24CA2169 Marriage of Kelly 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2169 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22DR31018 Honorable Kimberly Karn, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Uriah Michael Kelly,
Appellee,
and
Cassandra Anne Kelly,
Appellant.
ORDERS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division A Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD* Román, C.J., and Berger*, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Law Office of Leonard R. Higdon, PLLC, Leonard R. Higdon, Jacqueline M. Schneider, Greenwood Village, Colorado for Appellee
Paul A. Frederiksen, Parker, Colorado for Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 This is a dissolution of marriage proceeding between a wife,
Cassandra Anne Kelly, and a husband, Uriah Michael Kelly. Wife
appeals the district court’s permanent orders. She submits the
court did not have jurisdiction over the parties, and she challenges
the court’s determinations on maintenance and dividing up the
marital property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part,
and we remand the case to the court for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In 2022, husband asked the court to dissolve the parties’
fourteen-year marriage. Wife filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
asserting the court lacked jurisdiction because the parties had
moved to Florida. After a hearing, the court determined wife was
domiciled in Florida, but husband continued to be domiciled in
Colorado.
¶3 The court later entered permanent orders. As is pertinent to
our analysis, the court found the value of husband’s 401(k) was
$69,353.94 and it had a loan against it of $27,494.64. So the court
allocated husband his 401(k) in the amount of $41,859.30. The
court allocated to wife the parties’ debt to wife’s parents in the
amount of $23,363.89.
1 ¶4 With respect to the marital home in Florida, the court
• valued it at $295,800, noting it was encumbered by a
mortgage with a balance of $238,558.21;
• allocated the marital equity in the home of $57,241.79 to
wife;
• ordered her to assume the mortgage or to refinance it in
her name within ninety days; if she could not do so, she
was to sell the home within sixty-one days of the order;
• decided, if wife sold the home and garnered more than
$57,241.79 in profit, she must split the proceeds above
this amount equally with husband.
¶5 With respect to maintenance, the court found husband should
pay wife the guideline amount, which it calculated at $385.05 per
month for a period of eight years and four months. But the court
found husband had paid the entire mortgage on the Florida home in
the time the parties owned it, even though husband never lived in
the home. These payments totaled $52,977.08. The court
considered these payments to be a form of maintenance and
credited them to husband, resulting in an overpayment of
2 $14,472.58 in the amount of maintenance due. As a result, the
court found husband did not owe wife any maintenance, but it did
not require wife to refund the overpayment to husband.
II. Jurisdiction
¶6 Wife contends the court did not have jurisdiction to preside
over the dissolution proceeding because both parties were domiciled
in Florida. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
¶7 To dissolve a marriage, a court must find, among other things,
that “one of the parties has been domiciled in this state for ninety-
one days” before the proceedings began. § 14-10-106(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.
2025. If this domiciliary requirement is not met, the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage. See In re
Marriage of Barnes, 907 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Colo. App. 1995).
¶8 The determination of a spouse’s domicile is a question of fact.
In re Marriage of Akins, 932 P.2d 863, 868 (Colo. App. 1997).
Accordingly, we review the court’s finding that husband was
domiciled in Colorado for the requisite time before filing the petition
for clear error, meaning we will not disturb the finding if it is
3 supported by the record. See Martinez v. Mintz Law Firm, LLC, 2016
CO 43, ¶ 17.
¶9 Domicile “is the place of one’s actual residence with the
intention to remain permanently, or for an indefinite time, and
without any certain purpose to return to a former place of abode.”
Akins, 932 P.2d at 868; see also Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 43
(domicile is a “person’s permanent home to which he or she intends
to return to and remain”). “Domicile” is not synonymous with
“residence,” however, because a person can have more than one
residence at a time, but only one domicile. Old Republic Nat’l Title
Ins. Co. v. Kornegay, 2012 COA 140, ¶ 18; see Brandt, ¶ 43. Both
residence and intent to remain permanently must coexist to create
a person’s domicile. Akins, 932 P.2d at 868. Once established, a
person’s domicile continues until another one is established,
without regard to any “changes in temporary sojourn.” Id.
