25CA0544 Marriage of Martin 04-30-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0544 El Paso County District Court No. 23DR31739 Honorable Catherine Mitchell Helton, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Angela D. Martin,
Appellee,
and
Richard J. Martin,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 30, 2026
Cage Lewis Weiman, LLC, Jamie L. Cage, Allyson C. Beyer, Glendale, Colorado, for Appellee
McClintock Criminal Defense, P.C., Theodore P. McClintock, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Richard J. Martin (husband) appeals the division of marital
property and maintenance portions of the permanent orders entered
in connection with the dissolution of his marriage with Angela D.
Martin (wife). He also asserts that the district court didn’t provide
him due process when it placed time limits on the permanent
orders hearing. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 1993. During the marriage, husband
served in, and retired from, the military. Based on his military
service, husband received military retirement benefits and Veterans’
Affairs disability benefits (VA disability benefits).
¶3 In 2016, husband started his own business selling homes and
providing property management services. Husband owned one
hundred percent of the business. The parties’ adult son joined the
enterprise as an employee and worked to grow the business’s
property management side.
¶4 Following a permanent orders hearing, the district court
dissolved the marriage and made the following relevant findings:
• Husband was the sole owner of his business.
1 • Wife’s expert, who valued husband’s business at
$294,500, was credible. He explained the numbers he
used, his sources were reliable, and his method of
valuation was appropriate.
• Husband’s expert, who opined that the business was
worth $62,000, valued the business “from the perspective
of [it] being sold now,” which was “not the situation”
because husband testified that he wanted to keep the
business.
• Husband testified that he couldn’t work as much as he
once did and would like to slow down, but no evidence
suggested he would no longer be a part of the business or
would sell it.
• The value of the business, which the court awarded to
husband, was $294,500.
• Husband’s annual income was $133,517 based on an
average of his earnings in 2022 and 2023.
• Husband’s VA disability benefits weren’t marital property
to be divided in permanent orders, but they could be
2 included as income in the court’s determination of a
maintenance award to wife.
II. Procedural Due Process
¶5 Husband first argues that the district court didn’t allow him to
fully present his case in violation of his procedural due process
rights. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶6 A meaningful opportunity to be heard is an inherent element
of due process. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329
(Colo. App. 2007). Parties are entitled to have sufficient time in
which to orderly present their case. See In re Marriage of Salby,
126 P.3d 291, 302 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶7 A district court’s interest in administrative efficiency may not
take precedence over a party’s right to due process. In re Marriage
of Goldin, 923 P.2d 376, 382 (Colo. App. 1996). The court, however,
may set a time limit on a hearing from the outset and monitor the
parties’ use of their time during the hearing. See Maloney v.
Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1102-05 (Colo. App. 2010); CRE 611(a)
(“The [district] court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode
3 and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to . . . avoid needless consumption of time.”).
¶8 We review a district court’s imposition of time limits at a trial
for an abuse of discretion. Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1102. A court
abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair,
or unreasonable manner, or when it misapplies the law. In re
Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.
B. Additional Facts
¶9 The district court initially set the permanent orders hearing for
two hours. Husband moved for a full day hearing, contending that
the parties intended to call three experts and that the hearing
would include several complicated issues, such as the valuation of
husband’s business, consideration of husband’s military benefits
and two marital properties, and wife’s maintenance request. The
court granted husband’s motion, in part, and extended the hearing
to four hours. In the parties’ joint management trial certificate
(JTMC), husband again asked for a full-day hearing, reiterating that
the case was complex, involved experts, and required the testimony
of the parties’ adult son, who worked for husband’s business;
husband’s doctor; an individual who recently sold a similar
4 business to that of husband; two other property managers/agents;
and his own lengthy testimony. Following a review of the JTMC, the
court extended the hearing to five hours. In doing so, the court
recited husband’s proposed evidence and witnesses relating to his
business, but it also stated that “[a]dditional lay testimony will
likely not be helpful to the [c]ourt.”
