25CA0895 Marriage of Edwards 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0895 El Paso County District Court No. 22DR30884 Honorable Jill Brady, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Dillon L. Edwards,
Appellant,
and
Michaela Edwards n/k/a Michaela Timney,
Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
Thomas Law Group, P.C., Sergei B. Thomas, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Dillon L.
Edwards (father) and Michaela Edwards, now known as Michaela
Timney (mother), father appeals the denial of his motion concerning
parenting time disputes under section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025.
We dismiss the appeal in part and otherwise affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 In March 2023, the district court entered a decree dissolving
the parties’ marriage. At that time, the court named mother the
primary residential parent of the parties’ only child, who was then a
toddler. Given father’s mental health struggles and his “very
serious” problems with alcohol, the court established a graduated
parenting time for him:
• Supervised Parenting Time: For the first four weeks, father
could exercise two supervised visits per week, each lasting
four hours. If the parties agreed on an individual
supervisor, they could use that person. If not, supervision
was to occur at the Court Appointed Special Advocates
(CASA) facility. Father had to take two ethyl glucuronide
(EtG) tests each week and submit clean results.
1 • Phase I: After four weeks of clean EtG tests and four weeks
of supervised parenting time, father could exercise
unsupervised parenting time on Fridays and Saturdays for
four hours each day, with continued testing.1
• Phase II: With another month of clean results, father’s
parenting time would increase to eight hours each Friday
and Saturday, with continued testing. He was required to
return to Phase I if he had a positive or diluted test.
• Phase III: Following another month of clean results, father
could exercise overnight parenting time on the first, second,
and fourth weekends of each month. If he submitted clean
results for a month after beginning overnights, he no longer
needed to test.2
• Father had to abstain from alcohol or marijuana during his
parenting time and for the twelve hours preceding it.
1 Although “Phase I” was clearly a second phase of parenting time, it
was the first phase of unsupervised parenting time and mirrored “Phase One” of the temporary orders the district court entered on October 4, 2022, and repeatedly cross-referenced in the 2023 order. 2 In the 2023 order, the court erroneously dubbed this “Phase IV.”
In its oral ruling on father’s parenting time disputes motion, the court recognized that it should have called this part of the parenting plan Phase III.
2 • Father was permitted fifteen-minute video calls with the
child on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, between 6:30
p.m. and 7:30 p.m. He would notify mother when he was
ready to start the call, and she would initiate it. Calls were
not to occur on days when he had parenting time.
The court also found that father committed domestic violence
against mother during the marriage.
¶3 In July 2024, father filed a motion concerning parenting time
disputes under section 14-10-129.5. He alleged that mother had
prevented him from advancing through the parenting plan by
refusing to complete the registration for supervised parenting time
at a facility called Teresa’s Place. He had tested negative for alcohol
for four consecutive weeks. And although he acknowledged positive
marijuana results, he asserted that he did not consume it during
his parenting time or for twelve hours beforehand.
¶4 In March 2025, the district court held an evidentiary hearing.
The court credited mother’s testimony over father’s and concluded
that she had not violated the supervision and video call provisions
of the 2023 order. The court found that the parties did not agree on
an individual supervisor and that father failed to utilize the CASA
3 facility, the “backup” option. The court also found that all but two
disputed video calls had occurred consistent with the 2023 order.
The court nevertheless declined to assign blame to mother for those
two calls, reasoning that while she did not respond to father’s
messages seeking to initiate them, he failed to prove that she had
not made the calls.
¶5 The district court then noted that supervised parenting time
had recently begun at Teresa’s Place; father had not tested in June,
November, or December of 2023 and later stopped testing
altogether; and father had positive test results for marijuana. As a
result, the court “clarified” the 2023 order:
• Father would have four more supervised visits at Teresa’s
Place, while undergoing EtG testing.
• After four weeks of clean results and supervised visits,
father would have unsupervised parenting time on Fridays
and Saturdays for four hours each day, with continued
testing.
• After another month of clean results, father’s unsupervised
parenting time on Fridays and Saturdays would increase to
eight hours each day, with continued testing.
4 • Following another month of clean results, father would
move to overnights on the first, second, and fourth
weekends of each month.
