25CA0869 Marriage of Cooper 01-22-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0869 Pueblo County District Court No. 18DR98 Honorable Dorothy A. Radakovich, Magistrate Honorable Tayler M. Thomas, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Evelynn Harmes,
Appellee,
and
Harry Cooper,
Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026
No Appearance for Appellee
Harry Cooper, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case between Harry
Cooper (father) and Evelynn Harmes (mother), father appeals the
district court’s adoption of the magistrate’s denial of his motion to
modify parental responsibilities. We dismiss the appeal in part and
affirm the order.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 The parties’ marriage ended in 2018. At that time, the district
court designated mother as the child’s primary residential parent
and granted father two overnights a week. The parties agreed that
mother would have sole decision-making responsibility.
¶3 Within a year, mother filed a motion to restrict father’s
parenting time. In it, she alleged, among other things, that he had
not exercised parenting time for several weeks, had failed to provide
her with a current address, and was “unreachable.”
¶4 A magistrate temporarily restricted father’s parenting time,
requiring that it be supervised by an unrelated third party. The
magistrate set an evidentiary hearing for October 11, 2019, and
directed mother to “properly serve” father with her motion and the
order.
1 ¶5 At the hearing, mother appeared, and father did not. The
magistrate found that
• father had an outstanding arrest warrant;
• father was evicted from his former residence and was
residing at a place that was unsafe for the child due to
unfinished floors with exposed nails and the presence of
asbestos;
• father failed to keep the court informed of his current
address;
• when the child returned from parenting time with father,
the child had numerous flea bites, and he had ignored
the child’s medical needs;
• father had arrived at parenting time exchanges driving
despite not having a valid license; and
• father had no parenting time with the child for
approximately one month.
¶6 From those findings, the magistrate determined that the child
was in imminent danger while in father’s care and restricted his
parenting time to supervised visits at a facility. Father never
2 contacted the facility or scheduled any visits. Father did not appeal
the magistrate’s order.
¶7 About four years later, father filed a motion to modify, asking
the court to name him the sole residential parent for the
then-six-year-old child, order mother’s parenting time be
supervised, and grant him sole decision-making responsibility.
¶8 In February 2025, following an evidentiary hearing, the
magistrate denied the motion and continued the restriction on
father’s parenting time. The magistrate found that the child was
not endangered in mother’s care. The magistrate further found that
father had been largely absent from the child’s life for the last four
years, did not know how to take care of the child’s needs, and had
recently tested positive for methamphetamines.
¶9 Then, father, without timely providing a hearing transcript,
petitioned the district court for review of the magistrate’s order.
Unpersuaded by father’s arguments, the court adopted the
magistrate’s decision.
¶ 10 After filing his notice of appeal, father moved to supplement
the record to include the transcript. This court issued a limited
remand order, directing the district court to determine whether the
3 absence of the transcript was through no fault of father and
whether the prior order should be amended.
¶ 11 On remand, the district court found that father was diligent in
trying to obtain the transcript and that its absence was not his
fault. The court found that “that the facts necessary for review
purposes are undisputed and within the court records” and
therefore a transcript [was] not necessary for review” of the
magistrate’s order. The court therefore declined to amend the prior
¶ 12 This court, on its own initiative, added the transcript to the
appellate record.
II. Appellate Standard of Review
¶ 13 Our review of a district court’s adoption of a magistrate’s
decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we
must accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25; see
C.R.M. 7(a)(9). A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only
if there is no record support for them. Thorburn, ¶ 25. Legal
conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See In re Parental
Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.
4 III. Discussion
A. Hearing Transcript
¶ 14 Normally, when reviewing a district court order adopting a
magistrate’s decision, we do not consider a hearing transcript that
was not submitted to the district court. See In re Marriage of Dean,
2017 COA 51, ¶ 14. Here, however, we elect to do so given the
additional proceedings on remand, the district court’s finding that
the absence of the transcript was not attributable to father, and our
inability to discern whether the court, in fact, reviewed the
transcript.
B. Sufficiency of Findings
¶ 15 Father contends that the magistrate did not make specific
findings when it denied his request to modify parental
responsibilities. We disagree.
¶ 16 A court has broad discretion when modifying parenting time
and decision-making responsibility, and “we exercise every
presumption in favor of upholding its decisions.” In re Marriage of
Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26. A court abuses its discretion when it
misapplies the law or acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or
5 unreasonable manner. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶
45.
¶ 17 A modification of parenting time that substantially changes
parenting time and changes the parent with whom the child resides
the majority of the time requires a finding that there has been a
change in the circumstances of the child or of the party with whom
the child resides a majority of the time and that the modification is
necessary to serve the child’s best interests. § 14-10-129(2), C.R.S.
2025. In making this determination, a court must consider all
relevant factors, including those listed in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a),
C.R.S. 2025. The court need not make specific findings on all
statutory factors. Pawelec, ¶ 44. That said, the court’s findings
must be sufficiently explicit to give us a clear understanding of the
basis of the order. Id
¶ 18 Additionally, when considering such a modification, a court
must retain the existing parenting time order unless the child’s
present environment endangers the child’s physical health or
significantly impairs the child’s emotional development and the
harm likely to be caused by a change in residence is outweighed by
the advantage of the change. § 14-10-129(2)(d); see also In re
6 Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶¶ 19-21
(describing required three-step analysis starting with presumption
that the prior order remains in effect).
