Marriage of Gonzalez Morales

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0039
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0039 Marriage of Gonzalez Morales 07-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0039 Garfield County District Court No. 21DR30071 Honorable Denise Lynch, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Juan Antonio Gonzalez Morales,

Appellee,

and

Abril Dubbe Meixueiro,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 9, 2026

The Harris Law Firm PLLP, Richard A. Harris, Katherine O. Ellis, Kady L. Tran, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Anne Whalen Gill, L.L.C., Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Abril Dubbe Meixueiro (mother) appeals the district court’s

order, following a hearing on remand, granting the petition by Juan

Antonio Gonzalez Morales (father) to return the parties’ child to

Mexico. We affirm.

I. Remand Order

¶2 This case is a sequel to In re Marriage of Gonzalez Morales,

2024 COA 2 (Gonzalez Morales I), in which the division held that the

district court improperly dismissed father’s petition under the

provisions of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International

Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 (Hague

Abduction Convention), and its implementing statutes, 22 U.S.C.

§§ 9001-9011. Gonzalez Morales I, ¶ 35.

¶3 The Gonzalez Morales I division reversed and remanded the

case for the district court to resolve father’s wrongful removal action

under the Hague Abduction Convention. Id.

¶4 On remand, the district court found that mother had

wrongfully removed the child from Mexico and ordered that the

child be returned to Mexico. Mother now appeals, claiming that the

district court erred by failing to dismiss father’s petition as moot

and declining to defer to certain findings by the Mexican court.

1 Mother also challenges the district court’s denial of her

postjudgment motion under C.R.C.P. 59. We address and reject her

first two contentions. Because the record is incomplete as to the

third, we are unable to meaningfully review it and reject it as well.

II. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

¶5 The parties were married in Texas in 2014 and have one

daughter who was born in 2015. Shortly after the child’s birth, the

parties moved to Mexico and settled in the city of Chihuahua in the

state of the same name. In November 2020, the parties divorced.

The Family Court of the Morelos Judicial District, Chihuahua,

Mexico, issued a decree that memorialized the parties’ agreement as

to their daughter. The decree awarded mother custody of the child

and provided father with regular parenting time. In early 2021,

father went to mother’s home in Chihuahua for his parenting time

and discovered that mother and the child were missing.

¶6 After learning that the child was in Colorado, father sought

and obtained, in Garfield County District Court, a warrant under

section 14-13-311, C.R.S. 2025, and the Hague Abduction

Convention to take immediate custody of the child and return her to

Mexico. After a year of trying to locate mother and the child, father

2 served mother with the district court pleadings and executed the

warrant in October 2022.

¶7 The district court then held a hearing on father’s request to

return the child to Mexico pursuant to the Hague Abduction

Convention. After father presented his case, mother moved for

judgment in her favor. Specifically, mother argued that father had

not proved that he possessed rights of custody sufficient to obtain

relief under the Hague Abduction Convention. The court deferred

ruling on the issue and directed mother to begin presenting her

case opposing father’s petition. However, after considering the

parties’ written briefs, the district court ruled in mother’s favor and

denied father’s petition. At the time, mother had not yet finished

the presentation of her case.

¶8 Father appealed and the Gonzalez Morales I division reversed,

holding that, under the Mexican doctrine of patria potestas, father

had sufficient rights of custody to maintain a wrongful removal

action under the Hague Abduction Convention. Gonzalez Morales I,

¶ 35. Per the division’s remand instructions, see id. at ¶ 37, in

December 2024, the district court held further proceedings, which

included the completion of mother’s case opposing father’s request

3 to return the child to Mexico and father’s presentation of rebuttal

evidence.

¶9 In a written order, the district court granted father’s petition

for the return of the child to Mexico. The court found that father

had demonstrated that, under the Hague Abduction Convention,

mother had wrongfully removed the child from Mexico and that she

had failed to prove any of the statutory defenses to her wrongful

removal of the child.

III. The Hague Abduction Convention

¶ 10 The purpose of the Hague Abduction Convention is to

promptly return children who are wrongfully removed from their

place of habitual residence, unless one of the narrow exceptions to

return applies. See 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4); In re Marriage of Jeffers,

992 P.2d 686, 690 (Colo. App. 1999). “The Convention is based on

the principle that the best interests of the child are well served

when decisions regarding custody rights are made in the country of

habitual residence.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). Thus,

the Hague Abduction Convention should not be interpreted to

permit a parent to select the country to adjudicate parental

responsibilities by crossing a border. See id. at 21; see also March

4 v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2001) (the Convention was

“specifically designed to discourage those who would remove or

retain children in the hopes of seeking a ‘home court advantage’”).

¶ 11 Under the Convention, the removal of a child is wrongful if

a. it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, . . . either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

b. at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

Hague Abduction Convention art. 3. If the petitioner establishes

these elements, the court “shall order the return of the child

forthwith,” id. at art. 12, unless the responding party can establish

one of the exceptions under Articles 12, 13, or 20. 22 U.S.C.

