Marriage of Jacobs

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 23CA1627
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1627 Marriage of Jacobs 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1627 El Paso County District Court No. 22DR30450 Honorable Diana K. May, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Rachel Kyle Jacobs,

Appellee,

and

Frank Arlen Jacobs, Jr.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Berger*, J., concurs Welling, J., concurs in part and dissents in part

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026

Hogan Lovells US LLP, Elizabeth A. Och, Valerie Marshall, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Frank Arlen

Jacobs, Jr. (father) and Rachel Kyle Jacobs (mother), father appeals

the parental responsibilities, spousal maintenance, and child

support aspects of the permanent orders. We affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand for additional proceedings.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 The parties married in 2010 and had four children. Mother

filed a petition for dissolution in March 2022.

¶3 Following a three-day hearing, the district court dissolved the

marriage and issued detailed permanent orders. The court named

mother the children’s primary residential parent, adopting a

“4/3/5/2 plan” in which father had five overnights with the

children every two weeks and mother had nine. After determining

that father had engaged in child neglect and domestic violence, the

court allocated sole decision-making responsibility to mother. The

court denied father’s request for spousal maintenance and ordered

him to pay mother monthly child support of $487.

¶4 Father now appeals.

1 II. Allocation of Parental Responsibilities

¶5 Father contends that the district court abused its discretion

by granting mother most of the parenting time and sole decision-

making authority. We discern no abuse of discretion.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 A district court has broad discretion in allocating parental

responsibilities, and we exercise every presumption in favor of

upholding its decision. See In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA

116M, ¶ 8 (parenting time); In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA

116M, ¶ 23 (decision-making responsibility). We won’t disturb the

court’s decision unless it abused its discretion, meaning that it

acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner, or

it misapplied the law. See Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶ 26; In re Marriage

of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 7.

¶7 Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard is

a question of law we review de novo. Dale, ¶ 8. We also review de

novo the court’s statutory interpretation and application. Id. When

interpreting a statute, we strive to ascertain and effectuate the

legislature’s intent. In re Marriage of Zander, 2021 CO 12, ¶ 13.

Our starting point is always the statute’s plain language, which we

2 construe according to its ordinary and natural meaning. Id. If the

statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written. In re

Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 22. But if the language is

ambiguous, we may look to other interpretative tools, like legislative

history, to discern the legislature’s intent. See id.

B. Applicable Law

¶8 In allocating parental responsibilities, a district court must

focus on the children’s best interests, prioritizing their safety and

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See §§ 14-

10-123.4(1)(a), -124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of

Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 43.

¶9 For parenting time, the district court must consider all

relevant factors, including those listed in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a).

Pawelec, ¶ 43.

¶ 10 For decision-making responsibility, the district court must

consider the factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), plus the three

additional factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(b). Morgan, ¶ 21.

¶ 11 In both situations, the district court must evaluate credible

allegations of child neglect and domestic violence. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)-(b), (4)(a). If either is proved by a preponderance of the

3 evidence, the court’s primary concern becomes the safety and well-

being of the children and the abused party. § 14-10-124(4)(d).

¶ 12 When the court finds that a parent has committed child abuse

or neglect, joint decision-making responsibility isn’t in the

children’s best interests if the other parent or the children’s legal

representative objects. § 14-10-124(4)(a)(I). A finding of domestic

violence, on the other hand, doesn’t automatically bar the court

from allocating joint decision-making responsibility, provided

credible evidence shows that the parties can make decisions

cooperatively in the children’s best interests in a manner that is

safe for the abused party and the children. § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II)(A);

Morgan, ¶ 22.

C. Analysis

1. Parenting Time

¶ 13 The district court first determined that father committed acts

amounting to child neglect and domestic violence. As to child

neglect, the court found that father left the youngest child, then

four years old and in father’s sole care, inadequately dressed for

winter and unsupervised for an “extended period of time.” The child

then left the house unattended, crossed streets, and “wandered”

4 through the neighborhood until a stranger found him. As to

domestic violence, the court credited mother’s testimony describing

father’s controlling behavior and emotional abuse during the

marriage.

