Marriage of: Caldwell

2025 MT 127N

Opinion

06/17/2025

DA 24-0371 Case Number: DA 24-0371

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2025 MT 127N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

JENNY LYNN CALDWELL,

Petitioner and Appellee,

and

BRANDON JAMES CALDWELL,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. DDR-20-0490 Honorable John W. Parker, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Marybeth M. Sampsel, Measure Law, PC, Kalispell, Montana

For Appellee:

Trevor Carlson, Carlson Law, PLLC, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 28, 2025

Decided: June 17, 2025

Filed: ir,-6L-.--if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Brandon James Caldwell appeals the District Court’s final decree of dissolution of

his marriage with Jenny Lynn Caldwell. Brandon claims that the court erred by failing to

issue a final parenting plan for the parties’ minor children and by allowing and relying on

a second appraisal of the marital home that was not provided for in the parties’ Property

Settlement Agreement. Jenny agrees that the District Court improperly failed to enter a

final parenting plan but argues that its decree otherwise should stand. We remand the case

for entry of a final parenting plan in accordance with § 40-4-234, MCA, and affirm the

Decree of Dissolution.

¶3 Brandon and Jenny were married in Colorado in 2008 and later moved to Montana.

The parties separated in June 2020. Jenny filed a petition for dissolution a few months

later, together with a proposed parenting plan for their three minor children.1 The District

Court entered its first interim parenting plan on December 7, 2020. Pending the final

decree, the court would enter several subsequent orders on parenting matters, each time

stating that its previous interim parenting plan otherwise would remain in effect.

1 The oldest child has since turned eighteen. 2 ¶4 Following a mediation on April 28, 2021, the parties reached agreement on the

distribution of their assets and debts, memorialized in a written Property Settlement

Agreement that they submitted to the District Court the next day. The notice of filing

advised the court that they were unable to reach agreement with respect to parenting.

¶5 The parties agreed in the Property Settlement Agreement to divide equally their

interests in two homes—a home they owned on 8th Avenue South in Great Falls and their

marital home in Highwood. With respect to the Highwood property, the Property

Settlement Agreement provided:

Within thirty (30) days, the parties will agree on an appraiser for the property . . . . The parties will equally split the costs associated therewith. After the appraised value is determined: 1) the property will either be sold and the net proceeds equally divided, or 2) Brandon will decide whether he wants to buy out Jenny’s half of the property. If Brandon wishes to purchase Jenny’s half, then he will indicate as much, in writing, within ten (10) days of the appraisal. If Brandon elects to purchase Jenny’s half of the property, he shall pay her her share and remove her name from any mortgages, deeds, etc. within sixty (60) days thereafter. The purchase price shall be determined by subtracting the existing mortgage balance and any costs and expenses associated with the sale from the appraised value.

The Agreement contained similar provisions regarding the Great Falls property—based on

sale price rather than appraised value—and provided Jenny with the option to purchase

Brandon’s half of the property.

¶6 After several hearings and continuances, the parties appeared with counsel at what

was designated a “final hearing” on August 30, 2021. During that hearing, the court

declared the marriage dissolved, approved the Property Settlement Agreement, and set a

deadline for exchange of personal property. The court took testimony on the parties’

3 proposals for a final parenting plan and directed each to submit their proposed findings of

fact, conclusions of law, and parenting plans.

¶7 After the August 2021 hearing, the parties sold the Great Falls house in accordance

with the Agreement when Jenny decided not to buy out Brandon’s interest. On February 1,

2022, the District Court ordered the sales proceeds to be deposited with and held by the

Clerk of District Court, pending issuance of the final decree, which would specify how the

funds were to be divided between the parties.

¶8 In early July 2022, Brandon’s counsel submitted notice to the court that included a

“reminder” that the matter was ready for ruling, as the final hearing was completed the

previous August, the parties had submitted their proposed findings, conclusions, and

parenting plans, and the court was holding proceeds from sale of the Great Falls home. For

reasons that are not entirely clear from the record, however, the District Court did not enter

a final decree or parenting plan. Another “final hearing” was held in September 2023, and

the final “final hearing” occurred on December 5, 2023.