§ 9003(e)(2).

¶ 12 Mother attempted to establish the following exceptions in

response to father’s Hague Abduction petition (1) proving by clear

and convincing evidence that there is a grave risk that the child’s

return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or

otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation; (2) proving by a

5 preponderance of the evidence that father was not actually

exercising custody rights at the time of removal; and (3) proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that the proceeding was

commenced more than a year from the date of wrongful removal

and the child is now settled in her new environment. See id.;

Hague Abduction Convention arts. 12 and 13.

¶ 13 We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the

Hague Abduction Convention and its implementing statute. In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning T.L.B., 2012 COA 8, ¶ 18.

IV. The Petition Was Not Moot

¶ 14 Mother first argues that the district court should have

dismissed or denied father’s petition because a subsequent order

issued by the Mexican court system on February 28, 2023,

rendered father’s petition moot. We are not persuaded.

A. Timeliness of Mother’s Appeal as to Mootness

¶ 15 As an initial matter, we disagree with father’s contention that

mother failed to timely appeal the district court’s ruling on

mootness. Before the hearing on remand, mother raised the issue

of mootness in a motion to dismiss father’s petition, which the

district court denied on November 19, 2024. Father argues that,

6 because mother’s notice of appeal was not filed until January 8,

2025, which was more than forty-nine days after the court’s

November 19 order, see C.A.R. 4(a)(1), mother’s appeal as to

mootness was untimely.

¶ 16 We reject father’s contention because our jurisdiction is

limited to the review of final judgments and orders. See L.H.M.

Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, ¶ 14; § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S.

2025; C.A.R. 1(a)(1). And it is well established that the denial of a

motion to dismiss is not a final and immediately reviewable order.

Marks v. Gessler, 2013 COA 115, ¶ 16; see also Suthers v. CB Servs.

Corp., 252 P.3d 7, 10 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[F]or purposes of appeal,

an order is final and appealable when it ‘finally disposes of the

particular action and prevents further proceedings as effectually as

would any formal judgment.’” (quoting Levine v. Empire Sav. & Loan

Ass’n, 557 P.2d 386, 387 (Colo. 1976)).

¶ 17 Thus, the court’s November 19 order denying mother’s motion

to dismiss, which did not end the proceeding, was not a final and

appealable order. Accordingly, mother was not required to file a

notice of appeal within forty-nine days of that order under C.A.R.

4(a)(1). Instead, she was required to and did file a notice of appeal

7 within forty-nine days of the district court’s January 7 order, which

fully and finally resolved father’s Hague Abduction Convention

petition. See Suthers, 252 P.3d at 10. Therefore, we review

mother’s contention of mootness.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 18 “A case is moot when the relief sought, if granted, would have

no practical legal effect on the controversy,” and “[g]enerally, courts

will decline to consider the merits of a case that is moot.” Gresh v.

Balink, 148 P.3d 419, 421 (Colo. App. 2006); see also In re Marriage

of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 7 (recognizing that an appellate court

will “not render an opinion when the issues presented have become

moot because of subsequent events”). We review de novo the legal

question of whether a case is moot. Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Urbina,

2013 COA 155, ¶ 23.

C. Discussion

¶ 19 In arguing that father’s petition was moot, mother relies solely

on a February 28, 2023, order issued by the Second Family

Chamber of the State Superior Court of Justice in the Mexican state

of Chihuahua. In that order, the Mexican court accepted as

“founded” mother’s assertion that, because the child had been living

8 abroad for a lengthy period, the child was adapted to her new

environment, and therefore a change to the child’s residence would

not be in her best interests. The Mexican court further found that

an “abrupt change” for the child “would be far from beneficial and

might even be harmful, as we can assume that with the passage of

time, the minor child has integrated into her new environment and

activities and is attached to her mother who cares for her.”

¶ 20 Therefore, the Mexican court revoked, as not in the child’s best

interests, a prior, temporary order that had modified custody in

father’s favor. The court then ordered mother to propose a schedule

wherein the child would continue living in the United States, with

father having regular visitation.

¶ 21 However, as recognized by the district court, a later June 15,

2023, order from a judge of the federal Second District Court in

Chihuahua found that the reasoning expressed in the February 28,

2023, order was incorrect. In the June 15 order, the court found

that mother had not presented any evidence that the child was

integrated into her new environment, and, therefore, the reasoning

and findings in the February 28 order were unsupported. The court

also held that the February 28, 2023, order had failed to analyze

9 several other relevant issues and, consequently, nullified that order

and stated that further proceedings would be required.

¶ 22 Although mother’s opening brief acknowledges in passing that

the February 28 order was nullified, her entire mootness claim is

based on her assertion that the order nevertheless mooted father’s

petition because it awarded her sole custody of the child and

prohibited the child’s return to Mexico. Yet mother has made no

attempt to explain how a nullified order could properly form the

basis of a finding of mootness. Thus, we decline to further consider

mother’s contention that father’s petition was moot based on the

February 28 order, which was no longer valid at the time of the

remand proceedings.1 Cf. Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento

Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 44 (declining to consider undeveloped

and conclusory contentions of error made without supporting

argument or authority).

