Marriage of Mackey CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/10/26 Marriage of Mackey CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re the Marriage of B349404 STEPHEN J. and HAYDEE R. MACKEY. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.

STEPHEN J. MACKEY, 22STFL01919)

Respondent,

v.

HAYDEE R. MACKEY,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Christine J. Gonong, Judge. Affirmed.

Claery & Hammond, Lance R. Claery, Kai W. Lucid, and Frederick M. Medill for Appellant.

Stephen J. Mackey, self-represented litigant, for Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Haydee Mackey appeals from an order of the family law court, which she characterizes as denying her request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Family Code section 20301 after the dissolution of her marriage. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

After Stephen Mackey2 filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Haydee, she requested need-based attorney fees pursuant to section 2030. The trial court awarded Haydee $8,000 in attorney fees on July 8, 2022, and another $8,000 in attorney fees on February 17, 2023, which fees Stephen paid.

On October 24, 2023, Haydee filed a third request for fees in the amount of $25,000.3 Stephen opposed the request for fees.

On January 17, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Haydee’s October 24, 2023, request for attorney fees and granted her request in part. The court found “that there is disparity in access to funds and ability to pay.” It ordered Stephen to pay

1 Further statutory references are to the Family Code.

2 Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names for ease of reference.

3 On October 22, 2023, counsel Ilse Williamson submitted a declaration requesting $35,000 in fees and on May 9, 2024, she filed a supplemental declaration updating the attorney fee request to $45,000. On March 14, 2025, she revised the request to $50,000.

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directly to Haydee’s counsel the sum of $4,000 no later than February 15, 2024, and continued the hearing.

On August 5, 2024, trial began on Haydee’s claims for postdissolution spousal support, division of assets, and attorney fees. During trial proceedings, Haydee’s counsel raised the issue of the “ongoing RFO4” for need-based attorney fees and requested an additional $22,502.31 in attorney fees.

On November 19, 2024, the trial court awarded Haydee $8,000 in attorney fees.

On June 30, 2025, after multiple days of testimony, the trial court issued three orders regarding spousal support, division of assets, and attorney fees. The court first addressed the request for modification of spousal support.5 The court explained, “If there were to be retroactive spousal support, it will only go back to February 1, 2024, because the motion for modification was filed on January 3, 2024.”

The trial court then explained why it denied Haydee’s request for permanent spousal support and set future spousal support to zero. It assessed the duration of the marriage at five years and determined “it will not be just for [Stephen] to continue

4 In family law proceedings under the Family Code, the term “request for order” (RFO) “has the same meaning as the terms ‘motion’ or ‘notice of motion’ when they are used in the Code of Civil Procedure.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(a)(1)(A).)

5 The record on appeal did not initially include a reporter’s transcript of the proceedings on June 30, 2025. On August 18, 2026, 50 days after briefing was completed in this appeal, Haydee filed a motion to augment the record with the reporter’s transcript of the June 30, 2025, proceeding. We grant the request.

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paying spousal support beyond two years and six months, one half of the length of [the] marriage… . [¶] … That means spousal support should be set to zero starting February 1, 2024, based on the retroactivity of that [spousal support modification] motion.”

After addressing the division of assets, the trial court considered Haydee’s request for attorney fees. The court acknowledged that “[w]hen a request for attorney[ ] fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney[ ] fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity of access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both fees.” The court then cited to section 2030, subdivision (a)(2) and found that “Here [Stephen] has significant access to funds and ability to pay. According to [his] most recent income and expense declaration, [he] has resources available to pay for [Haydee’s] and his own attorney[ ] fees. The court has received and reviewed three different billing records prepared by counsel for [Haydee].” After confirming with Haydee’s counsel that Stephen had already paid $28,000 in attorney fees, the court found that Haydee’s request for attorney fees was unreasonably high because the case had been “overly litigated. It should have settled a long time ago … that’s why I reduced the fees based on my review.” The court stated its intention to award Haydee an additional $4,000 in attorney fees.

When, however, counsel for Haydee requested that the trial court make the zero spousal support order effective the following day instead of on February 1, 2024, because Haydee did not have the ability to return the $12,750 overpayment, the court asked Stephen whether he would be willing to waive his right to the

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overpayment in exchange for Haydee waiving her right to the $4,000 attorney fees award. Stephen agreed. The court then granted Haydee’s request to make the zero spousal order effective “today” and issued a written order.6 On August 26, 2025, Haydee appealed from the trial court’s order, which she characterized as “an order denying attorney fees under [section] 2030 … .”

III. DISCUSSION

Haydee contends the trial court erred when it failed to award her attorney fees and costs in violation of section 2030, which requires such an award upon a showing of disparity in income. (§ 2030, et seq.) She further contends that the court failed to expressly find whether the awarding of fees under section 2030 was appropriate, whether there was a disparity in access to funds, and whether one party was able to pay for the legal representation of both spouses.

The record belies Haydee’s arguments on appeal. The latefiled reporter’s transcript is consistent with the written order and demonstrates that the trial court found there was a disparity in access to funds and ability to pay and that Stephen was able to pay Haydee’s attorney fees. Further, the record demonstrates and Haydee did not dispute that on June 30, 2025, the court stated its initial intention to award her another $4,000 in attorney fees, pursuant to section 2030, before Stephen agreed to waive his entitlement to $12,750 for overpayment of spousal support payments in exchange for an order awarding no further attorney fees. Indeed, Haydee agrees that “the parties reached a

6 The written order was part of the initial record on appeal.

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negotiated resolution” at the June 30, 2025, hearing but contends, without citation to authority, that such a negotiated resolution “does not cure the trial court’s legal error in failing to apply the correct standard or make the required findings.” Not only does the transcript demonstrate that the court expressly made findings under section 2030, but by agreeing to forego an additional $4,000 in attorney fees in exchange for forgiveness of the $12,750 spousal support overpayment she owed to Stephen, Haydee has forfeited her argument on appeal. (Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1210 [a party is not aggrieved by an order to which she consented]; see also Sorensen v. Lascy (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 606, 608 [“[i]t is an elementary and fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a judgment or order will not be disturbed on an appeal prosecuted by a party who consented to it”].)

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IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Stephen is awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.