Marriage of Braff CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 8/18/26 Marriage of Braff CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of ANDREA 2d Civ. No. B346988 and CHARLES BRAFF. (Super. Ct. No. 19FL-0051)

(San Luis Obispo County)

ANDREA BRAFF,

Appellant,

v.

CHARLES BRAFF,

Respondent.

After the dissolution of their marriage, Andrea Braff (wife)

and Charles Braff (husband) were unable to agree on the division of their tangible personal property. Wife appeals the trial court’s order approving an arbitrator’s division of the property. Both parties are proceeding in propria persona.

Wife contends the trial court unlawfully compelled her to engage in arbitration. She further contends the court and the arbitrator committed numerous errors.

We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that wife consented to the arbitration. Wife fails to comprehend the limited scope of judicial review of an arbitrator’s award. In addition, the record on appeal is inadequate for meaningful review of the award.

Factual and Procedural Background According to husband, the parties were married in September 2012 and separated in December 2018. The record shows that in November 2020 a status-only judgment was entered dissolving the parties’ marriage.

In August 2024 husband filed a Request for Order “for Personal Property Arbitration to divide Parties’ household furniture, furnishings, and personal effects.” Husband declared: “[Wife] contends all personal property was divided at the time of separation. This is not true.” Husband listed 51 items of tangible personal property that were subject to division between the parties.

In her response to husband’s Request for Order, wife said the parties should use private mediation to try to resolve their dispute concerning the division of property. “Should mediation fail to resolve all issues, we will proceed to arbitration for disputes.”

On October 16, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on husband’s Request for Order. Husband was represented by counsel. Wife appeared in propria persona. Two days before the hearing, husband requested “a personal property arbitration order assigning our Receiver, Theodore Lanes,” as the arbitrator.

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In August 2024 the trial court appointed Lanes “as Superior Court Receiver to liquidate community assets and retire community debt.”

At the October 16, 2024 hearing, wife objected to the appointment of Lanes as arbitrator because his fee – $525 per hour – was too high and because husband was trying “to litigate [her] separate property that [she had] acquired post separation.” Wife protested, “[I]t’s an attempt to bankrupt me.”

The parties agreed that the trial court would refer the matter to the court clerk, who would arrange for low-cost arbitration pursuant to local court rule 2:16. But the clerk informed the court that rule 2:16 arbitration was no longer available. The court told the parties that they must select an arbitrator. If they were unable to agree on an arbitrator, the court would select one. Wife did not object.

In a document filed five days later on October 21, 2024, wife requested clarification. Wife said, “I do not have the financial ability to pay for the costs associated with arbitration and have not stipulated to arbitration.”

In a separate document also filed on October 21, 2024, husband’s counsel declared: “I confirmed with Mr. Lanes that he is qualified, willing and able to serve as arbitrator. He is familiar with the Parties and the facts of the case. To address costs, provided the arbitration is binding, [husband] agrees to pay the first $3,000 of Mr. Lanes’ fees for his role as personal property arbitrator, after which the Parties would share the costs equally.” Wife did not object to this fee arrangement.

The next document in the clerk’s transcript is an order filed on November 4, 2024, appointing Lanes “to serve as Arbitrator over the issue of Personal Property Arbitration.” The order

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stated: “The scope of the arbitration shall be to characterize, value and distribute the furniture, furnishings and personal effects of the Parties. [¶] [] Provided the Parties stipulate that the arbitration shall be binding, [husband] shall pay the first $3,000 of Mr. Lanes’ fees as arbitrator, after which the Parties shall share the cost equally. [¶] [] In the alternative, the Parties shall stipulate to non-binding arbitration and each Party shall pay the arbitrator's fees equally.” Wife did not object to the court’s order.

The next document in the Clerk’s transcript is Lanes’

report filed on March 20, 2025. The report included the division of the parties’ tangible personal property.

Wife objected to Lanes’ report in her lengthy declaration that included exhibits. In addition, she filed 18 pages of supporting points and authorities. The trial court “overruled” all of her objections. It ordered the distribution of the parties’ tangible personal property pursuant to Lanes’ division of the property. In accordance with Lanes’ report, it ordered wife to pay husband “$14,015 to account for the difference in value of the personal property.”

The Arbitration Is Binding In her opening brief wife does not say whether she accepted husband’s offer to pay the first $3,000 of Lanes’ fee provided that the arbitration would be binding. Wife suggests that the arbitration is nonbinding. (See p. 7 [“Even if the appointment [of Lanes] were valid as a non-binding reference, the court committed a distinct, reversible error”]; see also p. 30 [“A court conducting a genuine review of a non-binding report is obligated to reject baseless findings”].)

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The record on appeal is inconclusive as to whether wife accepted husband’s offer to pay the first $3,000. Husband contends she accepted his offer, so the arbitration is binding. He alleges, “Evidence of [wife’s] receipt of $3,000 advance is identified in RECEIVER’S REVISED FINAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTING, filed on December 12, 2025,” which wife did not include in the record. Husband has not moved to augment the record to include this document. “[M]atters outside the record will not be considered on appeal.” (Gopal v. Yoshikawa (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 128, 133.)

In her reply brief, wife does not deny husband’s claim that she accepted his offer to pay the first $3,000 of Lanes’ fee and that he in fact paid it. She contends the claim “is improper and factually unsupported by the record on appeal.” Therefore, it is “forfeited.”

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson).)

