24CA1041 Marriage of Campbell 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1041 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23DR31193 Honorable Michelle Jones, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Andrea Yanique Palmer,
Appellee,
and
Bobby Lee Campbell JR,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Gomez and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
No Appearance for Appellee
Bobby Lee Campbell JR, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Andrea Yanique
Palmer (wife) and Bobby Lee Campell Jr. (husband), husband
appeals the district court’s judgment and challenges the court’s
rulings concerning parenting time, child support, and attorney fees.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2021 and have two minor children. In
2023, wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. In May 2024,
following a hearing,1 the district court dissolved the parties’
marriage and entered permanent orders.
¶3 The district court first found the following facts. From
February through May 2023, the parties lived separately in
Colorado and that wife was the primary caretaker for the parties’
1 The transcript from the May 2, 2024, hearing was not included in
the appellate record. Therefore, we must presume the court’s rulings based on the hearing evidence from that day are correct. See Colo. Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Colo. Dep’t of Pers., 991 P.2d 827, 831 (Colo. App. 1999) (our review is limited to the record presented); see also In re Marriage of Rivera, 91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004) (“It is the obligation of the party asserting error in a judgment to present a record that discloses that error, because a judgment is presumed to be correct until the contrary affirmatively appears.”).
1 two children. The parties discussed developing a parenting time
schedule, but they were unable to reach an agreement.
¶4 At the end of May 2023, wife moved to Florida where both she
and husband had family. Wife informed husband that she had a
job in Florida and asked for his input. At the time, husband
indicated that he was okay with wife having primary custody of the
children and wanted to have as close to equal parenting time as
possible.
¶5 The district court then divided the marital estate. The court
found that the parties were not married for long and, therefore,
could leave the marriage in similar positions where both had the
ability to work, earn funds, and not be burdened with substantial
marital property or debt. As relevant here, the court ordered a
parenting time schedule that accommodated wife’s relocation to
Florida, ordered husband to pay child support both retroactively
and in the future, and ordered husband to pay $5,000 of wife’s
attorney fees.
II. Evidence Admission and Due Process Violation
¶6 Husband challenges the district court’s refusal to admit
evidence allegedly critical to his case. He also asserts that the
2 court’s refusal to consider this evidence, as a sanction for
noncompliance with the rules, denied him due process. We are
unable to review the court’s rulings on these issues because
husband did not designate the transcript of the May 2 hearing at
which the court heard evidence and issued its ruling. As the
appellant, it was his responsibility to “include in the record
transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering and
deciding the issues on appeal.” C.A.R. 10(d)(3). Consequently,
husband’s failure to include the May 2 transcript as part of the
appellate record requires us to presume that the district court’s
findings and conclusions are correct. See In re Marriage of Dean,
2017 COA 51, ¶ 13 (“Where the appellant fails to provide . . . a
transcript, the reviewing court must presume that the record
supports the judgment.”); In re Marriage of Beatty, 2012 COA 71,
¶ 15 (same); see also McCall v. Meyers, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo.
App. 2004) (“A party cannot overcome a deficiency in the record by
statements in the briefs.”).
¶7 While we recognize that husband appears pro se, he is bound
by the same rules of procedure as attorneys. See Yadon v.
Southward, 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App. 2002); see also Dean,
3 ¶ 12; Rosenberg v. Grady, 843 P.2d 25, 26 (Colo. App. 1992) (“A pro
se litigant who chooses to rely upon his own understanding of legal
principles and procedures is required to follow the same procedural
rules as those who are qualified to practice law and must be
prepared to accept the consequences of his mistakes and errors.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the court’s rulings on these issues.
III. Child Support
¶8 Husband next contends that the court’s imposition of child
support in the amount of $1,100 per month is unreasonable.
Because the record supports the court’s order, we disagree.
A. Additional Facts
¶9 The record reflects that the district court acknowledged
husband’s argument that wife was capable of earning more income
than she was currently earning. But it refused to impute additional
income because wife cared for their youngest child, who was less
than two years old, full time. The court also ordered retroactive
child support to the time husband was served with the dissolution
petition.
