24CA1172 Marriage of Keyes 05-15-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1172 Summit County District Court No. 13DR30007 Honorable Reed W. Owens, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Marion A. Keyes,
Appellant,
and
Laurie A. Keyes n/k/a Laurie A. Collins,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 15, 2025
Marion A. Keyes, Buena Vista, Colorado, for Appellant
Laurie A. Keyse, Pro se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Marion A.
Keyes (father) and Laurie A. Keyes, now known as Laurie A. Collins
(mother), father appeals the district court’s order granting mother’s
motion to modify parenting time. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 The parties’ thirteen-year marriage, which resulted in four
children, ended in 2013. The court named mother the children’s
primary residential parent. Father’s parenting time included three
weekends a month during the school year, alternating weeks in the
summer, and rotating holidays.
¶3 In 2023, mother moved to modify parenting time for the two
youngest children, M.K. and K.K., (modification motion). Among
other things, mother proposed that father’s parenting time consist
of the first weekend of each month, with the provision that the
children could opt out of the visit for “any reason.” The district
court set an evidentiary hearing for March 14, 2024.
¶4 Meanwhile, the district court appointed a child and family
investigator (CFI) to investigate and make recommendations
regarding mother’s modification motion.
1 ¶5 Father moved to vacate the hearing and to stay the
proceedings because mother’s requested relief was “unlawful”
(motion to vacate). The district court denied the motion to vacate.
¶6 In December 2023, the CFI submitted a report to the district
court and the parties.
¶7 A few months later, father asked the district court to make
preliminary findings that the CFI violated practice standards in
Chief Justice Directive 04-08, Directive Concerning Court
Appointment of Child and Family Investigators Pursuant to Section
14-10-116.5 (amended Aug. 2024) (CJD 04-08). CJD 04-08(V)(D)(1)
provides that, “Prior to filing a complaint with the [State Court
Administrator’s Office], parties or their counsel of record shall
request preliminary findings on the record from the judicial officer
presiding over the current case that the CFI failed to comply with
the court’s order of appointment or has violated a practice standard
set forth in this CJD.” After considering father’s contentions, the
court determined that the CFI did not violate CJD 04-08.
¶8 Father then filed a motion seeking the recusal of the entire 5th
Judicial District, including the presiding judge (recusal motion). He
expressed concern that the CFI was married to a Summit County
2 Court Judge, alleging that the marriage created a conflict of
interest, which prevented any 5th Judicial District judge from
impartially reviewing the CFI’s alleged violations or the assigned
judge’s order denying his request for preliminary findings. Father
described the 5th Judicial District as an “extremely tight-knit
group.” He also reported that he had initiated investigations into
the CFI and the presiding judge.
¶9 The district court deferred ruling on the recusal motion until
the then-upcoming hearing in order to allow the parties time to
present additional arguments addressing the motion. The court
added that if the recusal motion was denied, the hearing would
proceed as planned; if granted, the hearing would be continued and
the case reassigned to another judge.
¶ 10 At the time of the hearing on the modification motion, M.K.
and K.K. were sixteen years old and fifteen years old, respectively.
According to the minute order, the district court orally denied
father’s recusal motion, citing the applicable law and explaining its
reasoning. Following the hearing, the court issued a written order
• maintaining mother’s status as the minor children’s
primary residential parent;
3 • allocating to father the first and third weekend of each
month throughout the year;
• allowing the children to choose which parent they would
spend time with during any fifth weekend that may fall in
a given month;
• granting each party one uninterrupted week with the
children; and
• continuing the holiday schedule.
¶ 11 The district court also encouraged father to travel to Summit
County to be more involved in the children’s lives.
¶ 12 Father now appeals.
II. Missing Hearing Transcript
¶ 13 The transcript of the modification hearing is not in the record
on appeal. As the appellant, it was father’s responsibility to
“include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for
considering and deciding the issues on appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3).
The failure to include the transcript is significant because, in the
absence of a complete record, we must presume that the missing
portions of the record support the district court’s findings and
conclusions. See In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15
4 (where the record is incomplete, the appellate court must assume
that the evidence supports the district court’s findings); see also In
re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13 (“Where the appellant fails
to provide . . . a transcript, the [appellate] court must presume that
the record supports the judgment.”); McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d
1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A party cannot overcome a
deficiency in the record by statements in the briefs.”).