¶ 10 At the outset of the hearing, husband’s counsel again
requested a full-day hearing. The court denied the request,
informing husband’s counsel that a full-day hearing amounted to
about three hours and fifteen minutes per side, and the court had
already granted the parties two hours and thirty minutes per side.
Throughout the hearing, the court reminded husband’s counsel of
his remaining time on at least five occasions and even allowed
husband’s testimony to go slightly over his allotted time so that he
could finish it.
¶ 11 The court also allowed the parties to submit written closing
arguments, noting that although it granted husband some
additional time, it didn’t grant all the time he requested. And at the
close of the hearing, the court allowed husband’s counsel to make
an offer of proof regarding the additional witnesses she would have
5 called on husband’s behalf if the court had not placed a time limit
on the parties’ presentations of their cases. In that offer of proof,
husband’s counsel told the court that the two property
manager/agents would have “talked about the industry and the
level of work and extra time as both property managers and real
estate agents” and that another witness “would have testified with
respect to the sale of her business for $93,000, which is a company
similar [to husband’s] except they have [more property management
clients].” Husband’s counsel also stated that, if her time had not
been limited, she would have expanded on husband’s testimony
because “there were things that we had rushed through that were
important to him.”
C. Analysis
¶ 12 Given the court’s advance notice, its communication at the
hearing, its flexibility to revise time limitations, and its allowance of
written closing arguments, we aren’t persuaded that the court
violated husband’s due process rights by limiting the time available
for the hearing. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1103 (listing factors to
determine whether the court’s time limitation was improper).
6 ¶ 13 Still, husband contends that he didn’t receive enough time to
present his case. He argues that he wasn’t able to demonstrate the
proper valuation of his business because the court didn’t afford him
sufficient time to present the testimony of the witness who had
recently sold a similar business or the testimony of other property
manager/agents about the hours and amount of work involved in
his profession. But as the district court found, because no evidence
suggested that husband intended to sell his business, testimony
regarding the sale of a similar business wouldn’t have been helpful
to the court. Moreover, the testimony of other property
manager/agents would have been duplicative because husband and
wife testified at length about how many hours husband and their
son worked at the business.
¶ 14 Husband also argues he didn’t have adequate time to
thoroughly discuss his VA disability benefits and the reduction in
the amount of those benefits once the dissolution proceedings were
finalized. Although husband included this information in his
portion of the JTMC, he never informed the court that he lacked
sufficient time to provide this information at the hearing nor did he
address the reduced amount of VA disability benefits in his written
7 closing arguments. Thus, this contention doesn’t change our
conclusion that the time limitations that the court imposed didn’t
violate husband’s due process rights.
¶ 15 In sum, the district court’s time management didn’t appear
inflexible or unduly restrictive during the hearing. The court
periodically reminded the parties of their remaining time, allowed
husband to provide a summary of the evidence he was unable to
present given the time limits, and permitted the parties to submit
written closing arguments. See id. at 1103-05. Thus, the court’s
imposition of a time limit of two and a half hours per side didn’t
constitute an abuse of discretion. See id. at 1103.
III. VA Disability Benefits
¶ 16 Husband next argues that the district court erred when it
included his VA disability benefits as income when determining
maintenance. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 17 We review maintenance orders for an abuse of discretion but
review de novo the legal standard applied by the court. In re
Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12.
8 ¶ 18 In determining maintenance, the court must calculate each
party’s gross income. Id. at ¶ 12. Gross income includes income
“from any source,” other than certain listed exceptions not
applicable here, and specifically includes disability insurance
benefits. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c)(I)(S), C.R.S. 2025.
B. Analysis
¶ 19 Husband argues that the court erred because the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408, prohibits state courts from dividing or assigning VA
disability benefits. But because the court didn’t divide or assign his
VA disability benefits when it included them in its income
calculation, it did not err.
¶ 20 Military retirement benefits are generally distributable as
marital property in a dissolution of marriage case. 10 U.S.C.
§ 1405; In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 530 (Colo. 1995).