¶9 In the meantime, on August 16, 2022, Jenny filed a motion seeking an additional

appraisal of the Highwood property and a brief in support. She alleged that the initial

appraisal, completed in September 2021, valued the property at $245,000, just $5,000 more

than the price at which the parties bought the property in 2019. Because of the rise in

Montana property values since that time and in light of improvements the parties made to

the home, Jenny asserted that the property was substantially undervalued and that a second

appraisal was warranted. Jenny submitted two affidavits from real estate professionals in

4 support of her allegations. She contended that a new appraisal was necessary in order for

the property to be equitably divided, as the Property Settlement Agreement intended.

¶10 Brandon opposed the motion, arguing that a second appraisal would be contrary to

the Property Settlement Agreement. He pointed out that the parties had agreed on the

appraiser, the appraisal was conducted, and he exercised his option to purchase Jenny’s

interest in the Highwood property. Brandon represented that he paid Jenny her

50% interest of the amount determined, as specified in the Agreement, on December 3,

2021. He argued that Jenny could not now seek to modify the Agreement, which the court

previously adopted, based on her dissatisfaction with the appraisal to which she had agreed.

¶11 The District Court held a hearing on December 19, 2022, to address Jenny’s motion

and another motion regarding parenting time. Over Brandon’s objection, the court heard

testimony from Andrew Long, a Highwood realtor involved in the parties’ 2019 purchase,

about his recent market analysis of the property. The court determined that, though Long

was not an appraiser and would not be testifying to an appraised value of the property, he

was qualified to discuss his market analysis, and his testimony would be relevant because,

under the law, the court needed “to really have a solid understanding of the value of the

assets” before entering a final decree. Long testified that, based on his analysis, the

recommended price for the property at that time would be $437,277. The court overruled

Brandon’s further objection, stating: “I think we need to understand proper evaluation of

these assets to ensure we’re reaching the right conclusion under the family law statutes for

property division.” Again, citing In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, 363 Mont. 352,

270 P.3d 39, and § 40-4-202, MCA, the court explained:

5 And subsection (1) of the statute provides that the Court shall finally equitably [apportion] between the parties the properties. And I just find, conclude, and order I can’t equitably apportion it if there is a possible swing in evaluation of one or two hundred grand. I think we need more evidence on the point. So I think it’s squarely before us under the laws of Montana. And I’m going to [overrule] the objection.

¶12 Jenny also called Brenda Nelson, a certified residential real estate appraiser, to

testify to her review of the first appraisal. After an extensive voir dire and continued

objections from Brandon’s counsel, the court interjected:

So we’ve had a lot of argument about this now and looking at the language of [§] 40-4-202 given that the Court may equitably apportion properties, I find, conclude, and order the Court cannot equitably apportion this property when the evaluation is in question. And we don’t -- I don’t need an eight-hour fight over it. We’re just getting into minutia here. I’m going to order that there shall be another appraisal.

The court agreed, however, to allow Brandon to present evidence from Joe Seipel, who

conducted the first appraisal pursuant to the Property Settlement Agreement. When Mr.

Seipel was unable to connect into the court via Zoom, the court concluded the hearing with

a promise to set a new hearing in February, the next time its calendar would allow.

¶13 The court and parties reconvened on February 10, 2023, at which time Mr. Seipel

testified to his 2021 appraisal and explained his disagreements with the opinions of Long

and Nelson. Following argument from both counsel, the court granted Jenny’s motion for

the second appraisal, explaining its ruling from the bench:

I do find as a factual matter that the testimony from the prior hearing and from today calls into question economic value of the subject property. Section 40-4-202 requires the trial court to equitably apportion the property and assets of the parties. The Court cannot render an equitable distribution if the value of a very significant asset, like a home, is inaccurate.