¶ 10 Using Worksheet A, the court computed child support for
August through November 2023 at $732 per month, and husband
4 does not challenge that calculation, which is supported by the
worksheet in the record. It then computed child support for
December 2023, based on wife’s incursion of child care expenses, at
$1,333. Again, husband does not challenge this calculation, which
is supported by the worksheet in the record.
¶ 11 Using the same worksheet, the court calculated child support
for January 2024 at $1,615 based on wife’s reduced income, a
calculation not challenged on appeal. For February 2024, the court
noted that wife’s child care expense was reduced and ordered child
support in the amount of $948. Additionally, for March through
May 2024, the court found husband had obtained new employment
with a higher income and it rejected wife’s argument that the State
of Florida considered child support income. Using Worksheet A, it
ordered child support in the amount of $1,077.
¶ 12 Finally, the court recognized the additional expense husband
would incur to exercise his parenting time with the children in
Florida and reduced his child support obligation by $300 per month
to $777 per month, beginning in June 2024. The court noted this
was a deviation from the child support guidelines and found it was
5 equitable and appropriate to deviate given the “significant and
unknown travel expenses that [husband] will incur.”
¶ 13 In addition to husband’s ongoing child support expense, the
district court ordered father to pay his retroactive child support,
totaling $10,055, over the ensuing twenty-four months, bringing
husband’s monthly child support obligation to $1,196 until the
retroactive fees were paid in full.
¶ 14 During the court’s oral ruling on child support, husband left
the virtual proceeding after attempting to object and being told he
could not do so during the reading of the court’s judgment.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 15 We review a court’s maintenance and child support orders,
including its determination of the parties’ incomes, for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶¶ 12, 21, 27.
We defer to the district court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous, meaning there is no evidence in the record to
support them. Dean, ¶ 8; In re Marriage of Connerton, 260 P.3d 62,
66 (Colo. App. 2010). But the court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law must be “sufficiently explicit” to give us a clear
understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage of Gibbs,
6 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9; see also C.R.C.P. 52. Factual findings are
sufficient if they “identify the evidence which the fact finder deemed
persuasive, and determinative of the issues raised.” In re Marriage
of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App. 1998).
¶ 16 Colorado’s child support guidelines provide district courts with
a framework for determining the amount of child support they
should award in dissolution of marriage proceedings. In re Marriage
of Boettcher, 2019 CO 81, ¶ 1. These guidelines establish specific
presumptive payment amounts based on the number of children
and the parties’ combined income. Id.
¶ 17 In calculating child support, the court must consider the
parties’ financial resources, including each parent’s income. See
§ 14-10-115(2)(b)(II), (V), C.R.S. 2024. “Income” for purposes of the
child support guidelines means the “actual gross income of a
parent, if employed to full capacity, or potential income, if
unemployed or underemployed.” § 14-10-115(3)(c). Potential
income is used to calculate child support only if the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. See § 14-10-115(5)(b)(I).
“‘Voluntarily’ in this context means that the parent is
underemployed ‘intentionally, of free will.’” In re Marriage of Garrett,
7 2018 COA 154, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 477-
78 (Colo. 2003)). Thus, before the court may impute potential
income to a parent, it must find that the parent is “shirking his or
her child support obligation by unreasonably forgoing higher-
paying, obtainable employment.” Id. A court may not impute
income if a parent is unemployed or underemployed because they
are caring for a child under the age of twenty-four months for whom
the parties owe a joint legal responsibility. See § 14-10-
115(5)(b)(I)(B); see also In re M.E.R-L., 2020 COA 173, ¶ 34
(declining to impute any income to wife because she cared for a
child under the age of two).
C. Analysis
¶ 18 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s child support
orders because they are supported by the record, which shows that
the court followed the child support guidelines by considering the
parties’ varying incomes and child care expenses. See Boettcher,
¶ 1; see also § 14-10-115(2)(b)(II), (V) (in calculating child support,
the court must consider the parties’ financial resources, including
each parent’s income).
8 ¶ 19 Additionally, in rejecting husband’s argument that wife should
have additional income imputed when determining his child
support obligations, the district court correctly reasoned that wife
was caring for a child under twenty-four months. See § 14-10-
115(5)(b)(I)(B); see also M.E.R-L., ¶ 34. Moreover, to the extent
husband challenges the court’s ruling ordering him to pay
retroactive child support, we discern no error and conclude it is
consistent with section 14-10-115(2)(a), under which a court may
order a party to pay child support for the time before the entry of a
support order back to the date the dissolution petition was filed.
