25CA0277 Marriage of Fazzi 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0277 Mesa County District Court No. 23DR194 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Marielle Michelle Fazzi n/k/a Marielle Michelle Hylton,
Appellee,
and
Shane Allen Fazzi,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
JVAM PLLC, Ann Jefferson, Quentin H. Morse, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Kanthaka Group, John M. Scorsine, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Shane Allen Fazzi (husband) appeals the district court’s
division of marital property entered in connection with the
dissolution of his marriage to Marielle Michelle Fazzi, now known as
Marielle Michelle Hylton (wife). We reverse the court’s division of
marital property and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 Husband and wife were married for about twelve years and
share two children. Husband and his business partner, Colin
Dutton, formed LuckyShot, LLC, and LuckyShot Holdings, LLC
(collectively, the LLCs), during husband and wife’s marriage. Before
the entry of permanent orders, husband owned 50% of the LLCs,
while Dutton owned the other 50%.
¶3 The district court held a permanent orders hearing and
entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage. The court took
the case under advisement and subsequently entered permanent
orders regarding financial matters in early January 2025
(permanent orders).
¶4 The court found, and the parties don’t dispute, that husband’s
50% interest in the LLCs was marital property. The court further
found that “it [was] equitable to award each of the parties one-half
1 (50%) of the marital interest in [the LLCs], meaning each would be a
25% owner and Mr. Dutton would be a 50% owner.”
¶5 Based on the historical monthly distributions that husband
received from the LLCs — typically $8,000 — the court concluded
that “each party should . . . receive one-half of the monthly income
from the business (currently each would receive $4,000 per month
from the business as well as their share of other financial benefits
that the business currently provides to them, including in-kind
payments).”
¶6 On February 17, husband filed a notice of appeal in which he
challenged portions of the court’s financial orders regarding the
LLCs. On February 21, wife filed a motion under C.R.C.P. 60
asking the court to make her a managing partner of the LLCs.1 Five
days later, the court granted wife’s Rule 60 motion and amended
the permanent orders (amended orders).
1 Husband didn’t supplement the record with any filings or orders
entered in the district court after February 14. Because our review of wife’s C.R.C.P. 60 motion and the court’s related ruling are necessary to explain the procedural posture of this case, we take judicial notice of Mesa County Court Case No. 23DR194. See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (appellate courts can judicially notice the contents of relevant, related court records).
2 ¶7 In his appeal, husband contends that the court erred by
(1) ruling on wife’s Rule 60(b) motion when it lacked jurisdiction to
do so; (2) ordering that wife be made a 25% owner of the LLCs; and
(3) ordering that wife receive specified financial distributions from
the LLCs.
¶8 As an initial matter, we note that we lack jurisdiction to
consider the merits of husband’s first contention. Husband filed
his notice of appeal before the court issued the amended orders.
Because he didn’t file an amended notice of appeal, his challenge to
the amended orders isn’t properly before us. See In re Estate of
Anderson, 727 P.2d 867, 869-70 (Colo. App. 1986) (notice of appeal
wasn’t effective to initiate the appeal of an order entered after the
notice was filed). Although we don’t have jurisdiction over the
amended orders, we nonetheless clarify for the court and the
parties on remand that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the amended orders. See Molitor v. Anderson, 795 P.2d 266, 269
(Colo. 1990) (after a party files a notice of appeal, the district court
no longer has authority to consider a Rule 60(b) motion when the
relief sought would substantially affect the judgment subject to that
appeal).
3 ¶9 Therefore, the permanent orders are the orders that are
subject to this appeal. We now consider husband’s remaining
contentions.
II. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 10 A district court has great latitude in equitably dividing a
marital estate in such proportions as it deems just. See
§ 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA
42M, ¶ 28. Before dividing a marital estate, a court must determine
whether an asset is marital or separate. § 14-10-113(1); In re
Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9. And then it must value
marital property as of the date of the hearing on the disposition of
property. § 14-10-113(5); see In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d
28, 36 (Colo. 2001). Subject to certain exceptions not applicable
here, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed
marital. § 14-10-113(2), (3); see In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024
COA 103M, ¶ 10.
¶ 11 Absent a showing that the court abused its discretion, we
won’t disturb a court’s equitable division of a marital estate.
Medeiros, ¶ 28. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
4 manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or a misapplication of
the law.” Id.
III. The Court Erred When It Divided the Marital Estate
¶ 12 Husband argues that the court abused its discretion when it
dictated the distribution of the LLCs’ income because it didn’t have
personal jurisdiction over the LLCs or Dutton. Wife argues that
because husband acquired his interests in the LLCs during the
marriage, the court correctly concluded that husband’s interests
were marital and the court could therefore transfer half of those
interests to her.
