25CA0634 Marriage of Dexter 06-11-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0634 Adams County District Court No. 23DR30021 Honorable Rayna Gokli McIntyre, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Gary Dexter,
Appellee,
and
Christina Dexter,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 11, 2026
Erskine Family Law PLLC, Christopher A. Erskine, Highlands Ranch, Colorado, for Appellee
Christina Dexter, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding concerning
Christina Dexter (wife) and Gary Dexter (husband), wife appeals the
district court’s denial of her C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion and its denial of
her subsequent C.R.C.P. 59 motion. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The district court dissolved husband and wife’s marriage of
almost eight years. The parties have two children, both of whom
were minors when the court entered the divorce decree. The court
issued permanent orders addressing, as relevant here, property
allocation, maintenance, and attorney fees. The court made the
following orders:
• wife to retain the marital home and refinance to remove
husband’s name from the mortgage within six months;
• wife to retain a 2017 Land Rover, which included a $30,000
loan balance;
• $70,000 in cash, held in wife’s counsel’s trust account, to be
“released to [wife] to pay her outstanding attorney fees”;
• husband to pay wife $113,700 as an equalization payment;
1 • husband to pay wife $9,300 monthly for three years and one
month in maintenance.
After the court issued permanent orders, wife’s attorney withdrew
and filed a lien to recover unpaid fees.
¶3 Husband filed an “Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to
Request Post-Trial Relief Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59,” which the court
granted. Husband then filed a motion requesting amendments to
the permanent orders (motion to amend).
¶4 Meanwhile, wife filed many pro se motions. These motions
alleged that her former attorneys improperly accepted a filing
deadline extension for the modification of permanent orders without
her consent and forced her to use retroactive child support and
maintenance funds from temporary orders to pay legal fees. Wife’s
motions also alleged that husband concealed and mishandled
marital assets, because he was seen driving new vehicles. Wife
requested that the court appoint a forensic accountant and twice
requested that husband be held in contempt. In various orders, the
court deemed wife’s request for a forensic accountant untimely and
denied her requests that husband be held in contempt.
2 ¶5 The court addressed husband’s motion to amend and some of
wife’s motions in one order (the amended order). The court found
and ordered the following.
• It lacked jurisdiction to address “allegations of misconduct or
malpractice against [wife’s] counsel.”
• Wife had not “sufficiently alleged that [husband’s non-
disclosure of assets such as luxury vehicles] is newly
discovered evidence[,] which could not have, with reasonable
diligence, . . . been discovered and produced at trial.”
• To avoid damage to husband’s credit from wife’s nonpayment
of the marital home’s mortgage, husband was to make these
payments and offset the amount from funds from the home’s
eventual refinance or sale.
of the 2017 Land Rover loan, husband was to make these
payments and “offset the amount [he] pays in the equalization
payment.”
• The court, at permanent orders, “failed to adjust maintenance
to account for the non-taxable nature of the award and to
equitably allocate the tax burden.” The court recalculated
3 maintenance, reducing it by twenty-five percent, to account for
the fact that husband’s maintenance payments were not tax
deductible. See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(XII), C.R.S. 2025. Wife’s
new monthly maintenance amount was $6,960.
• The court indicated it would issue a separate order regarding
the attorney lien.
¶6 Wife filed a motion to vacate the amended order, which
repeated her claims that (1) her attorneys acted unethically in
agreeing to the post-trial motion extension and improperly
garnished retroactive maintenance to pay the attorney lien; and
(2) husband fraudulently concealed assets, including a
“Lamborghini valued at $240,000,” “a McLaren valued at
$280,000,” and a “GMC Truck.” She also claimed that husband
withheld maintenance for three months, preventing her from
refinancing the home, and otherwise financially abused her. The
court denied wife’s motion to vacate, reiterating that it did “not have
jurisdiction to address any allegations of ethical misconduct by
[wife’s] counsel” and indicating, (1) again, that it would issue a
separate order regarding the attorney lien; and (2) that order would
also relate to maintenance payments.
