24CA2191 Marriage of Middleton 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2191 El Paso County District Court No. 16DR340 Honorable Amanda J. Phillips, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Amy Diane Middleton,
Appellee,
and
Austin Miles Middleton,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
The Law Office of Andrew Bryant, LLC, Catherine H. Ford, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Austin Miles Middleton, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving
Austin Miles Middleton (father) and Amy Diane Middleton (mother),
father appeals the district court’s order modifying parental
responsibilities concerning their child. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After nearly three years of marriage and the birth of a son,
mother filed a petition for dissolution in 2016. In the permanent
orders, the district court approved the parties’ stipulations
concerning decision-making responsibility and parenting time.
Under those stipulations, the parties shared decision-making
responsibility, except that mother had the final say regarding
religion, and mother was the child’s primary residential parent.
¶3 In 2020, during proceedings on a motion mother had filed to
modify parenting time, a child and family investigator (CFI) credited
mother’s allegations that father had committed numerous acts of
domestic violence during the marriage. Father admitted to the CFI
only that he had recently shoved mother and said that he didn’t
think it was a “big deal.” The CFI requested, and the court agreed,
that father could receive equal parenting time after completing a
1 domestic violence evaluation. Father did so. The court didn’t
modify the allocation of decision-making during those proceedings.
¶4 Three years later, mother filed the underlying motion to modify
decision-making responsibility and parenting time. The district
court held an evidentiary hearing on mother’s motion, after which it
made the following findings:
• Father committed acts of domestic violence against
mother during the marriage.
• Father failed to take any responsibility for his actions,
thereby denying the reality of the abuse and its
continuing effects on mother and the child. “[T]he
underlying problem [was] domestic violence and [f]ather
simply being unwilling to relinquish control.”
• A supplemental parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE)
testified that she observed father’s ongoing controlling
behavior in the parties’ online communications. And
mother testified that she still struggled to be in the same
room with father.
• The child was “suffering from emotional dysregulation
due to the incredibly problematic relationship that [the
2 parties] have and their inability to get past their dislike
for each other.”
• The PRE testified that the child’s behaviors were
consistent with exposure to domestic violence and that
the parties “cannot do things cooperatively together,”
which was causing the child to experience “distress” and
was “emotionally endangering his development.”
• Despite years of warnings that their behavior was
harming the child, the parties had made no meaningful
or lasting changes. They were incapable of change; could
not encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact
between the child and the other party; and could not
place the child’s needs above their own.
• Mother objected to joint decision-making responsibility.
¶5 The district court determined that the ongoing impact of
father’s domestic violence made the current joint decision-making
responsibility arrangement and equal parenting schedule contrary
to the child’s best interests and placed the child in danger. The
court named mother as the child’s sole decision-maker and primary
parent and granted father three weekends of parenting time per
3 month during the school year and equal parenting time during the
summer.
¶6 Father filed a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59,
which the district court denied.
¶7 On appeal, father contends that the district court erred by
modifying decision-making responsibility and parenting time. We
address — and reject — each contention in turn.
II. Standard of Review
¶8 A district court has broad discretion when modifying decision-
making responsibility and parenting time, and “we exercise every
presumption in favor of upholding its decisions.” In re Marriage of
Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26. A court abuses its discretion when it
acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner, or
when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA
107, ¶ 45.
¶9 However, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, meaning that we will not disturb the findings unless
they lack any support in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy,
2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
4 III. Discussion
A. Decision-Making Responsibility
¶ 10 Father argues that the district court was aware of his domestic
violence by 2020 — three years before mother filed the underlying
motion to modify — and, thus, that there are no new circumstances
to support a modification of decision-making responsibility under
section 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. We discern no error.
¶ 11 Section 14-10-131(2) allows a district court to modify decision-
making responsibility if it finds, based on facts that have arisen
since or were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order,
that (1) a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or
the party to whom decision-making responsibility was allocated and
(2) the modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.
In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA 92M, ¶ 17.
¶ 12 When, as here, a party requests a change in decision-making
based on endangerment of the child, the district court must retain
the existing order unless the order endangers the child’s physical
health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development
and the advantage of a change outweighs the harm likely to result
to the child. § 14-10-131(2)(c); Humphries, ¶ 20.
5 ¶ 13 Additionally, when a party has committed domestic violence, it
is not in the child’s best interests to allocate joint decision-making
responsibility over the abused party’s objection unless the court
finds credible evidence of the parties’ ability “to make decisions
cooperatively in the best interest of the child” and “in a manner that
is safe for the abused party and the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(b),
(4)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 14 Here, in making its decision, the district court didn’t rely solely
on father’s history of domestic violence during the marriage.
