Marriage of Mullins

Opinion

25CA0506 Marriage of Mullins 07-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0506 Jefferson County District Court No. 23DR30326 Honorable Tamara S. Russell, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Daniel Trout Mullins,

Appellant,

and

Jessica Lynn Mullins,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 30, 2026

The Harris Law Firm PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Jessica Lynn Mullins, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case, Daniel Trout Mullins

(husband) appeals the portions of the district court’s permanent

orders concerning maintenance and child support. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 Husband and Jessica Lynn Mullins (wife) were married nearly

seventeen years when husband petitioned to dissolve their

marriage. The parties mediated an agreement regarding the

division of their marital estate and filed a memorandum of

understanding to that effect, which was adopted by the court.

¶3 Later, the district court held a permanent orders hearing

regarding the remaining issues, including child support and wife’s

maintenance request. After the hearing, the court issued

permanent orders and dissolved the parties’ marriage. It found that

wife’s monthly income was $8,210 and that husband’s monthly

income was $25,273. Using these incomes, the court calculated

maintenance based on the advisory guidelines in section 14-10-

114(3)(b), C.R.S. 2025, and ordered that husband pay wife $3,887

in monthly maintenance for a term of eight years and nine months.

This award was less than that requested by wife. The court later

1 determined wife’s child support obligation based on husband’s

majority parenting time.

II. Child Support and Maintenance

¶4 Husband contends that the district court erred in its

determination of (1) the parties’ incomes for purposes of child

support and maintenance and (2) the amount and duration of its

maintenance award. We disagree with husband about the income

findings. And, while we agree with him that the court erred by

calculating the amount of its maintenance award, we conclude the

error was harmless.

A. Standard of Review

¶5 We review maintenance and child support orders for an abuse

of discretion. In re Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 8. A

court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary,

unfair, or unreasonable manner, or when it misapplies the law.

In re Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5. We defer to the court’s

factual findings so long as they are supported by the record. In re

Marriage of Connerton, 260 P.3d 62, 66 (Colo. App. 2010). But we

review de novo whether the court applied the proper legal standard.

Schaefer, ¶ 8.

2 B. Income Calculations

1. Legal Principles

¶6 To calculate maintenance and child support, a court must first

determine the parties’ incomes. See In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019

COA 83, ¶ 13. In this context, income means a party’s actual gross

income if the party is fully employed. § 14-10-114(8)(a)(II), C.R.S.

2025 (maintenance); § 14-10-115(3)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (child support).

“Gross income” means income from any source, including from

salaries and bonuses. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I); § 14-10-115(5)(a)(I).

2. Wife’s Income

¶7 Husband contends that the record contains no support for the

district court’s finding that wife’s monthly income was $8,210.

¶8 Finding that wife works full-time at a new job, the court based

its finding as to her income on her salary from that job and her

investment income from property she received in this case.

Contrary to husband’s assertion, the court’s findings are sufficiently

explicit such that we have an understanding of the basis for its

decision. See In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.

¶9 Wife had just started a new position at the time of the

permanent orders hearing, earning a monthly salary of $7,083. She

3 explained that, while eligible for bonuses in this new role, she had

not received any and didn’t “know anything” about them. As

husband notes, the $8,210 figure appears in the record in a

maintenance worksheet admitted as only a demonstrative exhibit.

Wife testified that she reached this figure by approximating her

expected interest and dividend income and adding that amount to

her salary. To calculate the investment income portion, wife used

an average of the parties’ past investment income from several tax

returns, most of which were admitted as exhibits.

¶ 10 Husband points to evidence in the record that could have

supported a higher income finding, such as dividend information

from one specific tax return and wife’s eligibility for bonuses. But

because the record contains support for the court’s income finding,

we discern no error, as it is for the district court, and not us, to

resolve any contested evidence. See Connerton, 260 P.3d at 66; see

also Tooker, ¶ 31 (recognizing that any conclusions to be drawn

from the conflicting evidence were for the district court to resolve);

In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district

court to determine witness credibility and the weight, probative

4 force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom).

3. Husband’s Income

¶ 11 Husband next asserts that the court erred by including one of

his bonuses as income for maintenance and child support

purposes. He testified that he received approximately $10,613 in

monthly bonus income from two bonuses, split about evenly

between the two. Husband received one of the bonuses based on

his percentage of ownership in his company. Husband testified

that he received this bonus in cash but that his employer

“expect[ed]” him to use the bonuses to invest in additional shares,

and that not doing so would effectively make him ineligible for

future bonuses. Given this, he asserts that the bonus was not

income but instead akin to unrealized gains in an investment

account. In Schaefer, ¶ 20, a division of this court held that

“unrealized, paper only gains in an investment account are not

income for maintenance and child support purposes,” as they

cannot “be used to meet living expenses, pay discretionary

expenses, or increase the recipient’s standard of living.” (citation

5 modified). In other words, a person can spend the bonus, while

such is not true for unrealized gains.

¶ 12 The court implicitly made a factual finding that husband’s

bonus qualified as income. The record supports this finding

because, unlike unrealized gains, husband received his bonus in

cash. That husband chose to invest this bonus in his company or

that not doing so could affect future bonus opportunities does not

make his bonus tantamount to unrealized gains, unavailable for

meeting expenses. See id. Thus, the court properly included all of

his bonus income as income. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(I)(E) (for

purposes of maintenance, gross income includes bonuses); § 14-10-

115(5)(a)(I)(E) (same for child support).1

1 We do not address husband’s claims that the court’s income

calculations caused an inequitable result or that the court improperly based his income on a single, atypically high-earning year. That is because he fails to develop arguments on these bases, see Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12, or seeks to do so in his reply brief, see In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

6 C. Determination of Maintenance

¶ 13 Section 14-10-114(3) sets forth the process a court must

follow when considering a maintenance request. In re Marriage of

Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 13. The court must first make findings on

the amount of each party’s gross income, the marital property

apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the

parties’ reasonable financial need as established during the

marriage, and the taxability and tax deductibility of any

maintenance payments. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); Wright, ¶ 14.

¶ 14 The court then must determine an amount and term of

maintenance, if any, that is fair and equitable by considering the

statutory advisory guidelines and a list of nonexclusive statutory

factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A)-(B), (3)(b), (3)(c); Wright, ¶ 15. But

when, as here, the parties’ combined annual adjusted gross income

exceeds $240,000, the advisory guideline amount of maintenance

under section 14-10-114(3)(b)(I) “does not apply.” See § 14-10-

114(3.5). Instead, the court must determine the amount of

maintenance based on its consideration of the statutory factors in

section 14-10-114(3)(c). § 14-10-114(3.5); Herold, ¶ 26. As part of

7 this determination, the court may consider the advisory guideline

term of maintenance set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(b)(II). § 14-

10-114(3.5).

¶ 15 Next, the court must determine whether the requesting spouse

qualifies for maintenance, meaning that the spouse lacks sufficient

property to provide for their reasonable needs and is unable to

support themself through appropriate employment. See § 14-10-

114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d); Wright, ¶ 16.

¶ 16 Finally, the court must make specific written or oral findings

in support of the amount and term of maintenance awarded. § 14-

10-114(3)(e).

2. Maintenance Guideline and Term

a. Additional Background

¶ 17 At the permanent orders hearing, husband asserted that wife

could provide for her reasonable needs and, thus, was not entitled

to maintenance. For her part, wife requested $4,300 in monthly

maintenance for a term of eight years and ten months.

¶ 18 In its oral ruling, the court recognized that the advisory

guidelines did not apply because the parties’ combined adjusted

gross annual income exceeded $240,000. It found that wife’s

8 monthly income was $8,210, and that husband’s monthly income

was $25,273.

¶ 19 The court then made findings considering many of the section

14-10-114(3)(c) factors, including the parties’ lifestyle during the

marriage, historical incomes, economic and noneconomic

contributions to the marriage, as well as the distribution of marital

property. It also examined the parties’ financial resources,

including the potential that much of husband’s income was

invested. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(I)-(II). Based on these

considerations, it concluded that wife qualified for maintenance.

See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d); Wright, ¶ 16.

¶ 20 The court, however, did not initially identify its maintenance

award. Rather, it requested that the parties calculate maintenance

based on a worksheet. When wife’s counsel later asked the court to

identify the amount of its award, the court responded that it didn’t

“know,” which was why it was requesting the parties to “extrapolate

from the [m]aintenance [w]orksheet.”

¶ 21 After wife’s counsel generated a worksheet that utilized the

advisory guideline calculation procedure, the court granted wife

9 $3,887 in monthly maintenance. It ordered that husband pay this

amount for a term of eight years and nine months.

b. Analysis

¶ 22 Husband contends that the district court improperly

“extrapolated” from the statutory guidelines to calculate its

maintenance award.

¶ 23 While the court thoroughly considered the section 14-10-

114(3)(c) factors, it solely relied on mother’s worksheet to determine

the amount of its award. Because the worksheet calculated

maintenance based on the advisory guidelines, the court

determined the award amount solely on the guidelines. Doing so

was improper because the guidelines do not apply when the parties’

incomes exceed the $240,000 statutory cap, as here. See § 14-10-

114(3.5). The court should have instead decided the amount based

on its consideration of the section 14-10-114(3)(c) factors.

See § 14-10-114(3.5); Herold, ¶ 26. Thus, while the court was

aware that the advisory guidelines did not apply here, and while it

considered the relevant statutory factors to determine that wife was

entitled to maintenance, it erred by determining the maintenance

amount without linking the ordered amount to the factors.