4 ¶7 In its order regarding the attorney lien and maintenance, the
court determined that wife’s former counsel was entitled to
$164,000 in unpaid fees. It again ordered $70,000, which had not
yet been released from wife’s counsel’s trust account as had been
ordered at permanent orders, to be directed toward the attorney fee
payment and entered a lien for the remainder of $94,000. And it
ordered husband to remit wife’s maintenance payments to wife’s
former attorney until the lien was satisfied.
¶8 Wife filed a motion to set aside the amended order and order
regarding the attorney lien and maintenance, and to “reopen the
financial issues in this matter,” pursuant to C.R.C.P. 60 and 16.2.
Although wife contends that her allegations fall under many
subsections of Rule 60(b), we construe them as falling under Rule
60(b)(1) or (b)(2). As relevant here, wife made the following
allegations.
• The court erred by reducing her maintenance and equalization
awards without a modification motion, updated financial
statements from husband, or an evidentiary hearing.
• She did not receive proper notice of husband’s modification
request in violation of her right to due process.
5 • Husband concealed marital assets. She attached an exhibit
showing husband’s purchase of a McLaren for $145,300 and
showing that husband had purchased another car after
permanent orders.
• Her former counsel acted unethically by failing to object to the
post-trial motion extension and they did not “protect court-
awarded financial orders.”
• Because the court ordered that her maintenance payments be
made directly to satisfy the attorney lien, she could not make
her mortgage payments on the marital home.
¶9 The court denied the motion in a short order, stating that wife
had “not met the standards in C.R.C.P. 60 for the [c]ourt to grant
relief pursuant to section (b).” The court also incorporated the
following prior rulings: (1) its denial of wife’s motion to vacate,
which itself references the reasoning of the amended order; (2) its
combined order denying her motions to reconsider its decision
requiring husband to remit maintenance payments to pay the
attorney lien, reiterating her attorneys’ allegedly unethical actions,
and requesting that maintenance and equalization payments be
6 placed in escrow; and (3) its order placing $70,000 in trust for
attorney fees and entering the first lien.
¶ 10 Wife then requested, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(4) and (a)(5), that
the court amend its order denying her Rule 60(b) motion to address
her due process allegations and to include “specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law.” The court denied that motion as untimely.
¶ 11 Wife appeals the court’s denial of her 60(b) motion, seeking “to
restore [her] lawfully awarded maintenance and equalization” and to
“address due process failures and systemic misconduct that
occurred after permanent orders were entered.”.
II. Briefing on Appeal
¶ 12 Husband argues that wife’s appeal should be dismissed
because she fails to identify the standard of review, applicable law,
or preservation as required by C.A.R. 28 and 32. While we agree
that wife’s brief does not fully comply with the appellate rules, we
were able to understand her contentions. We therefore deny
husband’s request. See Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co.,
252 P.3d 1182, 1186 (Colo. App. 2011) (addressing the merits of
arguments even though the briefs failed to comply with C.A.R. 28
and 32); Barr Lake Vill. Metro. Dist. v. Colo. Water Quality Control
7 Comm’n, 835 P.2d 613, 615 (Colo. App. 1992) (declining to dismiss
an appeal for failure to comply with C.A.R. 28).
III. Timeliness of Appeal
A. Notice of Appeal
¶ 13 Husband argues that wife did not timely file a notice of appeal
under C.A.R. 4. We disagree. A notice of appeal “must be filed . . .
within [forty-nine] days after entry of the judgment, decree, or order
being appealed.” C.A.R. 4(a)(1). Here, wife appeals the court’s April
1 and April 7, 2025, denials of her Rule 60(b) and Rule 59 motions.
She filed her notice of appeal on April 10, 2025, well within the
forty-nine day time limit.
B. Post-Trial Motions
¶ 14 Husband also argues that wife failed to timely appeal the
January 8, 2025, post-trial relief orders. Again, we disagree.
