Marriage of Colburn

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0038
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0038 Marriage of Colburn 12-11-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0038 Ouray County District Court No. 18DR15 Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Yolande Miracle Colburn,

Appellant,

and

Larry Rodney Colburn,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I Opinion by JUDGE GROVE J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 11, 2025

Hogan Omidi PC, Hollie A. Hinton, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Heritage Family Law, LLC, Jarod C. Harsha, Broomfield, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 Yolande Miracle Colburn (wife), formerly married to Larry

Rodney Colburn (husband), appeals the district court’s judgment

denying her post-decree motion for a declaratory judgment. We

reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

I. Background

¶2 Husband and wife had been married for thirty-one years when

wife petitioned for legal separation. The parties filed a separation

agreement resolving all matters pertaining to their legal separation

in 2019. The district court then incorporated the separation

agreement into the decree of legal separation, finding that it was

“not unconscionable as to support, maintenance (spousal support)

and division of property.” The decree of legal separation was later

converted into a decree of dissolution of marriage.

¶3 According to the agreement, husband is required to make

monthly maintenance payments to wife in addition to a yearly

maintenance payment through 2026. In pertinent part, the

paragraph of the agreement describing the schedule for husband’s

monthly maintenance payments provides as follows: “Husband

shall pay maintenance to [w]ife of $8,350.00 per month payable on

1 or before the third day of each month beginning on the first month

after the entry of the Decree of Legal Separation and continuing

through February 28, 2026.”

¶4 The next paragraph of the agreement describes the schedule

for husband’s yearly payments:

In addition [to transferring to wife some retirement funds], for year [sic] beginning January 31, 2020, and continuing on January 31st of each year through year 2026, [h]usband shall pay a lump sum maintenance of $35,000.00, subject to an annual adjustment equivalent to the [Consumer Price Index], from [h]usband’s annual bonus or other funds in the event [h]usband does not receive an annual bonus. If [h]usband also receives Goldman Sachs stock as part of his annual bonus, beginning in 2020 and continuing until year 2025, he shall also transfer to [w]ife shares of Goldman Sachs stock with an equivalent value of $13,600.00, by January 31st of each year. If [h]usband does not receive stock as part of his annual bonus, [h]usband agrees to add $13,600 cash to the lump sum annual maintenance payment through 2026.

¶5 In summary, wife is to receive $8,350 per month in

maintenance “on or before” the third day of each month. In

addition, she is to receive a yearly maintenance payment — the

timing of which we discuss below — and also, “by January 31st of

2 each year,” a transfer of Goldman Sachs stock if husband’s bonus

included a stock award.

¶6 Importantly, the agreement also provides that husband’s

maintenance obligation will be automatically extended from its

original expiration date of February 28, 2026, through the end of

2028 if husband “defaults on either his monthly or yearly

maintenance payments at any point during the maintenance term.”1

¶7 It is undisputed that husband’s monthly maintenance

payments were made timely and that, up until 2023, he made his

yearly maintenance payments in January of each year. But in 2023

and 2024, because he changed jobs and his new employer

disbursed annual bonuses somewhat later, husband made the

corresponding yearly maintenance payments in March. Wife’s

motion for a declaratory judgment asked the court to determine

that the 2023 and 2024 annual payments were untimely and,

accordingly, rule that husband’s maintenance term is extended

1 The agreement allows for one late payment to be excused each

year, so long as that payment is not more than five days late. The payments in question, however, were both made more than five days after January 31 in both 2023 and 2024, so that grace period has no bearing on our analysis.

3 through the end of 2028. The court found that the “annual bonus-

related maintenance obligation is ambiguous because it does not

provide a due date for an annual maintenance payment from

bonuses received after January each year.” The court went on to

deny wife’s motion in its entirety, ruling that, regardless of the

correct interpretation of the agreement, it would “work a significant

inequity” on husband to extend husband’s term of maintenance

based on the “relatively small default” caused by “[a] three-month

delay in the payment of $35,000.00.”

¶8 Wife appeals the district court’s ruling.

II. Relevant Law and Standards of Review

¶9 To promote the amicable settlement of disputes, parties to a

marriage, in contemplation of their separation or the dissolution of

their marriage, may enter into a written separation agreement

providing for, as relevant here, maintenance. § 14-10-112(1),

C.R.S. 2025. A separation agreement is enforceable unless the

court, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties

and other circumstances, finds it unconscionable. § 14-10-112(2);

In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005). A

4 separation agreement is a contract between parties to a marriage.

In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669, 671 (Colo. 1983).

