24CA1129 Marriage of Kuznetsov 05-22-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1129 Eagle County District Court No. 22DR30032 Honorable Rachel Olguin-Fresquez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Lauren Khouri Smith,
Appellee,
and
Dennis Kuznetsov,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Freyre and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 22, 2025
Harwich Brickey, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee
Dennis Kuznetsov, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Lauren Khouri
Smith (wife) and Dennis Kuznetsov (husband), husband appeals
those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital
property division, maintenance, and attorney fees. He also appeals
the district court’s modification of his child support obligation.
¶2 We affirm the judgment as to the property division. We
reverse the judgment as to maintenance and attorney fees, reverse
the portion of the permanent orders modifying child support, and
remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶3 In 2022, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage of
approximately ten years. In February 2023, the district court
adopted the parties’ jointly executed parenting plan and separation
agreement and entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage.
The parenting plan allocated parental responsibilities as to the
parties’ two children and provided that husband would pay wife
$1,942 per month in child support. The separation agreement
awarded wife the vast majority of the marital estate and waived
maintenance on behalf of both parties.
1 ¶4 In April 2023, husband filed a C.R.C.P. 60 motion to amend
both the parenting plan and the separation agreement, asserting
that the district court had failed to review the documents’
provisions for unconscionability and that he had executed the
documents during a mental health crisis. While his C.R.C.P. 60
motion was still pending, husband also moved to modify child
support. The district court then granted husband’s C.R.C.P. 60
motion in part and reopened the marital property division.
However, the provisions of the parenting plan were left in place,
subject to husband’s motion to modify child support.
¶5 After a hearing, the district court entered permanent orders.
The court indicated that it was dividing the approximately $950,000
marital estate, which consisted primarily of the parties’ four
properties, equally. Specifically, the court awarded wife one
property with $303,581 in equity and husband two properties with
$346,702 in total equity. The court ordered the parties’ fourth
property (Old Trail) to be sold with an equal division of the net
proceeds. After dividing the parties’ other assets and debts, the
court ordered husband to pay wife a total of $108,039, consisting of
a property equalization payment of $69,149, a $18,890 child
2 support arrearage, and $20,000 in attorney fees that the court
awarded to wife.
¶6 The court ordered the equalization payment to be taken from
husband’s portion of the proceeds from the sale of Old Trail.
Shortly after the entry of the permanent orders, the district court
granted the parties’ joint motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b) to reduce the
total payment to wife to $79,686 because a debt that had been
allocated to wife had been inadvertently overstated by $28,353.
¶7 In the permanent orders, the district court also awarded wife
maintenance in the amount of $1,143.75 per month for a term of
five years and six months, and reduced husband’s child support
obligation to $1,534.59 per month.
II. Marital Property Division
¶8 We first consider and reject husband’s contention that the
district court reversibly erred when dividing the marital property.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 Upon dissolution, a district court divides marital property in a
way that is just and equitable, although such a division need not be
equal. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also In re Marriage of
Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001). The court enjoys
3 broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of marital
property. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001).
Accordingly, we will not disturb the court’s division of property
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of
Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). A district court
abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In re
Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.
B. Discussion
¶ 10 To start, because he inaccurately characterizes the marital
property division, we reject husband’s contention that the district
court abused its discretion by inequitably awarding wife a
disproportionate share of the marital property.
¶ 11 Arguing that anything less than a 50/50 division of the
marital estate was inequitable, husband erroneously claims that the
district court unequally, and therefore inequitably, divided the
marital property. But in asserting that the division of the marital
estate was unequal, husband incorrectly uses the full payment to
wife in his calculations. In using the full payment, husband ignores
the fact that only $40,796 of the $79,696 payment pertained to
4 equalizing the marital property division; the remaining portion of
the payment consisted of his child support arrearage and the award
of attorney fees to wife. Similarly, husband’s calculations appear to
ignore and exclude from the marital estate the 50 percent of the
approximately $385,763 in marital equity from Old Trail that each
party will receive upon the property’s sale.