¶ 15 A party must file a motion to set aside a judgment for mistake,
fraud, or misconduct [under Rule 60(b)(1) or (2)] “not more than
182 days after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken.” C.R.C.P. 60(b). Courts strictly adhere to that time limit.
Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO, LLC, 2025 COA 8M, ¶ 77. Courts
8 lack authority to provide relief under Rule 60(b)(1) and (b)(2) after
that time has lapsed. Id.
¶ 16 Wife filed her Rule 60(b) motion seeking to amend the court’s
January 8, 2025, amended orders eighty-three days after the court
entered the amended orders, on April 1, 2025. To the extent wife’s
motion attacks the January 8, 2025, judgment, it was untimely.
C.R.C.P. 59(a) (motion filed pursuant to Rule 59 must be filed
within fourteen days of the entry of judgment). Wife filed her
motion within fourteen days of the court’s order regarding her 60(b)
motion; so, in so far as her motion attacked the court’s denial of her
60(b) for alleged lack of findings or legal conclusions, it was timely.
However, the record belies this claim. The order includes references
to the court’s previous orders — many of which include findings of
fact — and the court reached a legal conclusion based on those
facts.
IV. Arguments We Will Not Address
A. Wife’s Former Counsel
¶ 17 Wife argues that her former counsel, through the law firm’s
conduct after withdrawal, breached their fiduciary duties and
committed financial misconduct and civil theft. This is not the
9 proper forum for wife to pursue these claims. Our role is to review
final judgments and orders, not to determine allegations of attorney
misconduct. See C.A.R. 1(a)(1); § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2025; see also
In re Org. of N. Chaffee Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist., 544 P.2d 637, 638
(Colo. 1975) (“The purpose of an appellate court is to [r]eview
judgments, not to make them . . . .”); see also C.A.R. 3(d)(2)(B)
(requiring the notice of appeal to specify “the judgment, order or
parts being appealed”). Likewise, the district court did not err in
declining to address this issue because it does not have jurisdiction
over attorney misconduct claims. In re Storey, 2022 CO 48, ¶ 34
(The supreme court “has exclusive jurisdiction over attorneys and
the authority to regulate, govern, and supervise the practice of law
in Colorado to protect the public.”).
B. July 15, 2025, Order
¶ 18 Wife argues that the court’s July 15, 2025, order — issued
after wife filed her notice of appeal — reaffirming permanent orders
and denying husband further relief supports reinstatement of the
permanent orders’ financial terms. Because there was no way for
husband to know that this court action would be contested on
appeal, we decline to address this issue. See Converse v. Zinke, 635
10 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Colo. App. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds,
635 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1981) (notice of appeal that did not designate
judgment appealed was not erroneous when there was no doubt
which court action was being appealed).
C. Business Valuation
¶ 19 Wife argues for the first time on appeal that she was prevented
from participating in the valuation of the marital business and that
the court’s valuation, therefore, “did not reflect the true scope of
assets and liabilities.” Wife did not preserve this issue for our
review. To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be brought
to the attention of the trial court, and the court must be given an
opportunity to rule on it. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251
P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010), as modified on denial of reh’g
(Sept. 23, 2010). Here, wife does not point to any evidence in the
record, nor can we locate any, that the district court had an
opportunity to address this issue.
V. Wife’s Remaining Arguments
¶ 20 Wife argues that the court improperly denied her Rule 60(b)
motion for various reasons, which we address in turn below.
11 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 21 “[T]he decision to grant relief under [Rule] is generally within
the trial court’s discretion and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310,
314 (Colo. 2010). A court abuses its discretion when it rests its
decision on a misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law.
Harriman v. Cabela’s Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 19.
