24CA1408 Marriage of Janousek 05-14-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1408 Boulder County District Court No. 23DR30210 Honorable Andrew Hartman, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Michael Richard Janousek,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
and
Tamara Reynolds Janousek,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 14, 2026
Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant
Colorado Divorce Law Group, Brandi M. Petterson, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee ¶1 This appeal arises from a dissolution of marriage action
between Michael Richard Janousek and Tamara Reynolds
Janousek.1 The district court entered permanent orders addressing
the division of property, maintenance, and waste of the marital
estate. The parties contest different parts of the permanent orders
in their appeal and cross-appeal.
¶2 We affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background
¶3 Michael and Tamara married in 1995. They have three adult
children. The couple separated in 2021 and filed for divorce in May
2023.
¶4 At the initial status conference, Tamara requested emergency
temporary orders, claiming that Michael had severely restricted her
financial access to the marital estate. The court denied her request
for emergency relief but set a temporary orders hearing within a
month.
¶5 The district court entered temporary orders in July 2023. The
following spring, after a three-day contested permanent orders
1 Because the parties share a last name, for clarity we refer to both
by their first names. We intend no disrespect by doing so.
1 hearing, the district court entered the permanent orders that are
the subject of this appeal and cross-appeal.
II. Discussion
¶6 The parties’ contentions on appeal are largely divided into
three categories. First, Tamara challenges the district court’s ruling
concerning their son’s 529 account. Second, both parties challenge
the district court’s calculation of Michael’s income and the resulting
maintenance award to Tamara. Relatedly, Michael argues that the
district court erred by requiring him to obtain life insurance as
security for the maintenance award. Finally, Tamara contends the
district court erred by finding that she committed economic waste
and allocating certain assets to Tamara, along with the associated
debt.
¶7 We address these contentions in turn.
A. 529 Account for Son’s Education
1. Additional Facts
¶8 About a week before he filed for divorce, Michael placed
$100,000 into a 529 account, for use in funding their son’s
education-related expenses. Tamara testified that she did not know
about the transfer of funds and would not have agreed to it.
2 ¶9 Michael testified that he and Tamara had agreed to fund their
children’s college educations. More specifically, Michael stated that
he and Tamara agreed to pay for the children’s living expenses in
college, any expenses that weren’t covered by the children’s student
loans, and one-half of the student loans used to pay tuition.
Michael was the sole guarantor of the children’s student loans.
Michael also testified that the couple’s middle daughter stopped
paying on her student loan when he filed for divorce, requiring him
to make the full loan payments.
¶ 10 Michael stated that he deposited $100,000 in the son’s 529
account to ensure that the parties could comply with their past
agreements regarding funding of their son’s education. Tamara
objected to the transfer because it was made without her
knowledge, and she believed Michael would retain access to the
funds in the account. Tamara also argued that their middle
daughter’s student loan debt was not part of the marital estate and
instead was their daughter’s obligation.
¶ 11 At the end of the permanent orders hearing, the district court
found that the parties agreed to pay half of the children’s loans as
they accrued, but that Michael’s $100,000 lump sum deposit in the
3 529 account was contrary to the parties’ agreement. Still, it
reasoned that it would be inequitable for Michael alone “to be
saddled with that debt.” In light of these findings, the district court
ordered that only $50,000 of the $100,000 deposit would remain in
the account for use to fund the parties’ share of their son’s
education.
¶ 12 In addressing the remaining $50,000 in the account, the court
first determined that the middle daughter had defaulted on her
student loan. The balance of that loan was $35,369.77. The court
found that even though the parties had agreed that the children
would pay for half of their student loans, in practice, they had
funded the portion of the children’s share that the children either
could not or did not pay. Given these historical practices, the court
determined that $35,369.77 from the 529 account would be used to
satisfy the balance of the middle daughter’s student loan.2 After
paying the middle daughter’s outstanding loan balance, the court
2 Tamara’s opening brief cites the district court’s statements made
at the conclusion of the permanent orders hearing, which vary slightly from the written orders it later entered. In resolving any inconsistencies, we treat the court’s written orders as controlling. See In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 41 (“[I]n the event of a conflict, the written order prevails over the oral order.”).