1 To the extent that mother briefly references a later January 11,

2024, Mexican court order (which appears to have altered virtual visitation between father and the child in Colorado due to conflicts with the child’s extracurricular activities), mother has made no argument regarding that order in relation to her mootness claim. We therefore do not consider it.

10 V. Deference to the Mexican Court Orders

¶ 23 For similar reasons, we are not persuaded by mother’s

assertion that, under principles of comity, the district court was

required to defer to the invalidated February 28, 2023, order from

the Chihuahua Second Family Chamber of the State Superior Court

of Justice State Superior Court of Justice when considering the

physical or psychological harm and well-settled defenses that

mother asserted under the Hague Abduction Convention. See

¶ 24 To start, as explained above, mother’s reliance on that order is

misplaced given that it was nullified and otherwise declared to be

unsupported by any evidence by the later June 15, 2023, order.

¶ 25 Equally fatal to mother’s argument, the Hague Abduction

Convention unambiguously provides that the well-settled defense is

applicable only where proceedings for the return of a wrongfully

removed child were commenced more than a year from the date of

the wrongful removal. See Hague Abduction Convention art. 12.

And here, mother does not challenge the district court’s finding that

father commenced the necessary proceedings within a year of

mother’s wrongful removal of the child from Mexico. Thus,

11 regardless of any findings the Mexican court made as to the child’s

adjustment to living in Colorado, the well-settled defense does not

apply under the plain terms of the Hague Abduction Convention.

¶ 26 Indeed, federal courts applying the Hague Abduction

Convention have recognized that it is not appropriate to defer to

foreign court orders under the principle of comity where it would

result in a misapplication or misinterpretation of the provisions of

the Hague Abduction Convention. See, e.g., Asvesta v. Petroutsas,

580 F.3d 1000, 1010-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Carrascosa v. McGuire,

520 F.3d 249, 258-63 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, we disagree with

mother that the district court was obligated to defer to the findings

from the February 28, 2023, order, even if that order had remained

in effect.

¶ 27 Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the February 28

order was not nullified, any findings of psychological harm to the

child in that order were based on mere assumptions made by the

Mexican court as to the child’s status. For instance, the court

found that “presumably, [the] child has already integrated” into her

new environment and it also “assume[d] that[,] with the passage of

time, the minor child has integrated into her new environment.”

12 (Emphases added.) Likewise, that order was based at least in part

on the “potential risk to the child, without any harm actually

occurring,” and it speculated that a change in the child’s

environment “might . . . be harmful.”

¶ 28 Mother has not explained how such speculative findings meet

the clear and convincing evidence standard that applies to a

physical or psychological harm defense under the Hague Abduction

Convention or the preponderance of the evidence standard that

applies to the well-settled defense. See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2);

Hague Abduction Convention arts. 12 and 13(b). Nor has mother

explained how the mere possibility of harm from a change in the

child’s environment clears the high bar of “grave risk” of harm to

the child. Hague Abduction Convention art. 13(b); see also Gil-

Leyva v. Leslie, 780 F. App’x 580, 589-90 (10th Cir. 2019)

(recognizing that “‘grave risk’ means the ‘potential harm to the child

must be severe, and the level of risk and danger . . . very high.’”

(quoting West v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 931 (10th Cir. 2013)));

Souratgar v. Lee, 720 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); cf. Walsh

v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that the

harm must be greater than the harm that would typically be

13 expected from taking the child from one parent and placing them

with the other parent).

¶ 29 Lastly, we decline to address mother’s assertion, presented in

a conclusory fashion without any meaningful discussion or legal

analysis, that the district court erred by ignoring other evidence

that the child was at risk of psychological harm if she was returned

to Mexico. See People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 35. And

where mother expands on such an argument for the first time in

her reply brief, we also decline to address it. See In re Marriage of

Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

VI. Mother’s Postjudgment Motion Under C.R.C.P. 59

¶ 30 To the extent that mother also challenges the district court’s

April 3, 2025, order denying her February 18, 2025, postjudgment

motion under C.R.C.P. 59, we decline to disturb the district court’s

ruling. As the appellant, it was mother’s responsibility to designate

the record and to ensure that all items designated were transmitted

to the appellate court. See In re Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092,

1096 (Colo. App. 2002). Yet mother’s postjudgment motion does

not appear anywhere in the record, leaving us in the dark as to the

arguments that she presented in that motion. We are therefore

14 unable to meaningfully review her contentions. Where an appellant

fails to include the necessary portions of the record, we must

presume that the missing record supports the judgment. See Dean,

¶ 15; cf. People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo. 1989) (reviewing

court cannot conclude that the district court’s judgment is

erroneous when the record is insufficient).

VII. Disposition

¶ 31 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.