B. Discussion
¶ 10 The court found, although wife moved to Florida in July 2021,
husband never moved to join her. It also found, although it may
have been husband’s intent to reside in Florida at some point, he
4 was never domiciled there and remained domiciled in Colorado.
The record supports the court’s findings.
¶ 11 Both parties testified wife moved to Florida in July 2021, but
husband was unable to move because he could not ask for a
transfer of employment until at least April 2022. Husband
continued to live in Colorado at his father’s home. He testified that,
after wife moved, he visited Florida only twice for a total of ten days
and returned to Colorado after each trip. He also testified and
provided exhibits supporting his testimony that he had a
commercial driver’s license issued out of Colorado; he was
registered to vote in Colorado; he titled, registered, and insured his
car in Colorado; and he was not aware of receiving any mail at an
address outside of Colorado.
¶ 12 We acknowledge wife asserts husband intended to move to
Florida once he was able to request a transfer from his employer, he
signed a mortgage agreement which appears to state his intent to
live in the Florida home, and he alone paid the mortgage for the
Florida house. But it is the court’s role, and not ours, to resolve the
conflicting evidence regarding where and when husband established
a domicile, and its resolution of that factual issue is binding on
5 review. See M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1383-84
(Colo. 1994); see also In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 270
(Colo. App. 2010)(it is the province of the district court to determine
the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve conflicting evidence).
¶ 13 We are not persuaded by wife’s reliance on People v. Fox, 862
P.2d 1000, 1004 (Colo. App. 1993), to conclude husband changed
his domicile by virtue of wife alone moving to Florida. Fox
considered when a “marital domicile” enjoyed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
hinged on the undisputed fact the defendant and his wife would
have remained together in the marital domicile — wherever that
might have been located — had the defendant not been
incarcerated. Id.
¶ 14 In this case, wife submits, by analogy, the “only reason
husband did not stay in Florida . . . was that he could not transfer
his . . . employment to Florida until April of the next year.” This is
another attack on the court’s finding that, although husband might
have intended to move to Florida at some point, he was never
domiciled anywhere but Colorado. Because the record supports the
6 court’s finding that husband remained domiciled in Colorado, we
will not disturb it.
¶ 15 Last, to the extent wife asserts the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under section 13-1-124(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025, we disagree.
She contends section 13-1-124(1)(e) “requires that the marital
domicile has been maintained in Colorado without interruption.”
But she misreads the statute. Rather, section 13-1-124 confers
jurisdiction on Colorado courts for actions related to “the
maintenance of a matrimonial domicile . . . if one of the parties of
the marriage continues without interruption to be domiciled within
the state.” The court found that husband continued to be domiciled
in Colorado and, as we have discussed, we defer to this finding of
fact.
III. Property Division
¶ 16 Wife contends the court erred when it divided the marital
property. Specifically, she asserts (1) the court inappropriately
calculated the amount of husband’s 401(k) and the debt owed to
wife’s parents; (2) its order relating to allocation of profit if the
marital home were to be sold was contrary to Colorado law; and (3)
it did not make any finding about the total assets and debts
7 allocated to each party. Although we agree the court’s order
relating to the profit made on the marital home was erroneous, we
affirm the remaining property division orders.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 17 Before dividing the marital estate, a court must first determine
whether each asset or debt is marital property, which is subject to
division, or separate property, which is not. § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S.
2025. Assets acquired and debts incurred during the marriage are
presumed marital, but this presumption can be rebutted with
evidence proving an exception listed in section 14-10-113(2). § 14-
10-113(3); see In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1171-72
(Colo. App. 2006)(“Marital liabilities include all debts that are
acquired and incurred by [the spouses] during their marriage.”).
