Marriage of Franzoy

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0187
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0187 Marriage of Franzoy 05-28-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0187 Pueblo County District Court No. 23DR136 Honorable Tayler Thomas, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Ginger Nicole Franzoy n/k/a Ginger Nicole Steffan,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

and

Trey Michael Franzoy,

Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE LUM Welling and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 28, 2026

Epstein Patierno, LLP, Christina H. Patierno, Courtney J. Leathers Allen, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant

The W Law, Jon Eric Stuebner, Carolyn Witkus, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee ¶1 Trey Michael Franzoy (husband) appeals the property division

portion of the district court’s permanent orders entered in

connection with the dissolution of his marriage to Ginger Nicole

Franzoy, now known as Ginger Nicole Steffan (wife). We affirm and

remand the case to the district court to determine wife’s request for

appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025.

I. Background

¶2 During their marriage, the parties owned and operated three

business entities relevant to this appeal: Charlie Chedda’s LLC

(Chedda’s), which had locations in Colorado Springs and Grand

Junction; Patriot Contests and Games, LLC (Patriot); and Starfish

Management and Consulting, LLC (Starfish). Starfish is a holding

company that owns Chedda’s and Patriot. Because Chedda’s and

Patriot are gaming businesses, they are often subject to

governmental, legislative, and law enforcement scrutiny.

¶3 The district court held a three-day permanent orders hearing.

Husband testified about the risks associated with operating the

businesses and expressed concern over the toll these risks had

taken on him and on the business entities. For instance, he

testified that law enforcement agencies had raided Chedda’s in

1 Colorado Springs in 2015, and in 2016, he faced personal criminal

charges related to illegal gambling. Husband also testified that in

2018, Chedda’s in Grand Junction began receiving threats of

prosecution from the district attorney. And in 2023, Chedda’s in

Colorado Springs received a cease-and-desist letter. Between May

2023 and the permanent orders hearing in October 2024, law

enforcement raided Chedda’s in Colorado Springs location eight

times. None of the raids or legal actions against any of the

businesses (or against husband) had resulted in any convictions,

fines, or adverse administrative actions as of the time of permanent

orders.

¶4 Although wife was a part-owner of all three businesses, she

testified about her lack of operational knowledge of how the

businesses run and how the games work. Wife’s role was largely

confined to running errands, picking up supplies, and training

employees.

¶5 The parties presented the court with three options for

allocating the businesses:

• Award husband the businesses (wife’s position);

2 • Order a joint sale of the businesses (husband’s position);

or

• Divide the businesses by awarding the Chedda’s in

Grand Junction to wife and all other businesses to

husband (husband’s alternative position).

¶6 The court issued thorough written permanent orders in which

it valued the businesses and considered and analyzed each of the

three allocation options presented by the parties. The court

concluded that the most reasonable and equitable way to divide the

businesses was to allocate all three to husband as his sole and

separate property. In doing so, the court weighed the testimony

from the parties’ three experts regarding the values of each

company, the nature of the specific businesses and the parties’ past

involvement in them, and the business risks. The court valued the

business as follows:

• Chedda’s — $2,847,000;

• Patriot — $976,000; and

• Starfish — $173,000.

¶7 To achieve an equitable division of the marital estate after

allocating the rest of the property, the court ordered husband to

3 make an equalization payment to wife in the amount of $1,869,398

(amortized over ten years at a 4% interest rate). All in all, each

party received marital property with a net value of $2,933,472.50.

¶8 After accounting for the equalization payments ordered, the

court concluded that husband’s gross monthly income was

$78,349.25. The court imputed wife with a monthly income of

$2,500. The court ordered husband to pay wife $5,000 per month

in spousal maintenance for ten years.

¶9 Husband appeals the property division component of the

permanent orders, arguing that the district court abused its

discretion by allocating the three businesses to him instead of

ordering a sale. (Husband doesn’t argue that the court should have

chosen his alternative option to divide the business entities between

the parties. And neither party disputes the court’s calculation of

income or its maintenance award.)

II. Applicable Law & Standard of Review

¶ 10 The district court has great latitude to fashion an equitable

distribution of marital property based on the unique facts and

circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28,

35 (Colo. 2001); § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025. “[A]n appellate court

4 must not disturb the delicate balance achieved by the [district]

court in division of property . . . unless there has been a clear abuse

of discretion.” In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 538 (Colo.

1995). A court abuses its discretion only when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. In re Marriage of

Gromicko, 2017 CO 1, ¶ 18. Credibility determinations; the weight,

probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence; and the inferences

and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are matters within

the district court’s sole discretion. In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d

204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003).

III. Analysis

¶ 11 Husband argues that allocating the businesses solely to him

while requiring him to make a substantial equalization payment to

wife is inequitable and overly burdensome to him. We perceive no

abuse of discretion.