Instead, the court emphasized new and continuing facts showing
that the child was endangered by the lingering effects of father’s
abuse. See § 14-10-131(2). In particular, the court found, with
record support, that mother and the child both continued to
experience trauma from father’s domestic violence; father’s coercive
control persisted in the parties’ interactions; the parties were
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24CA2191 Marriage of Middleton 12-04-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2191 El Paso County District Court No. 16DR340 Honorable Amanda J. Phillips, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Amy Diane Middleton,
Appellee,
and
Austin Miles Middleton,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 4, 2025
The Law Office of Andrew Bryant, LLC, Catherine H. Ford, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Austin Miles Middleton, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving
Austin Miles Middleton (father) and Amy Diane Middleton (mother),
father appeals the district court’s order modifying parental
responsibilities concerning their child. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After nearly three years of marriage and the birth of a son,
mother filed a petition for dissolution in 2016. In the permanent
orders, the district court approved the parties’ stipulations
concerning decision-making responsibility and parenting time.
Under those stipulations, the parties shared decision-making
responsibility, except that mother had the final say regarding
religion, and mother was the child’s primary residential parent.
¶3 In 2020, during proceedings on a motion mother had filed to
modify parenting time, a child and family investigator (CFI) credited
mother’s allegations that father had committed numerous acts of
domestic violence during the marriage. Father admitted to the CFI
only that he had recently shoved mother and said that he didn’t
think it was a “big deal.” The CFI requested, and the court agreed,
that father could receive equal parenting time after completing a
1 domestic violence evaluation. Father did so. The court didn’t
modify the allocation of decision-making during those proceedings.
¶4 Three years later, mother filed the underlying motion to modify
decision-making responsibility and parenting time. The district
court held an evidentiary hearing on mother’s motion, after which it
made the following findings:
• Father committed acts of domestic violence against
mother during the marriage.
• Father failed to take any responsibility for his actions,
thereby denying the reality of the abuse and its
continuing effects on mother and the child. “[T]he
underlying problem [was] domestic violence and [f]ather
simply being unwilling to relinquish control.”
• A supplemental parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE)
testified that she observed father’s ongoing controlling
behavior in the parties’ online communications. And
mother testified that she still struggled to be in the same
room with father.
• The child was “suffering from emotional dysregulation
due to the incredibly problematic relationship that [the
2 parties] have and their inability to get past their dislike
for each other.”
• The PRE testified that the child’s behaviors were
consistent with exposure to domestic violence and that
the parties “cannot do things cooperatively together,”
which was causing the child to experience “distress” and
was “emotionally endangering his development.”
• Despite years of warnings that their behavior was
harming the child, the parties had made no meaningful
or lasting changes. They were incapable of change; could
not encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact
between the child and the other party; and could not
place the child’s needs above their own.
• Mother objected to joint decision-making responsibility.
¶5 The district court determined that the ongoing impact of
father’s domestic violence made the current joint decision-making
responsibility arrangement and equal parenting schedule contrary
to the child’s best interests and placed the child in danger. The
court named mother as the child’s sole decision-maker and primary
parent and granted father three weekends of parenting time per
3 month during the school year and equal parenting time during the
summer.
¶6 Father filed a motion for reconsideration under C.R.C.P. 59,
which the district court denied.
¶7 On appeal, father contends that the district court erred by
modifying decision-making responsibility and parenting time. We
address — and reject — each contention in turn.
II. Standard of Review
¶8 A district court has broad discretion when modifying decision-
making responsibility and parenting time, and “we exercise every
presumption in favor of upholding its decisions.” In re Marriage of
Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26. A court abuses its discretion when it
acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner, or
when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA
107, ¶ 45.
¶9 However, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error, meaning that we will not disturb the findings unless
they lack any support in the record. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy,
2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
4 III. Discussion
A. Decision-Making Responsibility
¶ 10 Father argues that the district court was aware of his domestic
violence by 2020 — three years before mother filed the underlying
motion to modify — and, thus, that there are no new circumstances
to support a modification of decision-making responsibility under
section 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. We discern no error.
¶ 11 Section 14-10-131(2) allows a district court to modify decision-
making responsibility if it finds, based on facts that have arisen
since or were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order,
that (1) a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or
the party to whom decision-making responsibility was allocated and
(2) the modification is necessary to serve the child’s best interests.
In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA 92M, ¶ 17.
¶ 12 When, as here, a party requests a change in decision-making
based on endangerment of the child, the district court must retain
the existing order unless the order endangers the child’s physical
health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development
and the advantage of a change outweighs the harm likely to result
to the child. § 14-10-131(2)(c); Humphries, ¶ 20.