¶ 19 Likewise, a court may modify an order of decision-making
responsibility if it finds that “a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child” or the parent with decision-making
authority, and “the modification is necessary to serve the best
interests of the child.” § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S. 2025. The court
must also retain the existing decision-making responsibility order
unless doing so would endanger the child’s physical health or
significantly impair the child’s emotional development and the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the
advantage to the child. § 14-10-131(2)(c).
¶ 20 In denying father’s motion to modify, the magistrate made the
following findings:
• Currently, the child was receiving appropriate medical
treatment in mother’s care and was performing well in
school.
• The child was also participating in ongoing mental health
counseling.
7 • Father decided not to show up for the restriction hearing
in October 2019 because he had an outstanding warrant
and feared that he would be arrested.
• Father chose to be estranged from the child for more
than four years rather than address the issues that led to
his parenting time restriction.
• Father had minimal interactions with the child since
2019, had one contact with the child after July 2020,
and never exercised supervised parenting time as ordered
by the court.
• Given this limited contact, father lacked knowledge of the
child’s current needs.
• Father tested positive for methamphetamines in October
2024 and had not attempted to undergo a substance
abuse evaluation to determine whether treatment was
appropriate.
• Father presented no evidence demonstrating that the
restriction on his parenting time should be lifted.
8 • In 2021, mother was convicted of class one misdemeanor
child abuse, misdemeanor driving under the influence,
and felony vehicular assault.
• Mother served a jail sentence, had remained sober since
the car accident, was compliant with probation, and had
completed the required alcohol education and treatment.
• Father failed to prove that mother perpetrated domestic
violence.
¶ 21 So, contrary to father’s contention, the magistrate’s findings
are sufficient as they clearly explained the basis for denying his
request for sole parental responsibilities — that is, the child was not
endangered in mother’s care and father had not spent much time
with the child in the last four years, did not know the child’s needs,
and had recently tested positive for methamphetamines. Because
the record supports those findings, we cannot say that the court
erred in this regard. See Wenciker, ¶ 26.
¶ 22 Father relatedly asserts that the magistrate ignored evidence
and “minimalized” mother’s criminal history. We presume,
however, that the magistrate considered all the evidence admitted.
In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 21 (an appellate court
9 may presume that the district court considered all the evidence
admitted). And to the extent he challenges the weight the
magistrate accorded to the evidence in its best interests analysis
and asks us to reweigh it in his favor, we will not do so. See In re
Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an
abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the record that
could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute
our judgment for that of the district court.”); see also Thorburn, ¶ 49
(it is for the district court to determine witness credibility and the
weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as
the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom).
C. Domestic Violence
¶ 23 Father contends that the magistrate erred by denying his
request for sole decision-making responsibility because the
magistrate did not consider certain evidence of mother’s alleged
domestic violence against him during the marriage in violation of
section 14-10-124(1.5)(4)(a)(II) (the district court must consider the
history of domestic violence when allocating decision-making
responsibility).
10 ¶ 24 We will not address the issue now because father did not
argue it before the magistrate. See Pawelec, ¶ 38 (stating that to
preserve an issue for appeal, it must be presented in such a way
that the district court has an opportunity to rule on it); see also
Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 2016 COA 22, ¶ 26
(only specific arguments made to the district court are preserved for
appeal).
¶ 25 At the modification hearing, father attempted to admit an
arrest record concerning mother. The magistrate questioned the
relevance of any allegations predating the 2018 dissolution decree
and explained that any domestic violence issue should have been
raised before the parties stipulated to joint decision-making
responsibility. He did not challenge the court’s view that the exhibit
was irrelevant. Instead, he responded, “Okay, I understand,” and,
“Absolutely Your Honor.” As well, when asked if he had any
witnesses with personal knowledge to testify that mother committed
domestic violence against him, he answered no.
D. Drug Test Results
¶ 26 Next, father contends that the magistrate erred by admitting
his drug test results without “foundation.” Specifically, he
11 challenges the admission of the results based on chain of custody,
testing methodology, the absence of testimony from a supporting
witness, and hearsay. Again, because he did not raise those issues
before the magistrate, we will not consider them.
¶ 27 At the hearing, father did object to the admission of his drug
test results, yet his objection was limited to a different ground. He
asserted that the results should be excluded because mother
allegedly misrepresented that the magistrate had ordered him to
submit to testing. That is a different issue than what he is arguing
on appeal. Moreover, his appellate issues were not raised in his
petition for review. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402,
403 (Colo. App. 2006) (a party appealing a magistrate’s decision
must first raise a particular issue in the district court in a petition
for review and thereby allow the court to correct any error before
raising the issue on appeal).
