Marriage of Gilbert CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: E084112
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 2/5/26 Marriage of Gilbert CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of MAURICE AND ISABEL GILBERT.

MAURICE GILBERT, E084112 Appellant, (Super.Ct.No. FAMSB2200803) v. OPINION ISABEL BARRIOS GILBERT et al.,

Respondents.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Carlos M.

Cabrera, Judge. Affirmed.

Maurice Gilbert, in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent Isabel Barrios Gilbert.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General,

Maureen C. Onyeagbako and Grant Lien, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent

California Department of Child Support Services.

1 This opinion constitutes this court’s fifth time addressing this child support

matter. (In re Marriage of Gilbert (July 9, 2019, E070292) [nonpub. opn.]; In re

Marriage of Gilbert (Nov. 19, 2019, E071428) [nonpub. opn.]; In re Marriage of

Gilbert (Nov. 13, 2023, E077917) [nonpub. opn.]; In re Marriage of Gilbert (May 14,

2025, E082826) (modified June 12, 2025) [nonpub. opn.] (the fourth appeal).) In the

current appeal, among other contentions, appellant Maurice Gilbert (Father) asserts the

family court erred by issuing an order, while the fourth appeal was pending, that

concerned the order under review in the fourth appeal. We affirm.

FACTS

In the fourth appeal we reviewed an order issued by the family court on

September 14, 2023 (the September order). In the September order, the family court

corrected an error in a 2014 order to clarify that Father was the parent ordered to pay

child support—not respondent Isabel Barrios-Gilbert (Mother). Father filed a notice of

appeal for the fourth appeal on December 15, 2023. In the fourth appeal, Father

asserted the family court erred by correcting the 2014 order. (In re Marriage of Gilbert

(May 14, 2025, E082826) (modified June 12, 2025) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 6-8.)

On December 18, 2023, the family court determined that Mother did not owe

child support arrears, while Father owed child support arrears of $26,523.44

($13,583.04 is principal and $12,940.40 is interest). The family court ordered Father to

pay the arrears “at a rate of $500.00 every month to be paid on the 1st day of each

month commencing 01/01/24.”

2 DISCUSSION

A. JURISDICTION DURING THE FOURTH APPEAL

Father contends the family court lacked jurisdiction to enter the December 18,

2023, order while the fourth appeal was pending. Respondent California Department of

Child Support Services (the Department) concedes that Father is correct. We conclude

the family court did not err.

“[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the

judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected

thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 916.)

However, “[u]nless an undertaking is given, the perfecting of an appeal shall not stay

enforcement of the judgment or order in the trial court if the judgment or order is for . . .

[¶] [m]oney or the payment of money.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.1, subd. (a)(1).) “Such

an undertaking has been required in dissolution proceedings pending the appeal of

support orders.” (In re Marriage of Thompson (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 621, 625.) The

purpose of the rule staying proceedings is to “ ‘ “preserv[e] the status quo until the

appeal is decided.” ’ ” (Royals v. Lu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 328, 343.)

The family court’s December 18, 2023, order did not alter the status quo. Rather,

it enforced the clarified 2014 child support order designating Father as the parent

required to pay support. It enforced the 2014 order by setting a payment schedule and

an amount owed. Moreover, the law recognizes the payment of arrears as enforcement

of a judgment. Family Code section 4503 provides, “If a parent has been ordered to

make payments for the support of a minor child, an action to recover an arrearage in

3 those payments may be maintained at any time within the period otherwise specified for

the enforcement of such a judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the child has attained

the age of 18 years.” (Italics added.) Father does not assert that he posted an

undertaking for the fourth appeal. Without an undertaking, the family court retained

jurisdiction to enforce the payment of arrears. In sum, the family court did not err.

The Department cites two cases to support its concession that the family court

erred. The first case is Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 625. In that case, the

plaintiff filed a personal injury action, and the trial court entered a default judgment

against the defendants. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to vacate the

judgment, and the defendants appealed. While that appeal was pending, more motions

were filed and ruled upon. (Id. at p. 628.) An order denying a motion to vacate is not

an order for the payment of money. Therefore, the Department’s reliance on Elsea is

misplaced.

The second case is Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th

180. In that case, the Supreme Court considered “whether the perfecting of an appeal

from the denial of a special motion to strike[, i.e., an anti-SLAPP motion] automatically

stays all further trial court proceedings on the merits upon the causes of action affected

by the motion.” (Id. at p. 186.) The denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is not an order for

the payment of money. Accordingly, the Department’s reliance on Varian is also

4 B. DUE PROCESS

Father contends the family court violated his right of due process by entering the

arrears order sua sponte and without notice.

