Marriage of Meincke

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2161
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2161 Marriage of Meincke 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2161 Arapahoe County District Court No. 24DR30026 Honorable Frank Moschetti, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Raymond Meincke,

Appellee,

and

Stephanie Lynn Scott,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025

Griner Legal, LLC, Amy D. Griner, Lakewood, Colorado, for Appellee

Suazo Law LLC, Ian Z. Shea, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Stephanie Scott (wife) appeals the permanent orders entered

on the dissolution of her marriage to Raymond Meincke (husband).

She specifically challenges the property division and allocation of

decision-making responsibility. We reverse and remand for

additional proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 After approximately five years of marriage and one child,

husband petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage. At the time,

husband lived in his premarital home (Centennial home), and wife

resided in the marital home.

¶3 The parties waived spousal maintenance and agreed to joint

decision-making responsibility and equal parenting time. But they

disputed the allocation of marital assets and debts as well as the

payment of child support.

¶4 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court entered

permanent orders. In its oral ruling, the court found that neither

party was “entirely truthful about money” and that “[husband]

play[ed] fast and loose with his — assets, with his actions done

towards those assets.” As to the marital assets and debts, the court

1 • awarded the marital home to wife and the Centennial

home to husband;

• classified a $32,000 debt from a loan made by husband’s

father to wife as wife’s “separate” and “non-marital”

obligation;

• classified a $40,561 line of credit as wife’s “separate

debt”; and

• designated a $14,151 attorney fee debt as wife’s separate

obligation.

The court also ruled that

• the child “will continue with daycare and subsequent

schooling” as “[wife] deems appropriate, consistent with

the stipulations in the parenting plan”; and

• child care must be included in the child support

calculation, and “[e]ither [party] may choose to do what

they think is in their child’s best interest. . . . [T]he $500

a month by [wife] . . . is consistent with the monthly

expenses that are out there.”

2 ¶5 The court adopted husband’s spreadsheet as the basis for its

property division, except for recommended equalization payment

from wife:

Husband’s Marital Asset Marital Value Wife’s Award Award Marital Home $35,836 $35,836 Centennial Home $138,000 $138,000 Ford Escape $22,004 $22,004 Bank Accounts $23,592 $811 $22,781 Retirement Accounts $314,230 $190,227 $124,003 Debts ($108,346) ($33,443) ($74,903) TOTAL $425,316 $215,435 $209,881

It then instructed husband to submit a written proposed order.

¶6 As directed, husband filed a proposed order. In it, he omitted

the court’s credibility findings, noted that his father’s loan was “not

a marital debt,” awarded husband “all marital equity” in the

Centennial home, and stated that “each party may choose their own

childcare during [their] parenting time.” The proposed order also

awarded husband multiple Navy Federal Credit Union bank

accounts and a Charles Schwab investment account that it

designated as husband’s “separate property with no marital value

that exceed[ed] the value at the time of the marriage.”

3 ¶7 Without waiting for wife’s response, the district court signed

husband’s proposed order. It then denied wife’s request to set aside

the order.

¶8 On appeal, wife contends that the district court erred (1) in

classifying, valuing, and dividing the marital assets and debts;

(2) by allowing each party to make their own child care decisions;

and (3) by adopting husband’s proposed permanent orders without

first giving her an opportunity to object.

II. Property and Debt Division

¶9 Wife challenges the district court’s (1) calculation of the

marital value of the Centennial home; (2) classification of the loan

balance, line of credit, and attorney fees as her separate debt; and

(3) classification of husband’s bank and investment accounts as his

separate property. We address each issue in turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 10 “When dividing a marital estate, a district court must first

determine whether an asset or debt is marital or separate.” In re

Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 9; see § 14-10-113(1),

C.R.S. 2025. The court then must value the marital property and

4 equitably divide it, though the division need not be equal.

Capparelli, ¶ 9; see § 14-10-113(1).

¶ 11 Subject to exceptions not relevant here, all property acquired

during the marriage is presumed marital. Capparelli, ¶ 10; § 14-10-

113(2)-(3). And property acquired before the marriage is separate.

In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 8; see § 14-10-113(4). The

spouse claiming that property is not marital bears the burden of

proving that the property retained its separate character. In re

Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 41.