¶ 14 The district court then carefully analyzed the statutory best

interests factors, making the following findings:

• Father sought equal parenting time. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(I) (directing the district court to consider the

parents’ wishes).

• Mother requested that father’s parenting time be

supervised or, alternatively, that the court award her the

bulk of the time based on a two-week rotating schedule.

See id.

• The children lacked sufficient maturity to express a

meaningful parenting time preference. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(II) (directing the district court to consider the

children’s wishes).

• Both parties had positive relationships with the children,

and the maternal grandparents were actively involved in

the children’s lives. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III) (directing

5 the district court to consider the interaction and

interrelationship of the children with their parents,

siblings, and any other person who may significantly

affect their best interests).

• To help the children maintain stability in their home and

school environments, the court awarded mother the

marital home. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(IV) (directing the

district court to consider the children’s adjustment to

their home, school, and community); see also § 14-10-

113(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025 (the district court should consider

the desirability of awarding the family home to the

spouse with whom any children reside most of the time).

• The children were physically and mentally healthy. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V) (directing the district court to

consider the mental and physical health of all individuals

involved).

• Increased overnights with mother would better support

the children’s well-being and stability. See id.

• Father’s mental health concerns, including a need for

domestic violence treatment, were also relevant. See id.

6 • Mother actively encouraged the children’s relationship

with father. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI) (directing the

district court to consider each parent’s ability to

encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact

between the children and the other parent).

• In contrast, father let his anger, hurt, and

disappointment hinder his ability to encourage the

children’s relationship with mother. See id.

• While not an absent parent, father wanted to be the “fun”

parent, often neglecting the necessary responsibilities to

support the children. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VII)

(directing the district court to consider whether the

parents’ past pattern of involvement with the children

reflects a system of values, time commitment, and

mutual support). Specifically, father had demonstrated

the ability to care for the children safely since the parties’

separation but remained occasionally “distracted.” See

id.

• Mother regularly met the children’s needs, such as

enrolling them in school and taking them to medical

7 appointments, thus showing a stronger commitment to

their day-to-day care. See id.

• The parties lived close enough to facilitate regular

parenting time exchanges. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII)

(directing the district court to consider the parents’

physical proximity to each other as it relates to the

practical considerations of parenting time).

• Mother placed the children’s needs above her own, while

father struggled to do so. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(XI)

(directing the district court to consider each parent’s

ability to place the needs of the children ahead of his or

her own needs).

• Father’s focus on “punishing” mother and “being right”

overshadowed fostering the relationship between her and

the children. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI), (XI). As one

example, during an exchange on a snowy winter day,

father refused maternal grandmother’s request to bring

the children inside, choosing instead to keep them in the

car to document mother’s purported tardiness, which he

8 believed established mother’s noncompliance with the

court’s temporary orders.

¶ 15 From those findings, the district court denied both mother’s

request that father’s parenting time be supervised and father’s

request for equal time. Rather, the court adopted the two-week

rotating schedule proposed by mother:

• Week One: Father has the children from Sunday to

Tuesday; mother has Wednesday to Saturday.

• Week Two: Mother has Sunday as well as Wednesday

through Saturday; father has Monday and Tuesday.

¶ 16 Because father doesn’t contest the factual findings, we accept

them as true. See In re Marriage of O’Connor, 2023 COA 35, ¶ 11.

¶ 17 Father argues that the district court’s findings don’t demand a

significantly unequal parenting time allocation, nor does the

adopted schedule remedy the purported concerns identified by the

court. To get there, father says that (1) awarding mother the

marital residence didn’t necessitate reducing his parenting time; (2)

if the court truly had safety concerns regarding his domestic

violence, it would have given him even fewer overnights; and (3) a

9 less “convoluted” schedule could have preserved the children’s

stability while minimizing parental interaction.

