Marriage of Menard

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0358
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0358 Marriage of Mendard 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0358 Adams County District Court No. 21DR30368 Honorable Kelley R. Southerland, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Christopher Thomas Menard,

Appellant,

and

Jenna Lyn Menard, n/k/a Jenna Lyn Elmore,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* Dunn and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025

Thomas Law Group, P.C., Sergei B. Thomas, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Price Family Law, LLC, Trista Price, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Christopher

Thomas Menard (father) and Jenna Lyn Menard, now known as

Jenna Lyn Elmore (mother), father appeals the district court’s

rejection of the magistrate’s decision modifying decision-making

responsibility. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties’ marriage ended in 2021. The dissolution decree

incorporated their parenting plan, which named mother, who lived

in Wiggins, the children’s primary residential parent and gave

father, who lived in Westminster, three weekends per month plus

additional time during school breaks, summers, and holidays. They

also agreed to share decision-making responsibility.

¶3 About two years later, father filed a motion concerning

parenting time disputes under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025.

In it, he alleged that mother violated the parenting time order by

unilaterally relocating with the children to Fort Morgan. He also

alleged that mother enrolled the older child in the Fort Morgan

school district on her own despite the order that educational

decisions be made jointly. Mother responded that the relocation

added only fourteen minutes to father’s drive time to see the

1 children and asserted that the school change had little impact on

him, as he had been minimally involved with the children’s prior

school.

¶4 In October 2023, following a hearing, the magistrate entered

an order concluding that mother’s relocation did not violate the

parenting time order but that her decision to change schools was a

willful violation of the order. Despite that, the magistrate granted

her sole decision-making responsibility over all major education

matters and allocated father sole decision-making responsibility for

the children’s medical, dental, religion, “[p]assports,” travel, and

extracurricular activities. The magistrate scheduled a status

conference in six months to evaluate whether the parties could

resume joint decision-making responsibility and expressed “hope

that . . . we can change this mess.”

¶5 At the status conference, father reported, among other things,

that the parties still disagreed regarding decision-making for the

children. At a further status conference one month later, he again

indicated ongoing decision-making problems. The magistrate

reiterated that the October 2023 decision was temporary and set a

contested hearing on modifying decision-making responsibility

2 permanently. The magistrate treated the matter as “a continuation

of the parenting time dispute under section 14-10-129.5.” Mother

argued that the legal standard under section 14-10-131, C.R.S.

2025, applies when modification is sought in that context.

¶6 The magistrate made the following findings at a hearing

conducted in July 2024:

• Mother’s testimony regarding her efforts to co-parent and

make joint decisions was not credible.

• Father repeatedly attempted to work with mother on the

children’s health care issues, yet mother had consistently

refused to co-parent.

• Mother violated the October 2023 order by refusing to

allow father to exercise his allocated sole decision-making

responsibility regarding extracurricular activities.

• Mother failed to “cooperatively make decisions” related to

the allocation for parenting time, such as the children’s

spring break and summer vacation.

• Mother did not place the children’s needs ahead of her

own and frequently undermined father’s input.

• Mother blatantly ignored “[o]rders of this [c]ourt.”

3 ¶7 From those findings, the magistrate first acknowledged the

presumption in favor of maintaining the existing allocation of

decision-making responsibility, then determined that continuing it

would endanger the children’s emotional development and that the

modification would serve the children’s best interests. See In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1 (district court’s oral

findings supplement its written order). The magistrate therefore

designated father as the children’s sole decision-maker.

¶8 Mother petitioned for district court review. The district court

rejected the magistrate’s decision, reasoning that (1) no formal

motion to modify decision-making responsibility under section 14-

10-131 had been filed, as required under section 14-10-129.5(2)(f);

(2) the magistrate did not apply the full statutory analysis under

section 14-10-131; and (3) the record did not support a finding of

endangerment. The court reinstated the original 2021 joint

decision-making responsibilities order.

¶9 Father now appeals.

II. Appellate Standard of Review

¶ 10 Our review of a district court’s order rejecting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we

4 must accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. Thorburn, ¶ 25; C.R.M. 7(a)(9). A court’s factual

findings are clearly erroneous only if there is no record support for

them. Thorburn, ¶ 25. We review legal conclusions de novo,

however. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022

COA 105, ¶ 11.

III. Discussion

¶ 11 Father contends that the district court erred by rejecting the

magistrate’s decision. He argues that the court improperly (1)

altered the magistrate’s factual findings that were substantially

supported by the record; (2) determined that the magistrate

incorrectly applied the analytical process prescribed by section 14-

10-131; and (3) concluded that the evidence did not support the

magistrate’s finding of endangerment.

¶ 12 We affirm the district court’s order, but for different reasons.

See Rush Creek Sols., Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402,

406 (Colo. App. 2004); see also Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v.

Samora, 2013 COA 81, ¶ 38 (“An appellate court may affirm the

[district] court’s ruling based on any grounds that are supported by

the record.”).

5 ¶ 13 Under section 14-10-129.5(1), when a party files a motion

claiming that the other party is not complying with a parenting time

order or schedule, the district court must determine “whether there

has been or is likely to be substantial or continuing noncompliance

with the parenting time order or schedule.” The court must then

deny the motion, set an evidentiary hearing, or order the parties to

seek mediation and report back. § 14-10-129(1)(a), (b), & (c). “If,

after a hearing, a district court finds that a party has not complied

with a parenting time order, it may enter certain remedial orders.”