¶ 12 The classification of property as marital or separate is a legal

determination based on the district court’s factual findings.

Capparelli, ¶ 8. While we defer to the court’s factual findings, we

review its legal determinations de novo. Id.

¶ 13 The district court “has broad discretion to determine an

equitable division of the marital assets and debts.” Id. at ¶ 7. We

won’t disturb that division absent an abuse of discretion “that,

when viewed in relation to the property division as a whole, ‘affects

the substantial rights of the parties.’” LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3,

¶ 61 (quoting In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36 (Colo.

5 2001)). The court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law.

Smith, ¶ 65.

B. Centennial Home

¶ 14 It’s undisputed that the Centennial home is husband’s

separate property. At the time of the marriage, husband used the

Centennial home as a rental property. It was valued at $390,000

with a $378,179 mortgage, leaving $11,821 in equity. Wife testified

that the parties paid the mortgage with a combination of the rental

income and marital funds. By the time of the permanent orders

hearing, the home was valued at $528,000 and the mortgage had

dropped to $329,337, increasing the equity to $198,663. Thus,

during the marriage, the Centennial home’s equity increased by

$186,842.1

¶ 15 The district court did not consider the equity increase.

Instead, it found that the marital value of the Centennial home was

$138,000 based on the difference in the property’s market value on

the date of the marriage ($390,000) and on the date of the hearing

($528,000).

1 Subtracting $11,821 (equity at the time of the marriage) from

$198,663 (equity at the time of the hearing) equals $186,842.

6 ¶ 16 By doing that, the court erred. That’s because when marital

funds reduce debt on separate property — as happened here — the

resulting equity increase is marital property. See In re Marriage of

Cardona, 321 P.3d 518, 522 (Colo. App. 2010) (concluding that

rental income used to pay down the mortgage was marital income),

aff’d on other grounds, 2014 CO 3; see also In re Marriage of

Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. App. 2001) (noting that equity from

use of marital funds to pay off separate debts must be considered in

property division). The court therefore erred by failing to account

for the $186,842 of marital equity in the Centennial home.

C. Husband’s Father Loan

¶ 17 Husband testified that during the marriage, his father loaned

wife $50,000 to cover “therapeutic care” for her child from a

previous relationship. Husband’s father deposited the funds into a

joint account that he shared with husband. Husband then

withdrew $35,000 and paid off marital credit cards that had been

used to pay for the therapeutic care. Wife repaid husband’s father

$18,000, leaving a $32,000 loan balance. Husband’s father later

filed an action against wife for breach of contract, and, in turn, she

7 impleaded husband as a third-party defendant. That lawsuit was

pending at the time of the permanent orders hearing.

¶ 18 Because it was the subject of a pending civil suit, the district

court classified the $32,000 loan balance as wife’s separate debt.

¶ 19 Because the loan was incurred during the marriage, however,

the debt was presumptively marital. See Capparelli, ¶¶ 10, 18; see

also In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 6 (student loans

incurred during marriage were marital debt). The district court

cited no legal authority — and we’re aware of none — that says the

presumption of marital debt may be overcome when that debt

becomes the subject of a separate civil action. See In re Marriage of

Blaine, 2021 CO 13, ¶ 3 (“[A] party may overcome the marital

property presumption . . . only through the four statutory

exceptions set forth in section 14-10-113(2).”). And the district

court didn’t find — and husband doesn’t argue — that the debt fell

under any of the statutory exceptions. See § 14-10-113(3); Smith,

¶ 41.

¶ 20 For that reason, the district court erred by classifying the

$32,000 loan balance as wife’s separate debt.

8 D. Line of Credit

¶ 21 Wife took out a $50,000 line of credit shortly after husband

filed for divorce, using it to finish the basement in the marital

home. Due in part to that improvement, the home’s appraised

value increased from $521,000 to $547,000. At the hearing, the

line of credit had a $40,561 balance.

¶ 22 Husband asserted that the remaining debt was wife’s alone

because she had opened the line of credit without informing him

and did not share the funds with him.

¶ 23 The district court accepted the $547,000 valuation of the

marital home but determined that the $40,561 line of credit was

wife’s separate obligation.