¶ 13 We agree with wife that the court correctly categorized
husband’s interests as marital and could transfer half of those
interests to her; however, we agree with husband that the court’s
order directing specific income distributions from the LLCs was
erroneous.2
2 Because we conclude that the court erred when it determined the
LLCs’ income distribution, we need not consider husband’s argument about whether the court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the LLCs or his reliance on Littell v. Bridges, 2023 ME 29, a nonbinding case from Maine.
5 ¶ 14 Husband doesn’t dispute that his 50% interest in the LLCs is
marital. However, he argues that the court couldn’t “simply direct
the transfer of one-half share of the [LLCs’] holdings” to wife without
considering the LLCs’ operating agreements. While this may be
true, husband doesn’t cite any portion of the record that contains
an operating agreement for either LLC. Indeed, husband
acknowledges that there was “scant” reference to the operating
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25CA0277 Marriage of Fazzi 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0277 Mesa County District Court No. 23DR194 Honorable Brian J. Flynn, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Marielle Michelle Fazzi n/k/a Marielle Michelle Hylton,
Appellee,
and
Shane Allen Fazzi,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
JVAM PLLC, Ann Jefferson, Quentin H. Morse, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Kanthaka Group, John M. Scorsine, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Shane Allen Fazzi (husband) appeals the district court’s
division of marital property entered in connection with the
dissolution of his marriage to Marielle Michelle Fazzi, now known as
Marielle Michelle Hylton (wife). We reverse the court’s division of
marital property and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 Husband and wife were married for about twelve years and
share two children. Husband and his business partner, Colin
Dutton, formed LuckyShot, LLC, and LuckyShot Holdings, LLC
(collectively, the LLCs), during husband and wife’s marriage. Before
the entry of permanent orders, husband owned 50% of the LLCs,
while Dutton owned the other 50%.
¶3 The district court held a permanent orders hearing and
entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage. The court took
the case under advisement and subsequently entered permanent
orders regarding financial matters in early January 2025
(permanent orders).
¶4 The court found, and the parties don’t dispute, that husband’s
50% interest in the LLCs was marital property. The court further
found that “it [was] equitable to award each of the parties one-half
1 (50%) of the marital interest in [the LLCs], meaning each would be a
25% owner and Mr. Dutton would be a 50% owner.”
¶5 Based on the historical monthly distributions that husband
received from the LLCs — typically $8,000 — the court concluded
that “each party should . . . receive one-half of the monthly income
from the business (currently each would receive $4,000 per month
from the business as well as their share of other financial benefits
that the business currently provides to them, including in-kind
payments).”
¶6 On February 17, husband filed a notice of appeal in which he
challenged portions of the court’s financial orders regarding the
LLCs. On February 21, wife filed a motion under C.R.C.P. 60
asking the court to make her a managing partner of the LLCs.1 Five
days later, the court granted wife’s Rule 60 motion and amended
the permanent orders (amended orders).
1 Husband didn’t supplement the record with any filings or orders
entered in the district court after February 14. Because our review of wife’s C.R.C.P. 60 motion and the court’s related ruling are necessary to explain the procedural posture of this case, we take judicial notice of Mesa County Court Case No. 23DR194. See Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (appellate courts can judicially notice the contents of relevant, related court records).
2 ¶7 In his appeal, husband contends that the court erred by
(1) ruling on wife’s Rule 60(b) motion when it lacked jurisdiction to
do so; (2) ordering that wife be made a 25% owner of the LLCs; and
(3) ordering that wife receive specified financial distributions from
the LLCs.
¶8 As an initial matter, we note that we lack jurisdiction to
consider the merits of husband’s first contention. Husband filed
his notice of appeal before the court issued the amended orders.
Because he didn’t file an amended notice of appeal, his challenge to
the amended orders isn’t properly before us. See In re Estate of
Anderson, 727 P.2d 867, 869-70 (Colo. App. 1986) (notice of appeal
wasn’t effective to initiate the appeal of an order entered after the
notice was filed). Although we don’t have jurisdiction over the
amended orders, we nonetheless clarify for the court and the
parties on remand that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the amended orders. See Molitor v. Anderson, 795 P.2d 266, 269
(Colo. 1990) (after a party files a notice of appeal, the district court
no longer has authority to consider a Rule 60(b) motion when the
relief sought would substantially affect the judgment subject to that
appeal).
3 ¶9 Therefore, the permanent orders are the orders that are
subject to this appeal. We now consider husband’s remaining
contentions.
II. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 10 A district court has great latitude in equitably dividing a
marital estate in such proportions as it deems just. See
§ 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA
42M, ¶ 28. Before dividing a marital estate, a court must determine
whether an asset is marital or separate. § 14-10-113(1); In re
Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9. And then it must value
marital property as of the date of the hearing on the disposition of
property. § 14-10-113(5); see In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d
28, 36 (Colo. 2001). Subject to certain exceptions not applicable
here, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed
marital. § 14-10-113(2), (3); see In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024
COA 103M, ¶ 10.
¶ 11 Absent a showing that the court abused its discretion, we
won’t disturb a court’s equitable division of a marital estate.
Medeiros, ¶ 28. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
4 manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or a misapplication of
the law.” Id.
III. The Court Erred When It Divided the Marital Estate
¶ 12 Husband argues that the court abused its discretion when it
dictated the distribution of the LLCs’ income because it didn’t have
personal jurisdiction over the LLCs or Dutton. Wife argues that
because husband acquired his interests in the LLCs during the
marriage, the court correctly concluded that husband’s interests
were marital and the court could therefore transfer half of those
interests to her.
¶ 13 We agree with wife that the court correctly categorized
husband’s interests as marital and could transfer half of those
interests to her; however, we agree with husband that the court’s
order directing specific income distributions from the LLCs was
erroneous.2
2 Because we conclude that the court erred when it determined the
LLCs’ income distribution, we need not consider husband’s argument about whether the court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the LLCs or his reliance on Littell v. Bridges, 2023 ME 29, a nonbinding case from Maine.
5 ¶ 14 Husband doesn’t dispute that his 50% interest in the LLCs is
marital. However, he argues that the court couldn’t “simply direct
the transfer of one-half share of the [LLCs’] holdings” to wife without
considering the LLCs’ operating agreements. While this may be
true, husband doesn’t cite any portion of the record that contains
an operating agreement for either LLC. Indeed, husband
acknowledges that there was “scant” reference to the operating
agreements for the LLCs, and neither party introduced the
agreements.3 See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (appellant must provide
citations to the parts of the record on which the appellant relies);
see also Condo v. Conners, 266 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Colo. 2011)
(noting that while an ownership interest in an LLC is normally
treated as assignable personal property, this general rule may be
abrogated by the express terms of an LLC’s operating agreement).
Thus, the district court didn’t consider the LLCs’ operating
agreements.
3 In a footnote, counsel acknowledges that the record doesn’t
contain the operating agreements for either LLC. This footnote’s text, like all footnotes in husband’s briefing, is in a typeface less than 14-point. This violates C.A.R. 32(a)(1)’s requirement that typeface in briefs “must be 14-point or larger, including footnotes.” We trust counsel will adhere to this rule in the future.
6 ¶ 15 Regardless, the court equally divided husband’s 50% interest
in the LLCs between the parties to give husband and wife each a
25% interest. It concluded that “each party should then receive
one-half of the monthly income from [the LLCs],” which included
in-kind payments.
¶ 16 But absent circumstances not present here — such as when a
court issues a charging order or judicially dissolves an LLC — a
court can’t compel an LLC to distribute income. See JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. v. McClure, 2017 CO 22, ¶ 15 (a charging order
allows a judgment creditor to receive a debtor-LLC member’s right
to profits and distributions from the LLC); Gagne v. Gagne, 2019
COA 42, ¶ 44 (permitting a court to order in-kind distributions from
an LLC “in the event of a judicial dissolution and winding up of the
company”). Rather, distributions from an LLC are limited to its
members as stated in the LLC’s records, § 7-80-504, C.R.S. 2025,
and there’s no information suggesting wife was a member of the
LLCs.
¶ 17 Moreover, by allocating each party a 25% interest in the LLCs,
the court kept the parties financially entangled by ordering them to
share interests in the businesses, which is contrary to public policy.
7 See In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 49 (Colo. App. 1993) (“It is
generally improper to continue [joint ownership] between the
parties, as contrary to the public policy of discouraging continued
litigation and ongoing financial interaction between divorced
spouses.”). For these reasons, the court erred when it divided the
marital estate. See Medeiros, ¶ 28. Accordingly, we remand for the
court to reconsider its division of the marital property.
¶ 18 When the court reconsiders its equitable distribution of the
marital estate on remand, it should ensure that the parties don’t
continue any joint ownership of marital assets. See Simon, 856
P.2d at 49. The court must also reevaluate maintenance and child
support based on the court’s reconsideration of the property
division and the parties’ current financial circumstances. See
§ 14-10-113(1)(c); In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 26
(maintenance); see also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
M.G.C.-G., 228 P.3d 271, 273 (Colo. App. 2010) (child support). The
court may exercise its discretion to determine whether additional
proceedings or an evidentiary hearing is necessary. See In re
Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 85.
8 IV. Disposition
¶ 19 The portion of the judgment concerning the marital property
division is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Those portions of the
judgment not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.