Marriage of Lyons

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0972
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0972 Marriage of Lyons 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0972 Pitkin County District Court No. 22DR30012 Honorable John F. Neiley, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jennifer C. Lyons, n/k/a Jennifer Constable,

Appellee,

and

Michael Lyons,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Dunn and Harris, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026

Schaffner Law LLC, Jennifer Schaffner, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellee

Michael Lyons, Pro Se ¶1 Michael Lyons (husband) appeals the portions of the

permanent orders concerning the district court’s division of marital

property on the dissolution of his marriage to Jennifer C. Lyons,

now known as Jennifer Constable (wife). We affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In 2024, the district court dissolved the parties’ marriage of

approximately seventeen years. Following the court’s issuance of

the original permanent orders, both parties filed motions for

postjudgment relief under C.R.C.P. 59. The court granted parts of

the parties’ dueling postjudgment motions and issued amended

permanent orders.

¶3 The marital estate primarily consisted of the marital home,

which was worth approximately $443,000 and encumbered by a

mortgage with an outstanding balance of $260,000. In the

amended permanent orders, the district court allocated the marital

home and responsibility for the mortgage to wife. The court

ultimately divided the marital estate, which had a total value of

approximately $285,000, by allocating sixty percent to wife and

forty percent to husband. To achieve that division, which the court

1 found to be equitable, the court ordered wife to pay an

“equalization” payment of $95,000 to husband.

II. Tracing of Wife’s Separate Property

¶4 Husband first contends that the district court erred by making

inconsistent and insufficient findings to support its conclusion that

portions of three different retirement accounts were wife’s separate

property. We disagree.

A. Applicable Legal Standards

¶5 A property division requires two steps: first, the court

determines whether an interest constitutes “property” and then, if

so, whether it is marital or separate property. In re Marriage of

Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). The court sets aside the

spouses’ separate property and then divides the marital property.

§ 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 All property acquired during the marriage is presumed

marital. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 10;

§ 14-10-113(2), (3). Property acquired before the marriage may be

separate. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 8;

§ 14-10-113(4). The spouse claiming that property existing at

dissolution is separate because it was owned before the marriage

2 has the burden of proof to trace the property back to the original

premarital asset. In re Marriage of Dale, 87 P.3d 219, 227 (Colo.

App. 2003); see also § 14-10-113(2)(b) (excluding property that is

acquired in exchange for premarital property from division as

marital property).

¶7 The classification of property as marital or separate is a legal

determination based on the district court’s factual findings.

Capparelli, ¶ 8. While we defer to the court’s factual findings, we

review its legal determinations de novo. Id.

¶8 When, as here, the district court has granted relief under

C.R.C.P. 59, we review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. Top

Rail Ranch Ests., LLC v. Walker, 2014 COA 9, ¶ 74; see also

C.R.C.P. 59(f) (permitting the court, “if a ground exists, [to] open the

judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend

findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and

conclusions, and direct entry of a new judgment”). A court abuses

its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Top Rail Ranch, ¶ 74.

3 B. Discussion

¶9 In the original permanent orders, the district court found that

wife had not demonstrated that she had a separate property

interest in her retirement accounts. But wife’s postjudgment

motion asserted that the district court erred because she had in

fact presented testimony and exhibits on such separate property

interests at the permanent orders hearing.

¶ 10 In the amended permanent orders, the district court reversed

course and allocated wife parts of three retirement accounts,

totaling approximately $28,000, as her separate property. In doing

so, the court initially observed that “the testimony and exhibits [at

trial] were so confusing, voluminous, and contradictory, [that] the

court ordered the parties to submit a joint property spreadsheet

listing all the items that constituted the marital estate and their

values, noting where there was agreement and where there was

disagreement.” In the resulting spreadsheet, the parties listed

wife’s separate property interest in each of the three accounts as

“disputed.” Even after referencing the spreadsheet, the court still

struggled to make sense of the numbers presented in wife’s

postjudgment motion, stating: “As was the case at trial, none of the

4 numbers add up, the names don’t match, and the accounting is

opaque.”

¶ 11 Yet while the district court expressed frustration that the

testimony at trial was “brief and conclusory on the marital versus

separate property question,” it nevertheless awarded wife portions

of the three retirement accounts as her separate property because

the court’s notes “reflect[ed] that [w]ife did testify that portions of

these accounts were her separate property and she made passing

reference to her exhibits during the testimony.” Similarly, the court

explained that its allocation of separate property to wife was

“consistent with the court’s notes from trial.”

¶ 12 While husband asserts that the district court’s findings were

contradictory and otherwise insufficient, given the state of the

appellate record, we disagree.

¶ 13 Specifically, our review of husband’s contentions is severely

hampered by the lack of the permanent orders hearing transcript.

As the appellant, it was husband’s responsibility to designate the

record and to ensure that all items designated were transmitted to

the appellate court. In re Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092, 1096

(Colo. App. 2002). Therefore, husband was required to “include in

5 the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering

and deciding the issues on appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3). Where an

appellant fails to include the necessary portions of the record, we

must presume that the missing record supports the judgment. See

In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶¶ 13, 15 (an appellate court

can’t conclude that the district court’s judgment is erroneous when

the record is insufficient).

