24CA1797 Marriage of Martinez 08-14-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1797 Weld County District Court No. 23DR218 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Christina Ellen Martinez n/k/a Christina LoneBear,
Appellant,
and
Matthew James Martinez,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 14, 2025
Christina Ellen Martinez n/k/a Christina LoneBear, Pro Se
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding between Christina
Ellen Martinez, n/k/a Christina LoneBear (mother), and Matthew
James Martinez (father), mother appeals portions of the permanent
orders. We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, the parties jointly petitioned to dissolve their nearly
fifteen-year marriage. After a hearing, the district court entered
permanent orders. As to the parties’ then-seven-year-old son, the
court designated mother the primary residential parent with sole
decision-making authority and awarded father parenting time three
weekends a month. The court also ordered father to pay monthly
maintenance and child support.
¶3 Mother appeals portions of the permanent orders concerning
parenting time. She also contends that the district court incorrectly
calculated her gross income for purposes of awarding maintenance
and child support.
II. Addiction Treatment
¶4 As we understand it, mother first asserts that the district
court failed to acknowledge that father has a pornography addiction
1 that affects his ability to care for the child and that the court erred
by not addressing father’s “need for inpatient addiction treatment.”
¶5 But the record shows that the district court considered and
addressed father’s pornography use. The court specifically rejected
father’s testimony that he no longer accessed online pornography,
and it ordered father to “continue individual therapy,” complete an
evaluation “to determine whether he has a pornography addiction,”
and “follow up with any therapies or other treatment recommended
by the evaluator.” And the court disagreed with mother’s argument
that father’s pornography use affected his ability to care for the
child. Rather, crediting the report of the child and family
investigator as well as the testimony of other professionals “involved
with [the child],” the court found that father “is a fit, appropriate
and loving parent.”
¶6 Though mother disagrees with the court’s findings and refusal
to order inpatient treatment, to the extent mother asks us to draw
different evidentiary inferences or reweigh the evidence, that’s not
our role. See In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur
supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled confidence in trial
courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”). We therefore reject mother’s
2 contention that the district court failed to consider father’s ability to
appropriately parent the child due to his pornography use.
III. Parenting Time
¶7 Mother next challenges the parenting time order. Specifically,
she says that allowing father three weekends a month of parenting
time was not in the child’s best interests and was contrary to the
recommendations of the child and family investigator.
¶8 Allocating parenting time is a matter within the sound
discretion of the district court. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d
326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based
on a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA
141, ¶ 25.
¶9 When allocating parenting time, the district court must focus
on the child’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the
child’s safety and their physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs. See §§ 14-10-123.4(1)(a), 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S.
2024; see also In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 17. To
make this determination, the court must consider all relevant
3 factors, including those factors identified in section 14-10-
124(1.5)(a) and (b). Morgan, ¶¶ 17, 21.
¶ 10 The court carefully considered the statutory factors; the
testimony of the parties, teachers, and therapists; and the child and
family investigator’s report. It credited testimony that father was a
good parent and engaged the child in ways that mother did not.
And though the court recognized that the child and family
investigator recommended that father have parenting time “every
other weekend,” the court found that allowing father parenting time
three weekends a month would “more likely” serve the child’s need
for “stability and predictability,” as well as “provide frequent and
continuing contact with father.” Still, recognizing the child’s
particular need for consistency, the court declined to order
additional parenting time for father during the week.
¶ 11 Though mother asks us to reach a different parenting time
decision, the district court applied the correct legal standard and
made findings supported by the record. Thus, we will neither
reweigh the evidence nor disturb the parenting time order.
4 IV. Mother’s Income
¶ 12 Mother contends that the district court miscalculated her
gross income for purposes of maintenance and child support.
¶ 13 Child support and maintenance are calculated using each
parent’s actual gross income. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c)(I), C.R.S.
2024; § 14-10-115(3)(c), (5)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024. Gross income
includes income “from any source,” other than certain listed
exceptions that are not applicable here. §§ 14-10-114(8), -115(3)(c),
(5)(a)(I); In re Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 15. We review
a court’s maintenance and child support orders, including its
determination of the parties’ incomes, for an abuse of discretion. In
re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶¶ 12, 21, 27.
¶ 14 The district court found that mother’s monthly gross income
totaled $3,335. That calculation included $1,875 per month from
mother’s part-time employment. It also included — over mother’s
objection — $1,460 per month that mother received to care for the
child through the “disabled children care program” (waiver
program). § 25.5-6-901, C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 15 Mother says that because the money she receives from the
waiver program is excludable from gross income under federal law,
5 see I.R.S. Notice 2014-7, 2014-4 I.R.B. 445, the district court erred
by including the monthly waiver program payments in her gross
income to calculate maintenance and child support.
¶ 16 But “[t]he determination of a parent’s gross income for child
support purposes is not controlled by definitions of gross income
used for federal or state income tax purposes.” In re Marriage of
Cardona, 321 P.3d 518, 526 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other
grounds, 2014 CO 3. To the extent that mother relies on In re
Marriage of Bolding-Roberts, 113 P.3d 1265 (Colo. App. 2005), to
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24CA1797 Marriage of Martinez 08-14-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1797 Weld County District Court No. 23DR218 Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Christina Ellen Martinez n/k/a Christina LoneBear,
Appellant,
and
Matthew James Martinez,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 14, 2025
Christina Ellen Martinez n/k/a Christina LoneBear, Pro Se
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding between Christina
Ellen Martinez, n/k/a Christina LoneBear (mother), and Matthew
James Martinez (father), mother appeals portions of the permanent
orders. We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, the parties jointly petitioned to dissolve their nearly
fifteen-year marriage. After a hearing, the district court entered
permanent orders. As to the parties’ then-seven-year-old son, the
court designated mother the primary residential parent with sole
decision-making authority and awarded father parenting time three
weekends a month. The court also ordered father to pay monthly
maintenance and child support.
