25CA0507 Marriage of Deyo 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0507 El Paso County District Court No. 24DR803 Honorable Sarah Zane, Judge
In re the Marriage of Rachel Deyo, Appellee and Cross Appellant, and Andrew Deyo, Appellant and Cross Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
Harrison Family Law, PC, Bridgette D. Harrison, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross Appellant
Mark Anthony Law, Mark Anthony Barrionuevo, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Rachel Deyo (wife) and Andrew Deyo (husband), husband appeals those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital property division and maintenance. Wife cross-appeals those portions of the permanent orders concerning child support and life insurance. Husband also appeals the judgment that imposed punitive and remedial contempt sanctions against him. We reverse the marital property division, maintenance, and child support. We agree the court improperly imposed remedial contempt sanctions and therefore reverse that portion of the contempt judgment. We affirm the remainder of the contempt judgment. We remand the case for further proceedings and for the district court to address wife’s requests for life insurance and appellate attorney fees.
I. Background
¶2 In April 2024, after the parties had been separated for some time, wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage of nearly eight years. The district court entered temporary orders requiring husband to pay wife $10,000 per month in temporary maintenance. The court also ordered husband to continue paying the mortgage
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associated with wife’s home but permitted him to reduce the maintenance payment by the amount of the mortgage.
¶3 In early 2025, wife sought an order of remedial and punitive contempt against husband for his failure to pay the mortgage associated with her home. The district court held a combined hearing on permanent orders and wife’s motion for contempt.
¶4 As part of its permanent orders, the district court equally divided the parties’ marital estate, which the court valued at approximately $445,000. The court included approximately $140,000 in dissipated assets to husband, finding that husband had dissipated marital assets by remodeling his own home and incurring additional debt against wife’s home.
¶5 As to wife’s contempt motion, the district court found husband in remedial and punitive contempt related to the payment of the mortgage on wife’s home. The court found that although husband had been ordered to pay the mortgage, which was a uniquely structured home equity line of credit (HELOC), husband instead allowed the HELOC to pay itself by automatically drawing down the line of credit to make the interest-only payments on the loan. As a remedial sanction, the court ordered husband to pay wife the sum
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of $16,608.57, representing the HELOC payments that he should have made, or be jailed until he paid said amount. The court also fined husband $1,500 as a punitive sanction.
¶6 The court awarded wife monthly maintenance of $9,000 for an initial six months, $7,500 for the next twelve months, and $6,000 for an additional seventy-six months. Following the maintenance schedule, the court also awarded wife $2,199, $2,401, and $2,605 per month in child support.
II. Marital Property Division
¶7 Husband challenges the marital property division on multiple grounds. Because we agree that the district court erred when valuing and allocating husband’s vehicle, we reverse the marital property division and remand for further proceedings.
A. Standards of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 Upon dissolution, a district court must divide the marital property in a way that is just and equitable, although such a division need not be equal. See § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 556 (Colo. App. 2001). The court enjoys broad discretion in fashioning an equitable division of marital property. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo.
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2001). A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5; cf. In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (Even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”).
¶9 While a court may not consider marital fault in dividing the marital estate, it may consider economic fault, which occurs when a spouse dissipates marital assets in contemplation of dissolution. In re Marriage of Hunt, 909 P.2d 525, 542-43 (Colo. 1995).
¶ 10 To prevent marital dissipation, an automatic temporary injunction, activated when the petition is served on the other spouse, prohibits both parties “from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any way disposing of, without the consent of the other party or an order of the court, any marital property, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life . . . .” § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2025. The temporary injunction remains in effect until the final entry of the decree, or until further order of the court. § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I). Whether a party has
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violated the injunction or otherwise dissipated marital assets is a factual question for the district court to determine, see In re Marriage of Martinez, 77 P.3d 827, 830-31 (Colo. App. 2003), meaning we defer to the district court’s finding on those issues if the record supports it. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.
B. Dissipation Involving Husband’s Remodel of his Home
¶ 11 We first consider and reject husband’s contention that the district court erred when it found that he dissipated funds associated with the remodel of his home and allocated those dissipated funds to him on the marital spreadsheet.
¶ 12 At the time of the permanent orders hearing, husband was living in a home valued at roughly $1.1 million that he had purchased several months before the parties’ separation. The district court found that, shortly before wife petitioned for dissolution and without wife’s consent, husband began an extensive remodel of the home that ultimately consumed over $160,000 in marital funds, charged primarily to husband’s American Express card (AMEX). The court further found that the remodel was solely for husband’s benefit and observed that husband had not even
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attempted to justify the remodel, as he had provided no evidence that the remodel was necessary.