• If father tested positive for alcohol or marijuana or
submitted diluted results before the start of overnights, he
would be required to restart the process from the first phase
with supervised visitation at Teresa’s place.
¶6 After reiterating its previous domestic violence finding, citing
father’s online threats and name-calling toward mother, and
crediting mother’s testimony about her safety concerns, the court
ordered that mother did not have to disclose her residential address
and that all parenting time exchanges would occur at a police
station.
II. Motion Concerning Parenting Time Disputes
¶7 Father contends that the district court erred by
(1) determining that mother did not violate the 2023 order;
(2) failing to sanction mother for her violations or award father his
attorney fees; and (3) modifying the existing parenting time orders.
We are not persuaded.
5 A. Law Governing Parenting Time Disputes
¶8 Section 14-10-129.5(1) allows a party to file a motion with the
district court when the other party is not complying with an existing
parenting time order. The court must determine whether there has
been or is likely to be “substantial or continuing noncompliance.”
Id. If, after a hearing, the court finds that a party has not complied
with the parenting time order, it shall issue remedial orders,
including attorney fees. § 14-10-129.5(2), (4).
¶9 The district court’s discretion over parenting time matters is
broad, and we presume its decision is correct if it is supported by
competent evidence in the record. In re Marriage of Badawiyeh,
2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies
the law or acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable
manner. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 45.
B. Supervised Visitation
¶ 10 Father contends that the district court erred by determining
that mother did not violate the portion of the 2023 order allowing
him supervised visitation. We disagree.
¶ 11 At the hearing, father argued that mother failed to comply with
the 2023 order because she did not timely complete the required
6 registration for supervised parenting time at Teresa’s Place. But the
court interpreted its prior order to mean that father had two paths
to start supervised parenting time: (1) using a mutually agreeable
individual supervisor; or (2) using the CASA facility. Because the
parties were not required to agree on a supervisor, and father did
not utilize the CASA facility, the court determined that mother’s
delayed registration at Teresa’s Place, a facility not specified in the
plan, did not violate the order. The court further found that father
did not comply with the EtG testing, had positive results for
marijuana, and stopped testing altogether.
¶ 12 The record supports the court’s findings and ultimate
determination. Both parties indicated that they could not agree on
a permanent individual parenting time supervisor. Father testified
that he understood that the CASA facility was the fallback option
under the 2023 order. He said that the facility would not allow him
to register without a “new decree.” Mother countered that father
chose not to go to the CASA facility because he did not want to
make the long drive from Pueblo, where the parties lived, to
Colorado Springs, where the facility was located.
7 ¶ 13 Father testified that he learned of Teresa’s Place from his
therapist in June 2023. Although he immediately asked mother to
complete the registration, she delayed doing so until February
2025. Mother explained, which the court credited, that the facility
could not accommodate her work schedule or the child’s school
schedule and that the facility did not have weekend supervision
until February 2025. Additionally, the record indicates that father
was not compliant with the EtG testing requirements and had
tested positive for marijuana several times.
¶ 14 Citing some of the exhibits admitted at the hearing, father
argues that the district court “failed to address . . . uncontroverted
testimony or make any findings regarding [m]other’s clear and
repeated noncompliance with the court-ordered supervised
visitation arrangements.” But the evidence was controverted. And
we decline his invitation to reweigh it in his favor and substitute
our judgment for that of the district court. See In re Marriage of
Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to
determine the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the
evidence and any inferences and conclusions to be drawn
therefrom); In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When
8 reviewing for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence
in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”); see
also In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21 (an appellate
court may presume that the district court considered all of the
evidence admitted); In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424
(Colo. App. 2007) (“The [district] court can believe all, part, or none
of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted . . . .”).3
¶ 15 Father also asserts that mother violated the parenting time
order by refusing to allow him unsupervised visits after he
demonstrated four consecutive weeks of clean test results. In his
view of the 2023 order, he was entitled to transition to Phase I
unsupervised parenting time following four weeks of clean tests —
whether or not he exercised four weeks of supervised parenting
3 Father also argues that mother violated section 14-10-131(2),
C.R.S. 2025, by “modifying the parenting time absent a court order.” But he does not tell us why the statute governing modifications of decision-making responsibility applies to this section 14-10-129.5, C.R.S. 2025, proceeding. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12. So, we will not address the argument. See id.