¶ 18 Father’s argument in essence asks us to reweigh the evidence

and the best interests factors in his favor. But that isn’t our role,

nor can we substitute our judgment for that of the district court,

even if the evidence and the factors could support a different

conclusion. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (the

district court, not a reviewing court, determines witness credibility

and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence,

including the inferences and conclusions drawn from the evidence);

In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for

an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the record

that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”); In re

Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 534 (Colo. App. 2008) (deferring

to the magistrate’s choice between competing parenting plans when

evidence conflicted regarding which plan would best serve the

child’s best interests).

¶ 19 The district court applied the correct legal standard, evaluated

each relevant best interest factor, and made detailed factual

10 findings supported by the record. Among the factors weighing in

mother’s favor, the court found that father committed child neglect

and domestic violence; that mother supported the children’s

relationship with father to a greater extent than father supported

their relationship with mother; that mother provided more

consistency in meeting the children’s needs; and that father’s

disdain and negative feelings toward mother impaired his ability to

place the children’s needs above his own.

¶ 20 At bottom, because the district court acted within its broad

discretion when determining parenting time based on the children’s

best interests, we won’t disturb its decision. See Collins, ¶ 8.

2. Decision-Making Responsibility

¶ 21 Father next contends that the district court erred by granting

mother sole decision-making responsibility. According to father,

the court misinterpreted the definition of child abuse in section 18-

6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, which includes child neglect. See § 14-10-

124(4)(a)(I) (defining “child abuse or neglect” by cross-referencing

the definition of child abuse found in the criminal code at section

18-6-401(1)(a)). Father argues that the phrase “ultimately results

in the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child” applies to

11 all definitions of child abuse under section 18-6-401(1)(a). Thus,

father asserts that because the youngest child didn’t suffer either

death or serious bodily injury when he wandered out of the house

unattended, father’s conduct can’t be considered child neglect

under section 14-10-124(4)(a)(I). We disagree with father’s

interpretation.

¶ 22 Before allocating decision-making responsibility, the district

court must consider any credible evidence of child abuse or neglect

as defined in the criminal code at section 18-6-401(1)(a). See § 14-

10-124(4)(a)(I).

¶ 23 Section 18-6-401(1)(a) provides the following definition:

A person commits child abuse if such person [1] causes an injury to a child’s life or health, or [2] permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child’s life or health, or [3] engages in a continued pattern of conduct that results in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child.

¶ 24 By using the disjunctive “or,” the statute establishes three

distinct definitions for child abuse or neglect, shown by the

bracketed numbering we’ve added above. See Lombard v. Colo.

12 Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (“Generally,

we presume the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’ marks distinctive

categories.”); People v. Weeks, 2015 COA 77, ¶ 45 (Section 18-6-

401(1)(a) “delineates three categories of child abuse.”).

¶ 25 Despite these distinct categories, father seeks to graft the

phrase “ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily

injury to a child” from the third definition onto the first two. But

Weeks rejected that reading. See Weeks, ¶ 70. The Weeks division

examined both the plain language and legislative history of section

18-6-401(1)(a), concluding that the phrase applies exclusively to the

third definition involving an “accumulation of injuries.” Weeks,

¶ 70. We agree with the Weeks division’s interpretation and see no

reason to depart from it in this case. See Chandler-McPhail v.

Duffey, 194 P.3d 434, 440 (Colo. App. 2008) (absent a contrary

intention, the last antecedent rule dictates that referential and

qualifying words and phrases refer exclusively to the clause

immediately preceding them).

¶ 26 Applying that interpretation here, the second definition says

that a person commits child abuse or neglect if they permit a child

to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of

13 injury to the child’s life or health. See § 18-6-401(1)(a). No actual

harm need occur. See People v. Ortiz, 155 P.3d 532, 533 (Colo.