¶ 13 Accordingly, the district court found that husband had dissipated $139,000 in marital assets corresponding to the remodel expenses that he incurred after entry of the automatic temporary injunction. After adjusting to avoid double counting certain remodel expenses that husband paid using the HELOC, the court allocated husband a “marital dissipation” asset valued at $101,234.66.
¶ 14 Husband first argues that by allocating him a $101,234.66 asset on the marital spreadsheet, the court effectively awarded wife double recovery because the remodel increased the value of his home, and that increased value was divided when the court allocated the home on the marital spreadsheet. We are not persuaded.
¶ 15 Like the district court, we reject husband’s premise that the funds he spent on the remodel increased the home’s value dollar for dollar. As the district court recognized, husband provided no evidence as to the value of his home when he purchased it and therefore has not shown that the remodel increased its value and
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benefited the marital estate. While husband cites a post-remodel valuation of the home as evidence of the home’s increased value, given the absence of any pre-remodel value, we cannot say the court erred by rejecting husband’s claim that he increased the value of the house. In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003) (sufficiency of the evidence is in the sole discretion of the trial court).
¶ 16 We also disagree with husband that court erred by finding that he dissipated funds in connection with the remodel because he began the remodel before the automatic temporary injunction entered. The district court recognized that husband incurred some remodeling expenses in the two months before the commencement of the dissolution proceedings and did not include the funds expended during that limited time. But the court also found, and husband does not dispute, that approximately $140,000 of the $160,000 in remodeling expenses were incurred after the entry of the automatic temporary injunction.
¶ 17 While husband claims that it was necessary for him to continue the remodel even after entry of the injunction, he has not directed us to any evidence in the record to support such an
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assertion. Nor has he cited any evidence that he received wife’s consent or the court’s permission to nevertheless proceed with the remodel. See § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A). Thus, we cannot say that the district court erred.
C. Dissipation Involving the HELOC
¶ 18 Husband next argues that the district court erred when it found that he had dissipated funds from the HELOC associated with wife’s home and then allocated those dissipated funds to him on the marital spreadsheet. We disagree.
1. Additional Background
¶ 19 At the time of the permanent orders hearing, wife was residing in a home valued at approximately $585,000 that the parties had purchased during the marriage. There was no traditional mortgage associated with wife’s home, but instead, the parties had an “all in one” HELOC secured by the home.
¶ 20 A loan officer from the bank that issued the HELOC explained how it works. According to the loan officer, an “all in one” HELOC consists of a line of credit paired with a checking account. At the end of each day, any funds in the checking account are automatically “swept over” to the HELOC and reduce the
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outstanding principal balance owed on the HELOC, while increasing the HELOC’s corresponding available credit.
¶ 21 Per the loan officer, the parties’ HELOC was an interest-only loan, with a single interest payment due each month based on the outstanding principal balance. If the associated checking account did not have sufficient funds to cover the interest payment on the day that it was due, the payment would automatically be paid from the HELOC’s available credit and routed through the associated checking account, thus increasing the outstanding principal balance on the loan and decreasing the available line of credit. The parties could also borrow funds from the line of credit via the associated checking account to use for other purposes.
¶ 22 The district court found that only husband had access to the HELOC and associated checking account. Around the time of the parties’ separation in 2023, husband deposited a total of $130,000 of marital funds into the checking account, which was then swept into the HELOC and reduced the principal balance on the loan. Therefore, as of April 2023, the HELOC had over $137,000 in credit available. Over the course of the next two years, that available credit was slowly depleted as husband allowed the interest
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payments to be paid from the HELOC itself and withdrew funds from the HELOC for various purposes. By November 2024, the entirety of the available credit line on the HELOC had been used, meaning that at least $137,000 in equity had been depleted from wife’s home.
¶ 23 While the district court declined to fault husband for any depletion of the HELOC occurring prior to the entry of the automatic temporary injunction, it scrutinized husband’s withdrawals from the HELOC via the associated checking account occurring after that date. Specifically, the court found that from the time the automatic temporary injunction entered and onward, husband engaged in marital waste and otherwise dissipated marital assets in the amount of $40,422.81 by using the HELOC to pay down his AMEX and to pay for other extraordinary expenses such as fine dining, night clubs, and Topgolf outings. The court also observed that the funds transferred to pay off husband’s AMEX were primarily used to cover charges for the remodel of his new home. These withdrawals occurred while husband was earning over $70,000 per month. Thus, when dividing the marital estate,
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the district court allocated husband a marital dissipation asset associated with the HELOC valued at $40,422.81.