¶ 14 While husband asserts that the district court’s findings were

otherwise so inconsistent as to warrant reversal, we are not

persuaded. Although the court initially concluded that wife’s

accounting of her separate property claims was “opaque,” it

ultimately found that her claims regarding the three retirement

accounts were sufficiently supported by her testimony at the

permanent orders hearing. And because we lack a transcript of

that hearing, we are unable to review whether wife’s testimony in

fact supported the district court’s conclusion and, accordingly, we

are unable to review whether the court abused its discretion by

amending the original permanent orders. Thus, we must presume

that the missing record supports the judgment, and we decline to

6 disturb the court’s findings that three of wife’s retirement accounts

were her separate property. See id. at ¶ 15.

III. Overall Property Division

¶ 15 Husband next contends that the district court abused its

discretion by implementing a disproportionate property division and

by failing to make adequate findings in support of that property

division, including findings as to other separate property owned by

wife. Because we agree that the court failed to consider wife’s

separate property, we conclude that further proceedings are

necessary.

¶ 16 The district court has great latitude to equitably divide the

marital estate based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

See LaFleur v. Pyfer, 2021 CO 3, ¶ 61. Although the marital

division must be equitable, it need not be equal. See In re Marriage

of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 17 To achieve an equitable division, the court must consider the

relevant factors under section 14-10-113(1). Such factors include,

but are not limited to, each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition

of marital property; the value of property set aside to each spouse;

7 and the spouses’ respective economic circumstances. Id.; In re

Marriage of Paulsen, 677 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. App. 1984). A

spouse’s economic circumstances may include the value of that

spouse’s separate property. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 38.

¶ 18 Weighing the factors under section 14-10-113(1) is within the

district court’s sound discretion, and the court need not make

specific findings on each factor if its findings indicate what evidence

it found persuasive. In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959

(Colo. App. 2009); see also In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104,

¶ 9 (recognizing that the court must make findings of fact and

conclusions of law sufficiently explicit to give an appellate court a

clear understanding of the basis of its order). We may not disturb

the district court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.

LaFleur, ¶ 61.

B. Discussion

¶ 19 In the amended permanent orders, the district court

acknowledged that the marital property division was

disproportionate, with husband receiving forty percent of the

parties’ net assets and wife receiving sixty percent, after factoring in

the “equalization” payment. Yet, the court found the property

8 division to be equitable because wife assumed approximately eighty

percent of the parties’ debt, which included a $260,000 mortgage

and over $90,000 in other unsecured debt.

¶ 20 The district court also appears to have weighed the benefits of

wife staying in the marital home, which constituted the bulk of the

marital estate, when crafting the property division. For instance,

the court found that wife had historically been the primary

caregiver for the parties’ children; it would be in the children’s best

interests to remain in the Aspen area where the parties presently

lived; and if both parties continued to reside in the Aspen area, then

a 50/50 parenting plan would be practical. Similarly, the court

found that wife credibly testified that without the marital home,

which was part of Aspen’s affordable housing program, she “ha[d]

no other place to live that would allow her to remain in the Aspen

area and facilitate the parenting time with [h]usband and [the]

children.” Lastly, the district court considered that, of the two

parties, only wife credibly testified that she would be able to

refinance and retain the home.

¶ 21 Although the district court identified some of the factors that it

found persuasive when crafting the disproportionate property

9 division, see Powell, 220 P.3d at 959, and nothing required the

property division to necessarily be equal, see Burford, 26 P.3d 550

at 556, we agree with husband that the court failed to consider the

parties’ respective economic circumstances. § 14-10-113(1)(c). In

particular, it was undisputed that wife had over $500,000 of

separate property consisting of an inherited IRA account and other

assets. Husband cited wife’s significant separate property as a

relevant factor for the court to consider in the parties’ joint trial

management certificate, and the parties listed said separate

property — without any indication that the figures were disputed —

on their joint property spreadsheet that was furnished to the court

following the permanent orders hearing.

¶ 22 Yet, despite the parties’ agreement that wife had over

$500,000 in separate property, we see no indication that the district

court considered wife’s separate property when determining an

equitable division of the marital estate. While the court did not

need to make findings on every statutory factor under section

14-10-113(1), see Powell, 220 P.3d at 959, given that wife’s

separate property was worth approximately twice the value of the

marital estate, we conclude that the court’s failure to consider that

10 separate property was nevertheless an abuse of discretion. See

Balanson, 25 P.3d at 38 (requiring a district court to make findings

as to how it considered separate property as an economic

circumstance when dividing a marital estate).

¶ 23 In sum, because there is no indication that the district court

considered wife’s substantial separate property when crafting the

marital property division, see id., we reverse the property division

and remand for additional findings and the district court’s

reconsideration.

¶ 24 On remand, the district court may take additional evidence as

it deems necessary to facilitate its additional findings. In re

Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App. 1989). However, the

court may not revalue or recharacterize the marital property or

debts accounted for in the existing property division. See

§ 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 25.

The court must also give the parties an opportunity to present any

new evidence concerning their current economic circumstances.

§ 14-10-113(1)(c) (the district court considers the parties’ economic

circumstances at the time the property division “is to become

effective”); Powell, 220 P.3d at 961 (requiring the district court to

11 consider the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of remand

when reconsidering a property division).

¶ 25 On remand, the court may adjust the property division as is

necessary to achieve an equitable result in light of its additional

findings and the parties’ current economic circumstances. See

Medeiros, ¶ 25. The court should make specific findings of fact to

support its determinations. Gibbs, ¶ 9.

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 Those portions of the judgment concerning the marital

property division are reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Those portions of the

judgment not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE HARRIS concur.