¶ 22 Rule 60(b) provides a remedy for a party seeking to set aside a
final judgment. See C.R.C.P. 60(b) (“On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding” for the reasons specified in the
rule.). “A final judgment is one ‘which ends the particular action in
which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court
pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of
the parties involved in the proceeding.’” Wilson v. Kennedy, 2020
COA 122, ¶ 7 (citation omitted). As relevant here, once a court
enters a final judgment, the party against whom the judgment was
entered can seek relief under Rule 60(b) based on “(1) [m]istake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; [or] (2) fraud . . .,
12 misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” among
other bases.
B. Amended Order Procedure
¶ 23 Wife alleges that the district court erred when it amended her
maintenance and equalization amount — from $9,300 to $6,960 —
without a “formal motion, sworn financial disclosures, or an
evidentiary hearing.” As we understand her argument, she alleges
that a formal motion, financial disclosures, or evidentiary hearing
were required pursuant to Rule 16.2(e)(10) and section 14-10-122,
C.R.S. 2025. She also asserts that the Joint Trial Management
Certificate (JTMC) filed before the permanent orders hearing —
which she alleges indicated that no modification of maintenance
was sought — precludes a modification motion. We disagree.
¶ 24 Here, husband did not file a motion to modify maintenance
pursuant to section 14-10-122.1 And we see nothing in the JTMC,
nor does wife point to anything, indicating either that the parties
1 Insofar as this claim relates to wife’s later claim that husband
failed to disclose his alleged purchase of luxury vehicles, we determine below that the court did not err in concluding that wife had not met her burden to introduce this evidence.
13 stipulated to the maintenance amount or that they agreed to forego
any modification.
¶ 25 Instead, husband filed a timely motion pursuant to Rule 59
alleging that the court erred in its permanent orders maintenance
calculations. Pursuant to this rule, husband’s motion was all that
was required for the court to amend its findings and judgment.
C.R.C.P. 59(a)(3), (a)(4). Moreover, Rule 59(i) indicates that the
granting of a Rule 59(a)(3) and (a)(4) motion is a final appealable
order. On appeal, however, wife only contends that the procedure
was in error, not the merits of the decision. We perceive no error in
the court’s application of Rule 59 and its subsequent amendment of
the maintenance amount.
C. Using Maintenance and Equalization to Pay Lien
¶ 26 Wife argues that the district court erred in directing her
maintenance and equalization payments to the payment of the
attorney lien. The court did not abuse its discretion.
¶ 27 The attorney lien statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll
attorneys . . . shall have a lien on any money, property, choses in
action, or claims and demands in their hands, on any judgment
they may have obtained or assisted in obtaining, in whole or in part
14 . . . .” § 13-93-114, C.R.S. 2025. The Colorado Supreme Court, in
Samuel J. Stoorman & Assocs., P.C. v. Dixon, 2017 CO 42, ¶ 7
(interpreted an identical older version of this statute) . It held that
“[t]he plain language of the attorney’s lien statute applies to
maintenance payments that the attorney may have obtained or
assisted in obtaining, and therefore . . . an attorney’s charging lien
may attach to an award of spousal maintenance.” Stoorman, ¶ 7.
Accordingly, the court did not err in requiring husband’s
maintenance payments to go directly to pay wife’s attorney lien.
¶ 28 By the same logic, the plain language of section 13-93-114
allows the court to assign wife’s equalization payment to the
payment of her attorney lien. Attorneys may have a lien on any
property they obtained for their client. Here, because the attorneys
helped obtain the equalization payment for wife, it could properly be
remitted to the attorneys for payment of the lien.
¶ 29 To the extent wife also argues that her former attorneys did
not satisfy the requirements of C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22(b), we
perceive no error. Wife’s payment of her own outstanding attorney
fees does not fall within the scope of this practice standard. And to
the extent wife claims that the full amount of maintenance
15 shouldn’t go towards the lien because she cannot pay her mortgage,
she does not develop this argument, so we do not address it further.
See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27, aff’d, 2021 CO
12.