On May 19, 2023, the Department filed a motion to correct the 2014 order. On

August 14, 2023, Mother filed a request for a determination of arrears. On September

14, 2023, the family court ordered the 2014 order corrected to clarify that Father was

the parent required to pay child support. In that same order, the family court continued

“[t]he issue of determination of child support arrears . . . to 10/30/2023 at 10am in Dept.

S51.” On October 20, 2023, the Department filed a request for a determination of

arrears and the setting of a payment schedule for Father. The Department also provided

an accounting of the arrears owed by Father. The family court reset the hearing for

December 18, 2023.

On December 14, 2023, Father filed a response, in which he asserted, “[Mother

and the Department] are asking for a determination of Arrears, a determination for

arrears is an ‘Independent Action’, see FC 4503.”1 Father’s response reflects that he

was aware of the request for a determination of arrears. Father was present at the

hearing regarding determining arrears. The record does not support Father’s assertion

that the determination of arrears and setting of a payment schedule were done sua

sponte and without his awareness that the issues would be addressed. Accordingly, the

family court did not violate Father’s right of due process.

1 The entirety of Family Code section 4503 is quoted ante in the discussion regarding jurisdiction.

5 C. 2022 JUDGMENT

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 5, 2022, the family court entered a judgment against Mother for

child support arrears of $26,613.47. On September 14, 2023, when the family court

corrected the 2014 order to clarify that it was Father who had been required to pay child

support, the family court vacated the October 5, 2022, judgment. The family court

explained, “The court makes a finding that the 10/05/2022 Judgment was based on a

void order (as the 07/07/2014 [order] is hereby corrected to reflect that [Father] rather

than [Mother] is the obligor) and the court not being aware of the order made on

05/16/2017, adjudicating child support arrears [Father] was ordered to pay.”

2. ANALYSIS

Father asserts the October 5, 2022, judgment is a final judgment on arrears

because it was never appealed. “[T]he effect of a vacating order is to eliminate the

judgment. [Citation.] Once vacated, the status of the parties that existed prior to the

judgment is restored and the situation then prevailing is the same as though the order or

judgment had never been made.” (Bulmash v. Davis (1979) 24 Cal.3d 691, 697.)

Because the October 5, 2022 judgment was vacated, it no longer exists. Thus, Father’s

contention fails.

D. TERMINATION OF JURISDICTION

Mother and Father’s child, who is now an adult, was born on August 31, 2004.

The child’s 18th birthday was on August 31, 2022. On May 25, 2023, the family court

6 issued an order that reads, in relevant part, “After argument, the court finds that child

support terminated by operation of law and pursuant to Family Code 3901 on 08/31/22.”

Father contends the family court’s “Jurisdiction Terminated on 5/25/23.” As we

explained in the fourth appeal, a judgment for child support “is enforceable until paid in

full or otherwise satisfied.” (Fam. Code, §§ 291, subd. (a).) Thus, a child reaching the

age of 18 does not terminate a court’s jurisdiction over the issue of child support arrears.

E. 2014 STIPULATION

Father contends, “The order under appeal altering/impairing the

stipulation/contract is Void.” We understand Father’s contention as reasserting an issue

addressed in the fourth appeal: That the 2014 order was made by stipulation so

correcting it is a violation of the stipulation. (In re Marriage of Gilbert (May 14, 2025,

E082826) (modified June 12, 2025) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 8.) Because we addressed that

issue in the fourth appeal and Father does not indicate that anything has changed, we

will not address the issue again.

F. CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHT

Father contends he had a property interest in the 2014 child support order, and it

violates the Constitution to deprive him of that property interest. We addressed this

issue in the fourth appeal. (In re Marriage of Gilbert (May 14, 2025, E082826)

(modified June 12, 2025) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 8-9.) Father does not indicate that

anything has changed on this issue since the fourth appeal. Therefore, we will not

address the issue again.

7 G. THE DEPARTMENT’S STANDING

Father contends the Department lacks standing to participate in this case. As we

explained in the fourth appeal, the Department is involved in the case because Mother

received public assistance during the time that Father failed to pay child support. (In re

Marriage of Gilbert (May 14, 2025, E082826) (modified June 12, 2025) [nonpub. opn.]

at pp. 10-11.) Because we addressed this issue in the fourth appeal and Father does not

indicate that anything has changed, we will not address the issue again.

H. INTEREST

Father proclaims the family court “cannot waive ‘Accrued Interest’ on the

arrears.” Father provides no analysis so it is unclear exactly what he is trying to assert.

We note that the family court determined Father owed child support arrears of

$26,523.44, of which $12,940.40 is interest.

I. RACISM

Father contends that, through the years, this court has ruled against him due to

the court being racist. Father’s appeals have failed for the reasons set forth in the

opinions filed in this case.

8 DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondent California Department of Child Support

Services is awarded its costs on appeal, if any.2 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER J.

We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL J.

2 We do not award costs to respondent Isabel Gilbert-Barrios because she did not make an appearance in this court.