9 time. But that is not what the 2023 order required. Rather, the
2023 order required that father “complete the [s]tipulation filed on
October 26, 2022[,] before moving onto Phase I of parenting time.”
And the October 2022 stipulation clearly provided that “[a]fter [four]
consecutive weeks of clean ETG tests and [four] weeks of supervised
visits . . . [father] will resume” Phase I parenting time. (Emphasis
added.)4 Father never completed four weeks of supervised visits, so
he was not entitled to unsupervised visits. As a result, mother did
not violate the 2023 order as alleged.
¶ 16 On this record, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its broad discretion by determining that father failed to prove
that mother’s conduct violated the order. See Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.
4 We acknowledge that the 2023 order restated only some of the
terms of the October 2022 stipulation, providing that “[f]ollowing [four] weeks of clean ETG tests, [father] may move to Phase I” parenting time. But the 2023 order clearly incorporated the October 2022 stipulation. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation is that father was required to demonstrate four weeks of clean tests and complete four weeks of supervised parenting time before proceeding to unsupervised parenting time.
10 C. Video Calls
¶ 17 Next, father contends that the district court should have
determined that mother violated the portion of the 2023 order
authorizing him to have video calls with the child. We disagree.
¶ 18 To begin, father says that mother’s pattern of noncompliance
and denial of video calls were made “abundantly clear” in Exhibit
10, which purportedly shows their online communications from
August 18, 2022, through February 2025. But we will not scour
the exhibit in search of evidence supporting his claims for which he
provides no specific citations. See Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA
66, ¶ 10 (an appellate court will not comb the record for facts to
support undeveloped arguments); O’Quinn v. Baca, 250 P.3d 629,
631-32 (Colo. App. 2010) (parties should not expect an appellate
court to peruse the record without the help of pinpoint citations).
¶ 19 Of the specific communications father identifies, the February
27, 2023, message predates the permanent orders mother was
alleged to have violated. And neither that message nor the
December 20, 2024, message appear in the part of Exhibit 10 we
have in the appellate record. It is father’s responsibility, as the
appellant, to provide us with a complete record showing the
11 asserted errors. See People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo.
1989). The missing parts of the record are significant because we
must presume they support the district court’s findings and
conclusions. See Love v. Klosky, 2016 COA 131, ¶ 18, aff’d on other
grounds, 2018 CO 20.
¶ 20 Father also points to an exchange from Friday, October 20,
2023, which does appear in Exhibit 10. At 6:30 p.m., father
checked with mother to see if the child was available, and she
responded that they were at a birthday party. At 10:25 p.m., she
informed him that they had just gotten home and asked whether he
wanted to call then or wait until tomorrow. About fifteen minutes
later, he asked if they were still awake. The exchange ended there.
¶ 21 The district court did not hear any evidence of that exchange
at the hearing, nor did the court address it in the 2025 order.
Regardless, the record supports the court’s conclusion that father
did not meet his burden. Although the exhibit establishes that
mother did not respond to father’s last question, the 2023 order
does not require mother to respond to father’s messages; rather, it
provides that “[f]ather will send a message through the parenting
app . . . when he is ready to begin the call, and then [m]other shall
12 initiate the call to [f]ather.” Consequently, the absence of a
response from mother to father’s communication does not prove
that mother never made that video call.
¶ 22 But even assuming there were three missed calls over about
two-and-a-half years, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s determination that there was no “substantial or
continuing noncompliance” under section 14-10-129.5(1).5
D. Sanctions and Attorney Fees
¶ 23 Because we affirm the district court’s order concluding that
mother did not violate the 2023 order, it follows that the court did
not err by declining to sanction mother under section
14-10-129.5(2) or award father attorney fees under section
14-10-129.5(4).
E. Unpreserved Contentions
¶ 24 Father contends that the district court applied the wrong legal
standard under In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 23, by
failing to make findings about mother’s “good faith or ability to
5 To the extent father contends that the district court erred by not
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard from section 13-25-127, C.R.S. 2025, he fails to develop the argument, so we decline to address it. See Zander, ¶ 27.