2. Discussion
¶ 24 We disagree with husband that the district court erred by finding that he had dissipated $40,422.81 from the HELOC. To start, husband does not challenge the court’s finding that, of the amount he withdrew from the HELOC after the entry of the temporary automatic injunction, $38,643.97 was used to pay his AMEX for charges incurred for the remodel of his home. And we have already concluded that the district court did not err by finding that husband’s remodel of his home constituted dissipation.
¶ 25 Husband suggests that the district court erred in finding dissipation related to other charges that he paid with the HELOC, such as those that he incurred for fine dining, night clubs, and Topgolf outings. But the district court, as fact finder, was free to weigh wife’s testimony concerning the extravagance of those expenses as it saw fit, and we decline to second-guess its credibility determinations. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (recognizing that it was for the district court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight, probative force, and
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sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom).
¶ 26 Likewise, the district court was free to reject husband’s suggestion that he had merely used the HELOC and associated checking account as an ordinary checking account to pay his necessary living expenses. Indeed, despite earning over $70,000 per month in 2024, husband conceded that, after the $130,000 that he deposited before the parties’ separation, he had not deposited any additional money into the associated checking account until December 2025, and he only did so because there was no more available credit on the HELOC.
¶ 27 We also perceive no abuse of the district court’s discretion in how it accounted for the dissipated funds on the marital spreadsheet. Husband claims that wife received a “double recovery” when the district court allocated him a marital asset valued at $40,422.81, corresponding to his dissipation of the HELOC. The district court properly valued the dissipated amounts as of the time they last existed, see In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996), and properly allocated those amounts to the
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responsible party as part of the marital property division, see In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1174 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 28 Husband’s reliance on In re Marriage of Butterworth, 2024 COA 95, is inapposite because the facts did not involve a dissipation finding to begin with, see id. at ¶¶ 79-81.
D. Husband’s Vehicle
¶ 29 We agree with husband, however, that the district court abused its discretion when valuing and allocating his Chevy Tahoe.
¶ 30 The district court found that husband purchased the Tahoe in October 2024, while the automatic temporary injunction was in place. Husband traded in a 2022 Ford F-150, which had a loan balance of $58,487, but a trade in value of only $41,000. Accordingly, husband rolled the remaining $17,487 owed on the Ford into a new $85,987.45 loan associated with the Tahoe. Husband also put down $5,365.23 in cash.
¶ 31 The court found that the Tahoe had a present value of $61,485 and awarded husband the Tahoe at that value. The court appeared to find that husband had committed marital dissipation when purchasing the Tahoe, explaining that he “violated the Temporary Injunction by incurring more marital debt while the
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divorce was pending, disposed of marital property[,] and no evidence was presented that it was for the ordinary course of business or necessity.” See § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A). Accordingly, the court “only value[d] the debt at the amount it was before the new car purchase of $-17,487.29 and not the new debt that was financed in violation of the injunction.” Thus, husband was allocated the Tahoe on the marital spreadsheet at a positive value of $44,357.71.
¶ 32 We agree with husband that the district court erred because it did not value the dissipated asset as of the date it last existed as marital property. Finer, 920 P.2d at 331. To start, the court conflated the $17,487 in negative equity associated with the Ford that husband traded in with the outstanding loan balance of $58,487 on that vehicle at the time. Then, instead of using the value of the Ford as it last existed, which was $41,000, the court improperly used the $61,845 value of the Tahoe. We therefore agree with husband that, given the court’s apparent finding of dissipation, the court should have valued and allocated to him the Tahoe at a value of negative $17,487.29, which was the net value of
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the dissipated asset (namely, the Ford) on the date that it last existed. See id.; Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at 1174.
¶ 33 Moreover, we cannot say that the district court’s error, which resulted in husband’s vehicle being overvalued by $60,000, was harmless, since the parties’ total marital estate was valued at less than $450,000. Accordingly, we must reverse the marital property division and remand for the court to correct its valuation of husband’s vehicle and reconsider the marital property division. See In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 893 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding that an error affecting a large percentage of the marital estate requires a remand to the district court to correct such error). However, because it is not otherwise accounted for when valuing the Ford as it last existed, the district court may also value on remand the $5,365.23 in cash that husband used for a down payment on the Tahoe and allocate that dissipated asset to husband accordingly. See Jorgenson, 143 P.3d at 1174.
E. Remand Instructions
¶ 34 Because we are reversing the marital property division, the district court must consider on remand the parties’ current economic circumstances and give the parties an opportunity to
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present any new evidence concerning those circumstances. In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 14; see § 14-10-113(1)(c) (When equitably dividing the marital estate, a court must consider “[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective.”).
¶ 35 Except as otherwise expressed herein, the court may not recharacterize or revalue the marital property or debts accounted for in the existing property division. See § 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 25. However, it may equitably reallocate the marital estate considering the new evidence, if any, on the parties’ current economic circumstances, as well as the relevant evidence from the previous permanent orders hearing. In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694, 697 n.6 (Colo. 1993); Medeiros, ¶ 25.
F. Timing of Equalization Payment
¶ 36 Because we are reversing the marital property division, we decline to address husband’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by giving him only ninety days to pay wife the approximately $110,000 equalization payment.
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III. Maintenance and Child Support
¶ 37 Given our reversal of the marital property division, we also reverse the portion of the permanent orders addressing maintenance and child support for the district court’s reconsideration. See In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 22 (when a district court revisits a property division, it must also reevaluate its maintenance and child support determinations because the issues are interdependent). On remand, the court should consider the revised property division and the parties’ present economic circumstances. See Wells, 850 P.2d at 697-99; In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d 518, 525 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 38 We therefore need not address husband’s contention that the district court failed to consider wife’s reasonable financial needs and the parties’ lifestyle during the marriage when awarding maintenance and that the court abused its discretion when awarding maintenance for a term of ninety-four months. We also decline to address wife’s cross-appeal of child support, in which she asserts that the court should have extrapolated beyond the upper limit of the child support guidelines.
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¶ 39 However, because the issue is likely to arise on remand, we address, and reject, husband’s contention that, when determining maintenance, the district court is required to give him a dollar-for- dollar credit for the temporary maintenance that he paid to wife. Husband cites section 14-10-114(3)(c)(VIII), which requires the court to consider “[t]he amount of temporary maintenance and the number of months that temporary maintenance was paid to the recipient spouse” as one of many factors affecting the amount and term of maintenance. But nothing in that section, nor in In re Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145, ¶ 33, which husband also cites, required the court to give husband a dollar-for-dollar credit for his payment of temporary maintenance.
¶ 40 Instead, on remand, the court is merely required to consider the temporary maintenance that husband has paid, and when determining maintenance, the court must make findings sufficient to give us a clear understanding of the basis of its order. See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 20 (recognizing that while a district court has no obligation to make specific factual findings on every factor listed in section 14-10-114(3)(c), there must be an indication that it meaningfully considered the necessary factors).
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IV. Life Insurance
¶ 41 Wife asserts in her cross-appeal that the district court erred by failing to rule on her request that husband be required to maintain a life insurance policy as security for his maintenance and child support obligations. We agree.
¶ 42 In its discretion, the court may require the payor spouse to provide reasonable security for the payment of maintenance or child support in the event of the payor spouse’s death. See § 14-10- 118(2), C.R.S. 2025 (“The court has the power to require security to be given to insure enforcement of its orders . . . .”); § 14-10- 114(6)(a) (requiring the court to consider six different factors when assessing a request for a life insurance policy to secure the payment of maintenance); In re Marriage of Icke, 540 P.2d 1076, 1076 (Colo. 1975); In re Marriage of Sim, 939 P.2d 504, 508 (Colo. App. 1997).
¶ 43 At the permanent orders hearing, wife requested that husband be required to maintain a life insurance policy, but the court appears to have overlooked her request given the numerous other issues that it had to address. Therefore, on remand, the district court should rule on wife’s request. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.
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V. Contempt Judgment
¶ 44 Husband also challenges the portion of the permanent orders finding him in punitive and remedial contempt and imposing corresponding sanctions against him for failing to pay the HELOC associated with wife’s home. While we disagree that the district court abused its discretion by finding husband in contempt, we agree that the remedial sanction it imposed was improper.
A. Legal Principles
¶ 45 A court may hold a party in contempt for “disobedience or resistance” to a lawful court order. C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1).
¶ 46 Whether a party is in contempt lies within the district court’s sound discretion, and we will uphold its decision absent a showing that the court acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair way, or it misapplied the law. In re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 23.