5 ¶ 13 Additionally, when a party has committed domestic violence, it
is not in the child’s best interests to allocate joint decision-making
responsibility over the abused party’s objection unless the court
finds credible evidence of the parties’ ability “to make decisions
cooperatively in the best interest of the child” and “in a manner that
is safe for the abused party and the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5)(b),
(4)(a)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 14 Here, in making its decision, the district court didn’t rely solely
on father’s history of domestic violence during the marriage.
Instead, the court emphasized new and continuing facts showing
that the child was endangered by the lingering effects of father’s
abuse. See § 14-10-131(2). In particular, the court found, with
record support, that mother and the child both continued to
experience trauma from father’s domestic violence; father’s coercive
control persisted in the parties’ interactions; the parties were
unable to make decisions cooperatively in the child’s best interests;
and mother objected to joint decision-making responsibility.
¶ 15 Father also argues that other findings made by the district
court and other evidence in the record justify a different outcome.
We decline his invitation to reweigh the statutory factors and
6 evidence in his favor and substitute our judgment for that of the
district court. See Wenciker, ¶ 26; see also In re Marriage of Nelson,
2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an abuse of discretion,
even where “there is evidence in the record that could have
supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the district court.”); In re Marriage of Thorburn,
2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to determine witness
credibility and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the
evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn
therefrom); In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21 (an
appellate court may presume that the district court considered all
the evidence admitted).
¶ 16 In sum, we cannot say that the district court abused its broad
discretion in allocating sole decision-making responsibility to
mother. See Wenciker, ¶ 26.
B. Parenting Time
¶ 17 Father also asserts that the district court erred by
substantially modifying parenting time without making adequate
findings. Relying on section 14-10-129(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and In re
Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 35, he argues that the court
7 was required to make express findings regarding (1) the
presumption in favor of retaining the prior parenting time order;
(2) whether the child was endangered by the status quo and
whether the advantages of the modification outweighed any harm
likely caused by the change; and (3) whether the modification was
in the child’s best interests. We discern no error.
¶ 18 Section 14-10-129(2)(d) and Schlundt apply only when a
parenting time modification is substantial and results in changing
the primary residential parent. See Schlundt, ¶ 24. However, the
prior order here provided for equal parenting time and, therefore, it
didn’t designate either party as the primary parent. Thus, the best
interests analysis applied, and the court’s findings were sufficient.
See In re Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002)
(“[I]n instances where the parties share equal parenting
responsibilities, any subsequent modification of that arrangement is
governed by the best interests standard.”); In re Marriage of
McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 331-33 (Colo. App. 1998) (where the
parents had equal parenting time, a modification naming one
parent as the child’s residential parent requires only a best
interests showing).
8 ¶ 19 Nor are we persuaded by father’s related assertion that the
modification constituted a restriction under section 14-10-
129(1)(b)(I), requiring an endangerment analysis.
¶ 20 Section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) provides that if a modification
restricts a party’s parenting time, the district court must find that
the existing parenting time order endangers the child’s physical
health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional development.
¶ 21 The modification order at issue is a purely quantitative
reduction in father’s parenting time and is not a restriction within
the meaning of section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). See In re Marriage of
Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 32 (cert. granted in part July 21, 2025).
A restriction occurs only when the court imposes a qualitative
limitation, such as requiring supervision, prohibiting overnights, or
limiting the location of visits. Id. So, contrary to father’s argument,
an endangerment finding was not required.
¶ 22 In any event, even if the endangerment standard did apply, the
district court expressly found, with record support, that the status
quo was endangering the child’s emotional development and
“significant changes” were necessary “to essentially save this child.”
9 ¶ 23 According to father, there are other district court findings and
evidence in the record that compel a different parenting time
determination under the best interests standard. But again, we
decline to reweigh the statutory factors in his favor and substitute
our judgment for that of the district court. See Wenciker, ¶ 26;
Nelson, ¶ 35; Thorburn, ¶ 49; Collins, ¶ 21.
¶ 24 Because the district court applied the correct legal standard
and the record supports the court’s exercise of its broad discretion
to name mother the child’s primary parent, we see no error. See
Wenciker, ¶ 26.
¶ 25 Given our disposition, we don’t need to resolve mother’s claim
that father failed to preserve his parenting time assertions. See
In re Marriage of Mack, 2022 CO 17, ¶ 12 (because a contention was
unavailing, the appellate court needn’t decide whether it was
preserved); accord Collins, ¶ 48.
IV. Disposition
¶ 26 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.