¶ 10 We apply principles of contract interpretation to determine the

meaning of a decree of dissolution that incorporates the parties’

separation agreement. In re Marriage of Thomason, 802 P.2d 1189,

1190 (Colo. App. 1990).2 The primary goal when interpreting an

agreement is to determine and give effect to the parties’ intent

based primarily on the language of the agreement. Ad Two, Inc. v.

City & Cnty. of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376 (Colo. 2000); In re Marriage

of Crowder, 77 P.3d 858, 860-61 (Colo. App. 2003). We construe

the agreement’s terms in accordance with their plain and generally

accepted meanings. Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376. We evaluate an

agreement by reviewing it as a whole and avoid interpreting specific

phrases or terms in isolation. See Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.,

29 P.3d 887, 898 (Colo. 2001).

2 After the parties’ agreed terms are incorporated into the

dissolution decree, they are no longer enforceable as contract terms. See In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 52 (Colo. 2005) (holding that the district court erred by enforcing parties’ agreement regarding payment of their children’s post-secondary education costs as a contract term after its incorporation into their dissolution decree). They are, however, enforceable “by all remedies available for the enforcement of a judgment.” § 14-10-112(5), C.R.S. 2025.

5 ¶ 11 We review de novo whether a contract is ambiguous. Gagne v.

Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶ 50. The language of a separation

agreement may be ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one

reasonable interpretation. Crowder, 77 P.3d at 861. Absent an

ambiguity, a court may “not look beyond the four corners of the

agreement to determine” the parties’ intent. Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376-

77. “If, however, the court finds the contract’s terms to be

ambiguous, . . . extrinsic evidence can serve as a useful starting

point in determining the actual intentions of the parties.” D.C.

Concrete Mgmt., Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 39 P.3d 1205, 1208

(Colo. App. 2001).

¶ 12 We review for an abuse of discretion a court’s ruling on a

request for entry of a declaratory judgment. Nash v. Mikesell, 2024

COA 68, ¶ 15. We review de novo a court’s interpretation of an

agreement. See Crowder, 77 P.3d at 860 (a court’s interpretation of

a dissolution decree incorporating a separation agreement is

reviewed de novo). A court necessarily abuses its discretion when it

misapplies the law. Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 29.

6 III. The Separation Agreement Is Ambiguous

¶ 13 Wife contends that the district court erred by determining that

the separation agreement is ambiguous concerning the date of her

yearly maintenance payment. She claims that the separation

agreement’s language — “for year beginning January 31, 2020, and

continuing on January 31st of each year through year 2026 . . .

from [h]usband’s annual bonus or other funds in the event [he]

does not receive an annual bonus” — establishes an annual

deadline of January 31 for that payment. She argues that, if

husband has not received his bonus by that date, the agreement

requires him to pay the amount due from “other funds.”

¶ 14 In contrast, husband argues that the language ties the yearly

maintenance payment to husband’s annual bonus and that, “when

the bonus is paid after January 31 . . . the deadline became

unclear.” Thus, while husband appears to concede that he must

make the yearly payment at some point after receiving his annual

bonus, he maintains that the date for the payment is flexible if his

employer does not pay him the bonus before January 31.

¶ 15 Both sides make good points. On wife’s side is the fact that

the agreement says, “continuing on January 31st of each year

7 through year 2026, [h]usband shall pay a lump sum maintenance

of $35,000.00.” This language could be reasonably construed as

setting an annual January 31 deadline for husband’s yearly

maintenance payments. In addition, as wife points out, husband’s

obligation to make the yearly maintenance payment does not

depend on whether he receives a bonus or a stock allocation; to the

contrary, if he “does not receive an annual bonus,” then he must

make the payment from “other funds,” and if he “does not receive

stock as part of his annual bonus,” he must add $13,600 cash to

the lump sum annual maintenance payments.

¶ 16 Husband’s position, on the other hand, is bolstered by a

review of the agreement as whole. As we have already noted, the

provision requiring monthly maintenance payments is perfectly

clear, requiring husband to make payments “on or before the third

day of each month.” The deadline for stock transfers is also certain,

requiring husband to make the transfer “by January 31st of each

year.” But the language in the lump sum payment provision differs

from both of these phrases, suggesting a reasonable conclusion that

the parties may have intended it to mean something different. See

Weitz Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 309, 313 (Colo. App.

8 2007) (noting that “the use of different terms in [a contract] signals

that those terms should be afforded different meanings”); cf. Ctr. for

Wound Healing & Hyperbaric Med. v. Kit Carson Cnty. Health Serv.

Dist., 2024 COA 24, ¶ 28 (absent a manifest indication to the

contrary, the rule of consistent usage requires that the use of the

same words or phrases in different parts of a statute should be

given the same meaning). Applying that rule, one alternative

interpretation of the “lump sum” language would be that husband’s

deadline for the yearly payment depends on the date that he

receives his annual bonus (assuming he receives a bonus at all).

¶ 17 After reviewing the agreement as a whole, we conclude that

both interpretations are plausible. While it is certainly possible that

the parties intended to set a firm January 31 deadline for

husband’s yearly payments, the fact that the agreement sets forth

three different types of maintenance payments and then describes

the due dates for those payments in three different ways casts some

doubt on that interpretation. The parties clearly knew how to set a

date certain for payments, as evidenced by the fact that monthly

payments are due “on or before the third day of each month,” and

husband’s annual stock transfer must be completed “by January

9 31st.” Their decision to employ different — and less certain —

language for the yearly payment undermines wife’s argument that

husband’s deadline for the yearly payment is January 31.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that “[t]he

annual bonus-related maintenance obligation is ambiguous

because it does not provide a due date for an annual maintenance

payment from bonuses received after January of each year.”

IV. A Hearing is Required to Resolve the Ambiguity

¶ 18 After determining that the separation agreement was

ambiguous, the district court denied wife’s motion for a declaratory

ruling on two grounds: (1) husband could not be in default for the

2023 and 2024 yearly payments “[b]ecause it is unclear what the

annual maintenance payment due date is in the event that annual

bonuses are not paid until after [the] express deadline”; and (2) “the

proposed declaration would work a significant inequity” because,

even assuming husband missed any deadlines at all, “[a] three-

month delay is a relatively small default.” Because these

conclusions are the result of legal errors by the district court, we

must reverse.

10 ¶ 19 The meaning of an ambiguous contract term cannot ordinarily

be resolved as a matter of law. See E. Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v.

Larimer & Weld Irr. Co., 109 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2005) (“When an

ambiguity has been determined to exist, the meaning of its terms is

generally an issue of fact to be determined in the same manner as

other factual issues.”). Accordingly, once a court determines that

the terms of an agreement are ambiguous, unless the facts relative

to the parties’ intent are undisputed, the court must hold a hearing

at which parties may present extrinsic evidence regarding the

parties’ intent at the time they entered into the agreement. Dorman

v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909, 915-16 (Colo. 1996) (when a

contract contains ambiguities, motion to dismiss must be denied

and parties should have a hearing to introduce extrinsic evidence);

see also D.C. Concrete Mgmt., 39 P.3d at 1208 (extrinsic evidence is

a starting point in determining the parties’ intent).

¶ 20 Here, the district court concluded that the ambiguity it

identified meant that the husband has no identifiable “express

deadline” for his yearly maintenance payments. But it is precisely

because no “express deadline” can be discerned from the separation

agreement itself that extrinsic evidence is needed to resolve that

11 issue. In the absence of clear contractual language, the question

whether the parties contemplated a strict deadline for the yearly

payment, an annual recurring window, or something in between

can only be resolved by making factual findings regarding their

intent.

¶ 21 For many of the same reasons, we also disapprove of the

district court’s finding that strict enforcement of an annual January

31 deadline would be inappropriate because it would “work a

significant inequity on father.” As wife points out, when approving

the decree of legal separation several years before husband’s alleged

default, the court found that the separation agreement was “not

unconscionable as to support, maintenance (spousal support) and

division of property.” Nothing in the record before us suggests that

the parties’ circumstances have substantially changed and, just as

importantly, husband never filed a motion to modify maintenance

as contemplated by section 14-10-122 or section 14-10-114, C.R.S.

2025. See In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶ 35 (“A district

court may modify maintenance on a showing of changed

circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the

existing maintenance terms unfair.”); Cedar Lane Invs. v. Am.

12 Roofing Supply of Colo. Springs, Inc., 919 P.2d 879, 884 (Colo. App.

1996) (“Equity by its very nature is applied on a case-by-case

basis.”).

¶ 22 Accordingly, the district court erred by resolving the ambiguity

in the separation agreement without holding a hearing at which the

parties could present evidence regarding their intent.

V. Husband’s Request for Attorney Fees

¶ 23 Husband requests attorney fees under section 13-17-102(2)

and (4), C.R.S. 2025; C.A.R. 38(b); C.A.R. 39(a)(2); and C.A.R. 39.1.

Having determined that the judgment must be reversed, we deny

his request.

VI. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.