¶ 47 When a court holds a party in contempt it may impose two types of sanctions. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25. Punitive sanctions are designed to punish “conduct that is found to be offensive to the authority and dignity of the court.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4). Remedial sanctions are “imposed to force compliance with a lawful order or to
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compel performance of an act within the person’s power or present ability to perform.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5).
B. Contempt Finding for Failure to Comply with the Temporary Orders
¶ 48 Husband first argues that the district court erred by finding him in both remedial and punitive contempt because, under his interpretation of the temporary orders, he in fact complied with the court’s orders as to the payment of the HELOC. We disagree.
¶ 49 We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the temporary orders. See Select Energy Servs., LLC v. K-LOW, LLC, 2017 CO 43, ¶ 12 (reviewing water court’s interpretation of prior decree de novo); In re Marriage of Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 859-60 (Colo. App. 2003) (interpreting dissolution decree incorporating separation agreement de novo). In doing so, we do not defer to the district court’s interpretation. See Crowder, 77 P.3d at 860; Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 (Colo. 1983) (noting that the same rules of interpretation apply to interpreting court orders as apply to interpreting other writings or instruments).
¶ 50 In interpreting the temporary orders, we first look to the plain language of the orders to determine whether the legal obligation
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that the district court applied to husband can be found in the order or from a proper and legal construction of it. See Select Energy Servs., ¶ 13. To be held in contempt, the alleged contemnor must have refused to do exactly what the court order required, and if the order is ambiguous, that ambiguity should be construed in favor of the contemnor. See In re Marriage of Davis, 252 P.3d 530, 537 (Colo. App. 2011); People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158, 173 (Colo. App. 1999).
¶ 51 The temporary orders ordered husband to pay wife $10,000 per month in temporary maintenance but gave “[husband] credit for the mortgage payment of [wife]’s home,” and thus reduced maintenance “by the mortgage payment, [with] the remainder due to [wife].” The court also ordered that husband “shall continue to pay the mortgage payment of [wife]’s home.”
¶ 52 In holding husband in contempt, the district court found that he failed to pay the monthly interest payments on the HELOC associated with wife’s home as required by the temporary orders. Specifically, the court found that rather than depositing external money into the associated checking account, husband instead allowed the HELOC to automatically pay itself using the HELOC’s
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available line of credit. This depleted the credit available on the HELOC, increased the principal balance owed, and depleted the equity in wife’s home. Moreover, the court found that the interest payments had not been paid for two months because the available credit on the HELOC had been completely consumed.
¶ 53 Yet despite letting the HELOC pay itself and lapsing entirely for two months once the credit was consumed, husband nevertheless subtracted the HELOC payments from the maintenance that he paid to wife during those months. The court found that husband had the ability to pay the HELOC himself but willfully failed to comply with the temporary orders and attempted to “pull a fast one” on wife and the court.
¶ 54 As we understand it, husband argues that he in fact complied with the temporary orders because (1) the over $130,000 in principal that he paid towards the HELOC when the parties separated was a prepayment of the interest on the HELOC, and (2) the temporary orders required him to “continue to pay” the mortgage associated with wife’s home and his standard method of payment had been letting the HELOC pay itself.
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¶ 55 We reject husband’s first contention because the plain text of the temporary orders required husband to pay the mortgage going forward, and there was no provision allowing him to claim a credit against his maintenance obligation for a paydown of the HELOC’s principal balance using marital funds from over a year earlier. Moreover, as fact finder, the district court was free to disbelieve husband’s testimony that his pre-temporary orders payments towards the HELOC effectively represented a prepayment of the monthly interest payments going forward. See In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that the district court “can believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted, and its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review.”).
¶ 56 Second, we disagree with husband that the temporary orders permitted him to let the HELOC pay itself and negatively amortize. The temporary orders unambiguously stated that husband was to pay the mortgage on wife’s home, and the HELOC automatically paying itself by incurring more debt did not constitute a payment by husband.
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¶ 57 We are similarly unpersuaded that, because the HELOC was paying itself, husband had no effective ability to purge the remedial contempt. See In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 92 (Colo. App. 2008) (When the court orders a remedial contempt sanction, it must specify how the contemnor can purge the contempt.). The requirement was that husband pay the mortgage, and even though the interest only payments were being automatically satisfied via the accrual of additional debt, husband at any time could have directly paid the HELOC by depositing funds into the associated checking account.