A. The District Court’s Findings

¶ 12 In valuing and allocating the businesses, the district court

thoughtfully considered legal risks to the businesses, wife’s

involvement in business operations, the businesses’ bookkeeping

procedures, and the implications associated with a potential sale.

5 ¶ 13 Multiple experts opined about the value of the businesses and

testified about various factors that justified a reduction in value for

Chedda’s and Patriot due to a lack of marketability (marketability

discount). These factors included (1) a reduced buyer pool due to

the legal and regulatory risks associated with gaming businesses,

along with the specific software the businesses used; (2) a limited

pool of buyers interested in skill-based gaming generally; (3) the

likely need to find a buyer who could pay cash due to banking

difficulties; and (4) earnings volatility. The court credited this

testimony and applied a 10 percent marketability discount to

Chedda’s and Patriot.

¶ 14 Regarding wife’s involvement in the three businesses, the

court made the following findings:

• It is “compelling” that wife was never on the payroll for

either of the Chedda’s locations and was not involved in

the “complicated accounting structure of the business.”

• Wife “lack[ed] operational knowledge of how the

businesses are run.”

6 • Wife “testified credibly that her role in the businesses

was to run errands, pick up supplies, [and] train

employees.”

• Wife “does not know how the games work, nor does [she]

have any idea how to fix the game machines if they

ceased working.”

¶ 15 The court also credited testimony from multiple experts that

the businesses’ financial records are “messy,” particularly because

the parties’ personal and business expenses are significantly

“intermingled.”

¶ 16 Finally, the court made the following findings regarding

husband’s proposal to maintain the existing business ownership

structure and order a sale:

• Husband’s proposal for the parties to jointly sell the

businesses would “intertwine[] the parties for an

indefinite period of time and require[] continued contact

between [h]usband and [w]ife.”

• Preparing for a sale would require “immediate substantial

changes in [financial] operations.”

7 • There would likely “need to be a mechanism for oversight

and possibly further court orders to supervise the sale of

the” businesses.

• “Husband has significant operational knowledge that he,

alone, holds in relation to this unique business”; thus, he

“is the only one who is in position to negotiate with a

potential buyer, and [w]ife would be totally reliant on

[h]usband during the sale of the business.”

B. The Court Didn’t Abuse its Discretion

¶ 17 Husband argues that the court abused its discretion by

allocating the businesses (and the inherent risks involved) to him

when neither party wanted to keep the businesses. We disagree for

four reasons.

¶ 18 First, the findings described above are supported by the record

and reflect reasoned consideration of expert testimony regarding the

disadvantages of ordering a sale of the businesses. The district

court noted several sound reasons for declining to order a sale,

including that a sale would disadvantage wife due to her lack of

knowledge about the business and would leave the parties

financially intertwined for an indefinite (and possibly lengthy) time.

8 See In re Marriage of Paul, 821 P.2d 925, 927 (Colo. App. 1991) (it is

generally improper to continue joint ownership of a marital asset

such as a continuing business operations because it is contrary to

“the public policy of discouraging continued litigation and ongoing

financial interaction between divorced spouses”).

¶ 19 Second, the district court discredited husband’s testimony

that he wanted to sell the businesses because husband had

continued to operate the businesses for nine years despite learning

about potential criminal and civil risks as early as 2015. We can’t

disturb that determination. See In re Marriage of Thornburn, 2022

COA 80, ¶ 49 (determining witness credibility is the district court’s

sole province). We also note that husband gave the court an

alternative proposal whereby he would continue operating some of

the businesses while wife would operate another.

¶ 20 Third, to the extent that husband argues that the allocation of

the risks associated with the businesses is inequitable to him, the

court accounted for those risks by applying the 10 percent

marketability discount to the value of the businesses. This

discount rate is supported by expert testimony, and husband

doesn’t appeal the court’s valuation.

9 ¶ 21 Fourth, the district court noted, and we agree, that allocating

the businesses to husband doesn’t prevent him from selling them if

he so chooses. In fact, at least one expert testified that it would be

easier for husband to sell the businesses as the sole owner than it

would be if he continued to co-own them with wife.

¶ 22 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court didn’t

abuse its discretion by allocating the businesses to husband. See

Hunt, 909 P.2d at 538.

IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 23 Wife asks for her appellate attorney fees under section

14-10-119, based on the disparity in the parties’ financial

resources. See In re Marriage of Gutfreund, 148 P.3d 136, 141

(Colo. 2006) (“Section 14-10-119 empowers the [district] court to

equitably apportion costs and fees between parties based on relative

ability to pay.”).

¶ 24 Because the district court is better situated than we are to

determine the factual issues regarding parties’ current financial

resources, we exercise our discretion and remand wife’s request to

the district court. C.A.R. 39.1; see In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019

COA 97, ¶ 30.

10 V. Disposition

¶ 25 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to

determine wife’s section 14-10-119 appellate attorney fees request.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.