Marriage of Maggard

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0372
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0372 Marriage of Maggard 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0372 Washington County District Court No. 24DR4 Honorable Matthew W.E. Bradley, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Brock Maggard,

Appellee,

and

Cheyenne Maggard,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026

The Harris Law Firm PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Jones Law Firm, P.C., Jessica Crawford, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Cheyenne Maggard (mother) appeals the district court

magistrate’s judgment allocating parental responsibilities in

connection with the dissolution of her marriage to Brock Maggard

(father). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother and father jointly petitioned for a dissolution of

marriage. Early in the dissolution case, the court entered

temporary orders, directing the parents to exercise equal parenting

time with their two children. The court then appointed a child and

family investigator (CFI).

¶3 After investigating, the CFI reported that both parents were

unable to control their emotions, involved the children in their

conflicts, and likely committed acts of domestic violence against

each other. The CFI also reported that, a few years earlier, mother

had left the home “for an extended period of time” and father

assumed primary caregiving responsibilities for about two years.

The CFI ultimately recommended that the parents exercise equal

parenting time, “despite all of [her] . . . concerns with both parents.”

She further recommended that, given their inability to make joint

decisions for the children, father should receive sole authority over

1 educational and extracurricular decisions and mother should

receive sole authority over medical and religious decisions.

¶4 After a hearing, the court issued permanent orders. The court

ordered that, during the school year, father would have primary

parenting time and mother would have parenting time every first,

third, and fifth weekend of the month as well as a dinner visit every

Wednesday. It further ordered that, in June and July, mother

would have primary parenting time and father would have

parenting time every first, third, and fifth weekend of the month as

well as a dinner visit every Wednesday. The court also allocated

sole decision-making responsibility over all major decisions to

father.

II. Analysis

¶5 Mother contends that the court erred by making insufficient

findings concerning its decision to allocate father majority parenting

time and sole decision-making responsibility. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 When allocating parenting time and decision-making

responsibility, the court must focus on the children’s best interests,

giving paramount consideration to the children’s safety, needs, and

2 physical, mental, and emotional conditions. See

§§ 14-10-123.4(1)(a), 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. 2025; In re

Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 7. In making its

determination, the court considers all relevant factors, including the

best interests factors identified in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (b).

See Collins, ¶ 7; In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 21.

The court need not make express findings on each of the factors,

but its findings must allow the reviewing court to determine

whether its decision is supported by competent evidence. See In re

Marriage of Fickling, 100 P.3d 571, 575 (Colo. App. 2004). “Factual

findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence which the fact

finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the issues raised.”

In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998).

¶7 The court has broad discretion over the allocation of parental

responsibilities, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse

of that discretion. See Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶¶ 23, 26. The court

abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or acts in a

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. See In re

Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. We exercise every

presumption in favor of upholding a court’s best interests decision

3 and will affirm the decision when it has record support. See Collins,

¶ 8; Morgan, ¶ 26.

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Allocated Majority Parenting Time To Father

¶8 To begin, mother suggests that the court restricted her

parenting time by allocating to her drastically less parenting time

than she previously enjoyed under the temporary orders. She also

argues that the court failed to make the necessary endangerment

finding before it restricted her parenting time. See

§§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a), 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage

of West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Colo. App. 2004). But see In re

Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 32 (concluding that “a purely

quantitative reduction in a parent’s parenting time is not a

restriction on that parent’s parenting time rights”) (cert. granted in

part July 21, 2025).

¶9 Father disagrees, arguing that the court was not required to

make an endangerment finding because a court’s quantitative

modification of temporary parenting time is not a restriction. See

Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo. 2005) (“[I]t is well

established that [temporary] orders merely allocate parental

4 responsibilities pending [the court’s final determination at

permanent orders].”); Fickling, 100 P.3d at 574 (“[T]he question

whether a restriction has occurred in parenting time need be

answered only when permanent, not temporary, orders are

modified.”). We agree with father. The best interests standard

applied to the court’s allocation of parenting time in its permanent

orders, and the court was under no obligation to make an

endangerment finding when it allocated mother less parenting time

than she enjoyed under the temporary orders. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a); Fickling, 100 P.3d at 573-74.

¶ 10 We also disagree with mother’s claim that the court made

insufficient findings to allow meaningful appellate review of its

allocation of parenting time primarily to father. After the court

recited the applicable law, it made the following relevant findings

related to the children’s best interests:

• Father was concerned that mother could not place the

children’s needs ahead of her own needs and believed

that it was in the children’s best interests to allocate

primary parenting time to him. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I), (XI).

5 • Mother had engaged in a “systematic attempt to prevent

the children from having contact” with father. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI), (VII).

• Mother filed a “groundless” motion to restrict father’s

parenting time and “used the legal process to impede and

stonewall [father’s] connection with the children.” See

• Mother had not complied with the court’s orders

concerning parenting time, refused to accommodate

father’s parenting time, needlessly involved law

enforcement when exchanging the children, and did not

allow father to have electronic contact with the children.

See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI), (VII).

• Mother “struggle[d] with emotional regulation” and could

not appropriately self-regulate. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V).

• Mother left the household for a significant period before

the dissolution case and was not present for the

children’s needs during that time. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VII).

6 ¶ 11 Following these and other findings, the court determined that

it was in the children’s best interests to allocate majority parenting

time to father, and the record supports the court’s findings. See

Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶ 26. Indeed, father testified that mother had

not allowed him to exercise all of his court-ordered parenting time

and that, during parenting time exchanges, she consistently

involved law enforcement. Father also testified that mother was

trying to impede his relationship with the children, explaining that

she filed multiple, unsuccessful motions to restrict his contact with

the children, including a groundless motion to restrict his parenting

time shortly before the permanent orders hearing. In addition,

father said that mother struggled to control her emotions, and that

before the dissolution proceedings, mother left the children in his

sole care.