¶ 58 Husband further argues that, since he was ordered to “continue to pay” the mortgage, he could simply let the HELOC draw down its own line of credit to make the payments as he had in the past. But we reject husband’s interpretation of the temporary orders because it would create an absurd result by allowing him to incur marital debt to make the monthly interest payments while simultaneously allowing him to claim a credit against his temporary maintenance obligation based upon the very debt that he created. Cf. Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 793 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[A] contract should never be interpreted to yield
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an absurd result.”), abrogated on other grounds by Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007); Blecker, 672 P.2d at 528.
¶ 59 Finally, we decline to second-guess the district court’s finding that husband had violated the dignity of the court. See A.J.L., 243 P.3d at 249-56. The district court found, and husband does not dispute, that he had full control of the HELOC and associated checking account and that he therefore knew that letting the HELOC pay itself would deplete the marital equity in wife’s home. And despite this knowledge, husband nevertheless claimed a credit for the HELOC payments against his temporary maintenance obligation.
C. Remedial Contempt Sanction
¶ 60 Husband next challenges the amount of the remedial contempt sanction. To start, we are unpersuaded by husband’s conclusory assertion that, by requiring him to compensate wife $16,608.57 for the interest only payments that he failed to make, wife somehow received a double recovery when the equity in her home was divided as part of the marital estate. By their very
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namesake, the interest only payments that husband failed to make would not have increased the equity in the home.
¶ 61 We agree with husband, however, that the district court erred when determining the amount that he had to pay wife to purge the contempt. Of the $16,608.57 that the court ordered husband to pay, $6,619.26 corresponded to the missed November and December 2024 interest payments, which the court found had not been paid at all in those months. However, the court also found that as of January 2025, husband had brought the HELOC current via a $10,000 deposit into the associated checking account, which suggests that husband, albeit belatedly, purged the November and December nonpayment using his own funds.
¶ 62 The district court did not explain whether it considered husband bringing the HELOC current with his own funds when determining the amount that he was required to pay wife to purge the remedial contempt. Accordingly, because we are unable to ascertain the basis of the court’s order, see Gibbs, ¶ 9, we reverse the remedial contempt sanction. On remand, the district court must reconsider the remedial contempt sanction and make sufficient findings explaining its decision. See id.
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VI. Due Process
¶ 63 We consider and reject husband’s assertion that the district court violated his due process rights by limiting his time at the permanent orders hearing.
¶ 64 In support, husband relies on an exchange in which the district court indicated that it would be “chipping away” at the time allocated to him due to numerous objections made by his counsel that the court found to be unnecessary. Yet, as the party alleging inadequate time, it was husband’s responsibility to create a record concerning the prejudicial time constraint, including an offer of proof as to the evidence that was consequently excluded. See CRE 103(a)(2); Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1105 (Colo. App. 2010) (requiring an offer of proof as to the excluded or truncated testimony).
¶ 65 Husband has not identified any place in the record indicating how much time, if any, the district court subtracted from his presentation of the case, nor has he identified any place in the record where he made an offer of proof as to the evidence that he was prevented from presenting.
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¶ 66 While husband cites an exchange in which the court informed him that he had only forty-five minutes remaining, at no point during that exchange did husband object, ask for an accounting of any supposedly missing time, or seek clarification that he had in fact been penalized by the court. Thus, we are unable to meaningfully review husband’s contentions given that we cannot ascertain (1) how much time, if any, the court may have penalized him and (2) what evidence was excluded as a result. Cf. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61,
¶ 18 (“It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”).
¶ 67 Indeed, in the only instance in which husband asked for more time, the court granted his request for an additional ten minutes. This undermines husband’s claim that he was somehow treated unfairly. Thus, we cannot say that husband’s due process rights were somehow violated because of time limits placed on him at the hearing.
VII. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 68 Wife requests an award of her appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, due to the alleged financial
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disparities between the parties. Because the district court is better equipped to determine the parties’ current financial resources, we direct it to address this request on remand. See C.A.R. 39.1; In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58, ¶ 54.
VIII. Disposition
¶ 69 Those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital property division, maintenance, and child support are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Those portions of the permanent orders not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed. The portion of the contempt judgment finding husband in contempt and imposing a punitive sanction is affirmed. The remedial contempt sanction entered against husband is reversed, and the district court is ordered to reconsider it on remand. On remand, the district court shall address wife’s requests for life insurance and appellate attorney fees.
JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.