III. Recusal
¶ 14 To begin, father contends that the district court erred by
denying his recusal motion. We disagree.
¶ 15 Upon the filing of the recusal motion, the district court
reserved ruling on recusal pending further argument at the
modification hearing. When the court deferred ruling, it indicated
that the hearing would take place as scheduled if it denied the
motion.
¶ 16 While the district court’s written order after the hearing was
silent on the recusal motion, the fact that the hearing proceeded
implies an oral denial, which the minute order confirms. Father,
however, has not provided the hearing transcript, which contained
the details of the parties’ arguments and the court’s ruling. In the
5 absence of the transcript, we must presume that the court made all
the necessary findings, that the record supports those findings, and
that the denial was consistent with the controlling legal principles.
See Beatty, ¶ 15; see also Dean, ¶ 13.
¶ 17 We reject father’s related argument that the grant of mother’s
modification motion gave the “impression” that the district court
“exacted revenge” against him for filing a grievance. Adverse legal
rulings do not constitute grounds for claiming prejudice or bias. In
re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (adverse
rulings, standing alone, do not constitute grounds for claiming bias
or prejudice); see People v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856, 859 (Colo. App.
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24CA1172 Marriage of Keyes 05-15-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1172 Summit County District Court No. 13DR30007 Honorable Reed W. Owens, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Marion A. Keyes,
Appellant,
and
Laurie A. Keyes n/k/a Laurie A. Collins,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Welling and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 15, 2025
Marion A. Keyes, Buena Vista, Colorado, for Appellant
Laurie A. Keyse, Pro se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Marion A.
Keyes (father) and Laurie A. Keyes, now known as Laurie A. Collins
(mother), father appeals the district court’s order granting mother’s
motion to modify parenting time. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 The parties’ thirteen-year marriage, which resulted in four
children, ended in 2013. The court named mother the children’s
primary residential parent. Father’s parenting time included three
weekends a month during the school year, alternating weeks in the
summer, and rotating holidays.
¶3 In 2023, mother moved to modify parenting time for the two
youngest children, M.K. and K.K., (modification motion). Among
other things, mother proposed that father’s parenting time consist
of the first weekend of each month, with the provision that the
children could opt out of the visit for “any reason.” The district
court set an evidentiary hearing for March 14, 2024.
¶4 Meanwhile, the district court appointed a child and family
investigator (CFI) to investigate and make recommendations
regarding mother’s modification motion.
1 ¶5 Father moved to vacate the hearing and to stay the
proceedings because mother’s requested relief was “unlawful”
(motion to vacate). The district court denied the motion to vacate.
¶6 In December 2023, the CFI submitted a report to the district
court and the parties.
¶7 A few months later, father asked the district court to make
preliminary findings that the CFI violated practice standards in
Chief Justice Directive 04-08, Directive Concerning Court
Appointment of Child and Family Investigators Pursuant to Section
14-10-116.5 (amended Aug. 2024) (CJD 04-08). CJD 04-08(V)(D)(1)
provides that, “Prior to filing a complaint with the [State Court
Administrator’s Office], parties or their counsel of record shall
request preliminary findings on the record from the judicial officer
presiding over the current case that the CFI failed to comply with
the court’s order of appointment or has violated a practice standard
set forth in this CJD.” After considering father’s contentions, the
court determined that the CFI did not violate CJD 04-08.
¶8 Father then filed a motion seeking the recusal of the entire 5th
Judicial District, including the presiding judge (recusal motion). He
expressed concern that the CFI was married to a Summit County
2 Court Judge, alleging that the marriage created a conflict of
interest, which prevented any 5th Judicial District judge from
impartially reviewing the CFI’s alleged violations or the assigned
judge’s order denying his request for preliminary findings. Father
described the 5th Judicial District as an “extremely tight-knit
group.” He also reported that he had initiated investigations into
the CFI and the presiding judge.
¶9 The district court deferred ruling on the recusal motion until
the then-upcoming hearing in order to allow the parties time to
present additional arguments addressing the motion. The court
added that if the recusal motion was denied, the hearing would
proceed as planned; if granted, the hearing would be continued and
the case reassigned to another judge.
¶ 10 At the time of the hearing on the modification motion, M.K.
and K.K. were sixteen years old and fifteen years old, respectively.