¶ 24 The line of credit arose during the marriage (and was used to

enhance the value of the marital home), triggering the presumption

of marital debt. See Capparelli, ¶¶ 10, 18. Husband points to no

evidence rebutting that presumption, nor does he argue that the

debt falls within a statutory exception. See § 14-10-113(3); Smith,

¶ 41. The district court therefore erred by excluding the $40,561

line of credit from the marital estate.

9 E. Attorney Fees

¶ 25 During the marriage, wife incurred attorney fees in a custody

dispute against the father of her other children. Husband said that

the outstanding $14,151 in fees should be classified as wife’s

separate debt because it did not “advance the marriage.” Wife

testified that, although the custody dispute started before the

marriage, husband was aware of the ongoing proceedings, and she

had “paid those litigation expenses that predated the marriage prior

to the marriage.”2

¶ 26 The district court classified the $14,151 debt as wife’s

separate obligation. But again, because the attorney fees were

incurred during the marriage and the court found no statutory

exception, the debt was presumptively marital. See § 14-10-113(3);

Capparelli, ¶¶ 10, 18; Smith, ¶ 41. Thus, the court erred by

classifying the fees as wife’s separate debt.

2 A stipulated invoice exhibit submitted before the permanent

orders hearing corroborates wife’s testimony that the attorney fees stemmed from work done during the marriage. The invoice also shows a $5,000 “[c]lient [d]iscount,” reducing the attorney fees debt from $14,151 to $9,151. However, neither party addresses the invoice on appeal, and it’s unclear whether the invoice was admitted during the hearing or otherwise considered by the district court.

10 F. Bank and Investment Accounts

¶ 27 At the hearing, husband maintained that the following

premarital bank and investment accounts remained his separate

property:

Value at Value at Permanent Institution Type Marriage Orders Hearing Navy Federal Checking $16,227 $3,804 Credit Union #4721 Navy Federal Savings $111 $55 Credit Union #4200 Charles Brokerage $71,865 $31,000 Schwab #5721

And he testified that the balances had not appreciated since the

marriage.

¶ 28 But husband acknowledged that $71,929 from the sale of the

parties’ Florida home, which had been held in their joint account,

was deposited into his checking account. He also admitted that he

transferred $15,000 in marital funds from his checking account

into a TD Ameritrade account. Moreover, husband’s checking

account was jointly titled with his father, who deposited the loan to

wife into that account.

11 ¶ 29 Regarding the savings account, husband testified that he was

not sure whether marital funds had been contributed.

¶ 30 As for the brokerage account, husband admitted that he

actively traded from it during the marriage. He testified that he

deposited $2,229 from unspecified “outside accounts” in 2021;

another $6,200 from “outside accounts” in 2022; and $20,400 in

“marital money” in 2023. He also indicated that some of the

brokerage account helped finance marital real estate, which was

later “rolled into” the Florida home purchase.

¶ 31 Despite this evidence, the district court adopted husband’s

asset spreadsheet and proposed permanent orders awarding the

three accounts to husband as his separate property. The court did

not address tracing, commingling, or appreciation. See In re

Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 11 (to remain separate,

premarital property that has been comingled with marital property

must be traced back to its separate form); see also Capparelli, ¶ 11

(separate property placed in joint ownership during the marriage is

presumed marital); Wright, ¶ 8 (the increase in value of separate

property during marriage is marital property subject to division).

Nor did the court consider third-party contributions to the checking

12 account. Each of those issues involves fact-intensive inquiries that

demand specific findings. See LaFleur, ¶¶ 64-65 (reversing property

division because appellate court could not determine whether

premarital assets and debts were separate or marital property); In re

Marriage of Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 586 (Colo. App. 2001) (reversing

property division because appellate court could not determine

whether the husband’s assets had been commingled or whether the

assets had appreciated during the marriage and should have been

included in the marital estate).

¶ 32 Without such findings, we are unable to determine whether

husband’s accounts are marital or separate property. See Wright,

¶ 20 (district court must make sufficient findings to permit

meaningful appellate review). We therefore must reverse the district

court’s determination that the Navy Federal Credit Union bank

accounts and the Charles Schwab investment account were

husband’s separate property.