Distributable benefits, however, are limited to “disposable retired
pay,” which is defined at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) to exclude disability
pay. Thus, federal and Colorado cases interpreting the USFSPA
hold that disability pay isn’t subject to division as part of a marital
property distribution. See Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 220
9 (2017) (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989)); see
also In re Marriage of Tozer, 2017 COA 151, ¶ 13 (disability
retirement is not disposable retired pay under the USFSPA and is
not subject to division as marital property); In re Marriage of
Williamson, 205 P.3d 538, 540 (Colo. App. 2009) (same); In re
Marriage of Franz, 831 P.2d 917, 918 (Colo. App. 1992) (same).
¶ 21 Husband argues that Howell is instructive because it stands
for the proposition that the USFSPA prohibits a state from treating
VA disability benefits as divisible community property.
¶ 22 But husband misses an important distinction. Howell
discusses only whether a court may divide or assign VA disability
benefits when allocating marital property during a dissolution
proceeding. Nothing in Howell or in the USFSPA addresses whether
a state — by statute or judicial decision — may treat VA disability
benefits as income for purposes of calculating a support obligation.
Rather, Howell stated that a state court “remains free to take
account of the contingency that some military retirement pay might
be waived, or, as the petitioner himself recognizes, take account of
reductions in value when it calculates or recalculates the need for
10 spousal support.” Howell, 581 U.S. at 222 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481
U.S. 619, 630-34 (1987)).
¶ 23 Husband acknowledges that a division of this court held that
VA disability benefits can be included when calculating a veteran-
parent’s income when determining the parent’s child support
obligation. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.E.R-L.,
2020 COA 173, ¶ 2 (“We conclude that the USFSPA does not
prohibit including such benefits in a parent’s gross income for child
support purposes.”). Still, he asserts that the same treatment of VA
disability benefits when calculating a maintenance award isn’t
warranted because after the dissolution of a marriage, the veteran
is no longer required to support the former spouse.
¶ 24 But the veteran is required to support the former spouse if the
court determines the spouse has a need for maintenance, as the
court did here. Moreover, husband cites no binding legal authority
holding that the USFSPA prohibits states from including veteran’s
disability benefits in a veteran-spouse’s income when calculating a
maintenance obligation. Nor are we aware of any such authority.
¶ 25 To the contrary, Colorado case law explicitly allows a court to
consider VA disability benefits when “determining the propriety and
11 amount of an award of spousal maintenance.” In re Marriage of
Nevil, 809 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Colo. App. 1991). And the
overwhelming majority of state courts that have considered the
issue have concluded that courts may consider military disability
benefits when setting maintenance. See In re Marriage of Morales,
214 P.3d 81, 85 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (collecting cases reaching this
outcome); Marriage of Strong v. Strong, 2000 MT 178, 8 P.3d 763,
770 (2000) (same).
¶ 26 These courts reasoned that because “‘Congress clearly
intended veterans’ disability benefits to be used, in part, for the
support of veterans’ dependents,’ ‘a state court is clearly free to
consider post-dissolution disability income and order a disabled
veteran to pay spousal support.’” Strong, 8 P.3d at 770 (citation
omitted) (first quoting Rose, 481 U.S. at 631, and then quoting
Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1263 n.9 (Alaska 1992)); but
see Ex parte Billeck, 777 So. 2d 105, 109 (Ala. 2000) (holding that
federal law precludes courts from considering VA disability
payments when awarding alimony).
¶ 27 Lastly, husband cites an unpublished court of appeals
opinion, along with Howell, Mansell, and Tozer, to assert that state
12 trial courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to order veterans to pay
spousal maintenance awards from VA disability benefits. First,
unpublished opinions announced by a division of this court have no
precedential value. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40.
Moreover, with exceptions not applicable here, this court’s policy
prohibits citations to our opinions that are not selected for official
publication. Colo. Jud. Branch, Court of Appeals Policy Concerning
Citation of Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2026),
https://perma.cc/5AZZ-KSWL.)