¶ 12 Indeed, contrary to husband’s assertion that the marital
property division was disproportionate, the district court explicitly
stated that it was equally dividing the marital estate as it allocated
the parties’ real estate, vehicles, bank accounts, and debt, while
calculating equalization payments corresponding to each category of
property.
¶ 13 We agree with husband, however, that the district court made
repeated errors in wife’s favor when calculating the equalization
payments for each category of marital property. Specifically, the
court failed to divide by two when calculating the equalization
payments as to the real estate, vehicles, and bank accounts,
resulting in a total miscalculation of $31,900 in wife’s favor.
¶ 14 However, errors in the marital property division are reversible
only when the aggregate effect of such errors affects the substantial
5 rights of the parties, meaning that we disregard errors affecting only
a small percentage of the overall marital estate. See Balanson, 25
P.3d at 36; see also C.R.C.P. 61. And here, the errors in wife’s favor
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24CA1129 Marriage of Kuznetsov 05-22-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1129 Eagle County District Court No. 22DR30032 Honorable Rachel Olguin-Fresquez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Lauren Khouri Smith,
Appellee,
and
Dennis Kuznetsov,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Freyre and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 22, 2025
Harwich Brickey, LLC, Kara M. Harwich, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellee
Dennis Kuznetsov, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Lauren Khouri
Smith (wife) and Dennis Kuznetsov (husband), husband appeals
those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital
property division, maintenance, and attorney fees. He also appeals
the district court’s modification of his child support obligation.
¶2 We affirm the judgment as to the property division. We
reverse the judgment as to maintenance and attorney fees, reverse
the portion of the permanent orders modifying child support, and
remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶3 In 2022, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage of
approximately ten years. In February 2023, the district court
adopted the parties’ jointly executed parenting plan and separation
agreement and entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage.
The parenting plan allocated parental responsibilities as to the
parties’ two children and provided that husband would pay wife
$1,942 per month in child support. The separation agreement
awarded wife the vast majority of the marital estate and waived
maintenance on behalf of both parties.
1 ¶4 In April 2023, husband filed a C.R.C.P. 60 motion to amend
both the parenting plan and the separation agreement, asserting
that the district court had failed to review the documents’
provisions for unconscionability and that he had executed the
documents during a mental health crisis. While his C.R.C.P. 60
motion was still pending, husband also moved to modify child
support. The district court then granted husband’s C.R.C.P. 60
motion in part and reopened the marital property division.
However, the provisions of the parenting plan were left in place,
subject to husband’s motion to modify child support.
¶5 After a hearing, the district court entered permanent orders.
The court indicated that it was dividing the approximately $950,000
marital estate, which consisted primarily of the parties’ four
properties, equally. Specifically, the court awarded wife one
property with $303,581 in equity and husband two properties with
$346,702 in total equity. The court ordered the parties’ fourth
property (Old Trail) to be sold with an equal division of the net
proceeds. After dividing the parties’ other assets and debts, the
court ordered husband to pay wife a total of $108,039, consisting of
a property equalization payment of $69,149, a $18,890 child
2 support arrearage, and $20,000 in attorney fees that the court
awarded to wife.
¶6 The court ordered the equalization payment to be taken from
husband’s portion of the proceeds from the sale of Old Trail.
Shortly after the entry of the permanent orders, the district court
granted the parties’ joint motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b) to reduce the
total payment to wife to $79,686 because a debt that had been
allocated to wife had been inadvertently overstated by $28,353.
¶7 In the permanent orders, the district court also awarded wife
maintenance in the amount of $1,143.75 per month for a term of
five years and six months, and reduced husband’s child support
obligation to $1,534.59 per month.
II. Marital Property Division
¶8 We first consider and reject husband’s contention that the
district court reversibly erred when dividing the marital property.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 Upon dissolution, a district court divides marital property in a
way that is just and equitable, although such a division need not be
equal. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also In re Marriage of
Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001). The court enjoys
3 broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of marital
property. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001).