According to the minute order, the district court orally denied
father’s recusal motion, citing the applicable law and explaining its
reasoning. Following the hearing, the court issued a written order
• maintaining mother’s status as the minor children’s
primary residential parent;
3 • allocating to father the first and third weekend of each
month throughout the year;
• allowing the children to choose which parent they would
spend time with during any fifth weekend that may fall in
a given month;
• granting each party one uninterrupted week with the
children; and
• continuing the holiday schedule.
¶ 11 The district court also encouraged father to travel to Summit
County to be more involved in the children’s lives.
¶ 12 Father now appeals.
II. Missing Hearing Transcript
¶ 13 The transcript of the modification hearing is not in the record
on appeal. As the appellant, it was father’s responsibility to
“include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for
considering and deciding the issues on appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3).
The failure to include the transcript is significant because, in the
absence of a complete record, we must presume that the missing
portions of the record support the district court’s findings and
conclusions. See In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15
4 (where the record is incomplete, the appellate court must assume
that the evidence supports the district court’s findings); see also In
re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13 (“Where the appellant fails
to provide . . . a transcript, the [appellate] court must presume that
the record supports the judgment.”); McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d
1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A party cannot overcome a
deficiency in the record by statements in the briefs.”).
III. Recusal
¶ 14 To begin, father contends that the district court erred by
denying his recusal motion. We disagree.
¶ 15 Upon the filing of the recusal motion, the district court
reserved ruling on recusal pending further argument at the
modification hearing. When the court deferred ruling, it indicated
that the hearing would take place as scheduled if it denied the
motion.
¶ 16 While the district court’s written order after the hearing was
silent on the recusal motion, the fact that the hearing proceeded
implies an oral denial, which the minute order confirms. Father,
however, has not provided the hearing transcript, which contained
the details of the parties’ arguments and the court’s ruling. In the
5 absence of the transcript, we must presume that the court made all
the necessary findings, that the record supports those findings, and
that the denial was consistent with the controlling legal principles.
See Beatty, ¶ 15; see also Dean, ¶ 13.
¶ 17 We reject father’s related argument that the grant of mother’s
modification motion gave the “impression” that the district court
“exacted revenge” against him for filing a grievance. Adverse legal
rulings do not constitute grounds for claiming prejudice or bias. In
re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (adverse
rulings, standing alone, do not constitute grounds for claiming bias
or prejudice); see People v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856, 859 (Colo. App.
2005) (the propriety of a district court’s rulings, whether right or
wrong, is not relevant in determining recusal issues), aff’d 157 P.3d
516 (Colo. 2007).
IV. Modification of Parenting Time
A. Endangerment Standard
¶ 18 As we understand father’s argument, he contends that the
district court erred by restricting his parenting time without
applying the endangerment standard of section 14-10-129, C.R.S.
2024. We disagree.
6 ¶ 19 A district court has broad discretion when modifying parenting
time, and we must exercise every presumption to uphold its
decision. In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 7. The court
abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. Id.
¶ 20 We review de novo, however, whether the district court applied
the proper legal standard. Id. at ¶ 8.
¶ 21 A district court may generally modify an order granting or
denying parenting time rights whenever such modification would
serve the children’s best interests under section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),
C.R.S. 2024. However, the court must not restrict parenting time
rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the
children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional
development. § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I).
¶ 22 Father seems to argue that the percentage reduction in his
parenting time, as compared to the 2013 plan or the 2023 plan, is
so substantial that it amounts to a restriction of his parenting time
as a matter of law. A division of this court recently rejected this
type of purely quantitative analysis to a change in parenting time.
See Dale, ¶ 32 (“We conclude that a purely quantitative reduction in
7 a parent’s parenting time is not a restriction . . . under section 14-
10-129(1)(b)[I].”)
¶ 23 There, the permanent orders gave the mother approximately
205 overnights a year with the child, while the father had about 160
overnights a year. Id. at ¶ 2. The father filed a motion to modify
parenting time, arguing that his work schedule had changed and
required him to relocate over 100 miles from the child’s primary
residence. Id. at ¶ 3. The district court held a hearing and
considered the child’s best interests under section 14-10-
124(1.5)(a), ultimately reducing his parenting time to around 115
overnights a year. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.