G. The Errors Require Reversal

¶ 33 Collectively, the district court’s errors impacted “a large

percentage of the marital estate” (which totaled over $1.2 million)

and thus affected the parties’ substantial rights. Balanson, 25 P.3d

13 at 36; see C.R.C.P. 61. We therefore must reverse and remand the

court’s property division for reconsideration. See Balanson, 25 P.3d

at 36; In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 894 (Colo. App.

2003) (remanding for new property division after the district court

failed to account for and divide $200,000 of marital property).

III. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶ 34 Wife next takes issue with the portion of the permanent orders

stating that “each party may choose their own childcare during his

or her parenting time.” She contends that order is inconsistent

with the court’s oral ruling. We conclude that further findings are

necessary.

¶ 35 The parenting plan states that “[e]ach party may select

daycare providers, babysitters or other such providers” for the child

during their respective parenting times.

¶ 36 At the hearing, husband testified that his mother provided free

child care during his parenting time. And in calculating the

appropriate child care expenses to be included on the child support

worksheet, husband wanted each party to choose and pay for their

own child care. By contrast, wife asked that she remain

responsible for arranging and paying $560 per month for after-

14 school care and summer camp. She testified that her daycare

provider was “better for” the child because it was close to the child’s

school and the child had many friends there.

¶ 37 The district court adopted the parties’ parenting plan and

orally ruled both that wife would continue to manage the child’s

“daycare and subsequent schooling” and that “[e]ither parent may

choose to do what they think is in their child’s best interest.” The

court added $560 a month to the child support worksheet. The

written permanent orders state that “each party may choose their

own childcare” during their respective parenting time.

¶ 38 Because there are inconsistencies between the oral and

written permanent orders, we are unable to determine from this

record whether the court adopted the parenting plan — which

allows each party to select child care during their respective

parenting time — or intended something else. To the extent the

court meant to deviate from the parenting plan, the permanent

orders do not contain any finding that such a deviation was in the

child’s best interests. Additionally, to the extent the court intended

to allow each party to choose their own child care, the child support

calculation — which is based on wife paying for “full time” child

15 care — doesn’t reflect that intent. Both inconsistencies require

clarification on remand. See Wright, ¶ 20.

IV. Remand Instructions

¶ 39 We reverse the district court’s property division and direct the

court to reexamine the entire property division.3 See Capparelli,

¶ 26. In doing so, the court must (1) recalculate the Centennial

home’s marital value to account for the $186,842 increase in

equity, see Cardona, 321 P.3d at 522; (2) reclassify the loan, line of

credit, and attorney fees as marital debts, see Capparelli, ¶ 26; and

(3) make findings on whether husband’s bank and investment

accounts retained their separate character, see LaFleur, ¶¶ 64-65;

Wright, ¶ 20.

¶ 40 Except for the Centennial home’s recalculated equity, the

district court must use the same property and debt valuations from

the permanent orders. See Capparelli, ¶ 26; § 14-10-113(5). The

court must examine the asset and debt divisions based on the

3 Because we are reversing the entire property division, we needn’t

consider wife’s contention that the district court erred by signing husband’s proposed permanent orders without first giving her a fair opportunity to object or suggest changes. See C.R.C.P. 121, § 1- 16(1) (allowing a party seven days to object to a proposed order).

16 parties’ current circumstances, see Capparelli, ¶ 26; § 14-10-

113(1)(c), and the court may take additional evidence as it deems

necessary, see Corak, ¶ 21. While the division must be equitable,

we express no opinion on how the court should divide the marital

assets and debts. See Capparelli, ¶¶ 9, 18; § 14-10-113(1).

¶ 41 Because we’re reversing the property division, we also reverse

the portion of the permanent orders addressing child support. See

In re Marriage of Singewald, 535 P.2d 252, 254 (Colo. App. 1975)

(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (reversing maintenance and

child support awards because they were “inextricably intertwined”

with an erroneous property division); cf. In re Marriage of de Koning,

2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 (collecting cases requiring the district court to

reevaluate maintenance and attorney fees awards in light of an

updated property division because “the issues are interdependent”).

¶ 42 Finally, the district court should clarify whether the parties

can choose their own child care and factor that determination into

its child support calculation. When appropriate, the court should

make specific findings that its child care determination is in the

child’s best interests.

17 V. Disposition

¶ 43 We reverse the portions of the permanent orders involving the

property division, child support, and decision-making

responsibility, and we remand the case for additional proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.