Accordingly, we will not disturb the court’s division of property
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of
Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). A district court
abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In re
Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.
B. Discussion
¶ 10 To start, because he inaccurately characterizes the marital
property division, we reject husband’s contention that the district
court abused its discretion by inequitably awarding wife a
disproportionate share of the marital property.
¶ 11 Arguing that anything less than a 50/50 division of the
marital estate was inequitable, husband erroneously claims that the
district court unequally, and therefore inequitably, divided the
marital property. But in asserting that the division of the marital
estate was unequal, husband incorrectly uses the full payment to
wife in his calculations. In using the full payment, husband ignores
the fact that only $40,796 of the $79,696 payment pertained to
4 equalizing the marital property division; the remaining portion of
the payment consisted of his child support arrearage and the award
of attorney fees to wife. Similarly, husband’s calculations appear to
ignore and exclude from the marital estate the 50 percent of the
approximately $385,763 in marital equity from Old Trail that each
party will receive upon the property’s sale.
¶ 12 Indeed, contrary to husband’s assertion that the marital
property division was disproportionate, the district court explicitly
stated that it was equally dividing the marital estate as it allocated
the parties’ real estate, vehicles, bank accounts, and debt, while
calculating equalization payments corresponding to each category of
property.
¶ 13 We agree with husband, however, that the district court made
repeated errors in wife’s favor when calculating the equalization
payments for each category of marital property. Specifically, the
court failed to divide by two when calculating the equalization
payments as to the real estate, vehicles, and bank accounts,
resulting in a total miscalculation of $31,900 in wife’s favor.
¶ 14 However, errors in the marital property division are reversible
only when the aggregate effect of such errors affects the substantial
5 rights of the parties, meaning that we disregard errors affecting only
a small percentage of the overall marital estate. See Balanson, 25
P.3d at 36; see also C.R.C.P. 61. And here, the errors in wife’s favor
affected less than 5 percent of the marital estate, so the errors were
harmless. See C.R.C.P. 61; cf. In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA
1, ¶ 8 (error involving loans comprising approximately one-third of
the marital estate required reversal). Moreover, lessening any
prejudice to husband, the parties and the district court made a
similar error in the amount of about $14,176 in husband’s favor
when amending the payment to wife postjudgment to account for
the $28,353 of debt that had been allocated to her, but which did
not exist.
¶ 15 We also reject husband’s assertion that the district court made
insufficient findings in support of the property division. While
section 14-10-113(1) requires the court to consider certain factors
when dividing the marital property, such as the contributions of
each spouse, the value of the parties’ separate property, and the
spouses’ respective economic circumstances, weighing the factors is
within the district court’s discretion, and the court need not make
specific findings on each factor. See Powell, 220 P.3d at 959; see
6 also In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (a district court
must make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently
explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis
of its order).
¶ 16 Here, although the district court didn’t engage in a detailed
discussion of each statutory factor, we are satisfied that the court
considered the pertinent factors when dividing the marital estate.
See Powell, 220 P.3d at 959. For instance, at other points, the
court found that “both parties have worked and contributed to the
financial stability of the family during the marriage,” and it engaged
in a detailed discussion of the parties’ respective economic
circumstances, including each party’s present earning capacity.
See § 14-10-113(1)(a), (c).
¶ 17 Finally, we reject husband’s contention that the district court
erred by allowing wife to select the real estate agent for the sale of
Old Trail. The mechanism employed to effectuate an equitable
division of the marital property rests within the court’s sound
discretion, and it may enter a variety of orders to implement the
division, including orders imposing conditions on the sale of marital
property. See In re Marriage of Lafaye, 89 P.3d 455, 462 (Colo. App.
7 2003). Accordingly, we decline to disturb the court’s orders
governing the sale of Old Trail.
III. Maintenance
¶ 18 While we reject husband’s challenge to the marital property
division, we agree with him that the district court made insufficient
findings when awarding wife maintenance, and we therefore
conclude that further proceedings are required.
A. Standards of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 19 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount
and duration of a maintenance award, and, absent an abuse of that
discretion, its decision will not be reversed. See § 14-10-114(2),
(3)(e), C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 15;
In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14.
¶ 20 Under section 14-10-114(3), the court must follow a specific
process when awarding maintenance. In re Marriage of Stradtmann,
2021 COA 145, ¶ 28. “[T]he court must first make written or oral
findings on each party’s gross income, the marital property
apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the
reasonable financial need as established during the marriage, and
the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” Herold, ¶ 25; see also
8 § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I). Next, the court must determine the amount
and term of maintenance, if any, that is equitable after considering
the statutory advisory guidelines and a list of non-exclusive
statutory factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(a)(II)(B), (3)(b), (3)(c);
Wright, ¶ 15. Finally, before the court may award maintenance, it
must find that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient
property, including marital property apportioned to them, to provide
for their reasonable needs and is unable to support themself
through appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).
¶ 21 While the district court ultimately has discretion to enter a fair
and equitable maintenance award, it must “make specific written or
oral findings in support of the amount and term of maintenance
awarded.” § 14-10-114(3)(e); see also Gibbs, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of
Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Factual findings are
sufficient if they identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed
persuasive and determinative of the issues raised.”).
¶ 22 We agree with husband that the district court made
insufficient findings to support the $1,143.75 per month in
maintenance awarded to wife.
9 ¶ 23 The district court’s findings in support of the maintenance
award were short and conclusory:
Given the lifestyle of the parties during the marriage and [wife’s] limited ability to meet her reasonable needs, and as her income is significantly less than that of [husband], the court finds that [wife] is eligible for and in need of maintenance. . . . The marriage lasted eleven years and 5 months. Therefore, maintenance is ordered for five years and six months. The amount of maintenance that [husband] shall pay [wife] each month is $1,143.75 as calculated using Colorado guidelines.
¶ 24 While the district court then made significant, detailed
findings in support of its determination of the parties’ respective
incomes, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A), the court made no findings as
to either party’s reasonable financial needs, despite concluding that
wife had a limited ability to meet her needs and thus qualified for
maintenance, see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(D), (3)(d). And although the
court then calculated the guideline amount of maintenance, see
§ 14-10-114(3)(b), and indicated that it had considered the parties’
lifestyle during the marriage, the court made no findings as to what
the parties’ lifestyle actually was or the costs that were associated
with their lifestyle, see § 14-10-114(3)(c)(III).
10 ¶ 25 Likewise, except for the district court’s findings concerning the
parties’ respective incomes and the duration of the marriage, we
lack sufficient findings to meaningfully review the extent to which
the court considered the numerous other maintenance factors
under section 14-10-114(3)(c). See Gibbs, ¶ 9; Garst, 955 P.2d at
1058; cf. Wright, ¶ 20 (recognizing that while a district court need
not make specific factual findings on every factor under section
14-10-114(3)(c), a generalized statement that the court considered
the statutory criteria is insufficient).
¶ 26 Wife cites portions of the record that she contends otherwise
support the award of maintenance, such as her financial needs as
reflected in her sworn financial statement. But given that it was the
district court’s role to make credibility determinations, as well as to
synthesize and resolve any contradictions in the evidence, we
decline wife’s invitation to infer our own findings in support of the
maintenance award. Cf. In re Marriage of Wollert, 2020 CO 47, ¶ 23
(“[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather
than appellate courts,” because a “cold record is a poor substitute
for live testimony.” (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
11 273, 291 (1982), and People v. Scott, 600 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1979),
respectively)).
¶ 27 Accordingly, we reverse the maintenance award and remand
the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court
must reconsider wife’s request for maintenance using the procedure
specified by section 14-10-114(3), making findings where required,
and addressing the factors relevant to its determination. See
Herold, ¶¶ 29-34; Stradtmann, ¶¶ 33-35. The court must make
sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give us a clear understanding
of the basis of its order. See Wright, ¶ 20; Gibbs, ¶ 9. Because
maintenance is based on the spouses’ financial circumstances at
the time an order is entered, the court on remand must consider
the parties’ current financial circumstances, which means it must
take additional evidence. See Wright, ¶ 24; Stradtmann, ¶ 35.
IV. Modification of Child Support
¶ 28 Asserting that the district court erred in determining the
parties’ respective incomes, husband also challenges the district
court’s order modifying child support that set his monthly child
support obligation at $1,534.59 per month.
12 ¶ 29 Because maintenance and child support, including the
determination of the parties’ incomes, are “inextricably intertwined,”
In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005), and
because we have reversed the maintenance award, we also reverse
the portion of the permanent orders modifying husband’s child
support obligation. We remand for reconsideration of husband’s
motion to modify child support under section 14-10-122(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2024, including the recalculation of child support consistent
with section 14-10-115(2)(b), (3)(a), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 30 Here, too, the district court must consider the parties’ current
financial circumstances on remand. See In re Marriage of Schaefer,
2022 COA 112, ¶ 41. Therefore, we decline to address husband’s
contention that the court erred in determining the parties’
respective incomes for both maintenance and child support
purposes, given that the parties will have an opportunity to present
evidence as to their current financial circumstances on remand.
See Wright, ¶ 24; Stradtmann, ¶ 35.
V. Attorney Fees
¶ 31 Husband lastly challenges the district court’s award of
$20,000 in attorney fees to wife under section 14-10-119, C.R.S.
13 2024, which it based on the parties’ disparate financial resources
and a finding that husband had prolonged the proceedings.
Because a determination of attorney fees must be reviewed in light
of the parties’ financial resources after any maintenance award, the
court must also reconsider its determination of attorney fees given
our reversal of the maintenance award. See In re Marriage of
Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 62. Therefore, we decline to consider
husband’s contention that the district court erred in awarding wife
attorney fees.
¶ 32 However, in the event that the district court awards attorney
fees on remand, the court must make findings sufficient for us to
determine whether it awarded attorney fees under section 14-10-
119, section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024, or both. See Gibbs, ¶ 9; see
also § 14-10-119 (affording the court discretion to award fees in a
dissolution proceeding “after considering the financial resources of
both parties”); §§ 13-17-102, -103, C.R.S. 2024 (governing awards
of attorney fees for maintaining a substantially frivolous,
groundless, or vexatious action); In re Marriage of Trout, 897 P.2d
838, 840 (Colo. App. 1994) (although the court may consider a
party’s actions in initiating unwarranted proceedings when
14 determining whether to award attorney fees under section 14-10-
119, the award should be primarily a means of apportioning the
costs and fees of an action equitably between the parties and not a
means of punishing a party).
VI. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 33 Asserting that husband’s appeal is frivolous, wife requests an
award of her appellate attorney fees under C.A.R. 38(b). Given our
disposition, we deny wife’s request for appellate attorney fees and
we also decline to award her costs on appeal. See C.A.R. 39(a) (if a
judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall
be allowed only as ordered by the court).
¶ 34 Wife also requests her appellate attorney fees under section
14-10-119 due to the alleged financial disparities between the
parties. Because the district court is better equipped to determine
the factual issues regarding the parties’ current financial resources,
we direct it to address this request on remand. See C.A.R. 39.1;
In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 54.
VII. Disposition
¶ 35 The portions of the judgment concerning the property division
are affirmed. The portions of the judgment concerning maintenance
15 and the award of attorney fees to wife are reversed. The portions of
the judgment modifying child support are reversed. The case is
remanded for further proceedings as to maintenance, the
modification of child support, wife’s request for attorney fees, and
her request for appellate attorney fees. Those portions of the
judgment not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.