6 Based on its review of Marriage of Funk and In re Marriage of Simpson, 2018 MT

281, 393 Mont. 340, 430 P.3d 999, the court concluded that it was required to make an

accurate determination of value. It stated, “Separation agreements are binding on a court

unless the court finds the agreement unconscionable after considering the parties[’]

economic circumstances. If this home is undervalued by 100 to 200,000 dollars that will

not be an equitable result. If this house is overvalued, that won’t yield the equitable result

for [Brandon].” The court added that “there will not be any peace and finality if the home

in this case is undervalued by 100 to 200,000 dollars.” The court discussed with counsel a

process for selection of another appraiser and directed them to proceed.

¶14 When the final hearing commenced on December 5, 2023, the parties presented

additional testimony about the parenting dispute and evidence about the division of their

personal property. The second appraisal had not yet been completed. At the conclusion of

the hearing, Brandon’s counsel said, “The other thing I think we have to look at is when is

this case gonna [sic] be over?” She repeated Brandon’s concern about the court having

allowed a second appraisal and noted that it still was not finished. The court inquired

whether the appraisal would be submitted after the hearing. After further back-and-forth

between counsel about process, the court declared that it would impose a simultaneous

deadline for each party to submit proposed findings and conclusions on the final parenting

plan and property issues, along with a “two-to-three page point brief on housing evaluation

and any supplemental exhibits[.]” The court advised that it would hold no more hearings

and would not extend filing deadlines. Brandon’s counsel confirmed that if the appraiser

contacted him, Brandon would set up a time for them to come to the home.

7 ¶15 Counsel for Jenny submitted a Notice of Filing on December 20, 2023, including

the appraisal for the Highwood property conducted by John Buck. Buck valued the

property at $462,000. Except for his proposed findings and conclusions, Brandon did not

submit any further point brief or supplemental information on the property evaluation.2

¶16 The District Court entered its final decree on March 14, 2024. The Decree ordered

the parties to comply with the Final Parenting Plan. The court did not, however, issue a

final parenting plan. The District Court discussed the two appraisals and concluded that

the parties’ division of property under the Property Settlement Agreement was equitable.

“However,” it concluded, “incidents have occurred since that time that require an

adjustment in the property distribution.” One such adjustment concerned the parties’

personal property, which is not at issue in this appeal. The second was the appraisal of the

Highwood Property. The court found that the current value of the property is $462,000. It

concluded that either Brandon must purchase Jenny’s half interest or “the parties must sell

the property and divide the proceeds.”

¶17 Brandon moved to alter or amend the judgment, pointing out that the court did not

enter a final parenting plan and arguing in part that the court should not have relied on the

Buck appraisal because it was inadmissible hearsay and Buck did not testify. The motion

was fully briefed and was deemed denied after the District Court did not rule on it within

sixty days or extend the time for decision. M. R. Civ. P. 59(f). Brandon timely appealed.

2 Brandon’s Notice of Filing is in the record transmitted on appeal, but the proposed findings and conclusions are not. 8 ¶18 “We review a district court’s findings of fact, including those underlying a

dissolution proceeding, parenting plan, and division of marital assets, to determine if they

are clearly erroneous.” In re Marriage of Thorner, 2008 MT 270, ¶ 20, 345 Mont. 194,

190 P.3d 1063 (citation omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by

substantial evidence, the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or our

review of the record convinces us the district court made a mistake.” Marriage of Thorner,

¶ 20 (citation omitted). “A district court’s apportionment of the marital estate will stand

unless there was a clear abuse of discretion as manifested by a substantially inequitable

division of the marital assets resulting in substantial injustice.” Hutchins v. Hutchins,

2018 MT 275, ¶ 7, 393 Mont. 283, 430 P.3d 502.

¶19 First, § 40-4-234, MCA, requires a court in every dissolution proceeding that

involves a child to incorporate a final parenting plan into any final decree. The District

Court appears simply to have overlooked this final step, as its decree included extensive

findings and conclusions on parenting and ordered the parties to “follow the Final Parenting

Plan.” The case will be remanded for the court to adopt a final parenting plan on the

existing record in accordance with its findings and conclusions.

