.C.P. 54(b). And even if it had, we
would have an independent obligation to assess the propriety of
that certification. See Harding Glass Co., 640 P.2d at 1126.
¶ 11 Morales’s reliance on In re Marriage of Best, 886 N.E.2d 939
(Ill. 2008), is misplaced for the same reason. In that case, the court
concluded that a declaratory judgment regarding a premarital
agreement was final and appealable under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 304(a) although the dissolution of marriage claim remained
pending. See id. at 942-43. But Rule 304(a) operates like C.R.C.P.
54(b) and provides that “an appeal may be taken from a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the . . . claims only
if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is
no just reason for delaying . . . appeal.” Again, no such certification
exists here.
¶ 12 Morales also cites Stone v. Thompson, 826 S.E.2d 868, 868
(S.C. 2019), which held that a “family court order finding a
common-law marriage was immediately appealable.” But the
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24CA0428 Marriage of Navarro-Garfio 03-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0428 Weld County District Court No. 22DR1335 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Irma Felipa Navarro-Garfio,
Appellee,
and
Susano Morales Lopez,
Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 20, 2025
Weibel Zacheis & Greenfield, LLC, Kristin M. Zacheis, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee
The Bagley Law Firm, LLC, Brian J. Bagley, Samuel T. Townsend, Lakewood, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Susano Morales Lopez, appeals the district court’s order
affirming the magistrate’s determination that a common law
marriage exists between him and Irma Felipa Navarro-Garfio. We
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Procedural History
¶2 Morales and Navarro-Garfio were in a relationship from 2010
until 2022. In 2022, Navarro-Garfio filed a petition for dissolution
of marriage. Morales filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging
that a common law marriage could not be established. A magistrate
held a hearing and orally ruled that a common law marriage existed
between the parties. The magistrate did not issue a written, dated,
and signed order, but Morales petitioned the district court for
review of the oral finding of a common law marriage under
C.R.M. 7. The district court adopted the magistrate’s finding, and
Morales Lopez appealed to us.
¶3 After reviewing the briefs in this case, we suspected that we
may not have jurisdiction over this appeal and issued a show cause
order directing Morales to explain why the appeal should not be
dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. See People v. S.X.G.,
2012 CO 5, ¶ 9 (“Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we
1 have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, we may raise jurisdictional
defects sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties have raised
the issue.”). Morales timely filed a response to the show cause
order. After considering the response, we vacated oral arguments.
We now dismiss the appeal.
II. Analysis
¶4 This court only has jurisdiction over appeals from final
judgments. See C.A.R. 1(a); § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also
Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 249 (Colo. 2006). A final
judgment “ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving
nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do except to execute
the judgment.” Musick, 136 P.3d at 249 (citation omitted).
¶5 A finding of common law marriage, by itself, does not
constitute a final judgment or order. In re Marriage of Armstrong,
515 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Colo. App. 1973) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(f)) (An order determining a common law marriage existed
was not final when “it did not end the suit and decided only one of
the several issues which had to be resolved in connection with the
petition for a decree of dissolution.”). Such a finding is one step in
the process of dissolving a marriage that is followed by the entry of
2 permanent orders and a decree of dissolution. See id.; see also
Nguyen v. Lai, 2022 COA 141, ¶¶ 12-14 (dismissing an appeal of a
decree invalidating a marriage for lack of final judgment when the
district court had yet to divide the parties’ property).
¶6 Here, the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s
finding that a common law marriage existed only resolved one part
of the dispute; it has not entered permanent orders or a decree of
dissolution. Under these circumstances, there is no final judgment
for us to review. See Armstrong, 515 P.2d at 1153; In re Marriage of
Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶7 In his response to the show cause order, Morales contends
that we should view the magistrate’s finding of a common law
marriage akin to a declaratory judgment claim that can be treated
as a final judgment. See C.R.C.P. 57 (Declaratory judgments “shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.”). We are
unpersuaded.
¶8 Neither party asserted a claim for declaratory judgment
regarding the status of their marriage. And we decline to adopt
Morales’s argument that such a claim is implied in Navarro-Garfio’s
petition for dissolution of marriage simply because the magistrate
3 had to find that a common law marriage existed to proceed to
dissolve the marriage.
¶9 But even if we treated the finding of common law marriage as
a declaratory judgment claim (and assumed such a claim was
proper), we would still not have a final judgment. See Musick, 136
P.3d at 249. To constitute a final judgment in an action involving
multiple claims against multiple parties, an order (or a combination
of orders) must fully and finally resolve all claims against all
parties. See Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31, ¶ 10 (“A judgment is
typically not ‘final’ until the court has ruled on all outstanding
claims.”); Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Colo. 1986)
(“[C]laims adjudicated early in the litigation must await the final
determination of all issues, as to all parties, before a final and
appealable judgment can be obtained.”).
¶ 10 Notably, C.R.C.P. 54(b) permits a court in an action involving
multiple claims against multiple parties to “direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties” when certain conditions are satisfied. Certification under
C.R.C.P. 54(b) operates as “an exception to the general rule that an
entire case must be decided” before a judgment is final. Harding
4 Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Colo. 1982). But the
district court did not certify the common law marriage finding as
separately appealable under C.R.C.P. 54(b). And even if it had, we
would have an independent obligation to assess the propriety of
that certification. See Harding Glass Co., 640 P.2d at 1126.
¶ 11 Morales’s reliance on In re Marriage of Best, 886 N.E.2d 939
(Ill. 2008), is misplaced for the same reason. In that case, the court
concluded that a declaratory judgment regarding a premarital
agreement was final and appealable under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 304(a) although the dissolution of marriage claim remained
pending. See id. at 942-43. But Rule 304(a) operates like C.R.C.P.
54(b) and provides that “an appeal may be taken from a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the . . . claims only
if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is
no just reason for delaying . . . appeal.” Again, no such certification
exists here.
¶ 12 Morales also cites Stone v. Thompson, 826 S.E.2d 868, 868
(S.C. 2019), which held that a “family court order finding a
common-law marriage was immediately appealable.” But the
governing South Carolina statute grants the appellate court
5 jurisdiction over appeals from “[a]ny intermediate judgment, order
or decree in a law case involving the merits in actions.” S.C. Code
Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (2024). In Colorado, the court of appeals does
not have jurisdiction over appeals from an “intermediate judgment,”
id.; we only have jurisdiction over appeals from “a final judgment,”
C.A.R. 1(a). See § 13-4-102(1); Musick, 136 P.3d at 249.
¶ 13 Lastly, because Morales acknowledged the issue in a footnote,
and because the issue is likely to arise on remand, see In re
Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 1993), we note that
the magistrate’s common law marriage finding itself was not a final
order subject to district court review. See C.R.M. 7(a)(3) (“Only a
final order or judgment of a magistrate is reviewable under this
Rule.”). Even if the magistrate’s finding fully resolved the issue of
whether a common law marriage existed, see C.R.M. 7(a)(3) (“A
[magistrate’s] final order or judgment is that which fully resolves an
issue or claim.”) (emphasis added), the magistrate never entered a
written, dated, and signed order, see C.R.M. 7(a)(4) (“A final order or
judgment is not reviewable until it is written, dated, and signed by
the magistrate.”). Thus, the magistrate’s order was not final.
6 ¶ 14 Although this defect by itself does not deprive us of
jurisdiction to review the district court’s order, see In re Marriage of
Malewicz, 60 P.3d 772, 774 (Colo. App. 2002) (a district court’s
adoption, rejection, or modification of a magistrate’s order creates a
final order for appellate review), the only disposition we could reach
were we to address this appeal on the merits would be to vacate the
district court’s order because it lacked jurisdiction to consider
Morales’s C.R.M. 7 petition.
III. Disposition
¶ 15 The appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.