App. 2006) (child abuse conviction affirmed where the child was left

alone in a car at night, even though no actual harm occurred).

¶ 27 The district court properly determined that father’s

conduct posed a serious threat to the youngest child’s life or health.

See § 18-6-401(1)(a); People v. Sherrod, 204 P.3d 472, 475 (Colo.

App. 2007) (the term “health” includes both physical and mental

well-being), rev’d on other grounds, 204 P.3d 466 (Colo. 2009). The

record shows that father left the four-year-old child unsupervised

and improperly dressed for winter, permitting the child to wander

through the neighborhood for a considerable time, including

crossing streets. When located by a stranger, the child appeared

scared and asked for mother. This child neglect determination,

standing alone, is sufficient to support the court’s decision granting

sole decision-making responsibility to mother. See § 14-10-

124(4)(a)(I).

¶ 28 Because the district court’s child neglect finding independently

supports its decision to allocate sole decision-making responsibility

14 to mother, we need not address father’s challenge to the court’s

domestic violence determination under section 18-6-401(1)(a).

III. Maintenance and Child Support

¶ 29 Father next contends that the district court erred by finding

that he was voluntarily underemployed and by imputing additional

income to him when calculating maintenance and child support.

We agree.

¶ 30 We review maintenance and child support orders for an abuse

of discretion. See In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 58

(maintenance); Collins, ¶ 37 (child support). And as before, we

review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the

relevant legal standards. See Medeiros, ¶ 58; People v. Martinez, 70

P.3d 474, 476 (Colo. 2003); Collins, ¶ 37.

¶ 31 When calculating maintenance and child support, income

refers to a party’s actual gross income if the party is fully employed.

§ 14-10-114(8)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (maintenance); § 14-10-115(3)(c),

C.R.S. 2025 (child support). If, however, a party is voluntarily

underemployed, maintenance and child support must be based on

15 that party’s potential income. § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV) (maintenance);

§ 14-10-115(5)(b)(I) (child support).

¶ 32 In this context, “voluntarily” means “intentionally, of free will.”

In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 10 (quoting Martinez, 70

P.3d at 478). “Potential income” is the amount a party could earn

from a full-time job commensurate with the party’s demonstrated

earning ability. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 35.

The analysis of voluntary underemployment is the same for

purposes of calculating both child support and maintenance.

In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 21 n.3.

¶ 33 Before imputing income, the district court must find that the

party is unreasonably forgoing higher-paying, obtainable

employment with the intent to shirk their financial support

obligations. Collins, ¶ 29; see In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA

96, ¶ 22. The district court should exercise caution when imputing

income. Garrett, ¶ 10.

C. Discussion

¶ 34 In determining child support, the district court acknowledged

father’s education, work history, and specialized experience in the

satellite field. The court found that he had recently re-entered the

16 job market, was working full time, and was earning what the court

characterized as a “good salary” of $122,000 per year. Drawing

from a vocational expert’s testimony and report, the court found

that father could potentially earn up to $150,000 per year and was

therefore “slightly underemployed.” The court added that father

might receive salary increases in the future and that he can, and

should, pursue higher-paying opportunities. It ultimately imputed

an additional $28,000 in annual income to father for a total of

$150,000 (or $12,500 per month).

¶ 35 The court again used this figure when separately denying

father’s request for spousal maintenance, saying that it had

“already found” father’s total monthly income to be $12,500. We

construe this order as incorporating the court’s prior finding that

father was slightly underemployed. See § 14-10-114(8)(c)(IV).

¶ 36 We conclude that the district court’s findings fall short of

satisfying the legal standard for imputing income based on

voluntary underemployment. The mere existence of higher-paying

jobs or a party’s theoretical ability to earn more doesn’t, by itself,

justify a finding of voluntary underemployment. See Collins, ¶ 29.

