Marriage of Collins

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 23CA2050
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA2050 Marriage of Collins 12-12-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2050 Gunnison County District Court No. 22DR30026 Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Wendy Kathleen Collins,

Appellee,

and

John Michael Collins,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Tow and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 12, 2024

Price Family Law, LLC, Trista Price, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

The Law Offices of Rodger C. Daley and Associates, Rodger C. Daley, Kerry Lego, Carrie Vonachen, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between John Michael

Collins (husband) and Wendy Kathleen Collins (wife), husband

appeals those portions of the permanent orders concerning the

marital property division. We reverse the judgment and remand the

case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2013. In 2023, the district court

dissolved their marriage and entered permanent orders. During the

permanent orders hearing, the parties stipulated to the division of

many of their marital assets without assigning values, including

their vehicles, their respective businesses, and other miscellaneous

assets. The primary disputed issues at the permanent orders

hearing were the valuation and division of the marital home and the

valuation and division of the marital interest of a ranch that wife

had co-owned with her brother until it was sold in early 2023. Wife

also argued that husband had dissipated marital funds through a

series of bad investments.

¶3 In the resulting permanent orders, the district court awarded

wife the marital home at a value of $965,500 but rejected her

assertion that husband bore any economic fault related to the

1 parties’ series of questionable investments. The court awarded

husband two of the parties’ “speculative” investments, known as

“China Meat” and “Gizmo,” at a combined value of $140,000.

Finding that “a precise 50/50 division [was] impossible,” the court

ordered wife to make a payment of $435,000 to husband. The court

explained that the $435,000 payment was for husband’s interest in

the marital home and that it also provided husband “some value”

for his portion of the marital increase in the value of the ranch.

II. Property Division

¶4 Husband contends that the property division must be reversed

because the district court made insufficient findings as to the value

of the marital assets and as to the relevant statutory factors. We

agree.

A. Preservation

¶5 As an initial matter, we disagree with wife’s assertion that

husband failed to preserve the issues presented in his appeal.

Husband’s appeal challenges the district court’s findings dividing

the marital estate, and “[a] party is not required to object to the trial

court’s findings in the trial court to preserve a challenge to those

findings.” In re Marriage of Crouch, 2021 COA 3, ¶ 17; see C.R.C.P.

2 52. Moreover, under C.R.C.P. 59(b), husband’s failure to raise an

issue in his later postjudgment motion does not limit his right to do

so on appeal. Thus, we may review husband’s contentions of error.

B. Applicable Law and Standards of Review

¶6 When dividing the marital estate, a district court must first

determine whether property is marital property (which is subject to

division) or separate property (which is not). § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S.

2024; In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9.

¶7 The district court is then “required to find the approximate

current value of all property owned by the parties.” In re Marriage

of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4. However, specific findings as to the

value of each asset are not always required, so long as the basis of

the resulting property division is apparent from the district court’s

findings. See id.; In re Marriage of Page, 70 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo.

App. 2003). It is the parties’ duty to present the court with the

requisite data to value property, and any failure in that regard

should not provide them with grounds for review. In re Marriage of

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003); In re Marriage of

Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 815 (Colo. App. 2007).

3 ¶8 The district court may value property based on an expert’s

testimony, the parties’ testimony, documentary evidence, its own

calculations, or a combination thereof. See In re Marriage of

Nevarez, 170 P.3d 808, 812 (Colo. App. 2007); see also In re

Marriage of Price, 727 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Colo. 1986); In re Marriage

of Keyser, 820 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Colo. App. 1991). Determining the

value of marital property is within the district court’s discretion,

and we will not disturb its determination “if it is reasonable in light

of the evidence as a whole.” In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶

23.

¶9 In reaching an equitable division, the district court must

consider all relevant factors, including each party’s contribution to

the acquisition of the marital property, the value of each party’s

separate property, each party’s economic circumstances, and any

increases or decreases in the value of separate property during the

marriage or the depletion of separate property for marital

purposes. § 14-10-113(1)(a)-(d). An equitable division of the

marital property need not be equal. Wright, ¶ 3.

¶ 10 Although the district court “is not required to make specific

findings as to each statutory factor,” In re Marriage of Smith, 2024

4 COA 95, ¶ 71, its findings must be sufficiently explicit “to give the

appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of its order,” In re

Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.

¶ 11 The court has considerable latitude to enter an equitable

property division based on the facts of each case, and we will not

disturb its decision absent an abuse of discretion, which occurs

when the court acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unfair, or

unreasonable manner, or when it misapplies the law. See In re

Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001); In re Marriage of

Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 5.

C. Findings Concerning the Marital Property Division

¶ 12 For multiple reasons, we agree with husband that the district

court made insufficient findings in support of the marital property

division.

¶ 13 To start, we are unable to ascertain the basis of the $435,000

payment that wife was ordered to pay husband. The district court

gave no explanation as to how it arrived at the $435,000 figure,

beyond suggesting that figure represented the difference between

the parties’ respective valuations of the marital home, while

simultaneously stating that the payment provided “some value” to

5 husband for his interest in the marital increase in the value of

wife’s ranch. Yet, at no point did the court indicate what portion of

the $435,000 represented the “some value” that husband was

receiving from the ranch, and the court gave no explanation as to

why a payment equaling the difference between the parties’

respective valuations of the marital home represented an equitable

division of the entire marital estate.