¶ 20 Furthermore, we reject husband’s assertion that the court
never considered his expenses at all. The record contains
numerous worksheets showing otherwise, and the court’s ruling
departing from the guidelines that reduced his monthly child
support payment was specifically based on the significant travel
expenses he would incur in exercising parenting time in the future.
¶ 21 Finally, we reject husband’s assertion that the court failed to
consider the best interests of the children in its child support order.
Husband argues that an excessive child support burden would
negatively impact his ability to provide for his children. We disagree
9 because, as discussed above, the court utilized Worksheet A and
considered the parties’ incomes and expenses when determining
child support and recognized that wife was the children’s primary
caretaker. Moreover, the court exercised its discretion to deviate
from the guidelines and reduce husband’s child support obligation,
reflecting the importance of the children maintaining a close
relationship with their father. Under these circumstances, we
cannot say that the court failed to consider the children’s best
interests.
¶ 22 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s child support orders.
IV. Attorney Fee Sanction
¶ 23 Husband next contends that the court abused its discretion in
ordering him to pay a portion of wife’s attorney fees because he
represented himself and the court was biased. We disagree.
¶ 24 The court heard evidence concerning wife’s attorney fee
request at the May 2 hearing and issued its oral ruling on May 24.
According to the court’s order, wife asked that husband be ordered
to pay all of her attorney fees. The court ordered husband to pay
$5,000 of wife’s attorney fees. It first found there was no significant
10 disparity in income between the parties to support equalizing the
footing of each party or allocating attorney fees based on section 14-
10-119, C.R.S. 2024. Instead, it noted that wife’s initial request for
attorney fees stemmed from husband’s repeated and willful
disregard for court orders and procedures.
¶ 25 Turning to section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2024, the court agreed
that husband, as a self-represented party, did not initially know
that some of his actions were frivolous. But it ultimately found that
he knew or reasonably should have known that he should not have
filed some of his later motions or requests. For example, husband
failed to respond to discovery requests even after the court entered
orders denying the abduction prevention measures that he
requested, and husband consistently failed to comply with many
procedural orders and scheduling requests. The court found that
approximately one-fourth of the costs wife incurred in attorney fees
were solely related to conduct that husband clearly knew or should
have known was “vexatious in failing to move this case forward.”
¶ 26 We review a district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse
of discretion. See In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 15. A
11 court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or acts in a
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner. Id. But we
review de novo whether the court properly applied the law. See In
re Marriage of Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 27 A court may assess reasonable attorney fees against a party
when it finds that the party brought an action that lacked
substantial justification. § 13-17-102(4). But when a party is not
represented by an attorney, the court must also find that “the party
clearly knew or reasonably should have known” that the action
“was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or
substantially vexatious” before it may assess attorney fees against
that pro se party. § 13-17-102(6). Absent this finding, an order
“awarding attorney fees cannot stand.” Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833
P.2d 62, 63 (Colo. App. 1992).
¶ 28 We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s attorney fee
order for two reasons.
¶ 29 First, the record shows that the court considered husband’s
actions in light of his pro se status, contrary to his argument. The
record shows the court did not believe husband’s conduct was
12 substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious in the beginning.
For example, the court noted husband’s filing of a petition for
allocation of parental responsibilities instead of a petition for
divorce or dissolution of marriage, a reflection of his pro se status.
Husband also filed a motion for abduction prevention measures,
despite the facts that he knew where the parties’ children were and
that he had discussed the relocation with wife before the move.
¶ 30 Second, the record shows the court sanctioned husband for
actions he knew or reasonably should have known were frivolous
and vexatious, not because he appeared pro se. Specifically, the
court found that husband failed to respond to reasonable discovery
requests. It also noted that even after it had entered orders denying
his request for abduction prevention measures, husband continued
to fail to comply with court orders and failed to schedule and attend
mediation with wife. Thus, it was husband’s failure to adhere to
court orders and procedures that led the district court to order him
to pay $5,000 of wife’s attorney fees.
