24CA1757 Marriage of Moniruzzaman 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1757 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR30867 Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge
In re the Marriage of
MD Moniruzzaman,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
and
Naheda Akter,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Warren Domangue, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee
Smith Balicki Finn Laraway, LLC, Ashley L. Balicki, William D. Taylor, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant ¶1 MD Moniruzzaman (husband) appeals the portions of the
permanent orders concerning property division and child support
entered on the dissolution of his marriage to Naheda Akter (wife).
Wife cross-appeals the allocation of the parties’ debt. We reverse
the property division, maintenance, and child support portions of
the permanent orders.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2014 and have two children. In 2022,
the parties separated, and husband petitioned to dissolve the
parties’ marriage.
¶3 The district court dissolved the marriage and entered
permanent orders. The marital estate consisted primarily of the
marital home and two vehicles. The court awarded each party a
vehicle. As to the marital home — the largest asset — the court
found that each party’s share of the equity in the home “would be
approximately $110,000.” But instead of dividing this equity
between husband and wife, the court found that “it is in the
children’s best interests to allow them to stay in the home” with
wife, their primary caretaker. The court added that, “[a]s long as
[husband] pays [his] arrearage on child support and remains
1 current on child support going forward, he shall continue to build
equity in the value of the marital home.”
¶4 Concerning the marital debt, the district court allocated about
$43,000 to wife and about $138,000 to husband.
¶5 As for child support, the district court ordered husband to pay
wife a total of $3,480 per month: $1,240 based on the child support
guidelines; $1,000 from an upward deviation; and $1,240 in
arrearage installments (lasting two years). Because the court
deviated upward from the child support guideline, it declined to
award wife any maintenance.
II. Property Division
¶6 Husband contends that the district court erred by failing to
divide the marital home’s equity. We agree.
¶7 The district court has broad discretion to equitably divide the
marital property, and we won’t disturb its division absent an abuse
of discretion. In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶¶ 64-65. A
district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law. Id.
at ¶ 65.
¶8 A district court must equitably divide the marital property,
though the division need not be equal. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S.
2 2024; In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001).
But an order that leaves one party with “only the vague expectation
that the property may one day be divided” is “illusory” and does not
comply with the statutory mandate to divide marital property. In re
Marriage of Gehret, 580 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Colo. App. 1978). Thus,
it’s generally improper for the court to continue joint property
ownership between divorced spouses unless the court “gives each
party a definable or ascertainable portion of at least some of the
attributes of ownership” and ensures that “the mechanics of any
fractional division can be accomplished within a reasonable time.”
In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 49 (Colo. App. 1993).
¶9 As best we can tell, the district court awarded husband an
unspecified amount of the marital home’s equity so long as he “pays
the arrearage on child support and remains current on child
support going forward.”1 But the order provides no guidance on
1 The district court added that husband would “continue to build
equity in the value of the marital home.” But if husband is not awarded any interest in the home, he would not be entitled to any future increase in the home’s value because property must be valued at the time of dissolution or the hearing on property division, whichever comes first. In re Marriage of Wormell, 697 P.2d 812, 814 (Colo. App. 1985); § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2024.
3 when, if ever, the marital home would be sold or how the proceeds
would be split. Instead, it appears that wife may reside in the home
indefinitely while husband has no assurance that he will receive his
interest in the home. Because this leaves husband with an illusory
interest in the marital home, we must reverse the property division.
See Gehret, 580 P.2d at 1276-77 (reversing illusory order that
equally divided marital interest in business “[i]n the event of the
sale of [the business] for any reason”); In re Marriage of Paul, 821
P.2d 925, 927-28 (Colo. App. 1991) (reversing illusory order
concerning husband’s interest in an office building because the
court “imposed no limitations on the time and manner of the
payment of husband’s interest, nor any restrictions on wife’s
exclusive control of the asset”).
¶ 10 And because the allocation of marital debt “is in the nature of
property division,” In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172
(Colo. App. 2006), the district court must necessarily revisit the
debt allocation on remand, see In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024
COA 103M, ¶ 26 (requiring court to reexamine “the entire property
division on remand” after reversal of material portions of the
4 property division). We therefore decline to consider wife’s cross-
appeal concerning the marital debt.2
¶ 11 We express no opinion on how the district court should divide
the marital home or allocate the marital debt. If the marital home
is to be fractionally divided, any such division must be
accomplished within a reasonable time. Simon, 856 P.2d at 49.
III. Other Contentions and Remand Instructions
¶ 12 Because we’re reversing the property division, we must also
reverse the portion of the permanent orders addressing
maintenance and child support. See LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3,
¶ 66; In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005).
For this reason, we similarly decline to address husband’s
contentions regarding child support.
¶ 13 On remand, the district court may take additional evidence as
it deems necessary, see In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147,
2 Though we do not consider the allocation of marital debt, we do
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24CA1757 Marriage of Moniruzzaman 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1757 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR30867 Honorable Ann Gail Meinster, Judge
In re the Marriage of
MD Moniruzzaman,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
and
Naheda Akter,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Warren Domangue, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee
Smith Balicki Finn Laraway, LLC, Ashley L. Balicki, William D. Taylor, Centennial, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant ¶1 MD Moniruzzaman (husband) appeals the portions of the
permanent orders concerning property division and child support
entered on the dissolution of his marriage to Naheda Akter (wife).
Wife cross-appeals the allocation of the parties’ debt. We reverse
the property division, maintenance, and child support portions of
the permanent orders.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2014 and have two children. In 2022,
the parties separated, and husband petitioned to dissolve the
parties’ marriage.