Put differently, the law doesn’t demand that a party maximize their

17 income at all costs; it requires only that they refrain from

unreasonable or bad faith employment choices that shirk their

support obligations. See id.

¶ 37 Critically, the district court made no finding that father

unreasonably rejected better-paying work for the purpose of evading

his support obligations. Nor does the record support such a

conclusion. Father secured a full-time job near his home in

Colorado Springs, earning a “good salary” of $122,000 per year. No

evidence suggested that he was attempting to shirk his support

obligations. To the contrary, father testified that after submitting

forty job applications he obtained just one other job offer at a

slightly higher salary of $130,00 per year, but that job was located

in Denver and required national travel that wouldn’t “fit a family

work-life schedule.”

¶ 38 We recognize that the court found that father “should have

been looking for [a job] a long time” before mother filed the

dissolution petition, suggesting that father wasn’t fully diligent in

his job search. But even accepting that finding, the court’s findings

still don’t reveal that father intended to shirk his obligations by

unreasonably forgoing higher-paying employment. See Collins,

18 ¶ 29; see also Martinez, 70 P.3d at 480-81 (explaining a parent’s

“lack of initiative” is one factor the court may consider in

determining whether that parent is voluntarily underemployed but

nonetheless reversing because the trial court “failed to examine all

relevant factors,” including the father’s search for other jobs and his

reasons for moving closer to family). And given the findings made

by the court on the record before it, we perceive no basis for any

such shirking finding. As a result, we conclude the court erred by

imputing income to father.

¶ 39 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment ordering

father to pay child support and declining to award him spousal

maintenance. On remand, the district court must consider the

parties’ current financial circumstances when recalculating father’s

income and use its new calculation to revisit maintenance and child

support. See In re Marriage of Schaefer, 2022 COA 112, ¶ 41. The

existing maintenance and child support orders will remain in place

pending the court’s entry of new orders. See id.

IV. Disposition

¶ 40 We affirm the portion of the district court’s judgment

allocating parental responsibilities, reverse the portion ordering

19 father to pay child support and declining to award him spousal

maintenance, and remand the case for additional proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE BERGER concurs.

JUDGE WELLING concurs in part and dissents in part.

20 JUDGE WELLING, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 41 I am fully on board with the majority’s disposition of the

parenting time and decision-making issues. I am also on board

with the majority’s reversal of the child support order and its

rationale for doing so — namely, that the district court failed to

make shirking findings when imputing income and that, in any

event, the record that was before the district court at the time of the

permanent orders wouldn’t have supported such a finding.

¶ 42 Where I part ways with the majority is regarding its conclusion

that the same error that necessitates reversal of the child support

order also necessitates reversal of the court’s decision not to award

father maintenance. I, instead, conclude that, based on the record

before us, this error was harmless with respect to the court’s

maintenance determination. The parties’ combined annual income

exceeded $240,000 — the top of the income range requiring the

court to calculate guideline maintenance. So, unless the court’s

error in calculating father’s gross income undermines the reliability

of the maintenance determination in some other respect, that error

doesn’t require reversal. Because I conclude it didn’t, I wouldn’t

reverse the court’s maintenance determination.

21 ¶ 43 A district court’s decision to award maintenance generally

requires the court to follow a three-step process. See In re Marriage

of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶¶ 14-16 (discussing the three-step

framework set forth in section 14-10-114(3), C.R.S. 2025). The first

step requires the court to make several findings, including “[t]he

amount of each party’s gross income.”1 § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(A),

C.R.S. 2025; Wright, ¶ 14. At the outset of step two, the court must

determine and consider the “guideline amount and term of

maintenance.” § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A). The guideline amount and

term of maintenance are based on the parties’ combined gross

income, the parties’ relative gross incomes, and the duration of the

marriage. § 14-10-114(3)(b).

1 The other required findings are (1) the marital property

apportioned to each party; (2) the financial resources of each party, including but not limited to the actual or potential income from separate or marital property; (3) the parties’ reasonable financial need as established during the marriage; and (4) whether maintenance awarded would be deductible for federal income tax purposes by the payor and taxable income to the recipient. § 14- 10-114(3)(a)(I)(B)-(E), C.R.S. 2025; see In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 14. On appeal, father doesn’t challenge the propriety of any of these other step-one findings by the district court, so I don’t address them further.

22 ¶ 44 But when the parties’ combined gross income exceeds

$240,000 per year, the three-step process discussed and applied in

Wright is short-circuited.

If the parties’ combined annual adjusted gross income exceeds two hundred forty thousand dollars, the calculation methodology described in subsection (3)(b)(I) of this section for determining the advisory guideline amount of maintenance does not apply, and the court shall instead consider the factors set forth in subsection (3)(c) of this section in determining the amount of maintenance.

§ 14-10-114(3.5); see also § 14-10-114(3)(c) (setting forth a

nonexhaustive list of factors a court should consider in fashioning a

maintenance award).

¶ 45 Thus, if this were a guidelines case, I would agree with the

majority that reversal of the maintenance decision is required. That

is because, pursuant to section 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), the court

must calculate the guideline amount of maintenance before moving

on to considering the statutory maintenance factors set forth in

section 14-10-114(3)(c). See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A)-(B); see also

Wright, ¶ 15.

¶ 46 But this isn’t a guidelines case. To be sure, the district court

was required to calculate the parties’ combined gross income in

23 order to determine whether it exceeded $240,000 per year. And to

the extent that the court used an imputed gross income of

$150,000 for father instead of his actual gross income of $122,000

for this part of its analysis, I agree with the majority that was error.

But, in my view, that error was harmless because mother’s gross

income alone — $331,296 per year — put the parties over the

$240,000 threshold set forth in section 14-10-114(3.5).

¶ 47 And once the district court correctly determined that the

parties’ combined gross income exceeds $240,000 per year, its

determination of whether (and how much and for what term) to

award maintenance is governed by the factors set forth in section

14-10-114(3)(c)(I) through (XIII). See § 14-10-114(3.5). And, in my

view, the court didn’t abuse its discretion in applying the section

14-10-114(3)(c) factors, notwithstanding its error in calculating

father’s gross income.

¶ 48 Factors the court should consider include the “parties’ income,

employment, and employability, obtainable through reasonable

diligence,” § 14-10-114(3)(c)(V) (emphasis added), and “[t]he

financial resources of the recipient spouse, including the actual or

potential income from separate or marital property or any other

24 source,” § 14-10-114(3)(c)(I) (emphasis added). Both of these

subsections, in my view, permit a court to consider a recipient

spouse’s potential income without first making a shirking finding.

And although the court’s findings regarding father’s potential

income didn’t satisfy the requirements for imputing that income for

the purpose of a gross income determination, those findings were

consistent with findings permitted by section 14-10-114(3)(c)(I) and

(V).

¶ 49 Moreover, my review of the record reveals that the district

court gave appropriate and adequate consideration to the other

factors set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(c). For example, the court

explicitly considered the following:

• the property division, including the $92,000 equalization

payment father would be receiving;

• the age, health, and education of both parties;

• father’s historical earnings, including that “in 2013

[father] was earning almost double what [mother] was

earning”;

• that father’s “earning potential and employability is

significant”;

25 • the parties’ lifestyle during the marriage; and

• a demonstrated ability on father’s part to “invest well.”

¶ 50 Thus, in my view, the court’s error in failing to correctly

determine father’s gross income for maintenance purposes only

infected its determination of the parties’ combined gross income,

and not its assessment of the factors for determining the amount

and term of maintenance set forth in section 14-10-114(3)(c). And

because the parties’ combined gross income exceeds $240,000

regardless of father’s gross income, I would conclude that the

court’s error in making this determination was harmless.

Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s maintenance

determination.