4 ordered the remaining balance of $14,630.23 to be equally divided
between the parties.
¶ 13 Tamara now appeals the district court’s determination that
$50,000 of the money Michael deposited in their son’s 529 account
would remain in that account to fund the son’s education and the
court’s distribution of the remaining funds.
2. Standard of Review
¶ 14 Generally, we review a district court’s division of the marital
estate for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d
952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009). We will not disturb the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. When
dividing a marital estate, the “division must be equitable, but not
necessarily equal.” In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3. An
equitable division of the marital property is specific to the facts and
circumstances of each case. Id.
¶ 15 To the extent that the court’s property award is driven by
statutory or other legal principles, we review its legal rulings de
novo. See In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 17. If the
court’s order is also based on factual findings, we evaluate those
findings for clear error or an abuse of discretion. Id.
5 3. Analysis
¶ 16 Michael concedes that a court may not, absent an agreement
of the parties, order the use of marital assets to fund an
emancipated child’s postsecondary education. In re Marriage of
Sewell, 817 P.2d 594, 598 (Colo. App. 1991) (“[P]arents have neither
an absolute duty to pay the post-secondary educational expenses of
their minor children, nor an obligation to pay post-majority
educational expenses.” (citations omitted)); § 14-10-115(13)(a),
C.R.S. 2025 (“[U]nless a court finds that a child is otherwise
emancipated, emancipation occurs and child support terminates
without either party filing a motion when the last or only child
attains nineteen years of age [absent exceptions not applicable
here].”).
¶ 17 But Michael argues that the court may allocate marital funds
to pay postsecondary expenses if doing so is consistent with the
parties’ prior agreement or practice to pay such expenses. See Van
Orman v. Van Orman, 492 P.2d 81, 84 (Colo. App. 1971) (“[W]e do
not agree with the wife’s contention that, even in the absence of a
statutory or contractual duty to do so, a divorced husband has an
unqualified obligation and duty to pay for the college ехpenses of
6 his minor child . . . .”); id. at 85 (The court did not err by requiring
that “father pay the sum of $1,100 to [son] as a contribution to
college costs already incurred . . . [because] father concedes [the
sum] was available for [son] from the funds of an irrevocable trust
which the father had established for [son’s] benefit.”).
¶ 18 Tamara initially argues that the court should have treated the
$100,000 deposit as marital dissipation or waste. We disagree.
¶ 19 The $100,000 was still in the 529 account at the time of final
orders, and as explained more fully below, the court distributed
$86,000 from the account for the benefit of the parties’ son and
middle daughter in satisfaction of the marital debt created by the
parties’ agreement and practice of paying significant portions of the
children’s college expenses. And the court allocated the remaining
balance equally between Michael and Tamara.
¶ 20 The district court also addressed the timing of the deposit into
the 529 account. Michael filed for divorce nine days after
depositing the money. The district court acknowledged that making
such a large transfer without the other party’s consent so close to
the filing date could potentially be problematic. However, the
district court ultimately allocated the 529 funds in a manner
7 consistent with the parties’ past agreements and practices to fund
their children’s higher education, with the remaining balance split
evenly between the parties. Given the court’s findings concerning
the $100,000 deposited into the 529 account, we discern no error in
its conclusion that the $100,000 deposit was not economic waste.
¶ 21 Next, Tamara contends the district court improperly allocated
the funds to pay off their middle daughter’s debt because Michael
individually guaranteed that debt and Tamara did not. Thus,
Tamara argues that she should have received half of the $50,000
that did not remain in the 529 account — that is, $25,000. We are
unpersuaded.