¶ 24 On appeal, the father in Dale argued that the modification was
a restriction of his parenting time and that the court should have
applied the endangerment standard. Id. at ¶ 6. As part of its
analysis resolving the argument, the division distinguished between
a qualitative restriction and a purely quantitative reduction in
parenting time. Id. at ¶ 32. A qualitative change restricts parenting
time rights, controlling “the manner, location, or environment in
which the parent engages in parenting time, such as a requirement
that parenting time be supervised, a prohibition of overnight visits
8 with a particular parent, or a limitation on the location where a
parent may exercise parenting time.” Id. Such a change
necessitates the court’s application of the endangerment standard
under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). See Dale, ¶ 33.
¶ 25 On the other hand, a purely quantitative change — like a
reduction in the number of overnights — does not equate to a
restriction on parenting time. See id. at ¶ 32. The division in Dale
concluded that because the modification was purely quantitative,
the district court appropriately applied the best interests of the
child standard rather than the endangerment standard. See id. at ¶
33.
¶ 26 We agree with the rationale in Dale. As the modification here
constituted a pure reduction of father’s parenting time, without
imposing any restrictions, the district court appropriately applied
the best interests standard under section 14-10-124(1.5). See Dale,
¶¶ 32-33.
B. Delegation of Parenting Time Decisions
¶ 27 The district court ordered that, in months containing a fifth
weekend, the children could decide which parent they would visit.
Father asserts that the court erred by impermissibly delegating
9 parenting time decisions to the children. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1133 (Colo. 2010)
(only the district court has the authority to allocate parenting time);
see also In re Marriage of Ohr, 97 P.3d 354, 358 (Colo. App. 2004)
(the district court may not delegate parenting time decisions to
third parties). Although this is arguably an improper delegation of
parenting time decisions, we conclude that any error was ultimately
harmless under these specific circumstances. See C.A.R. 35(c)
(appellate court may disregard an error not affecting the parties’
substantial rights).
¶ 28 We first note that without a hearing transcript, our ability to
fully review this issue is considerably hampered.
¶ 29 In any event, the limited record reflects that the district court’s
apparently erroneous delegation did not affect father’s substantial
rights. See C.A.R. 35(c). M.K. is currently five months shy of his
eighteenth birthday, and K.K. is sixteen and a half years old. See In
re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶¶ 9-21 (after a child turns
eighteen years old, parenting time orders have no practical legal
effect); see also § 13-22-101(1)(d), C.R.S. 2024 (A person eighteen
years or older is deemed to be of full age to “make decisions in
10 regard to [their] own body . . . to the full extent allowed to any other
adult person.”). And M.K. held a part-time job on the weekends,
and K.K. was heavily involved in competitive dance, which also
included her primary social circle. Both were engaged in advanced
academic coursework and extracurricular activities. The CFI
reported that they felt “restricted by not being able to participate in
the same activities as other kids their ages,” and that the parties
lived some distance apart. As well, our review of the calendar
reveals that there are only three months containing five weekends
before the close of 2025 and just four more until November of 2026,
when K.K. will turn eighteen years old.
¶ 30 Moreover, father develops no argument explaining how his
substantial rights were prejudiced by the district court’s decision,
and absent this necessary showing of prejudice, he has not
established a sufficient basis to warrant reversal. See People in
Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding
that an alleged error, without a valid allegation of prejudice, is not
grounds for reversal).
¶ 31 In all, we disregard any error associated with this issue as
harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c).
11 V. Motion to Vacate
¶ 32 Last, father contends that the district court erred by denying
his motion to vacate. He argues that mother’s requested
modification was so significant that it required the court to apply
the endangerment standard under section 14-10-129(2)(c) and that
the court failed to tell either the parties or the CFI if that standard
would apply at the hearing.
¶ 33 We will not address this issue now because father never
specifically argued it in his motion to vacate. See Berra v. Springer
& Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010) (to preserve
an issue for appeal, it must be presented in such a way that the
district court has an opportunity to rule on it); see also Core-Mark
Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016 COA 22, ¶ 26 (only specific
arguments made to the district court are preserved for appeal). He
argued only that mother’s modification request, particularly to have
the children decide their parenting time, was “unlawful” as it would
“usurp judicial authority” and “place an undue psychological
burden on [the] children,” and therefore, the court should vacate
the hearing or stay the proceedings. That is not the contention he
12 advances on appeal to challenge the court’s denial of his motion to
vacate.
VI. Disposition
¶ 34 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE KUHN concur.