¶ 14 Likewise, the district court did not make any findings as to the

approximate value of the marital and separate property components

of wife’s ranch. While we acknowledge that specific findings as to

the value of each asset are not always required, see Wright, ¶ 4, the

absence of findings here as to both the value of the ranch and total

approximate value of the marital estate leaves us unable to

ascertain what relative proportion of the marital estate each party

received. See Page, 70 P.3d at 582 (providing that where the court

has not valued all the marital assets, the basis of the district court’s

decision must be apparent). Accordingly, we are unable to

meaningfully review the judgment. See In re Marriage of Aldrich,

945 P.2d 1370, 1379 (Colo. 1997) (reversing where the district

6 court’s findings and “reasoning [were] unclear and d[id] not permit

meaningful appellate review”).

¶ 15 We disagree with wife’s assertion that, primarily because of

husband’s deficient presentation of his case, the district court

lacked sufficient information to value the ranch and overall marital

estate. While neither party retained an expert on the subject, both

parties testified and introduced exhibits in support of their

respective valuations of the ranch as of 2013 and 2023. Indeed,

husband testified that wife’s interest in the ranch was worth

$1,650,000 as of the date of the marriage and that the value of

wife’s interest had increased to $3,200,000 based on the proceeds

from the January 2023 sale of the ranch. Conversely, wife assigned

a greater premarital value of $3,189,600 to her interest in the ranch

and testified that there was almost no increase in her equity in the

ranch during the marriage. Wife testified that she owed

approximately $1,000,000 in capital gains taxes on the sale of the

ranch assets and that the parties had borrowed heavily against the

ranch during the marriage, which significantly reduced the

proceeds she received from the January 2023 sale.

7 ¶ 16 Likewise, because each party testified concerning capital gains

taxes, we are not persuaded that the outstanding taxes owed on the

sale of the ranch assets prevented the district court from valuing

and dividing the separate and marital property components of the

ranch. And although wife asserts that the district court could not

otherwise estimate the value of the total marital estate because

husband failed to provide values for many assets (such as the

parties’ vehicles and businesses), we are not persuaded because the

parties unambiguously stipulated to a division of such assets at “no

value.”

¶ 17 We also agree with husband that the district court’s findings

as to the section 14-10-113(1) factors were insufficient. While the

court was not required to make detailed findings as to each factor,

Smith, ¶ 71, beyond a discussion of the parties’ respective

contributions to the ranch, see § 14-10-113(1)(a), the court’s

discussion of the statutory factors was minimal. For instance, the

court made no findings as to the parties’ respective economic

circumstances. And because the court did not value the marital

and separate property components of the ranch and did not assign

an approximate value to the marital estate, it likewise made no

8 findings as to the value of the property set aside to each party and

the change in value of any separate property during the marriage.

See § 14-10-113(1)(b)-(d). Therefore, the basis of the district court’s

order is not sufficiently clear. Gibbs, ¶ 9.

¶ 18 In sum, because we lack sufficient findings as to (1) the value

of the ranch and marital estate as a whole, and (2) the section 14-

10-113(1) and (5) factors, we reverse the property division and

remand for additional findings. See In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016

COA 71, ¶¶ 36-37; Aldrich, 945 P.2d at 1379.

¶ 19 On remand, the district court may take additional evidence as

it deems necessary to facilitate its additional findings. In re

Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App. 1989). The court

must value the marital property as it existed on the date of the

permanent orders hearing. See § 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of

Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996). The court must also

give the parties an opportunity to present any new evidence

concerning their current economic circumstances. § 14-10-

113(1)(c) (the district court considers the parties’ economic

circumstances at the time the property division “is to become

effective”); In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 961 (Colo. App.

9 2009) (requiring the district court to consider the parties’ financial

circumstances at the time of remand when reconsidering a property

division).

¶ 20 On remand, the court may adjust the property division as is

necessary to achieve an equitable result in light of its additional

findings. See In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 38. The

court should make specific findings of fact to support its

determinations. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.

¶ 21 Because we reverse the marital property division and remand

for further findings, we decline to consider husband’s additional

contention that the property division was otherwise inequitable.

¶ 22 However, because it is relevant to the district court’s

reconsideration of the property division on remand, we note our

agreement with husband’s contention that the court’s valuation of

the parties’ speculative “China Meat” and “Gizmo” investments was

unsupported by the record. The court valued those investments

based on an “agreed present value” of $140,000. But we cannot

locate anything in the record indicating that the parties explicitly

agreed to value those investments at that figure.

10 ¶ 23 Wife testified that husband had contributed a combined

$140,000 to those investments during the marriage, although

husband seemingly disagreed that the investments had a

substantial present value, describing the investments as “not

looking good” and “kabunk.” And while the district court, as fact

finder, was free to credit wife’s testimony as to the value of those

investments over husband’s vague statement of value, the court did

not base its findings on wife’s testimony, but instead concluded,

without record support, that the parties had mutually agreed to a

value of $140,000. See In re Marriage of Lewis, 66 P.3d 204, 207

(Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that credibility determinations and

the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well

as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within

the district court’s sole discretion). Accordingly, on remand, the

district court must reconsider its valuation of these investments

and make additional findings in support of their value.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 24 Given our disposition, we deny wife’s request for appellate

attorney fees based on her argument that husband’s appeal was

substantially groundless, frivolous, and vexatious.

11 ¶ 25 Husband requests an award of his appellate attorney fees

under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024. Because the district court is

better equipped to determine the factual issues regarding the

parties’ current financial resources, we direct the district court on

remand to determine whether an award of appellate attorney fees

under that section is appropriate. See In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019

COA 97, ¶ 30.

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 Those portions of the permanent orders valuing and dividing

the marital estate are reversed. The case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Those portions of the

judgment not challenged on appeal remain undisturbed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.