¶ 31 Finally, we do not address husband’s undeveloped claim that
the court was biased in ordering father to pay $5,000 for “Palmer
attorney.” See, e.g., Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco,
13 LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 n.12 (“We don’t consider undeveloped and
unsupported arguments.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.
¶ 32 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s attorney fee award.
V. Relocation
¶ 33 Husband lastly contends that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to consider the fact that husband could not
relocate to another state given his obligations to his older children
from a previous relationship, who resided in Colorado. Husband
also argues that relocating to Florida was not in the children’s best
interest because it significantly limited his ability to maintain a
meaningful relationship with them. We are not persuaded.
¶ 34 We presume that the following facts set forth in the court’s
order are correct because husband did not designate the May 2
hearing at which the court heard the evidence. The court ordered
wife to be the children’s primary caretaker. It found that the
children had integrated into their new Florida community and that
husband had inconsistently been involved in the children’s lives.
The court also found that husband traveled to Florida to visit his
14 family after wife’s relocation but had not attempted to see his
children while he was there.
¶ 35 The court then implemented a three-step parenting plan for
husband moving forward to help husband maintain a relationship
with the children. First, husband was required to spend one
weekend in Florida per month, to see his children, for three months
in a row. After compliance with step one, then parenting moved to
step two, consisting of an allocation of parenting time during school
breaks, holidays, and summers. Following compliance with step
two, husband would receive additional parenting time over school
holidays in Colorado. The court also created a set schedule for
video contact between the children and the parent who was not
exercising parenting time.
¶ 36 We review the court’s relocation decision for an abuse of
discretion, see In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 148 (Colo.
2005), meaning that we will not disturb the decision unless it is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Gibbs, ¶ 8. We
exercise every presumption that supports upholding the court’s
15 decision. In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App.
2007).
¶ 37 When a parent’s relocation is requested prior to permanent
orders, the court must fashion a parenting plan that takes the
planned locations of the parties and their proximity to each other
into account. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII), C.R.S. 2024; Spahmer v.
Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161-64 (Colo. 2005) (court must fashion a
parenting plan that can be exercised with the parties living in
different states, if that is their stated intention). A court does not
have the authority to order a party to live in a particular location.
Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 162.
¶ 38 When allocating parenting time, the court must focus on the
children’s best interests, giving paramount consideration to their
safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.
See § 14-10-123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; § 14-10-124(1.5), (1.7); see
also In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162,
¶ 16. In making this determination, the court must consider (1) the
wishes of the child’s parents as to parenting time; (2) the interaction
and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and any
other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;
16 (3) any report of domestic violence; (4) the child’s adjustment to his
or her home, school, and community; (5) the ability of the parties to
encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the
child and the other party; (6) whether the past pattern of
involvement of the parties with the child reflects a system of values,
time commitment, and mutual support; (7) the physical proximity of
the parties to each other as it relates to the practical considerations
of parenting time; and (8) the ability of each party to place the
needs of the child ahead of his or her own needs. § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a).
¶ 39 We begin by noting that we must presume the May 2
transcript supports the court’s factual findings. See Dean, ¶ 13. In
doing so, we discern no error in the court’s ruling. The record
shows that the court considered both parties’ circumstances when
fashioning the parenting plan. Wife attempted to co-parent with
husband during her time in Colorado, following the parties’
separation. The district court found that husband’s “lack of
interest and lack of response to a set schedule” has “caused the
children to have a better interaction, and bond, with [m]other.” The
17 court also found that despite her treatment by husband, wife
continued to make “significant attempts to continue to share the
relationship the children have with their father and to encourage
that relationship.” Moreover, wife had already informed husband of
her relocation at the time the district court entered the parenting
time order. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 164 (reversing a parenting
time order that required a mother to remain in Colorado even
though she had told both the father and the trial court of her
intentions to relocate to Arizona). Wife told husband that she had a
indicated that he was okay with wife having primary custody of the
children and wished to have as close to equal parenting time as
possible. After wife moved to Florida, husband travelled to Florida
to visit family, but he made no attempt to visit the children.
Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s ruling.
VI. Disposition
¶ 40 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.