¶ 22 Recall that in its written permanent orders the court allocated
$35,369.77 of the withdrawn funds to pay off the balance of the
parties’ middle daughter’s student loan debt and split the remaining
$14,630.23 between the two parties. In explaining its decision to
use a portion of the funds to pay off the middle daughter’s loan
balance, the court correctly determined that the middle daughter’s
student loan, which was incurred during the marriage, was marital
debt subject to division between the parties, regardless of whether
Michael alone served as the guarantor. See In re Marriage of
8 Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Colo. App. 2006) (allocation of
marital debts is in the nature of property division, and marital
liabilities include all debts incurred by a husband or wife during
their marriage); see also § 14-10-113(2), C.R.S. 2025 (subject to
exceptions not relevant here, marital property is all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage). The court
also reasoned that “although this allocation deviates from the
parties’ agreement with their [middle] daughter, the parties have not
consistently required [her] to pay back her half of the loans, and, as
the guarantor, [Michael] equitably should not be entirely
responsible for the outstanding loan balance.” We perceive no error
in the court allocating $35,369.77 to pay a marital debt and then
dividing the remaining $14,630.23 evenly between the parties.
¶ 23 Finally, as to the $50,000 remaining in the 529 account, the
court designated this sum to pay that portion of their son’s
education that the parties had previously committed to pay.
Focusing on the court’s oral ruling that Michael’s transfer of funds
to the 529 account was not in accord with the parties’ agreement
regarding payment of the children’s education expenses, Tamara
argues that the court’s order improperly forces her to pay for the
9 son’s postsecondary education expenses in contravention of
Colorado law.
¶ 24 Historically, the parties had taken private loans, deposited
those funds in a 529 account, and then used the funds to pay their
50% share of their two daughters’ educations. With respect to their
son, who was a sophomore in college at the time of final orders,
they made the same commitment to pay 50% of his education, but
they did not obtain a private loan to fund that commitment.
Instead, they periodically made deposits into the 529 account and
then used those funds to pay their share of his education.
¶ 25 Thus, in allocating $50,000 of the 529 account for their son’s
education, the court was effectively treating this sum as a marital
liability the parents owed to the son based on their past agreement
and practices to fund such expenses. Under these circumstances,
we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by
earmarking $50,000 to pay their share of their son’s educational
expenses. See Van Orman, 492 P.2d at 84-85.
¶ 26 Moreover, even if the district court erred by treating the
parents’ commitment to their son as a marital debt, the net result is
that Tamara arguably should have received an additional $25,000.
10 Given that the total value of the parties’ marital estate exceeded
$2,500,000, we deem $25,000 to be de minimis and any error
therefore harmless. See In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36
(Colo. 2001) (“If . . . a trial court’s error affects only a small
percentage of the overall marital estate, such an error may be
deemed to have been harmless and thus does not require
reversal.”).
B. Maintenance Award
¶ 27 As part of its temporary orders, the district court required
Michael to pay $10,000 per month to Tamara. Michael argued at
the permanent orders hearing that his maintenance obligation
should be reduced from the $10,000 temporary amount to $4,950
per month. Tamara argued for permanent maintenance in the
amount of $12,636 for the duration of her lifetime, asserting that
she was physically unable to work full time.
¶ 28 In its permanent orders, the district court ordered Michael to
pay Tamara $8,000 per month until March 2038. The court based
its maintenance determination on its finding that Michael earned a
monthly income of $34,936, which it calculated as an average of
11 Michael’s base salary and bonuses from 2019 to 2023. The court
also found that Tamara was voluntarily underemployed and
imputed her monthly income of $6,625.
¶ 29 The district court also required Michael to obtain a $1,000,000
life insurance policy, naming Tamara as the beneficiary, for the first
five years of his maintenance obligation with a step-down of the
policy’s benefit for the remainder of the maintenance period.
2. Parties’ Contentions
¶ 30 Tamara contends that the district court abused its discretion
by incorrectly calculating Michael’s income. Specifically, Tamara
argues that the court should have calculated Michael’s income by
using only his base salary from 2024 and then adding an average of
Michael’s bonuses from 2019-2023, rather than averaging both his
base salary and bonuses over the prior five years.3
¶ 31 Michael cross-appeals the court’s calculation of his income.
While Michael agrees it was proper for the court to average his
annual base salary between 2019 and 2023, he argues that the
3Tamara also argued in her briefs that the court should have
included a dividend Michael received in calculating his salary. But during oral argument, Tamara’s counsel stated that she is not pursuing this contention, so we do not address it further.
12 court abused its discretion by including his average bonuses over
that same period. Michael notes that he testified he would almost
certainly not receive a bonus in 2024, and that future bonuses were
not guaranteed. Therefore, he argues that the court should not
have included any bonuses in its calculation of his income. Michael
also contends that the court failed to make the requisite findings
under section 14-10-114(3)(c), C.R.S. 2025, to support its
maintenance order.
¶ 32 Relatedly, Michael cross-appeals the court’s order requiring
him to obtain life insurance to secure his maintenance obligation.
At times his opening brief appears to assert that Tamara failed to
preserve any request for life insurance. At other times, he argues
that Tamara failed to request an increase in the amount of life
insurance beyond the existing $500,000 policy. In addition to his
preservation contentions, Michael argues that the court failed to
make the necessary findings to require him to obtain life insurance
to secure the maintenance award.
¶ 33 We address the parties’ contentions in turn.
13 3. Standard of Review
¶ 34 We review a district court’s maintenance award for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 58. And
“we review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the
law.” Id. “The court has discretion to determine the award of
maintenance that is fair and equitable to both parties based upon
the totality of the circumstances.” § 14-10-114(3)(e).
4. Analysis
a. Adequacy of Findings
¶ 35 Under section 14-10-114(3)(d), a court may only award
maintenance “if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks
sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him
or her, to provide for his or her reasonable needs and is unable to
support himself or herself through appropriate employment.” The
court shall consider several factors under section 14-10-114(3)(c) to
determine the amount and length of the award. Although the court
must consider the statutory factors, it need not make express
findings concerning each factor. See Wright, ¶ 20 (“[W]hile a district
court has no obligation to make specific factual findings on every
factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), it must ‘make sufficiently
14 explicit findings of fact to give the appellate court a clear
understanding of the basis of its order.’” (quoting In re Marriage of
Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9)).
¶ 36 We begin by addressing Michael’s contention that the district
court did not make adequate findings concerning the section 14-10-
114(3)(c) factors. We are not persuaded. The court’s permanent
orders set forth these factors verbatim, and although the court did
not make detailed findings concerning each factor, its lengthy
discussion of the maintenance issues reflected its consideration of
the statutory factors. Thus, we discern no error in the court’s
decision to award Tamara maintenance. See Marriage of Wright, ¶
20.
b. Michael’s Income
¶ 37 We turn next to the court’s calculation of Michael’s income.
When considering a maintenance award, the court must determine
the parties’ incomes. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 12;
see § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A). A party’s gross income generally
includes income from any source. See § 14-10-115(5)(a).
“Bonuses . . . are to be included in a determination of income.” In
re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 32; see § 14-10-
15 115(5)(a)(I)(E). The court added an average of Michael’s base salary
and the bonuses he had received between 2019 and 2023 to
determine that Michael’s monthly income was $34,936.
¶ 38 We begin by addressing Tarama’s argument that the district
court abused its discretion by averaging Michael’s base salary
between 2019 and 2023 instead of using only his 2024 base salary.
Despite this argument, Tamara contends that the court
appropriately added his average annual bonuses over the prior five
years to his base salary. Michael, by contrast, argues that the
court properly relied on his average base salary over the last five
years but improperly added his historical bonus income because he
was not guaranteed to receive bonuses in 2024 or moving forward.
We discern no error in the district court’s calculation of Michael’s
income.
¶ 39 True, as Tamara notes, maintenance is typically based on the
spouses’ incomes at the time permanent orders enter. But the
court recognized the uncertainty associated with Michael’s 2024
income. On the one hand, he was receiving a base salary that was
materially higher than his base salary over the prior five years, but
16 on the other hand, he had not yet received a bonus for 2024, and
he stated that he did not think he would.
¶ 40 The district court recognized that the parties’ respective
arguments served their individual interests at the cost of an
equitable result — Tamara by asking the court to maximize
Michael’s base salary by using his 2024 salary and then adding an
average bonus, and Michael by asking the court to average his base
salary over the last five years but not include any bonus, thereby
minimizing his base salary and excluding bonuses to minimize his
total income.
¶ 41 The court made clear that it found Michael’s contention that
he would not receive a bonus in 2024 to be unreliable. Based on
this factual determination, the court thoughtfully explained its
decision to average Michael’s bonuses and salary from 2019-2023.
We cannot say that the court abused its discretion by resolving the
uncertainty in Michael’s 2024 income by using his average base
salary and bonuses over the preceding five-year period.
c. Life Insurance Policy
¶ 42 Next, we address Michael’s arguments regarding the district
court’s order requiring Michael to obtain life insurance. We begin
17 by addressing Michael’s claim that Tamara failed to adequately
preserve or support her request for life insurance to secure the
maintenance award. We then turn to Michael’s argument that the
court failed to properly apply the provisions of section 14-10-114(6).
We disagree with both arguments.
¶ 43 To the extent Michael argues that Tamara completely failed to
preserve her life insurance request, the record establishes
otherwise. In the parties’ joint trial management certificate, Tamara
affirmatively stated:
[Tamara] additionally seeks life insurance to secure [Michael’s] maintenance obligation. [Tamara] notes that, just days before filing the Petition for Dissolution, [Michael] removed [Tamara] as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy, giving 100% of the policy to the parties’ adult son as the primary beneficiary. [Michael] must be required to provide proof that the policy is in place and that premiums have been paid each year.
¶ 44 Moreover, during her direct examination, Tamara testified
about Michael’s existing $500,000 policy and stated, “I need to have
guarantee that maintenance will be paid out. So I would request
that life insurance be carried on him . . . .” Thus, Tamara clearly
18 preserved this issue. See In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 21
(“[N]o talismanic language is required to preserve an issue.”).
¶ 45 Michael also argues on appeal that Tamara failed to preserve a
claim that she would ask for a life insurance policy in excess of the
existing $500,000 policy. We reject this argument for multiple
reasons. First, as noted in the joint trial management certificate,
Michael had changed the beneficiary under the existing policy.
Michael does not dispute this fact. Thus, at the time of final orders
there was no existing life insurance policy naming Tamara as the
beneficiary. Moreover, as Tamara notes, it would have been
inappropriate for her to request a specific amount of insurance
because it could not be known until the court first established the
amount and term of maintenance. In any event, Michael had
previously been insured for $500,000, and the parties knew the
range of maintenance they were each seeking. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Michael was on notice that
Tamara was requesting a life insurance policy to secure the
maintenance award and that the face value of the policy would
likely be near $1,000,000.
19 ¶ 46 Next, Michael points out that section 14-10-114(6) requires
the court to make certain findings before imposing a life insurance
requirement. Specifically, the statute provides:
(a) The court may require the payor spouse to provide reasonable security for the payment of maintenance in the event of the payor spouse’s death prior to the end of the maintenance term.
(b) Reasonable security may include, but need not be limited to, maintenance of life insurance for the benefit of the recipient spouse. In entering an order to maintain life insurance, the court shall consider:
(I) The age and insurability of the payor spouse;
(II) The cost of the life insurance;
(III) The amount and term of the maintenance;
(IV) Whether the parties carried life insurance during the marriage;
(V) Prevailing interest rates at the time of the order; and
(VI) Other obligations of the payor spouse.
§ 14-10-114(6).
¶ 47 As Michael notes, the statute requires the court to consider
these enumerated factors before compelling a spouse to provide
security for a maintenance award. But neither the statute nor our
20 case law requires that the court make express findings on each of
the enumerated factors. Cf. Wright, ¶ 20.
¶ 48 Although it did not make express findings on each of the
statutory factors, the court’s order reflects its adequate
consideration of them in making its award. The court was aware of
Michael’s age and the fact that he was previously insured for
Tamara’s benefit in the amount of $500,000. No party presented
evidence suggesting that he was uninsurable or that the policy
premiums were cost prohibitive.
¶ 49 True, the court did not expressly consider how the monthly
premiums would impact Michael’s ability to pay maintenance. But
the court expressly recited this statutory consideration, so it was
mindful of it. And Michael presented no evidence below, or any
argument on appeal, that his existing income was not adequate to
pay both maintenance and the life insurance premiums.
¶ 50 Moreover, the district court carefully made the policy’s benefit
commensurate with the maintenance award and its duration. The
award of $8,000 per month over the thirteen-year maintenance
term resulted in a total maintenance obligation of approximately
$1,250,000. Thus, the court selected a rational policy amount of
21 $1,000,000. But the court also recognized that the total
maintenance obligation would decrease over time. It therefore
ordered a reduction in the policy amount to $750,000 for years six
through ten of the maintenance obligation and to $500,000 for the
final three years.
¶ 51 These findings reflect the district court’s thoughtful
consideration of the statutory factors, are supported by the record,
and fall within the district court’s discretion. We perceive no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s orders regarding life insurance.
C. Economic Waste and Personal Property Allocations
¶ 52 Next, Tamara appeals the district court’s determination that
she committed economic waste in her failure to lease the couple’s
Moab rental property. She also argues that the district court erred
by finding waste regarding her spending habits. Part of her
argument is based on a false premise. While the court did find that
Tamara’s failure to lease the parties’ vacation home between
temporary and permanent orders constituted waste, the court did
not find that her expenditures on personal property or the money
transfer to family members constituted economic waste. Rather,
22 the court simply attributed the associated personal property and
funds to Tamara.
¶ 53 We turn now to Tamara’s contentions regarding these issues.
¶ 54 Michael and Tamara shared a large income and lived a lifestyle
commensurate with that income. Both parties appeared to
maintain that lifestyle while their divorce was pending.
¶ 55 The parties lived separately for about eighteen months before
they formally divorced. In that time, Tamara bought new furniture,
which the district court determined had a value of $36,651. During
the divorce proceedings, Tamara also bought quite a bit of clothing.
The district court ultimately determined Tamara should be awarded
that clothing and that its value equaled $21,300. Tamara also
moved money out of the marital estate and gave it to other people,
including $21,000 to her sister. The court received conflicting
testimony whether some or all of these transfers were a loan or gift.
Tamara also deposited roughly $2,600 of her earnings from a part-
time sales job into her middle daughter’s account. Michael testified
that he was not aware of the gift or loan to Tamara’s sister or of
23 Tamara’s deposit of her income into the daughter’s account. The
court found all these funds were marital property.
¶ 56 During the marriage, Michael acquired a large sports
memorabilia collection with a marital value of approximately
$105,259. He also continued to make memorabilia purchases and
spent significant amounts on sporting events while the divorce was
pending. The court treated the sports memorabilia as marital
property.
¶ 57 Michael and Tamara also owned a condo in Moab, which they
typically leased. Tamara managed the rental property. In its
temporary orders, the court ordered the parties to lease the
property to generate income, but Tamara failed to do so.
¶ 58 By the time the court entered permanent orders, the condo
was under contract for sale and was scheduled to close within a few
days. Michael requested that the lost income resulting from the
property sitting vacant be attributed to Tamara. Tamara argued
that not renting the condo was a reasonable decision because it
would have made it more difficult to sell. During this time, Tamara
also insisted on a listing price for the property that appeared to be
too high for the market. As a result, the house remained vacant
24 and on the market for several months. Based on these facts, the
district court concluded that Tamara caused $34,058.64 of waste
by not leasing the property during the pendency of these
proceedings.
¶ 59 Section 14-10-107(4)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025, imposes a “temporary
injunction” against both parties that remains in effect “until the
final decree is entered or the petition is dismissed.” The statute
reads in relevant part:
[B]oth parties [are restrained] from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any way disposing of, without the consent of the other party or an order of the court, any marital property, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life and . . . each party [is required] to notify the other party of any proposed extraordinary expenditures and to account to the court for all extraordinary expenditures made after the injunction is in effect.
§ 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A).
¶ 60 As previously stated, we do not disturb the division of a
marital estate unless the district court has abused its discretion.
Powell, 220 P.3d at 954. Whether a party has dissipated marital
funds presents a question of fact, and we uphold the district court’s
25 findings unless there is no record support for them. See Van Gundy
v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12 (“A court’s factual findings are
clearly erroneous only if there is no support for them in the
record.”).
3. Economic Waste of Moab Property
¶ 61 Tamara testified that she took over the management of the
Moab property in late 2022. She talked about repairs the property
needed before it was ready to be placed on the market, including
fire inspections, and said she was temporarily wheelchair-bound
after an accident during this period. Tamara also testified that she
thought the property would be difficult to sell while it was occupied
by renters. Michael testified that Tamara refused to rent the
property. He also presented evidence that the total loss during the
eight months between temporary and permanent orders was
$34,058.64. It is undisputed that the property sat vacant for eight
months after Michael filed the petition for divorce.
¶ 62 The district court found that Tamara had committed waste by
not renting the property. In addressing Tamara’s proffered
explanations, the court found her “justification for not seeking
rental of the property is just nonsensical. It had a rental history. It
26 was a monthly burn, which even if there is some tax benefits, it’s
still a loss. And if that could have been rented, that would have
been a marital asset.” The district court also credited Michael’s
testimony concerning the amount of the lost income.
¶ 63 Thus, because the district court’s findings are supported by
the record, we defer to them and conclude that it did not err by
determining that Tamara’s refusal to lease the Moab property
resulted in $34,058.64 of economic waste. See Jorgenson, 143 P.3d
at 1174 (noting that the district court could assign husband sole
responsibility for a lease liability because husband’s decision to
stop making lease payments constituted economic fault).
4. Tamara’s Spending
¶ 64 As previously noted, Tamara argues that the district court
found her spending on personal property to be waste as well. But
that argument misapprehends the record. The court did not
conclude that her spending constituted economic waste, but rather
that the marital debt and associated marital property obtained
through that spending should be allocated to her.
¶ 65 Tamara argues that because she bought the clothing and
furniture on a credit card and was also allocated the debt of that
27 credit card, she was forced to pay for the clothing and furniture
twice. But, as Michael points out, it is not unusual for a court to
allocate personal property as an asset and the associated debt to a
particular party. Doing so allows that party to realize the net value
of the asset. We discern no error in the court’s doing so here.
¶ 66 Tamara also argues that the amount she spent on clothing
after temporary orders was in line with what she spent during the
marriage. However, evidence admitted during the permanent orders
hearing showed that her clothing spending dramatically increased
after the court entered its temporary orders. While she spent
$3,235 between January 1 and July 10, 2023, the court received
evidence that she spent $17,866 between July 11 and December
31, 2023.
¶ 67 Tamara also asserts that the district court inverted numbers
in calculating her clothing expenditures. She points to an exhibit in
which some of her expenditures on clothing were quantified at
$12,300. But the court did not cite that exhibit when referring to
the clothing awarded to Tamara. And the court also received
evidence from Michael that her clothing expenditures between
temporary and final orders were proximate to the amount the court
28 awarded to Tamara. Under these circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in setting the
value of the clothing assigned to Tamara at $21,300 and allocating
that clothing and the associated debt to her.
¶ 68 Finally, even if we were to accept Tamara’s premise that the
court transposed the numbers representing her spending on
clothing, the difference between the number she cites and the
court’s figure is less than $9,000. Given the size of this estate, that
asserted error is de minimis. See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36.
5. Tamara’s Transfers to her Sister and Daughter
¶ 69 Turning to Tamara’s transfer of money to family members, the
evidence was in conflict whether the money she gave to her sister
was a gift or a loan. The parties had previously made monetary
gifts to Tamara’s sister during the marriage. After the parties
separated but before the petition was filed, Tamara gave her sister
various sums that collectively exceeded $21,000. Tamara also
diverted approximately $2,600 into her middle daughter’s bank
account. Michael testified that Tamara made these money transfers
without his knowledge.
29 ¶ 70 The district court found that the funds were marital property
that Tamara diverted without Michael’s agreement. Accordingly,
the court attributed the combined amount to Tamara. With respect
the money transferred to Tamara’s sister, the court stated that she
was entitled to collect the money from her sister, if it was indeed a
loan. In reaching these conclusions, the court found that Tamara
“was not highly credible on financial matters, . . . was evasive and
rambling, provided unsupported contradictory testimony, and often
relied on inaccurate filings and disclosures.” By contrast, the court
seems to have found Michael’s testimony credible.
¶ 71 We discern no error in the court’s finding that these transfers,
and any corresponding right to repayment, should be attributed to
Tamara. See Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo. App. 2008)
(“We defer to the court’s credibility determinations and will disturb
its findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous and not
supported by the record.”).
6. Michael’s Spending
¶ 72 Tamara argues that, if the district court properly determined
that some of her spending on clothing and furniture was waste,
then it erred by not determining that Michael’s spending was also
30 waste. But this argument is also based on the noted false premise.
The court did not treat either Tamara’s expenditures on clothing or
her transfers to family members as economic waste. Therefore, we
do not further analyze her comparative spending argument, though
we note that the court allocated the sports memorabilia to Michael
as a marital asset, just as it allocated the clothing and furniture to
Tamara as a marital asset.
D. Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 73 Finally, Tamara requests an award of her attorney fees and
costs incurred on appeal under C.A.R. 38(b), 39(a), and 39.1 and
section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 74 C.A.R. 38(b) addresses an appellate court’s authority to award
attorney fees as sanctions against a party for a “frivolous appeal.”
Tamara does not develop any argument explaining why Michael’s
defense of Tamara’s appeal or his own cross-appeal was frivolous,
so we do not address it further. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo
Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12 (“We don’t consider
undeveloped and unsupported arguments.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.
¶ 75 Tamara is correct that under section 14-10-119 an appellate
court, “after considering the financial resources of both parties” can
31 order one party to pay the fees and costs of the other party. § 14-
10-119. The purpose of section 14-10-119 is to ensure that
“neither party suffers undue economic hardship as a result of the
proceedings.” In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1377 (Colo.
1997). And Tamara is correct that Michael makes significantly
more money than she does. However, in rejecting Tamara’s request
for attorney fees, the district court concluded that both parties have
ample resources to pay for their own attorney fees and costs.
Neither party points to any material developments that would
impact this conclusion. Therefore, we exercise our discretion under
C.A.R. 39.1 and deny Tamara’s request for attorney fees
¶ 76 Rule 39(a)(2) provides that if a judgment is affirmed on appeal,
the appellant is entitled to an award of costs “unless the law
provides or the court orders otherwise.” This case involves both an
appeal and a cross-appeal, and neither party prevailed on their
respective appeals. Under the circumstances, we conclude that
neither party is entitled to an award of appellate costs.
III. Disposition
¶ 77 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.