¶ 28 Second, husband’s argument continues to miss the mark. The
cases he cites stand for the proposition that VA disability benefits
can’t be divided or assigned, nor can state courts order that they be
used to indemnify or reimburse a spouse for arrearages. See
Howell, 581 U.S. at 220; Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594-95; Tozer, ¶ 13.
But the district court didn’t order husband to pay maintenance
from his VA disability benefits, nor did it require him to indemnify
or reimburse wife out of his VA disability benefits. Rather, it
considered the VA disability benefits — along with all of husband’s
other sources of income — to calculate husband’s gross income for
purposes of setting maintenance. This was a proper consideration
13 under Colorado law. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c)(I)(S) (including
disability benefits under the definition of income); Nevil, 809 P.2d at
1123.
IV. Valuation of Husband’s Business
¶ 29 Husband asserts that the district court erred when it valued
his business because it based its determination on husband’s
future earning potential from the business rather than its actual
value. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 30 The court has latitude to equitably divide a marital estate
based on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we won’t
disturb its decision absent a showing that the court abused its
discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28. “A
court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the
law.” In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16.
¶ 31 When dividing marital property, the court determines the
property’s approximate current value. In re Marriage of Wright,
2020 COA 11, ¶ 4. In doing so, the court may select the valuation
of one party over that of the other party or make its own valuation,
14 and we will affirm its decision if the value is reasonable in light of
the evidence as a whole. Medeiros, ¶ 41; In re Marriage of Krejci,
2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (recognizing that a valuation will be upheld
“unless clearly erroneous”).
B. Discussion
¶ 32 Wife’s proposed valuation of husband’s business, which the
district court adopted, was grounded in the evidence. The parties
stipulated that wife’s expert was qualified to offer opinions on
business valuations. He valued husband’s business at $294,000
using the capitalization of earnings method for an income approach
and the seller’s discretionary earnings method for the market
approach, and he averaged the numbers he obtained through the
two valuation methods. The expert explained that the seller’s
discretionary earnings method considers the earnings of the
company, adding back wages paid to the owner to determine the
total cash flow to the owner, and was an appropriate valuation for a
business the size of husband’s enterprise. The expert then
subtracted reasonable officer compensation from the seller’s
discretionary earnings, explaining how he arrived at each number
in his calculation. He then explained the market approach, using
15 the seller’s discretionary earnings and averaging and weighing those
earnings. He again explained his methodology and how he arrived
at each number he used in his valuation.
¶ 33 The court found wife’s expert credible, noting that he
explained the numbers he used, his sources were reliable, and his
methodology was appropriate.
¶ 34 Husband asserts that the district court erred and should have
valued the business at $64,000, the amount his expert testified the
business would sell for if it was sold on the date of the permanent
orders hearing. But the district court didn’t find this valuation
reliable or appropriate because no evidence suggested that husband
intended to sell the business. Rather, it found, with record support,
that husband wanted to keep the business and eventually allow the
parties’ son to take it over someday. Based on this evidence and
these findings, it wasn’t an abuse of discretion for the district court
to decline to base its valuation on the business’s potential sales
price.
¶ 35 Husband further argues that the “seller’s discretionary
earnings” method essentially converted his future earnings into
marital property to be divided as part of the marital estate. Thus,
16 he argues, the court didn’t value the business as of the date of the
permanent orders hearing. And he asserts that the “personal
goodwill” he brought to the company isn’t a commodity that can be
quantified or divided. But we discern no legal error in the valuation
methodology the court adopted. Instead, husband’s arguments
amount to a request that this court reweigh the credibility of the
parties’ witnesses and evidence presented, which we can’t do. See
In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (“[C]redibility
determinations and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of
the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn
therefrom, are matters within the sole discretion of the [district]
court.”); In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 270 (Colo. App. 2010)
(the district court’s resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on
review).
¶ 36 Based on the evidence and arguments before the court, the
court’s decision to calculate the value of the business using wife’s
expert testimony was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. We
therefore won’t disturb that valuation. See Krejci, ¶¶ 23, 25.
V. Disposition
¶ 37 We affirm the judgment.
17 JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.