¶20 Second, under § 40-4-201(2), MCA, a dissolution court is bound by an agreement

between the parties regarding the disposition of their property “unless it finds, after

considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence

produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that the separation

agreement is unconscionable.” In such a case, the statute allows the court to “make orders

for the disposition of property[.]” Section 40-4-201(3), MCA. With exceptions not

9 relevant here, the statute provides further that “the decree may expressly preclude or limit

modification of terms set forth in the decree if provided for in the separation agreement.”

Section 40-4-201(6), MCA.

¶21 Brandon and Jenny’s Property Settlement Agreement provided:

The parties hereto understand and agree that all of the provisions of this Agreement are subject to the approval of the court having jurisdiction over this cause and that the said court may make such modification of this Agreement as it deems fit and proper.

It also provided:

Both parties agree that this agreement and any decree of dissolution of their marriage incorporating this Agreement shall not be modified in any future legal proceeding under the authority of § 40-4-201(6), MCA. [Emphasis added.]

¶22 The Agreement called for the parties to divide the Highwood Property equally based

on the “appraised value.” Contrary to Brandon’s argument, nothing in the parties’

Agreement prohibited the District Court from considering a substantive review of the

appraisal to satisfy itself that the Agreement met the statutory requirements and would

result in an equitable apportionment of the marital estate. Section 40-4-202(1), MCA. In

fact, the Agreement expressly allowed the court in the dissolution proceeding to “make

such modification” as it deemed “fit and proper.” During every record discussion of the

matter, the court noted its obligation to accurately value and equitably distribute the

property and expressed its concern about the potentially undervalued Seipel appraisal. It

also allowed Brandon to present Seipel’s testimony defending the appraisal and disputing

Jenny’s evidence that he had not valued the property accurately.

10 ¶23 Brandon maintains, however, that the court could not simply adopt the Buck

appraisal when Jenny submitted it after the final hearing, without an affidavit, and with no

opportunity for cross-examination. Brandon raised these concerns in his Rule 59 motion

but not before the court entered its decree. At the final “final hearing,” the District Court

expressly invited the parties to submit supplemental exhibits and point briefs on the

property valuation; it told them on the record that it would hold no more hearings.

Brandon’s response was that he would make the house available to the appraiser. True,

the appraisal did not get filed until the day before the court’s final deadline, but Brandon

submitted no objection, no point brief, and no supplemental exhibits of his own before the

court entered its decree nearly three months later.

¶24 Upon review of the complete record, we are not persuaded that the District Court’s

use of the Buck appraisal warrants reversal. We do not condone the lengthy delay in

bringing this matter to resolution. But the court nonetheless was obligated to determine a

reasonable valuation of the property when it entered its decree. Although “[t]he time for

proper valuation cannot be tied to any single event in the dissolution process[,]” it is

preferable for property valuation to “occur at the time of distribution,” and “present fair

market values should be used.” In re Marriage of Krause, 200 Mont. 368, 378-79,

654 P.2d 963, 968 (1982); accord In re Marriage of Bartsch, 2004 MT 99, ¶¶ 24-27,

321 Mont. 28, 88 P.3d 1263; In re Marriage of Pospisil, 2000 MT 132, ¶¶ 43-52, 299 Mont.

527, 1 P.3d 364. In the final analysis, the District Court exercised conscientious judgment

in approving a final decree that “finally equitably apportion[ed] between the parties the

property and assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired[.]”

11 Section 40-4-202(1), MCA. To the extent that the court’s acceptance of the Buck appraisal

constituted a modification of the Property Settlement Agreement, its determination of

unconscionability was not an abuse of discretion. Marriage of Simpson, ¶ 10.

¶25 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. With the exception

of the parenting plan oversight, the District Court’s rulings at issue are entitled to

deference, and we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. Its March 14, 2024

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution are affirmed. The case

is remanded with instructions to the court to issue a Final Parenting Plan on the existing

record in accordance with its Decree.

/S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE