25CA1591 Marriage of Hass 06-11-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1591 Elbert County District Court No. 22DR30009 Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Ashlynn Hass,
Appellee,
and
Zachary Hass,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 11, 2026
Griffiths Law, PC, Duncan Griffiths, Kimberly Newton, Lone Tree, Colorado, for Appellee
Todd Collins & Associates, LLC, Todd Collins, Marc B. Tull, Elizabeth, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Zachary Hass (husband) appeals various portions of the
district court’s permanent orders entered in the dissolution of his
marriage to Ashlynn Hass (wife). We reverse the court’s property
division and retroactive child support order and remand for the
district court to reconsider both. In all other respects, we affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Husband and wife were married in August 2017 and had a
child together about four years later. Husband’s family owns a
ranch where both parties lived and worked throughout the
marriage. Before the marriage, and as relevant here, husband
acquired fractional interests in multiple parcels of real property that
were part of the ranch. The parties separated in January 2022, and
wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage shortly thereafter.
¶3 A couple months after wife filed the petition, the parties filed a
joint motion asking the court to determine temporary parenting
time, maintenance, and child support. The court held a hearing
where it discussed with the parties that under the maintenance and
child support guidelines, husband should pay wife $2,026 for
maintenance and $410 for child support per month. After learning
that wife had transferred over $60,000 from a joint account to an
1 individual account before filing for dissolution, the court said that it
would allow wife to maintain access to those marital funds but
wouldn’t order husband to pay wife maintenance. The court thus
ordered wife to make the marital funds in her individual account
accessible to husband.
¶4 After asking each party how much they believed they needed
for monthly expenses and discussing with the parties the estimated
monthly costs for their child’s ongoing healthcare needs,1 the court
authorized both parties to spend $2,200 a month in “discretionary
spending” from their marital funds. That amount didn’t include the
child’s healthcare expenses.
¶5 More than two years later, the court held a permanent orders
hearing over the course of three days. The court heard testimony
from the parties, husband’s family, and the parties’ respective
experts regarding the interests in and value of the parties’ property,
which included three parcels of real property — referred to as A, C,
and D. Wife’s counsel offered her appraiser — Carissa Marler — as
1 The child was born with several serious and complicated medical
conditions, which have required ongoing surgeries and specialized medical care.
2 an expert witness in the area of residential and rural appraisals.
Husband’s counsel didn’t object, and the court accepted Marler as a
real estate appraisal expert.
¶6 Husband acquired a 50% interest in Property A during the
marriage, after husband’s father deeded the property to husband
and his sister in 2019. The court found that the parties agreed that
husband’s interest in Property A was marital, its marital value was
$142,500, and its value should be allocated to husband.
¶7 For Property C, the court found that “[t]he parties seem to
agree that [husband] has a 25% interest in this property.” The
court found that Property C’s value at the date of marriage was
$265,000, and, at the time of the permanent orders hearing, the
value was $450,000. The increased value between the date of
marriage and the hearing was thus $185,000. The court then
found that husband’s “combined (separate and marital) interest
value” was $112,500, with $66,250 as husband’s separate property
and $46,250 as marital property.
¶8 The parties lived on Property D throughout their marriage and
considered it their marital home. Husband and his father
purchased this property in 2012 and both, along with husband’s
3 stepmother, are listed as borrowers on the mortgage. The court
found that Property D’s value at the date of the marriage in 2017
was $849,938.80, the mortgage balance was $210,817, and the
equity — which was husband’s separate property — was
$639,121.80. The court found that the property’s value at the time
of the hearing was $1,255,840, the mortgage balance was
$156,655.40, and the total equity was $1,099,184.60. Using those
figures, the court subtracted the 2017 equity amount of
$639,121.80 from the total equity of $1,099,184.60 and concluded
that the marital equity totaled $460,062.80.
¶9 When dividing the marital estate, the court concluded that it
was allocating marital assets of $785,025 to husband and $43,709
to wife. The court further concluded that husband’s separate and
marital property totaled approximately $2,000,000, while wife had
only $49,740. Because of this imbalance between the parties’
assets, the court ordered husband to pay wife an equalization
payment of $357,158. The court found that husband “ha[d] the
ability to pay that payment immediately” but also noted that “much
of [husband’s] assets [were] tied to other individuals.” Alternatively,
the court allowed husband to pay wife in four installments of
4 $100,000 between May 2025 and December 2025, which increased
the equalization payment total to $400,000. The court found this
fair and equitable under the circumstances because it incentivized
husband to pay wife early and mitigated losses that wife faced “by
not being able to invest property that [was] rightfully hers.”
¶ 10 The court ordered husband to pay wife $182 per month for
child support. The court concluded that “[t]here were no orders in
place regarding child support” during the pendency of the case, so
it ordered husband to pay wife $6,552 in retroactive child support.
¶ 11 Husband appeals the portions of the court’s permanent orders
related to its determination of the marital estate and its division
thereof. Husband also appeals the court’s order for retroactive
child support.
II. Applicable Legal Principles
A. Marital Estate Division
¶ 12 A district court has great latitude in equitably dividing a
marital estate in such proportions as it deems just. See
§ 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA
42M, ¶ 28. “The key to an equitable distribution is fairness, not
5 mathematical precision.” In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55
(Colo. 1988).
¶ 13 Before dividing a marital estate, a court must determine
whether an asset is marital or separate. § 14-10-113(1); In re
Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9. Marital property is subject
to division and includes the appreciation of a spouse’s separate
property during the marriage. § 14-10-113(4); see In re Marriage of
Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 13. The court must value marital property as
of the date of the hearing on disposition of property.
§ 14-10-113(5); see In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4.
¶ 14 A court can only distribute marital property that exists at the
time of dissolution. See In re Marriage of Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264,
267 (Colo. App. 1998). And absent a finding that a spouse
dissipated property in anticipation of the dissolution or engaged in
conduct constituting economic fault, marital property disposed of
before the permanent orders hearing may not be included in the
marital estate. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA
95, ¶ 75 (defining dissipation as “when one spouse depletes the
marital estate for an improper or illegitimate purpose in
contemplation of the dissolution”). If marital assets have been
6 dissipated by one of the parties, then the assets must be valued as
of the last date they existed. Martinez v. Gutierrez-Martinez, 77 P.3d
827, 830 (Colo. App. 2003).
B. Child Support
¶ 15 “A child has a legal right to support from both parents, and
both parents have a continuing duty to provide reasonable support
for the child.” In re Marriage of Salas, 868 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Colo.
App. 1994). The district court may order a parent to pay retroactive
child support from the date of the filing of the petition for
dissolution to the month before the support obligation begins.
§ 14-10-115(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025. However, “[a] [district] court’s order
must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently
explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis
of its order and to enable the appellate court to determine the
grounds upon which it rendered its decision.” In re Marriage of
Rozzi, 190 P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008).
C. Standard of Review
¶ 16 “The district court’s classification of property as marital or
separate is a legal determination that is based on the court’s factual
findings.” Smith, ¶ 42. We review de novo the court’s application of
7 the law but defer to its factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id. The court’s valuation of property is binding on
appellate review unless those findings are clearly erroneous. In re
Marriage of Nordahl, 834 P.2d 838, 842 (Colo. App. 1992).
¶ 17 Absent a showing that the court abused its discretion, we
won’t disturb its equitable division of a marital estate, decision to
accept an expert witness’s testimony, or child support order. See
Medeiros, ¶ 28 (abuse of discretion standard for dividing a marital
estate); Meier v. McCoy, 119 P.3d 519, 521 (Colo. App. 2004) (abuse
of discretion standard for qualifying expert testimony); In re
Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 8 (abuse of discretion
standard for ordering child support). “A court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
or a misapplication of the law.” Medeiros, ¶ 28.
III. The Court Erred When It Divided the Marital Estate
¶ 18 As discussed below, we decline to consider husband’s
argument that the court erred when it accepted Marler’s appraisal
values, but we agree with him that the court made certain
calculation errors regarding the marital estate. We further conclude
8 that the court’s findings are insufficient to enable us to review
husband’s allegation that wife dissipated marital funds.
A. Marler’s Valuation Opinions
¶ 19 Husband argues that the court erred when it accepted Marler’s
valuation opinions related to the parcels in which he maintained
varying fractional interests. He argues that, under People v. Shreck,
22 P.3d 68, 70, 77 (Colo. 2001), Marler wasn’t qualified to opine on
“the impact of [his] fractional interest in her final value
calculations.”
¶ 20 However, husband waived this argument because his counsel
failed to object when wife’s counsel offered, and the court accepted,
Marler as an expert in the field of residential and rural real estate
appraisal. See In re Estate of Musso, 932 P.2d 853, 857 (Colo. App.
1997) (failing to object at trial to the issue raised on appeal is
deemed a waiver and forecloses appellate review). And we reject his
assertion that raising this argument in his post-trial motion
preserved this issue. See In re Marriage of McClure, 2024 COA 70,
¶ 7 (appellate courts typically don’t consider arguments raised for
the first time in a post-trial motion). Because husband waived any
argument about Marler’s qualifications, we decline to address this
9 contention further. See In re Marriage of Wells, 252 P.3d 1212,
1215 (Colo. App. 2011) (an appellate court won’t address issues not
presented in the district court).
B. Calculating the Marital Estate
1. Property A
¶ 21 Husband argues that it’s undisputed that he and his sister
each acquired a 50% interest in Property A when they were minors
and that husband’s father transferred to them their respective
interests in 2019. Husband thus argues that the court should have
deducted Property A’s premarital value from its total value because
the premarital value was his separate property. However, husband
conceded in the joint trial management certificate, his sworn
financial statements, his proposed marital estate division
spreadsheet, and his trial testimony that his 50% interest in
Property A was marital. Because husband conceded that the
entirety of his interest in Property A was marital, we deem his
argument waived and decline to further consider it. See In re
Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244, 254 (Colo. 1992) (holding that a
spouse who submitted financial affidavits treating particular
10 property as marital couldn’t then question on appeal the district
court’s classification of the property as marital).
2. Property C
¶ 22 Husband argues, and wife concedes, that the determination of
Property C’s marital value in the court’s written order is different
than the determination of value the court included in the marital
property division spreadsheet attached to the order. While wife
argues that the error is merely clerical, husband argues it resulted
in a 9.5% overstatement of the marital value of the property.
Specifically, the written order states that Property C’s marital value
is $46,250, while the spreadsheet says its value is $118,750. Thus,
the court attributed $72,500 more to Property C’s marital value in
the spreadsheet than it did in its written order.
¶ 23 Wife argues that we should still affirm the court’s $357,158
equalization payment because any error was harmless. Wife argues
that the court’s detailed findings “reflect its true intent” because
husband received over $2,000,000 in total assets.
¶ 24 A court’s error that affects only a small percentage of the
overall marital estate may be considered harmless. In re Marriage of
Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36 (Colo. 2001). Given the overall value of
11 the parties’ marital property, viewed alone, an error of $72,500
could be considered harmless. However, when we consider the
court’s miscalculation of the value of Property C, along with its
other miscalculations — including its miscalculation of the value of
Property D, which we discuss next — we can’t conclude this error
was harmless.2 See id. (“[I]f the [district] court’s errors in a
particular case, viewed in the aggregate, affect a large percentage of
the marital estate, a remand of the case to the [district] court to
correct such errors is required.”).
3. Property D
¶ 25 Husband argues that the court erred when, in calculating the
value of his separate and marital property interests in Property D, it
failed to subtract his father’s 50% ownership interest (1) from the
property’s total value before deducting the mortgage from
2 The court’s written order repeatedly referenced the spreadsheet to
determine the value of husband’s marital property and total assets. But despite making written findings that husband was entitled to certain marital property and responsible for certain marital debts, the court didn’t include all the values of those assets and debts in its written calculation of the total value of his marital property. Put differently, there are additional discrepancies between the court’s written calculations and its valuation of those assets on the spreadsheet attached to the order. We are unable to discern the basis for the discrepancies.
12 husband’s remaining 50% interest, (2) after it determined the
property’s total equity. We disagree with his first contention but
agree with his second.
¶ 26 Husband provides no authority to support his first contention,
which contravenes how courts ordinarily calculate equity in real
property. See In re Marriage of Hiner, 710 P.2d 488, 492 (Colo.
1985) (calculating equity by subtracting the outstanding mortgage
from the appraised value). Accordingly, we reject his assertion that
the court’s method of calculating husband’s premarital equity in
Property D was erroneous.
¶ 27 However, we agree that the court erred by not accounting for
husband’s father’s 50% interest in the property at all. Accepting
the court’s finding that the property was worth $849,938.80 at the
date of marriage and subtracting the then-existing mortgage
balance of $210,817 results in $639,121.80 in total premarital
equity. Because husband has a 50% interest in Property D, we
conclude that the court should have divided this number in half to
value husband’s separate property interest at $319,560.90.
13 ¶ 28 Similarly, accepting the court’s value at the date of the hearing
as $1,255,8403 and subtracting the mortgage balance of
$156,655.40 results in $1,099,184.60 in total equity. The court
should have divided this number in half to determine husband’s
equity interest at the time of hearing, which was $549,592.30.
Subtracting the value of husband’s separate interest ($319,560.90)
from the value of his equity interest at the time of the hearing
($549,592.30) results in an appreciation of Property D’s value in the
amount of $230,031.40 as a marital asset.
¶ 29 Instead, the court neglected to account for husband’s father’s
partial interest when it concluded that husband had $639,122 in
separate interest and that the appreciation, which amounted to
$460,062.80, was marital. Additionally, the spreadsheet states that
the marital value of Property D was $303,408. Thus, in both the
written order and the spreadsheet, the court overstated husband’s
3 Husband argues that, “Without any explanation, the district court
adopted [wife’s] unsupported opinion that [Property D] was worth $1,255,840.00. This is more than [Marler’s] opinion that its value for permanent orders was $1,250,000.” Husband then references Marler’s valuation report in which she opined that Property D’s value was $1,255,840 but said she rounded the number down to $1,250,000. Thus, Marler’s report supports wife’s offered value of $1,255,840.
14 separate interest in Property D by $319,561.10. And the court
overstated the marital equity on the spreadsheet by $73,376.60.
¶ 30 The court thus erred when it divided the marital estate based
on the incorrect conclusion that the marital estate had
$145,876.604 in additional assets and that husband maintained
$319,561.10 in additional separate property. See Balanson, 25
P.3d at 36, 42.
C. Dissipation of Marital Assets and Equalization Payment
¶ 31 Next, husband argues that wife dissipated marital funds and
that the court erred by failing to consider such dissipation when it
divided the marital estate and calculated child support. The court
identified in the beginning of its written order that “potential
dissipation of bank accounts and marital funds” was a disputed
issue. However, the court didn’t make any findings of fact or
conclusions of law regarding dissipation.
¶ 32 Whether a spouse dissipated marital property is a factual
question. Smith, ¶ 76. A court may consider a spouse’s dissipation
of marital assets as economic fault when it divides the marital
4 This includes the $72,500 overstatement from miscalculating the
marital interest in Property C and $73,376.60 from Property D.
15 estate. In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Colo.
App. 2006); see also In re Marriage of Anderson, 811 P.2d 419,
420-21 (Colo. App. 1990) (dissipation is a proper consideration for
property division). When a spouse raises dissipation for the court’s
consideration, it is incumbent on the other spouse who spent
marital funds to establish they were used for proper expenses. See
Martinez, 77 P.3d at 830.
¶ 33 Because the court didn’t make any findings about whether
wife dissipated marital assets or whether those assets, if any, were
considered in the court’s division of the marital estate, we can’t tell
whether the property division is equitable. See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at
822. The court on remand should make specific findings regarding
whether wife used marital assets for an illegitimate purpose. See In
re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996). Only if
the court finds that wife’s use of marital assets was improper
should it consider the value of those assets in its property division
orders. See id.
¶ 34 Because we are remanding the case to the district court to
reconsider its division of the marital estate due to the
miscalculations identified above and consideration of whether wife
16 dissipated assets, we need not address husband’s argument that
the court abused its discretion when it determined that he had the
immediate ability to pay wife $357,158 for an equalization
payment.5 In remanding this case to the district court, we reject
husband’s apparent assertion that the district court doesn’t have
authority to order an equalization payment. In doing so, we
specifically note that the district court has authority to effect an
equitable division of the marital estate, which includes entering “a
variety of orders to implement its decision.” In re Marriage of Payne,
897 P.2d 888, 889 (Colo. App. 1995). Additionally, the court must
consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the time of the
remand. See In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 696 (Colo.
1993); § 14-10-113(1)(c).
5 In his appellate briefing, husband’s counsel cites two unpublished
opinions from this court in support of his argument. Absent exceptions inapplicable here, this court’s policy prohibits citations to our opinions that aren’t selected for official publication. Colo. Jud. Branch, Court of Appeals Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2026), https://perma.cc/ZQW2-H29D. We trust counsel will adhere to this policy in the future.
17 IV. Retroactive Child Support
¶ 35 Husband argues that the court overlooked the May 2022
temporary orders when it found that “[t]here were no orders in place
regarding child support while this case was pending.” In the
temporary orders, the court ordered that “both parties may spend
up to $2,200 a month of marital funds” from joint accounts. But
the record sheds little light on whether this authorization was
intended to cover temporary maintenance, child support, a
combination of both, or neither. Husband argues that the court’s
failure to consider the impact of the $2,200 monthly authorization,
along with wife’s other “economic circumstances,” amounted to
clear error.
¶ 36 Because the court didn’t clarify the intent of the temporary
orders in the permanent orders, it’s unclear whether it considered
the order authorizing each party to spend $2,200 per month during
the pendency of the proceedings when it ordered retroactive child
support. See Rozzi, 190 P.3d at 822. Thus, the court’s findings are
insufficient for us to determine whether the court erred in
determining the amount of retroactive child support.
18 ¶ 37 That said, our conclusion that the court’s findings were
insufficient shouldn’t be construed as a conclusion that the $2,200
monthly amount was child support. Indeed, as we have already
noted, at the temporary orders hearing, the court didn’t make clear
the purpose of its $2,200 per month authorization. Accordingly, on
remand, the court should determine the nature of the $2,200
monthly amount before recalculating the amount of retroactive
child support owed, if any.
V. Husband’s Request for Appellate Costs, and Wife’s Request for Attorney Fees
¶ 38 Husband requests that we award him appellate costs under
C.A.R. 39(a)(3).6 Wife requests that we award her attorney fees
under C.A.R. 38, C.A.R. 39.1, and section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.
Wife argues that the “court’s findings extensively illustrate a
substantial economic disparity between the parties” and that
husband has the means to continue to pay for legal fees because of
his family’s assistance, while she is not similarly situated.
6 The header in husband’s opening brief states “COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES,” but he only requests costs, so we need not consider whether to award him any attorney fees. See C.A.R. 39.1 (a party claiming attorney fees must explain the legal and factual basis for an award).
19 ¶ 39 Under C.A.R. 38(b), if we determine an appeal is frivolous, we
may award sanctions, which includes attorney fees, to the appellee.
C.A.R. 39(a)(4) taxes appellate costs “only as ordered by the
[district] court.” Under C.A.R. 39.1, it’s within our discretion to
determine a party’s “entitlement to and the amount of an award of
attorney fees” for an appeal, or we “may remand those
determinations to the lower court.” And section 14-10-119
authorizes a court to award attorney fees in dissolution proceedings
after considering the financial resources of both parties.
¶ 40 Because we affirm in part and reverse in part, we remand to
the district court the determination of husband’s appellate costs
under C.A.R. 39(a)(4) and reject wife’s assertion that his appeal was
frivolous. We thus deny wife’s request for sanctions under C.A.R.
38(b).
¶ 41 Regarding wife’s request for attorney fees under section
14-10-119, the district court is better equipped to determine
whether wife is entitled to attorney fees because it must consider
the factual issues regarding the parties’ financial resources at the
time of the remand proceedings. See In re Marriage of Boettcher,
2018 COA 34, ¶ 34 (“Section 14-10-119 empowers the [district]
20 court to apportion costs and fees equitably between parties based
on their relative ability to pay.”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.
VI. Disposition
¶ 42 The portions of the judgment addressing the separate and
marital values of Properties C and D, dissipation, and retroactive
child support are reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed. The court must also reevaluate maintenance and child
support based on the court’s reconsideration of the property
division and the parties’ current financial circumstances. See In re
Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26 (maintenance); In re
Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.G.C.-G., 228 P.3d 271, 273
(Colo. App. 2010) (child support). On remand, the court may
exercise its discretion to determine whether additional proceedings
or an evidentiary hearing is necessary. In re Marriage of Pawelec,
2024 COA 107, ¶ 85.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.