¶ 12 Still, mother highlights that the court also made negative

findings against father and that the court failed to explain how it

weighed those conflicting findings when determining its allocation

7 of parenting time.1 In particular, she notes that the court found

that father contributed to the deterioration of his relationship with

the children and that he also struggled to appropriately regulate his

emotions (but to a lesser extent than mother). See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (V). She also notes that the court found

that both parents (1) inappropriately placed the children in the

middle of their adult issues; (2) committed acts of domestic

violence; (3) struggled to encourage the sharing of love, affection,

and contact between the children and the other parent;

(4) attempted to alienate the children from the other parent; and

(5) lacked the ability to place the children’s needs ahead of their

own needs. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (III.5), (VI), (VII), (XI).

¶ 13 However, it was for the district court, not us, to weigh the

conflicting evidence and the relevant factors. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a); Collins, ¶ 13; see also In re Marriage of

1 We don’t consider mother’s citation in her opening brief to an

unpublished decision by a division of this court. This court’s policy prohibits citation to our opinions that are not selected for official publication, with exceptions not applicable here. See Colo. Jud. Branch, Colorado Court of Appeals, Citation Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2025), https://perma.cc/Z88K-5U7F.

8 Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (recognizing that the district court

determines the credibility, weight, probative force, and sufficiency of

the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

from that evidence). After doing so, the court determined that it

was in the children’s best interests to allocate the majority of

parenting time to father. Implicit in that conclusion is the court’s

determination that, despite its negative findings related to father,

the factors weighed in favor of its allocation of the majority of

parenting time to him. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 21 (recognizing that a court’s

findings may be implicit in its ruling); see also Collins, ¶ 21

(presuming that the court considered all the evidence). That

implicit finding along with the remainder of the court’s findings

sufficiently explained and supported the court’s decision. See

Fickling, 100 P.3d at 575; Garst, 955 P.2d at 1058.

¶ 14 In addition, mother notes that the CFI recommended an equal

allocation of parenting time, and the court did not explain why it

deviated from that recommendation. However, neither parent asked

the court to adopt the CFI’s recommendation. Moreover, the court

was under no obligation to follow the CFI’s recommended allocation

9 of parenting time. See In re Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330,

334 (Colo. App. 1998). It was the court’s role to weigh the CFI’s

investigation and recommendation, along with the other evidence,

and determine an allocation that served the children’s best

interests. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d

1128, 1133 (Colo. 2010). And as discussed above, the court’s

findings concerning the children’s best interests sufficiently

explained the basis of its decision to allocate majority parenting

time to father.

¶ 15 The court therefore did not abuse its discretion, and its

findings sufficiently explained its allocation of parenting time.

C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Allocated All Decision-Making Responsibility To Father

¶ 16 We also reject mother’s contention that the court failed to

make sufficient findings when it allocated all decision-making

responsibility to father.

¶ 17 The court found, with record support, that mother and father

engaged in acts of domestic violence and that they could not make

decisions together for the children. As a result, the court could not

allocate joint decision-making responsibility to the parents. See

10 § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A) (directing that when the court finds that a

party has committed domestic violence, it shall not be in the

children’s best interests to allocate joint decision-making

responsibility over a party’s objection unless the court finds that

there is credible evidence that the parties can make decisions safely

and cooperatively in the children’s best interests). Then, when

deciding whether to allocate sole decision-making responsibility to

father or mother, the court considered the best interests factors,

made detailed findings on the pertinent factors, and determined

that it was in the children’s best interests to allocate decision-

making responsibility for all major decisions to father.

¶ 18 While the court did not make explicit findings on every single

factor under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and (b), it was not required

to do so. See Fickling, 100 P.3d at 575; Garst, 955 P.2d at 1058.

The court made findings on the relevant best interests factors

concerning its determination of parenting time, which were also

relevant to its allocation of decision-making responsibility.

Specifically, the court found that mother (1) attempted to

systematically prevent the children from having contact with father;

(2) struggled to regulate her emotions; (3) did not comply with the

11 court’s previous parental orders; (4) needlessly involved law

enforcement in parenting issues; and (5) left the children in father’s

primary care for a significant period before the case. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (V), (VI), (VII). It further found that the

parents were “barely able to be in the same room” together, let

alone make joint decisions cooperatively for the children. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(b)(I), (II). In addition, the court’s allocation of

parenting time meant that the children lived primarily with father.

Together, these findings demonstrate that the court considered the

relevant factors, and they provide a sufficient explanation for the

basis of the court’s ruling. See Fickling, 100 P.3d at 575; Garst,

955 P.2d at 1058.

¶ 19 Still, mother notes that the CFI recommended that the court

divide decision-making responsibility by allocating medical and

religious decisions to her and educational and extracurricular

decisions to father. She argues that the court made no specific

findings explaining why it deviated from this recommendation and

declined to allocate any decision-making responsibility to her.

However, the court’s findings in support of its allocation adequately

explained its decision, and it was not required to make any further

12 explicit findings to deviate from the CFI’s recommendation. See

Fickling, 100 P.3d at 575; Garst, 955 P.2d at 1058; see also

McNamara, 962 P.2d at 334 (recognizing that the court is not

required to adopt the CFI’s recommendation). To the extent mother

also suggests that the court should have given the CFI’s

recommendation greater weight, we will not reweigh the evidence or

set aside the court’s determination when, as here, it is supported by

the record. See Thorburn, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Evans,

2021 COA 141, ¶ 45 (“We are not at liberty to re-evaluate the

conflicting evidence and set aside findings supported by the

record.”).

¶ 20 The court therefore acted within its discretion by allocating

decision-making responsibility to father, and its findings adequately

explained its allocation.

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.