D. Concealed Marital Assets
¶ 30 Wife asserts that husband “purchased a McLaren with
$100,000 down payment . . . [and] also acquired a GMC Denali, a
BMW, and a Mercedes registered jointly in his and his mother’s
names.” She also asserts that husband “funneled marital business
funds to his mother under the guise of ‘contract labor,’ which was
never performed.” The district court determined that wife had not
shown that, with reasonable diligence, she could not have
discovered concealment before the permanent orders. We perceive
no abuse of discretion.
¶ 31 Rule 59(d)(4) lists as one of the grounds for granting a new
trial “[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application which that party could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial.”
¶ 32 Courts review the application of Rule 59(d) using a three-part
test:
16 first, the applicant must establish that the evidence could not have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence and produced at the first trial; second, it must be shown that the evidence was material to an issue in the first trial; and third, the applicant must establish that the evidence, if admitted, would probably change the result of the first trial.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Peer, 804 P.2d 166, 172 (Colo. 1991); see People
v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654, 660 (Colo. 1988); People in Interest of P.N.,
663 P.2d 253, 256 (Colo. 1983); Kennedy v. Bailey, 453 P.2d 808,
810 (Colo. 1969).
¶ 33 With regard to the purchase of new vehicles, as we understand
it, the court concluded that wife had not met the third part of the
test: the result of the permanent orders hearing would not have
been different given the information wife had provided. The court
could not find, as it stated, that “simply because [husband was] in
possession of a new McLaren that he misused marital funds during
the divorce to obtain it.” Wife provided the court with evidence that
husband had, for example, purchased tires for a Lamborghini, but
she did not provide evidence that husband had used marital funds
to purchase them. Similarly, wife also provided the court with
photos of luxury vehicles with new, temporary registration plates.
17 But she did not provide evidence of how husband paid for these
vehicles, if he did. We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in
the court’s determination that wife had not met her burden
pursuant to Rule 59.
¶ 34 Concerning the contract labor funds, as we understand it, the
court decided that “any actions that [husband] took prior to the
parties’ separation should have been presented during the
[permanent orders] hearing.” And, while wife made this same
contention in the JTMC filed in advance of the permanent orders
hearing, wife, through counsel, later filed a stipulation agreeing
with husband regarding the business value. Wife, therefore,
abandoned this issue. See Brody v. Hellman, 167 P.3d 192, 199
(Colo. App. 2007) (an issue not pursued in the district court
through disposition is abandoned for the purposes of appeal).
E. Evidentiary Hearing
¶ 35 Finally, wife argues that “due process requires an evidentiary
hearing when material facts are in dispute.” Specifically, she
asserts that she “raised issues not addressed at trial, including
fraudulent liens, unreported vehicle purchases, misuse of business
funds, and procedural violations,” as well as “new facts.” We have
18 addressed each of these issues, in turn, above. To the extent wife
now claims that each of these issues implicated her right to due
process, she did not preserve this issue before the district court and
we cannot address it. See Berra, 251 P.3d at 570.
¶ 36 Wife also argues that she was not afforded a hearing on
attorney fees from one of her contempt motions, but we perceive no
error in the court’s failure to provide a hearing. The record shows
that she, through counsel, stipulated to vacating that hearing. To
the extent wife contends that her former counsel acted unethically
to prevent her from pursuing this hearing, we again conclude that
we do not have jurisdiction over her complaint. See C.A.R. 1(a)(1);
§ 13-4-102(1).
VI. Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 37 Wife requests that we award her attorney fees incurred on
appeal. As grounds for an award of attorney fees, she cites section
14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, contending that there is a significant
disparity in the parties’ financial resources. See In re Marriage of
Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 30 (determining that a court may consider
the parties’ relative financial circumstances when awarding
attorney fees pursuant to section 14-10-119). We remand to the
19 district court to determine whether wife is entitled to an award of
her appellate attorney fees pursuant to section 14-10-119, and, if
so, in what amount. See In re Marriage of Martin, 2021 COA 101,
¶ 42.
VII. Disposition
¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings on wife’s request for appellate attorney fees under
section 14-10-119.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.