¶ 28 We also decline to address father’s related argument that the
magistrate’s written order, which stated that the test was not court
ordered, created “confusion” about the “test’s validity.” He offers no
legal analysis explaining how this alleged error warrants reversal or
how it affected the admissibility of the evidence. See In re Marriage
12 of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to
consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any
meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12. As a result, the
argument is undeveloped, and we do not address it.
E. Bias
¶ 29 Father contends that the magistrate was biased against him.
To get there, he says that the magistrate did not rule on his pretrial
motion to strike, issued contradictory orders, admitted mother’s
allegedly “unauthenticated” testimony, and excluded evidence he
claims was properly authenticated. But adverse legal rulings,
standing alone, do not establish grounds for prejudice or bias. In re
Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007); see People
v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856, 859 (Colo. App. 2005) (the propriety of a
district court’s rulings, whether right or wrong, is not relevant in
determining recusal issues), aff’d, 157 P.3d 516 (Colo. 2007).
¶ 30 Father also points to the magistrate’s statement that “you were
trying to keep the court from seeing a hot drug test,” as evidence of
bias. Judicial comments made during the proceedings, however, do
not establish bias unless they show a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible. See In re
13 People In Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 31; see also Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial remarks during the
course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile
to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a
bias or partiality challenge.”).
¶ 31 The magistrate’s statement appeared to arise from an
evidentiary dispute and, by itself, does not reflect the sort of bias
that would prevent a fair decision. See Hatton, 160 P.3d at 330;
A.P., ¶ 31; see also People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶ 28 (the
record must clearly demonstrate the judge’s actual bias).
¶ 32 Father insists that during the modification hearing, the
magistrate showed bias by playing an audio recording of a prior
ruling. We disagree. The magistrate played the recording to simply
clear up a disagreement over what the magistrate previously
ordered. Father never objected, and nothing about the magistrate’s
conduct suggests favoritism or hostility. See Jennings, ¶ 28.
F. Constitutional Claims
¶ 33 Father contends that the magistrate violated his due process
or fundament rights to present his case by (1) failing to rule on his
pretrial motions; (2) admitting mother’s “unauthenticated” evidence
14 while excluding his properly “authenticated” evidence; (3) barring
his evidence of mother’s domestic violence; and (4) using “surprise
evidence tactics.” Because he did not raise those specific
complaints in his petition for review, we will not address them. See
K.L-P., 148 P.3d at 403; Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc, ¶ 26.
¶ 34 True, he argued in his petition for review that the magistrate
denied him a “fair opportunity to present his case” by refusing to
hear evidence of domestic violence that occurred before the
dissolution decree. But that argument was framed narrowly and
factually. He did not mention a due process violation, invoke
fundamental rights, or otherwise alert the district court that he was
asserting a constitutional claim.
G. Fraud on the Appellate Court
¶ 35 Father contends that the “district court” committed fraud on
this court by falsely certifying the appellate record as complete and
stating that no transcripts had been prepared, even though,
according to him, the hearing transcript had been completed and
delivered to the district court. In other words, he asserts that this
misrepresentation was intended to prevent this court from
reviewing the full record of the proceedings below. He cites two
15 cases for the general proposition that fraud on the court
undermines the integrity of the judicial process and requires
corrective action. However, he does not discuss any relevant facts
or provide any legal analysis applying the facts and law. See
Zander, ¶ 27; see also Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10 (an
appellate court will not comb the record for facts to support
undeveloped arguments). Thus, we decline to address the issue.
And we note that the transcript is part of the record, and we were
able to review the portions relevant to his contentions.
H. District Court Review
¶ 36 We reject father’s contention that the district court committed
“structural error” by merely “rubber-stamp[ing]” the magistrate’s
decision and failed to conduct an independent analysis. Our review
of the court’s order shows that it adequately considered and
addressed the alleged errors in his petition for review.
I. October 19, 2019, Order
¶ 37 Last, father contends that the October 19, 2019, order should
be void because he was not properly served, lacked notice of the
restriction hearings, and therefore the court did not have personal
jurisdiction over him. He maintains that mother allegedly engaged
16 in fraudulent service of process by providing an incorrect address
for him despite knowing his true whereabouts. We conclude that
the issue is moot.
¶ 38 While an order entered without jurisdiction is void and may be
challenged on that basis at any time, an appellate court will not
address the merits of an issue when subsequent events have
rendered the issue moot. In re Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117,
¶ 7. An issue is moot when the relief requested, if granted, would
have no practical effect on an existing controversy. See In re
Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶ 21.
¶ 39 The restriction order father challenges has been superseded by
the district court’s current order, which we have already determined
is proper. The restriction order is no longer operative and does not
govern the parties’ present rights or responsibilities. Even if we
were to accept his contention that the restriction order was entered
based on defective service and should therefore be declared void,
that determination would not alter the existing order. Because the
restriction order has been replaced and no longer has any legal
effect, granting him the relief he seeks would have no practical
effect. See id. Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal.
17 IV. Disposition
¶ 40 We dismiss the part of the appeal challenging the October 19,
2019, order. Otherwise, we affirm the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate’s denial of father’s motion to modify
parental responsibilities.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.