¶3 Mother appeals portions of the permanent orders concerning
parenting time. She also contends that the district court incorrectly
calculated her gross income for purposes of awarding maintenance
and child support.
II. Addiction Treatment
¶4 As we understand it, mother first asserts that the district
court failed to acknowledge that father has a pornography addiction
1 that affects his ability to care for the child and that the court erred
by not addressing father’s “need for inpatient addiction treatment.”
¶5 But the record shows that the district court considered and
addressed father’s pornography use. The court specifically rejected
father’s testimony that he no longer accessed online pornography,
and it ordered father to “continue individual therapy,” complete an
evaluation “to determine whether he has a pornography addiction,”
and “follow up with any therapies or other treatment recommended
by the evaluator.” And the court disagreed with mother’s argument
that father’s pornography use affected his ability to care for the
child. Rather, crediting the report of the child and family
investigator as well as the testimony of other professionals “involved
with [the child],” the court found that father “is a fit, appropriate
and loving parent.”
¶6 Though mother disagrees with the court’s findings and refusal
to order inpatient treatment, to the extent mother asks us to draw
different evidentiary inferences or reweigh the evidence, that’s not
our role. See In re Marriage of Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur
supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled confidence in trial
courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”). We therefore reject mother’s
2 contention that the district court failed to consider father’s ability to
appropriately parent the child due to his pornography use.
III. Parenting Time
¶7 Mother next challenges the parenting time order. Specifically,
she says that allowing father three weekends a month of parenting
time was not in the child’s best interests and was contrary to the
recommendations of the child and family investigator.
¶8 Allocating parenting time is a matter within the sound
discretion of the district court. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d
326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007). A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based
on a misapplication of the law. In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA
141, ¶ 25.
¶9 When allocating parenting time, the district court must focus
on the child’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to the
child’s safety and their physical, mental, and emotional conditions
and needs. See §§ 14-10-123.4(1)(a), 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S.
2024; see also In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 17. To
make this determination, the court must consider all relevant
3 factors, including those factors identified in section 14-10-
124(1.5)(a) and (b). Morgan, ¶¶ 17, 21.
¶ 10 The court carefully considered the statutory factors; the
testimony of the parties, teachers, and therapists; and the child and
family investigator’s report. It credited testimony that father was a
good parent and engaged the child in ways that mother did not.
And though the court recognized that the child and family
investigator recommended that father have parenting time “every
other weekend,” the court found that allowing father parenting time
three weekends a month would “more likely” serve the child’s need
for “stability and predictability,” as well as “provide frequent and
continuing contact with father.” Still, recognizing the child’s
particular need for consistency, the court declined to order
additional parenting time for father during the week.
¶ 11 Though mother asks us to reach a different parenting time
decision, the district court applied the correct legal standard and
made findings supported by the record. Thus, we will neither
reweigh the evidence nor disturb the parenting time order.
4 IV. Mother’s Income
¶ 12 Mother contends that the district court miscalculated her
gross income for purposes of maintenance and child support.
¶ 13 Child support and maintenance are calculated using each
parent’s actual gross income. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c)(I), C.R.S.
2024; § 14-10-115(3)(c), (5)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2024. Gross income
includes income “from any source,” other than certain listed
exceptions that are not applicable here. §§ 14-10-114(8), -115(3)(c),
(5)(a)(I); In re Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 15. We review
a court’s maintenance and child support orders, including its
determination of the parties’ incomes, for an abuse of discretion. In
re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶¶ 12, 21, 27.
¶ 14 The district court found that mother’s monthly gross income
totaled $3,335. That calculation included $1,875 per month from
mother’s part-time employment. It also included — over mother’s
objection — $1,460 per month that mother received to care for the
child through the “disabled children care program” (waiver
program). § 25.5-6-901, C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 15 Mother says that because the money she receives from the
waiver program is excludable from gross income under federal law,
5 see I.R.S. Notice 2014-7, 2014-4 I.R.B. 445, the district court erred
by including the monthly waiver program payments in her gross
income to calculate maintenance and child support.
¶ 16 But “[t]he determination of a parent’s gross income for child
support purposes is not controlled by definitions of gross income
used for federal or state income tax purposes.” In re Marriage of
Cardona, 321 P.3d 518, 526 (Colo. App. 2010), aff’d on other
grounds, 2014 CO 3. To the extent that mother relies on In re
Marriage of Bolding-Roberts, 113 P.3d 1265 (Colo. App. 2005), to
assert that the waiver payments should not have been counted as
income, we disagree. That case involved payments that constituted
income to the child. Id. at 1268. Mother does not argue that the
waiver program payments that she receives to care for the child are
income to the child. And mother provides no other authority or
argument explaining why the waiver program payments are
excluded from Colorado’s “broad statutory definition” of gross
income. In re A.M.D., 78 P.3d 741, 743-44 (Colo. 2003).
¶ 17 We therefore cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by including the waiver program payments in mother’s
gross income to calculate child support and maintenance.
6 V. Mother’s Income Loss
¶ 18 Finally, because she did not raise it in the district court, we
will not consider mother’s appellate argument that the district court
erred by not considering her lost waiver program payments under
the new parenting time schedule when it calculated child support
and maintenance. See In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107,
¶ 38 (declining to review as unpreserved an issue that was never
raised before or decided by the district court).
VI. Disposition
¶ 19 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.