13 comply” with the 2023 order. We do not address the contention for
two reasons. First, he did not raise this issue in the district court,
so it is not preserved for our review. See Pawelec, ¶ 38 (declining to
review as unpreserved an issue that was never raised before or
decided by the district court). Second, even if preserved, he does
not explain how Dean, which addressed remedial contempt, applies
in a section 14-10-129.5 proceeding. See Zander, ¶ 27; see also
Cikraji, ¶ 10.
¶ 25 Likewise, because father never raised it in the district court,
we will not consider his contention that mother’s “repeated refusal
to comply with court-ordered visitation and communication”
interfered with his fundamental liberty interest in the child. See
Pawelec, ¶ 38; see also McGihon v. Cave, 2016 COA 78, ¶ 16
(appellate court does not consider constitutional issues raised for
the first time on appeal).
F. Alleged Modifications to the Parenting Time Orders
¶ 26 Father contends that the district court improperly modified the
2023 order by (1) doing so in the absence of a motion to modify or a
finding of endangerment; (2) removing the parties’ ability to agree
on a supervisor; (3) requiring all supervised visits to occur only at
14 Teresa’s Place (even though that was the facility he had asked for);
(4) imposing a “rigid, time-based progression” for his parenting
time; (5) requiring that any diluted or failed EtG test before
unsupervised parenting time would restart the process; and
(6) compelling him to send all test results directly to mother’s
attorney.6 After briefing, this court issued a show cause order
directing father to explain why this appeal should not be dismissed,
in whole or in part, as moot. By then, significant time had passed
since the district court entered its order, and the supervision and
testing requirements appeared to have expired. In response, father
represented that he was currently exercising unsupervised
parenting time but maintained that the appeal was not moot.
¶ 27 An issue is moot when the relief requested, if granted, would
have no practical effect on an existing controversy. See In re
Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶ 21. An appellate court will
not render an opinion on the merits of an issue when later events
have rendered the issue moot. In re Parental Responsibilities
6 To the extent father contends that the district court’s alleged
modification of the parenting time orders denied him due process, he does not develop the argument, so we will not address it. See Zander, ¶ 27.
15 Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 50; see In re Marriage of Salby,
126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005) (original parenting time orders
deemed moot when they were superseded by later modified orders).
¶ 28 Father is now in the final, unsupervised phase of the 2025
order and is no longer subject to testing or supervision
requirements. Because any order disposing of those challenged
“modifications” would have no practical effect, we dismiss this part
of his appeal as moot. See Thomas, ¶ 21; see also S.Z.S., ¶ 50.
¶ 29 Father also contends that the court improperly modified the
2023 order by requiring all parenting time exchanges to take place
at a police station. We conclude that he invited any error.
¶ 30 The doctrine of invited error precludes a party from appealing
an error that the party invited or injected into the case. In re
Marriage of O'Connor, 2023 COA 35, ¶ 24. At the end of the district
court’s oral ruling, father’s counsel said, “[The parties are] going to
have to be doing [parenting time] exchanges. We probably need,
like, some address or at least some suggestion, picking up at the
party’s homes or wherever that goes, but without an address, that’s
not gonna be possible.” The court asked where the exchanges
should occur, and father’s counsel suggested the police station. By
16 proposing the police station as the location for parenting time
exchanges, father cannot now complain that the court erred by
ordering exchanges to occur at the police station. See id.
¶ 31 Finally, father contends that the court erred by allowing
mother to refrain from disclosing her residential address. To the
extent father argues this was a modification of the 2023 order, we
disagree. As best we can tell, mother had not been previously
ordered to disclose her address, so the court’s order merely
maintained the status quo. And besides arguing that this part of
the court’s order amounted to a modification, father fails to explain
why, or cite any supporting authority demonstrating that, the
court’s order was erroneous. Notably, the court found, and the
record supports, that mother was a victim of father’s domestic
violence during the marriage and that she still had safety concerns.
Thus, we perceive no error.
III. Disposition
¶ 32 We dismiss the part of father’s appeal challenging the district
court’s alleged modification of the existing parenting time orders
regarding supervision and testing. We otherwise affirm.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.