¶3 The district court dissolved the marriage and entered
permanent orders. The marital estate consisted primarily of the
marital home and two vehicles. The court awarded each party a
vehicle. As to the marital home — the largest asset — the court
found that each party’s share of the equity in the home “would be
approximately $110,000.” But instead of dividing this equity
between husband and wife, the court found that “it is in the
children’s best interests to allow them to stay in the home” with
wife, their primary caretaker. The court added that, “[a]s long as
[husband] pays [his] arrearage on child support and remains
1 current on child support going forward, he shall continue to build
equity in the value of the marital home.”
¶4 Concerning the marital debt, the district court allocated about
$43,000 to wife and about $138,000 to husband.
¶5 As for child support, the district court ordered husband to pay
wife a total of $3,480 per month: $1,240 based on the child support
guidelines; $1,000 from an upward deviation; and $1,240 in
arrearage installments (lasting two years). Because the court
deviated upward from the child support guideline, it declined to
award wife any maintenance.
II. Property Division
¶6 Husband contends that the district court erred by failing to
divide the marital home’s equity. We agree.
¶7 The district court has broad discretion to equitably divide the
marital property, and we won’t disturb its division absent an abuse
of discretion. In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶¶ 64-65. A
district court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law. Id.
at ¶ 65.
¶8 A district court must equitably divide the marital property,
though the division need not be equal. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S.
2 2024; In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001).
But an order that leaves one party with “only the vague expectation
that the property may one day be divided” is “illusory” and does not
comply with the statutory mandate to divide marital property. In re
Marriage of Gehret, 580 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Colo. App. 1978). Thus,
it’s generally improper for the court to continue joint property
ownership between divorced spouses unless the court “gives each
party a definable or ascertainable portion of at least some of the
attributes of ownership” and ensures that “the mechanics of any
fractional division can be accomplished within a reasonable time.”
In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 49 (Colo. App. 1993).
¶9 As best we can tell, the district court awarded husband an
unspecified amount of the marital home’s equity so long as he “pays
the arrearage on child support and remains current on child
support going forward.”1 But the order provides no guidance on
1 The district court added that husband would “continue to build
equity in the value of the marital home.” But if husband is not awarded any interest in the home, he would not be entitled to any future increase in the home’s value because property must be valued at the time of dissolution or the hearing on property division, whichever comes first. In re Marriage of Wormell, 697 P.2d 812, 814 (Colo. App. 1985); § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2024.
3 when, if ever, the marital home would be sold or how the proceeds
would be split. Instead, it appears that wife may reside in the home
indefinitely while husband has no assurance that he will receive his
interest in the home. Because this leaves husband with an illusory
interest in the marital home, we must reverse the property division.
See Gehret, 580 P.2d at 1276-77 (reversing illusory order that
equally divided marital interest in business “[i]n the event of the
sale of [the business] for any reason”); In re Marriage of Paul, 821
P.2d 925, 927-28 (Colo. App. 1991) (reversing illusory order
concerning husband’s interest in an office building because the
court “imposed no limitations on the time and manner of the
payment of husband’s interest, nor any restrictions on wife’s
exclusive control of the asset”).
¶ 10 And because the allocation of marital debt “is in the nature of
property division,” In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172
(Colo. App. 2006), the district court must necessarily revisit the
debt allocation on remand, see In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024
COA 103M, ¶ 26 (requiring court to reexamine “the entire property
division on remand” after reversal of material portions of the
4 property division). We therefore decline to consider wife’s cross-
appeal concerning the marital debt.2
¶ 11 We express no opinion on how the district court should divide
the marital home or allocate the marital debt. If the marital home
is to be fractionally divided, any such division must be
accomplished within a reasonable time. Simon, 856 P.2d at 49.
III. Other Contentions and Remand Instructions
¶ 12 Because we’re reversing the property division, we must also
reverse the portion of the permanent orders addressing
maintenance and child support. See LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3,
¶ 66; In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005).
For this reason, we similarly decline to address husband’s
contentions regarding child support.
¶ 13 On remand, the district court may take additional evidence as
it deems necessary, see In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147,
2 Though we do not consider the allocation of marital debt, we do
observe that the district court appeared to rely on a stipulation that each party would be “responsible for their respective credit card debt as reflected on their [s]worn [f]inancial [s]tatements.” Because the appellate record does not contain this stipulation, to the extent any such stipulation exists, it should be presented to the district court and made a part of the record.
5 ¶ 21, but it must use the same property and debt valuations from
the permanent orders, Capparelli, ¶ 26; § 14-10-113(5). The court
must also examine the property and debt divisions based on the
parties’ current economic circumstances. Capparelli, ¶ 26; § 14-10-
113(1)(c). The court should follow the multi-step analysis under
section 14-10-113 and make explicit factual findings when
required. See LaFleur, ¶¶ 62-63, 65.
¶ 14 After dividing the marital property and debt, the district court
should then assess maintenance and child support under the
procedures laid out respectively in sections 14-10-114(3)(a)(I) and
14-10-115(7), C.R.S. 2024. As before, the court should consider
the parties’ current economic circumstances and make findings
when required. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶¶ 23-24.
Any deviation from the child support guidelines must be supported
by specific findings. See § 14-10-115(8)(e).
IV. Disposition
¶ 15 We reverse the portions of the judgment concerning property
division, maintenance, and child support, and we remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The portions
6 of the permanent orders not challenged on appeal remain
undisturbed.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.