10 ¶ 24 Yet, husband does not articulate how the court’s use of this

method to calculate the maintenance amount was not harmless; in

other words, he did not argue that the procedure prejudiced his

substantial rights. See C.R.C.P. 61; C.A.R. 35(c). He maintained in

the district court and on appeal that wife was not entitled to any

maintenance and proposed no alternative award amount. The

court, based on its examination of the section 14-10-114(3)(c)

factors, including the parties’ lifestyle during the marriage and

disparate incomes, rejected husband’s position that wife was not

entitled to maintenance. That determination is supported by the

record. Because the court calculated maintenance pursuant to the

advisory guidelines, it granted wife an award that was appreciably

lower than the amount she sought. As a result, husband does not

explain how he was prejudiced by the court calculating

maintenance in this method, which resulted in this lower award for

wife. See People in Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo. App.

2007) (concluding that an alleged error, without a valid allegation of

prejudice, is not grounds for reversal). Accordingly, we do not

disturb the maintenance award on this basis. See id.

11 ¶ 25 Husband also asserts that the court erred by deciding the

term of its maintenance award based on the advisory guidelines.

We disagree. The court ordered husband to pay monthly

maintenance for a term of eight years and nine months, which was

one month less than the relevant advisory guideline duration.

See § 14-10-114(3)(b)(II). True, the court’s ruling reflects that it

considered the guideline term in determining this duration, but

doing so was not error. See § 14-10-114(3.5) (even when the

parties’ combined incomes exceed the statutory cap, a court may

consider the advisory guideline term under section 14-10-

114(3)(b)(II)).

3. Tax Implications

¶ 26 Husband also contends that the court failed to make

mandatory findings on the federal income tax implications of the

maintenance award.2 See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(E) (the court must

make written or oral findings concerning whether the award would

be deductible by the payor spouse and taxable income to the

2 To the extent that wife argues husband was required to preserve

this contention, we disagree. A party is not required to object to findings to preserve a challenge to those findings. See C.R.C.P. 52; People in Interest of D.B., 2017 COA 139, ¶ 30.

12 recipient spouse). Although the court did not make a specific oral

or written finding on this issue, its ruling reflects that it considered

the issue, as well as an implicit finding that maintenance was not

tax deductible and not taxable income.

¶ 27 Section 14-10-114(3)(b) provides a formula to calculate the

guideline amount of maintenance when it is deductible for federal

income tax purposes, and a different formula when it is not.

See § 14-10-114(3)(b)(I)(A)-(C). As noted, the court ordered

husband to pay $3,887 in monthly maintenance. On review, we

discern that it calculated the guideline amount under the formula

for an award that is not tax deductible. See § 14-10-114(3)(b)(I)(C).

Indeed, the court based the award on wife’s proposed worksheet,

which confirmed that the award was not tax deductible.

¶ 28 From this, we glean that the court implicitly found that

maintenance was not deductible for federal income tax purposes.

Cf. In re Marriage of Serdinsky, 740 P.2d 521, 523 (Colo. 1987)

(recognizing that a district court’s maintenance finding may be

implicit in its order). This finding makes sense, given that under

federal tax law, “[maintenance] payments are no longer tax

deductible and are not considered taxable income to the person

13 receiving them.” In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 21 (Iowa

2020); see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97,

§ 11051, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017) (repealing 26 U.S.C. § 215).

To the extent that husband asserts that this implied finding was

not sufficient, he again fails to argue how the lack of any explicit

findings prejudiced his substantial rights.

¶ 29 Finally, we address husband’s contention that the court failed

to consider the parties’ respective tax rates when determining

maintenance. More precisely, he asserts that “extrapolating” from

the guidelines does not adjust for any “changes” in the parties’ tax

rates, given that their combined income exceeds the limit

contemplated by the guidelines and multipliers therein. See § 14-

10-114(3)(b)(I) (providing distinct formulas for parties’ combined

monthly income of less than ten thousand dollars and for those

between ten thousand and twenty thousand dollars).

¶ 30 But husband doesn’t point to anywhere in the record he

offered evidence concerning the parties’ tax rates. See C.A.R.

28(a)(5) (It is the appellant’s responsibility to include “appropriate

references to the record.”) Nor does our review of the record reveal

that he did so. This was at husband’s own peril because he was

14 aware the parties’ combined income exceeded the statutory cap.

Given that, husband cannot argue here that the district court failed

to consider evidence that he did not present. See In re Marriage of

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003) (a party who fails to

present sufficient evidence at trial should not be allowed on appeal

to challenge the inadequacy of the evidence). We thus decline to

disturb the court’s maintenance award.

III. Conclusion

¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.