¶ 18 Next, a court must value each asset or debt. In re Marriage of
Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4; Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at 1172. It may
adopt either spouse’s valuation or arrive at its own, so long as the
valuation is reasonable considering the evidence as a whole. In re
Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 41. Property is valued as of
the date of the decree or as of the date of the hearing on the
8 disposition of property if this hearing precedes the date of the
decree. § 14-10-113(2), (5).
¶ 19 Finally, a court must equitably divide the marital estate,
considering all relevant factors. § 14-10-113(1); see In re Marriage
of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 50; Wright, ¶ 3; see also Jorgenson, 143
P.3d at 1172 (distribution of marital debts is like property division).
The division must be equitable, but it need not be equal. Wright,
¶ 3.
¶ 20 A court has broad discretion to divide the marital estate
equitably based on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case, and we will not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that
discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,
¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1); In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95,
¶ 67 (weighing the statutory factors is within the court’s sound
discretion). A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law
or its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.
Medeiros, ¶ 28. Specific findings on every statutory factor are not
required, provided a court’s overall findings allow us to determine
whether its decision was supported by competent evidence. Collins,
¶ 19.
9 B. Discussion
¶ 21 When valuing husband’s 401(k), the court found it was marital
property and the amount in the account was $69,353.94, with a
loan against the account of $27,494.64. The court therefore found
the account had a marital value of $41,859.00 and allocated it to
husband.
¶ 22 Wife asserts the court erred because the court’s valuation
merely subtracted the loan amount from the balance and, as a
result, ignored “that the loan is an asset that is owed to the account
that is not considered elsewhere” in husband’s financials or
property division. So, she continues, the court “hid” the debt of
$27,494.64 from consideration in the property division.
Accordingly, she asks us to remand the case to the court to award
husband the 401(k) in the amount of $69,353.94.
¶ 23 We decline wife’s request because, even if the court erred by
subtracting the amount of the loan from the 401(k) and awarding
the balance to husband, she does not explain how this harmed her.
If we were to remand with instructions to value the 401(k) at
$69,353.94, the court would also have to allocate the $27,494.64
loan against the 401(k), leaving husband with the same allocation
10 of property and the same debts as set forth in the permanent
orders. See C.R.C.P. 61; see also In re Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36
(Colo. 2001)(“Errors by the trial court in determining the property
division in a dissolution case are reversible when the aggregate
effect of such errors affects the substantial rights of the parties.”).
¶ 24 Wife next disputes the amount of the debt to her parents. The
court found that the balance on the debt the parties borrowed from
wife’s parents amounted to $23,363.89 and allocated it to wife.
Wife first submits the court’s determination that wife’s parents were
not collecting interest on the loan was error. The court noted that,
“[a]lthough there is an interest rate in the written document, the
evidence established that the parties have borrowed several times
from [w]ife’s parents, have never paid interest, and there is no
communication from the parents to husband or wife regarding how
much interest is due and owing.”
¶ 25 Wife asserts this finding was erroneous because evidence
showed wife’s parents had communicated about the debt on several
occasions. We agree evidence showed wife’s parents communicated
with the parties about the debt in general, but the court’s finding
was there had been no communication about the interest accrued
11 on the debt. The evidence wife cites does not address interest on
the debt. And, to the extent wife contends other evidence
established her parents intended to, or did, collect interest on the
debt, husband testified there had been no interest charged on the
loan to his knowledge. We are not free to reweigh the court’s
factual findings. Farr, 228 P.3d at 270.
¶ 26 Next, wife contends the amount the court found owing on the
debt to her parents is not supported by the record. We agree the
court incorrectly calculated the amount owed. It found the evidence
established the parties had borrowed a total of $60,300.00 and had
paid $37,136.11. This leaves a balance owed of $23,163.89 rather
than the court’s stated amount of $23,363.89. But we do not see,
and wife does not explain, how she was harmed by this calculation
error amounting to only $200.00. See C.R.C.P. 61; Balanson, 25
P.3d at 32.
¶ 27 Wife next takes issue with the court’s order that, if she must
sell the marital home because she cannot refinance it, she must
split any profits over $57,241.79 (the marital value awarded to her)
with husband. She asserts this order is “contrary to established
12 Colorado law” because husband is not entitled to any future
appreciation.
¶ 28 We agree with wife that, because the court awarded the
marital home to her in the permanent orders, any later appreciation
is hers. See In re Marriage of Wormell, 697 P.2d 812, 814 (Colo.
App. 1985)(noting husband was not entitled to share in the future
appreciation of the marital residence awarded to wife because
property is valued at the time of the dissolution hearing or as of the
hearing on property division, whichever occurs first); see also In re
Marriage of Campbell, 599 P.2d 275, 275-76 (Colo. App.
1979)(district court committed reversible error when it awarded the
wife the increase in value of the marital residence when sold after
the dissolution); § 14-10-113(3). We therefore vacate that portion of
the order requiring wife to split any proceeds over $57,241.79 with
husband if she must sell the marital home.
¶ 29 Last, wife submits the court erred because it did not make any
finding about the total assets and debts allocated to each party.
She provides no authority stating a final accounting is required,
and the court’s order is sufficient for us to understand the total
marital assets and debts and how they were allocated. See In re
13 Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (“The district court must
make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court
a clear understanding of the basis of its order.”).
IV. Maintenance Obligation
¶ 30 Wife challenges the court’s decision that husband fulfilled his
maintenance obligation. She asserts, among other reasons, the
court erred when it reduced husband’s income by $900.00 to
account for child support paid to his newborn son. Because we
cannot ascertain how the court landed on the amount of $900.00,
we agree. But, on remand, the court may consider the mortgage
payments husband made during the pendency of the proceeding
when determining the amount and the length of the term of
maintenance.
¶ 31 Section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2025, specifies the process a
court must follow when considering a maintenance request. Wright,
¶ 13. The court must first make findings concerning (1) the amount
of each party’s gross income; (2) the marital property apportioned to
each party; (3) the financial resources of each party; (4) the
reasonable financial need as established during the marriage; and
14 (5) whether the maintenance awarded would be deductible for
federal income tax purposes by the payor and taxable income to the
recipient. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); see also Wright, ¶ 14.
¶ 32 After making these initial findings, the court must determine
the amount and term of maintenance, if any, that is fair and
equitable to the parties after considering, among other things, the
guideline amount and term set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(b).
§ 14-10-114(3)(a)(II); Wright, ¶ 15.
¶ 33 The advisory guidelines are a “starting point” for the
determination of fair and equitable maintenance awards. § 14-10-
114(1)(b)(II). The advisory guideline amounts are based on the
parties’ “adjusted gross income,” which means gross income less
pre-existing court-ordered child support obligations actually paid by
a party and the adjustment to a party’s income as determined by
application of the child support guidelines in section 14-10-
115(6)(b), C.R.S. 2025, for any children who are not children of the
marriage for whom the party has a legal responsibility to support.
§ 14-10-114(8)(a)(I).
¶ 34 We review a court’s maintenance award for an abuse of
discretion. Medeiros, ¶ 58; In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530,
15 533 (Colo. App. 2011). A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misapplies the law. Medeiros, ¶ 28. A court must “make
sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear
understanding of the basis of its order.” Wright, ¶ 20
(quoting Gibbs, ¶ 9).
B. Child Support Deduction
¶ 35 The court determined husband’s monthly income was
$8,379.10. After considering the statutory factors set forth in
section 14-10-114(3)(a)(I), it determined wife had a need for
support. It then determined under the maintenance guidelines
husband must pay wife the monthly amount of $385.05 for eight
years. The court arrived at that number by taking husband’s
monthly income and adjusting it by $900.00 per month for support
paid to his son born to another woman. Wife submits this was
error because the court did not explain the foundation for the
$900.00 deduction. We agree.
¶ 36 When discussing support for his newborn child, husband
testified, “[I]t’s looking between [$]800 to $1,000 a month.” In
response to questioning from the court, husband clarified he was
16 currently supporting the child and there was no court order or case
filed for child support. But he had a “written agreement” with the
child’s mother about child support. The record does not establish
how much child support husband paid to the mother of his child or
document any such payments. In sum, we cannot discern how the
court decided $900.00 should be deducted from husband’s income
for child support and we must therefore remand the maintenance
determination to the court.
¶ 37 On remand, the court must take evidence about the parties’
then existing financial circumstances and, as such, we do not
address wife’s several additional contentions related to the court’s
determinations concerning income and other things. Id. at ¶ 24
(declining, after maintenance award was reversed and remanded, to
consider argument that court improperly calculated a party’s
income).
C. Credit for Mortgage Payments
¶ 38 Because it may arise on remand, we will consider whether the
court erred when it found husband’s maintenance obligation could
be offset by the amount he paid on the Florida mortgage.
17 ¶ 39 The court found husband had paid the mortgage on the
Florida home since it was purchased for a total of $52,977.08. It
considered this “as a payment of maintenance” and found husband
had fulfilled his entire obligation to wife, plus an overpayment of
more than fourteen thousand dollars. The court did not abuse its
discretion by crediting husband for the amount paid on the
mortgage.
¶ 40 Wife asserts the court erred because (1) there was no order for
husband to pay temporary maintenance, and the mortgage
payments could not be considered “maintenance” under section 14-
10-114(2); and (2) husband’s mortgage payments were not “from
one spouse to the other.”
¶ 41 First, the court’s order does not run afoul of section 14-10-
114(2). That statute provides the court may order the payment of
maintenance at the time of permanent orders — not whether the
court may consider mortgage payments made during the pendency
of a proceeding when deciding whether a permanent order of
maintenance would be fair and equitable. § 14-10-114(2).
¶ 42 Next, we agree the court never ordered husband to continue
making mortgage payments and the parties never requested
18 temporary maintenance. But, to the extent wife submits such
orders were required before the court could consider the mortgage
payments as a factor when determining the maintenance amount
and term, we are not persuaded.
¶ 43 The statute provides a nonexclusive list of factors a court shall
consider when determining the amount and term of maintenance.
§ 14-10-114(4)(c)(I)-(XIII). As part of its maintenance determination,
the court in this case was permitted to consider “any other factor” it
“deem[ed] relevant.” § 14-10-114(4)(c)(XIII).
¶ 44 Wife does not contend the mortgage payments were irrelevant.
We therefore do not agree the court erred when it offset wife’s
maintenance award with the amount of mortgage payments made.
See Smith, ¶ 67 (weighing the statutory factors is within a court’s
sound discretion).
¶ 45 Last, wife contends the court’s order that husband had met
his maintenance obligation was erroneous because it created an
“unmodifiable” award without “the necessary findings,” especially
considering wife’s medical conditions. But she does not develop
this argument further, and we therefore decline to address it. See
Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA
19 34, ¶ 44 (declining to consider undeveloped and conclusory
contentions of error made without supporting argument or
authority).
V. Attorney Fees
¶ 46 Husband requests an award of attorney fees and costs related
to this appeal. But we will only award attorney fees and costs if the
party seeking them states a legal and factual basis for the award.
C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 53; see also
Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984)(“A
request to impose sanctions has been denied where the appellee
failed to . . . clearly state the basis for the request.”). Husband does
not cite a statute or rule or explain what facts support his request.
Accordingly, we deny his request.
VI. Disposition
¶ 47 The portion of the court’s permanent orders requiring wife to
split the proceeds of the sale of the marital home is vacated. The
court’s maintenance determination is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. All other portions of the permanent orders are
affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE BERGER concur.