In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA 92M, ¶ 11; see § 14-10-

129.5(2).

¶ 14 In accordance with its own statutory title, section 14-10-129.5

is limited to disputes concerning parenting time, not decision-

making disputes. See Humphries, ¶ 11; In re Marriage of Schlundt,

2021 COA 58, ¶ 9. Parenting time and decision-making

responsibility are separate legal concepts that serve different

functions in allocating parental responsibilities. See § 14-10-

124(1.5), C.R.S. 2025 (“The court shall determine the allocation of

parental responsibilities, including parenting time and decision-

making responsibilities, in accordance with the best interests of the

6 child . . . .”); In re Marriage of Hall, 241 P.3d 540, 543 (Colo. 2010)

(the allocation of parental responsibilities is defined as both

parenting time and decision-making responsibility). Thus, a district

court cannot enter a remedial order modifying decision-making

responsibility based on violation of a prior parenting time order or

schedule unless the facts establish grounds for modifying decision-

making responsibility under section 14-10-131(2). See Humphries,

¶¶ 11-20.

¶ 15 In contrast, the magistrate expressly found that mother’s

relocation to Fort Morgan did not violate the parenting time order,

and nothing in the later proceedings suggested that she wasn’t in

compliance with that order1. Because there was no finding that

mother violated the parenting time order or schedule under section

14-10-129.5(2), and the evidence did not support modification of

decision-making responsibility under the endangerment standard in

section 14-10-131(2)(c), the magistrate lacked authority to issue a

remedial order allocating sole decision-making responsibility to

1 Although it is not entirely clear, the context of comments in the

record suggests that the magistrate’s declaration that mother was not complying with court orders was directed to decision-making orders.

7 father. See Humphries, ¶ 11. On that basis, the district court

correctly rejected the magistrate’s decision. As a result, we affirm,

albeit on other grounds. See Rush Creek Sols., Inc., 107 P.3d at

406; Samora, ¶ 38.

¶ 16 The endangerment standard requires evidence that keeping

the current decision-making order “would endanger the child’s

physical health or significantly impairs the child’s emotional

development and the harm likely to be caused by a change of

environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the

child.” § 14-10-131(2)(c). The standard is intended to be a high

one. In re Marriage of Fickling, 100 P.3d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 2004);

see Humphries, ¶ 20 (“The endangerment standard is more

stringent than the best interests of the child standard.”).

¶ 17 The magistrate did not identify any evidence showing that the

children experienced emotional distress, school problems, or other

negative effects from the parties’ conflict. The magistrate did find

that the older child was suffering from “significant emotional

impairment” because the child was “afraid of even discussing

extracurricular activities.” However, father’s testimony actually

showed that he wanted to co-parent and support the children’s

8 extracurricular activities, but he faced difficulties because of the

distance between the parties’ homes and his limited weekend time.

He was worried that losing sole decision-making responsibility

concerning extracurricular activities would create scheduling

conflicts and put pressure on the children. He also explained that

the older child had “mental breakdowns” about “actual sports,” so

he focused on informal activities, like bowling or basketball until

the child felt ready to participate.

¶ 18 In In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 40, the district

court found, among other things, that mother’s complete refusal to

accept court orders as well as her inability “to encourage a healthy

relationship between the child and [f]ather” endangered the child’s

“emotional wellbeing.” But the division concluded that those

findings were insufficient because the court did not explain how the

mother’s demeanor in court or her beliefs about the court’s orders

significantly impaired the child’s emotional development; nor did it

find whether any potential benefits of modifying the parenting time

order outweighed the harm of doing so. Id. The same analytical

gap exists here. There was no strong connection between mother’s

behavior and the child’s “mental breakdowns,” and the magistrate

9 didn’t determine whether the benefits of changing the decision-

making responsibility order would outweigh the harm.

¶ 19 Moreover, the two cases the magistrate relied on don’t support

an endangerment finding on this record.

¶ 20 In re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 532 (Colo. App. 2008),

involved a child who had limited intellectual abilities and multiple

physical problems. The district court found the child endangered

because the father was unwilling to recognize the child’s problems

and was unable to cooperate with the mother in addressing those

problems. Id. at 534-35. In contrast, there was no indication that

either child here was denied necessary medical care or experienced

negative health consequences. Similarly, In re Marriage of Hatton,

160 P.3d 326, 335 (Colo. App. 2007), involved evidence that the

mother’s distorted views and delusional beliefs about the father

actively harmed the children and enmeshed them in the conflict.

There was no such finding here. The record doesn’t suggest

manipulation, coaching, or “alienation.”

¶ 21 At most, the magistrate’s findings show less than ideal

parenting and persistent parental disagreements. Against this

10 background, the district court could not have concluded there was

endangerment to the children.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 22 Under C.A.R. 38(b) and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025,

mother asks for her appellate attorney fees based on the frivolity of

this appeal. Although father has not prevailed, we deny her

request. See In re Marriage of Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees

should be awarded only in clear and unequivocal cases when the

appellant presents no rational argument, or the appeal is

prosecuted for the purpose of harassment or delay.”), aff’d, 2019

CO 81.

V. Disposition

¶ 23 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.