25CA0571 Marriage of Larock 04-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0571 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR811 Honorable Christopher Boeckx, Magistrate
In re the Marriage of
Perry Gates Larock,
Appellant,
and
Terra Nicole Larock,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 2, 2026
Maha Kamal, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
Ciancio Ciancio Brown, P.C., Alexandra U. Goldstein, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 The district court dissolved the marriage of Perry Gates Larock
(Husband) and Terra Nicole Larock (Wife) and entered permanent
orders dividing marital property, allocating parental responsibilities,
determining spousal maintenance and child support, and denying
Husband’s request for attorney fees. Husband appeals several
aspects of the order. We affirm the judgment but remand the case
so the district court may correct a typographical error.
I. Background
¶2 The parties were married in June 2014 in Lyons, Colorado.
During the marriage they had two kids, acquired two homes, and
started a business. The parties jointly filed for divorce in June
2023 and consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate. Husband,
Wife, and three experts testified at a full-day hearing, and the court
issued its permanent orders on February 11, 2025.
¶3 On appeal, Husband challenges several aspects of the
permanent orders. He argues that the court erred by (1) misvaluing
the marital home awarded to him (Lincoln Residence); (2) failing to
include a marital balance sheet detailing its division of assets;
(3) allowing Wife two years to refinance the marital home awarded
to her (Grant Residence); (4) incorrectly imputing Wife’s income,
1 resulting in the denial of his request for spousal maintenance and
child support; (5) ordering a lump sum division of Wife’s stock in
her business; and (6) denying his request for attorney fees. While
we agree that the court made a typographical error in valuing the
Lincoln Residence, we otherwise affirm.
II. Valuation of the Lincoln Residence
¶4 After the parties separated in 2022, Husband lived at the
Lincoln Residence — one of two marital homes. The parties
stipulated in their “Joint Trial Management Certificate” (JTMC) that
the property “has an approximate fair market value (net equity) of
$357k.” Despite this, the district court adopted a $375,000
valuation when awarding the property to Husband.
¶5 The court provided no reason for the $18,000 discrepancy,
and Husband argues it resulted in an inequitable distribution of
marital assets. Wife believes the court made a typographical error.
In support of both parties’ positions, Wife points to the district
court’s statement that it “accepts the parties’ stipulation, set forth
on page 2 of the JTMC, that the net equity in the Lincoln Residence
is $375,000.” We agree that the error is clerical and remand the
case so the district court may correct the permanent orders to
2 reflect the stipulated valuation. See In re Marriage of Burford, 26
P.3d 550, 555, 560 (Colo. App. 2001) (the appropriate remedy for a
clerical error is correction on remand). However, because the
$18,000 discrepancy comprises only 2.3% of the marital estate, we
disagree that Husband was prejudiced by the error or that this
error requires reversal.1 See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28,
36 (Colo. 2001) (an error affecting a small percentage of the marital
estate is harmless and does not require reversal); In re Marriage of
Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 893 (Colo. App. 2003) (same).
III. Division of Marital Property
A. Additional Background
¶6 In its permanent orders, the district court divided all marital
property. The court described each asset, provided a numerical
value when appropriate, and awarded it to Husband or Wife. The
court cited its duty to divide marital property in a just fashion
pursuant to section 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025, and explained its
reasoning behind its conscientious divisions. Ultimately, the court
1 For the same reason, to the extent Husband asks us to consider
this discrepancy in our review of other issues presented on appeal, we decline to do so.
3 found that the “marital property apportioned to each party is
roughly equal in this case.”
¶7 Husband argues on appeal that the district court erred by
failing to include a “marital balance sheet” in its permanent orders.
Without citing law to support his position, Husband contends that
this omission deprived him of an equitable share of assets, leaves
the parties to “guess[] as to the ultimate division,” and prevents this
court “from conducting meaningful appellate review.” We disagree.
B. Standard of Review
¶8 The district court enjoys “great latitude to effect an equitable
distribution [of marital property] based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.” Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35. Thus,
absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the district
court’s findings. Id. A court abuses its discretion when its decision
is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it
misapplies or misconstrues the law. In re Marriage of Kann, 2017
COA 94, ¶ 56. An abuse of discretion amounts to reversible error
“only where the substantial rights of the parties are affected by the
trial court’s error when viewed in relation to its overall property
division.” Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36.
4 C. Applicable Law and Analysis
¶9 In marriage dissolution proceedings, section 14-10-113(1)
requires the district court to divide marital property in a just
manner. The distribution must be equitable, but it need not be
equal. Burford, 26 P.3d at 556. “The key to an equitable
distribution is fairness, not mathematical precision,” and the
district court considers several factors in a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis. In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 537-
38 (Colo. 1995) (alterations omitted) (citation omitted). Allocation of
the parties’ marital debt is likewise part of the property division,
and the trial court should take care to ensure that marital liabilities
are also assigned equitably. In re Marriage of Speirs, 956 P.2d 622,
623 (Colo. App. 1997).
¶ 10 Here, the district court adequately described each asset or
liability and awarded it to Husband or Wife. Our review of the
permanent orders reveals that the court provided reasons for
awarding property to one party or the other and arrived at
numerical values based on the parties’ stipulations or evidence
presented at the hearing. From this, it is apparent that the
allocation of marital property was equitable and supported by
5 sufficient evidence. See In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 71
(A “court is not required to make specific findings as to each
statutory factor; its findings need only be sufficient to allow [the
appellate court] to determine whether its allocation of the marital
estate is supported by competent evidence.”).
¶ 11 Husband cites no case law, and we are aware of none, holding
that a district court’s failure to include a marital balance sheet
renders the permanent orders inadequate. Rather, “[i]n dividing the
marital estate, specific findings as to the value of each asset are not
required if the basis for the trial court’s decision is apparent from
its findings.” In re Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. App.
2003). Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s allocation of
assets. See Hunt, ¶ 20 (trial courts are best situated to render
distribution in divorce proceedings, and absent an abuse of
discretion, an appellate court must not disturb the delicate balance
it achieved).
IV. Refinancing the Grant Residence
¶ 12 The district court awarded the Grant Residence — one of two
marital homes — to Wife. The property, valued at $415,000,
6 remained titled and financed in both parties’ names. Husband
desired removal from the mortgage, but Wife could not qualify for
refinancing at the time of the hearing because her “debt-to-income
ratio” was too high. The court therefore ordered the following:
Wife shall assume or refinance the mortgage for the Grant Residence within two years from the date of this Order. If Wife fails to do so, then the Grant Residence shall be sold with Wife to be solely responsible for all costs of bringing the Grant Residence to market . . . . Once Husband’s name has been removed from the mortgage for the Grant Residence, Husband shall execute a deed to remove his name from the title for that residence within 14 days.
The court further explained that this arrangement allowed the
parties to remain in their respective homes and ensured minimal
disruption for their children, who had been spending time at both
residences.
¶ 13 Husband contends that by allowing Wife two years to
refinance, the court violated “fundamental principles of marital
dissolution by maintaining Husband’s liability on the mortgage for
an extended period of time.” Husband argues that Colorado law
favors complete financial disentanglement between spouses and
that the court undermined this by placing him in a situation that
7 may lead to future litigation. Wife counters that there are
circumstances when a continued economic relationship is
necessary, and in any event, the arrangement at issue here is
definite. We discern no error.
¶ 14 We review the district court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion, applying the same principles outlined supra Part III.B.
C. Applicable Law and Analysis
¶ 15 Public policy “discourag[es] continued litigation and ongoing
financial interaction between divorced spouses.” In re Marriage of
Paul, 821 P.2d 925, 927 (Colo. App. 1991). Accordingly, “a division
of marital property should leave to each party a definable or
ascertainable portion of at least some of the attributes of
ownership.” Id. While the goal is to provide a sense of finality,
there are circumstances when a continued financial relationship is
necessary to achieve an equitable distribution of property. See
§ 14-10-113(1)(c); see also Hunt, 909 P.2d at 540 (acknowledging
certain circumstances do not warrant immediate distribution).
When this situation arises, courts should take care to ensure that
the arrangement disentangles the parties at a finite point in time.
8 Hunt, 909 P.2d at 540 (citing Shill v. Shill, 765 P.2d 140, 145 (Idaho
1988)).
¶ 16 While we agree with Husband that two years is a considerable
amount of time, the arrangement is not indefinite. The order
requires Wife to sell the Grant Residence if she cannot refinance
within the specified period. Cf. Paul, 821 P.2d at 927 (holding that
the trial court erred by failing to impose limitations on the time and
manner of payment of husband’s interest in wife’s company, nor
any restrictions on wife’s control of the asset). The alternative —
removing Husband’s name via immediate sale of the Grant
Residence — would have left Wife without a home while Husband
remained in the Lincoln Residence, a grossly inequitable
distribution of marital property. See § 14-10-113(1).
¶ 17 Additionally, the court was faced with Wife’s inability to
refinance at the time of the hearing, Husband’s desire to remove his
name from the mortgage, the well-being of the parties’ two minor
children, and the fact that the parties were already living separately
in their respective homes. Considering the competing interests at
play and the clear parameters the district court outlined when
9 distributing this asset, the court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing a two-year refinancing period. See Paul, 821 P.2d at 927.
V. Income, Spousal Maintenance, and Child Support
¶ 18 When the parties married, Wife worked as a school
psychologist and Husband as a data analyst. During their
marriage, Wife founded a tech company called Mindful Mamas.
Husband assisted Wife in starting the company and then worked for
Mindful Mamas as an accountant and administrative assistant. In
April 2024, after the parties filed for divorce, Wife terminated
Husband’s position with Mindful Mamas but continued to pay him
$1,000 per month as part of his severance package. After his
termination, Husband began driving for rideshare companies and
assisting a friend with home remodeling. Based on expert
testimony, the district court found Husband’s potential income to
be $75,000 for spousal maintenance and child support purposes.
¶ 19 Due to financial hardship, Wife decided to wind down Mindful
Mamas, and the company entered dissolution proceedings in
December 2024. As the CEO, Wife earned $175,000 annually.
However, because of the pending dissolution and the fact that she
10 allegedly would not receive a Mindful Mamas paycheck after
January 2025, the court determined that Wife’s actual income was
$0. To calculate spousal maintenance and child support, Wife
proposed that the court impute her income at the minimum wage or
at the $75,000 salary she earned as a school psychologist. Based
upon Wife’s testimony that she did not plan to operate another
business in the future and would likely return to her prior job, the
court imputed a $75,000 salary. The court then relied on these
imputations when declining Husband’s request for spousal
maintenance and child support.
¶ 20 Husband argues that the imputation of Wife’s potential income
is erroneous and should instead be $175,000, the salary she earned
as the CEO of Mindful Mamas at the time of the hearing. Husband
contends that the income imputation led to a cascade of errors,
including the district court denying his spousal maintenance and
child support requests. We are not persuaded.
¶ 21 Income imputation is a question of fact, and the trial court’s
findings regarding potential income are entitled to deference if
adequately supported by the record. In re Marriage of Yates, 148
11 P.3d 304, 311 (Colo. App. 2006). We review maintenance and child
support orders for an abuse of discretion because “the issue of the
[parties’] financial resources is factual,” but we review de novo
whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard to its
factual findings. In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 533 (Colo.
App. 2011); see also In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212, 1213
(Colo. App. 2011) (child support); In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023
COA 42M, ¶ 28 (maintenance).
¶ 22 Trial courts generally determine child support and
maintenance based on the parties’ gross incomes. § 14-10-
114(3)(a)(I)(A), (8)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (maintenance); § 14-10-
115(5)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (child support). “Gross income” means
income from any source and includes potential income for a party
who the court finds is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
§ 14-10-114(8)(c)(I), (IV); § 14-10-115(3)(c), (5)(a)(I), (5)(b)(I). If a
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the court must
calculate child support and maintenance based on the parent’s
potential, not actual, income. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV); § 14-10-
115(5)(b)(I). “Potential income” is “the amount a party could earn
12 from a full-time job commensurate with the party’s demonstrated
earning ability.” In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 26. “A
trial court may consider evidence of a party’s historical income in
determining the amount of income” to impute. Yates, 148 P.3d at
311.
¶ 23 The court addresses maintenance and child support after
dividing the marital assets and debt. See In re Marriage of Morton,
2016 COA 1, ¶ 31; § 14-10-113(1). Section 14-10-114(3) details the
process a trial court must follow when considering a maintenance
request. In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 13. The court
must first make findings concerning (1) the amount of each party’s
gross income; (2) the marital property distributed to each party;
(3) each party’s financial resources; (4) the reasonable financial
need established during the marriage; and (5) whether the
maintenance award would be deductible for federal income tax
purposes. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see Wright, ¶ 14.
¶ 24 After making these initial findings, the court must determine
“the amount and term of the maintenance award, if any, that is fair
and equitable to both parties.” § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II); see Wright,
¶ 15. The court need not make explicit factual findings about each
13 factor in section 14-10-114(3)(c), which governs the amount and
duration of maintenance, as long as the record shows that it
meaningfully considered the factors and provides us with a clear
understanding of the basis for its decision. Wright, ¶ 20. Then,
after calculating the maintenance award, the court may determine
child support obligations. In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2,
¶ 22. To determine the amount of a child support award, the court
must consider several factors, including both parents’ financial
resources. § 14-10-115(2)(b).
¶ 25 Here, the district court determined that Wife was voluntarily
unemployed due to the dissolution of Mindful Mamas and imputed
to her a potential income of $75,000 based on her prior work as a
school psychologist. The court was well within its discretion to do
so, as Wife testified that she planned to return to this job and the
amount is commensurate with her demonstrated earning capability
as a psychologist. See Tooker, ¶ 26; Yates, 148 P.3d at 311.
¶ 26 Congruent with our conclusion that the district court did not
err regarding Wife’s income nor in its distribution of marital assets,
we further uphold the court’s denial of Husband’s maintenance and
child support requests. The record before us makes clear that the
14 parties’ financial resources are roughly equal and that the court
made explicit findings as to each relevant statutory factor when
determining the maintenance and support awards. Thus, the
district court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unfairly by
denying Husband’s requests. See In re Marriage of Camarata, 602
P.2d 907, 908 (Colo. App. 1979); cf. Wright, ¶¶ 20-23 (concluding
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully
consider the section 14-10-114 factors and instead only alluding to
the criteria).
VI. Division of Mindful Mamas’ Stock
¶ 27 Initially, both parties used an online service called Carta to
value Mindful Mamas. Husband then retained expert Marty Wisott
to review Carta’s valuation, and Wife retained expert Jeremy
Harkness to conduct a rebuttal valuation of Wisott’s review. Wisott
valued Mindful Mamas at $620,000 in June 2024 and projected a
fair market value of $1,290,000 by December 2024. However,
Wisott noted at the hearing that Mindful Mamas lost nearly 11% of
its subscriber base in the first six months of 2024 and expressed
concern about the financial stability of the company.
15 ¶ 28 Harkness valued Mindful Mamas at $95,000. He testified that
Mindful Mamas was a high-risk business and noted Wisott’s failure
to distinguish where the company’s revenue was coming from —
namely, a transient business-to-business consulting contract with
client Otsuka. Harkness submitted that the revenue from this
contract should be subtracted from the income because the
arrangement served to keep Mindful Mamas afloat for a limited time
and was separate from the company’s dwindling subscription-based
income. Harkness further testified that Mindful Mamas had
incurred $1.4 million in debt, offsetting its assets. Wisott and Wife
similarly acknowledged this debt, and Wife explained that she
would have to pay back creditors as part of the Mindful Mamas’
dissolution proceedings.
¶ 29 Finding both experts credible, the district court valued Mindful
Mamas at $0. The court recognized, however, that Wife owned
5,816,680 shares of common stock in Mindful Mamas that retained
value to the extent the business itself retained value. Accordingly,
“in the interest of avoiding a potential windfall to Wife if Mindful
Mamas retain[ed] some value,” the court awarded 50% of Wife’s
shares to Husband. Husband argues on appeal that the district
16 court erred by ordering this lump sum payout and should have
instead appointed a special master to oversee dissolution
proceedings. We disagree.
¶ 30 We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion,
applying the same principles outlined supra Part III.B.
¶ 31 Generally, “property shall be valued as of the date of the
decree or as of the date of the hearing on disposition of property if
such hearing precedes the date of the decree.” § 14-10-113(5).
When an asset is not yet fully realized, the trial court may rely on
the net present value or reserve jurisdiction to distribute the
property at a later time. See Zappanti, 80 P.3d at 894; In re
Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Colo. App. 2006). The
former method allows the court to accord a present value to the
future benefit and allocate it between the parties immediately, while
the latter enables the court to wait until the benefit has accrued to
determine the proper division or allocation. Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at
1172-73.
17 ¶ 32 The crux of Husband’s argument is that the district court
heard such competing evidence on Mindful Mamas’ value, and the
dissolution proceedings remained so complex, that the court should
have appointed a special master and reserved jurisdiction for a later
distribution. Our review of the permanent orders, however, reveals
that the court appreciated the complexity of this asset, carefully
weighed the experts’ testimony, and determined that Mindful
Mamas had “essentially no value.” Based on this net present value,
but to avoid any potential windfall, the court rightfully allocated
equal shares of Wife’s common stock to Husband and Wife. Even if
we were to come to a different conclusion ourselves on the
appropriate method of distribution, we cannot say the district court
abused its discretion because its decision is reasonable,
ascertainable from the record, and comports with the net present
value method. See id. at 1172-74.
VII. Husband’s Request for Attorney Fees
¶ 33 Husband requested attorney fees under section 14-10-119,
C.R.S. 2025, for a “substantial disparity in income” and section 13-
17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025, for Wife’s alleged conduct after “forcing a
18 Permanent Orders continuance.” The court denied both requests,
finding that “the financial resources of the parties are essentially
equal,” and “[n]either party engaged in conduct which lacked
substantial justification.”
¶ 34 Husband argues on appeal that the district court’s imputation
of Wife’s potential income renders the attorney fees determination
invalid for purposes of income disparity. Providing little to no
record support, he further maintains that Wife’s conduct associated
with the permanent orders hearing continuance entitles him to fees.
Wife counters that the continuance resulted from the fact that
neither party had sufficient time to present their testimony or expert
testimony in the time originally allotted. We perceive no error.
¶ 35 We review the court’s decision to award attorney fees for an
abuse of discretion. Davis, 252 P.3d at 538.
¶ 36 In domestic relations cases, trial courts have the discretion to
order a party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees “after
considering the financial resources of both parties.” § 14-10-119.
“Courts must consider a request for fees ‘in light of [section 14-10-
19 119’s] equitable purpose,’” which includes ensuring that “neither
party suffers ‘undue economic hardship’ as a result of the
dissolution.” de Koning, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). Under the statute,
courts may “equitably apportion costs and fees between parties
based on relative ability to pay, and courts have great latitude . . .
to craft attorney fee orders appropriate to the circumstances in a
given case.” Davis, 252 P.3d at 538.
¶ 37 Alternatively, under section 13-17-102(4), the court shall
assess attorney fees if “an attorney . . . or party brought or defended
an action . . . that lacked substantial justification” or if the action
“was interposed for delay . . . or if the court finds that an attorney
. . . or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other
improper conduct.” The two statutes are not mutually exclusive,
and the trial court may award attorney fees under section 14-10-
119, section 13-17-102(4), or both. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945
P.2d 1370, 1377 (Colo. 1997).
¶ 38 The district court acted within its discretion by denying
Husband’s request under section 14-10-119 because the parties
have similar financial resources. See Davis, 252 P.3d at 538. And
because Husband fails to point us to locations in the record
20 supporting his position that Wife engaged in “dilatory tactics,” we
will not disturb the district court’s finding under section 13-17-
102(4). See C.A.R. 28(a)(7); see also Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am.
Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., 2015 COA 135, ¶ 42 (declining to consider
conclusory allegations that lacked development); In re Marriage of
Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded only in
clear and unequivocal cases . . . .”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.
VIII. Disposition
¶ 39 We affirm the judgment but remand the case so the magistrate
may correct the permanent orders to reflect the proper valuation of
the Lincoln Residence.
JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.