If the arbitration were nonbinding, wife could have rejected the arbitrator’s award and the trial court would have lacked jurisdiction to confirm it. There would have been no need for wife’s 98-page declaration of objections and 18-page points and authorities. That she objected to the award instead of rejecting it establishes that the arbitration was binding.

Standard of Review

“ ‘ “ ‘On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration

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award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those issues.’ ” ’ ” (Roussos v. Roussos (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 962, 973.)

“The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow because of the strong public policy in favor of arbitration and according finality to arbitration awards. [Citations.] An arbitrator's decision generally is not reviewable for errors of fact or law.” (Ahdout v. Hekmatjah (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 21, 33.)

Wife’s Claim that Court

Erroneously Compelled Arbitration Wife claims “the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by compelling arbitration without [her] consent.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) Wife forfeited the consent issue because she did not raise it in her declaration of objections or points and authorities filed in the trial court. “It is well settled that the failure to raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on appeal any claim of error based on that issue.” (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489; see also Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1127 [“A party who fails to alert the trial court to an issue that has been left unresolved forfeits the right to raise that issue on appeal”].)

In any event, wife’s claim fails on its merits. Whether wife consented to arbitration is a factual issue that we review for substantial evidence. (See ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1269; Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “[T]he power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or

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uncontradicted,” to support the [express or implied] findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . .’ ” ’ ” (David v. Hernandez (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 692, 702.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that wife consented to the arbitration. In her response to husband’s Request for Order, wife said, “Should mediation fail to resolve all issues, we will proceed to arbitration for disputes.” At the October 16, 2024 hearing, wife consented to low-cost arbitration pursuant to local court rule 2:16. In her opening brief wife states, “In response to [husband’s] proposal for an affordable court-administered program to be heard by an attorney, [she] gave conditional consent, stating, ‘I’m okay with that.’ ” Wife’s only objection to Lanes was his fee.

After it was determined that the court-administered arbitration program was no longer available, husband offered to pay the first $3,000 of Lanes’ fee provided that the arbitration would be binding. We assume that wife accepted his offer. (See the discussion, ante, at pp. 5-6.) She did not object to his offer or the court’s subsequent order appointing Lanes. She participated in the arbitration without objection.

Wife’s Claim that Trial Court and Arbitrator Committed Numerous Errors Wife claims the trial court “committed reversible error by abdicating its duty of independent review and adopting Mr. Lanes’ legally flawed report.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) In addition, the court’s order approving Lanes’ award “ratified a property division based on a cascade of categorical legal errors.”

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“The most fundamental error” was Lanes’ alleged reliance on an item’s cost basis instead of fair market value. “[T]he court ratified a value devoid of substantial evidentiary support and based on inadmissible, speculative hearsay.” (Capitalization and bold omitted.)

Wife goes on to list numerous additional errors allegedly committed by Lanes and the trial court. She also accuses Lanes of engaging in “a pattern and practice of a biased process.” Wife requests that we “correct” Lanes’ and the trial court’s errors and direct the trial court “to enter a new, final money judgment ordering [husband] to pay [her] a single, net payment of $30,024.46. This amount corrects the dispositive financial errors and makes [her] whole . . . .”

Wife misunderstands the applicable standard of review.

“When parties choose to forgo the traditional court system and arbitrate their claims, it is assumed they wish to have a final and conclusive resolution of their dispute. The Legislature has recognized this underlying assumption of finality and has, by statute, limited the grounds for judicial review of an arbitrator's award. [Citation.] Consistent with this legislative intent, [the California Supreme Court] recognized the general rule that ‘an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.’ (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11 . . . .)” (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 981-982.) “[C]ourts will not review the arbitrator’s reasoning or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award.” (Cooper v. Lavely & Singer Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 12.)

“In Moncharsh, [our Supreme Court] held judicial review of private, binding arbitration awards is generally limited to the statutory grounds for vacating ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 1286.2) or

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correcting (§ 1286.6) an award;[1] [it] rejected the view that a court may vacate or correct the award because of the arbitrator's legal or factual error, even an error appearing on the face of the award. [Citation.] [It] further explained that arbitrators do not ‘exceed[ ] their powers’ within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (d) and section 1286.6, subdivision (b) merely by rendering an erroneous decision on a legal or factual issue, so long as the issue was within the scope of the controversy submitted to the arbitrators. ‘The arbitrator's resolution of these issues is what the parties bargained for in the arbitration agreement.’ ” (Moshonov v. Walsh (2000) 22 Cal.4th 771, 775- 776.)

Pursuant to the principle that a trial court judgment is presumed correct (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609), wife was required to present meaningful legal analysis showing that the alleged errors are cognizable on appeal. “ ‘[T]he party asserting trial court error may not . . . rest on the bare assertion of error but must present argument and legal authority on each point raised. . . .’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.) Wife failed to carry her burden. She makes no attempt to show that the alleged errors are cognizable under Moncharsh and its progeny. She does not mention Moncharsh or sections 1286.2 and 1286.6. “We are not bound to develop [wife’s] arguments for [her].” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)

Wife “is not exempt from the foregoing rules because [s]he is representing [her]self on appeal in propria persona. Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney.

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

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[Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. . . .’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)

Moreover, wife failed to provide this court with an adequate record of the arbitration proceedings. The record consists only of Lane’s perfunctory report, wife’s declaration of objections to the report, and her supporting points and authorities. The record does not include all of the relevant evidence presented to the arbitrator. In his report Lanes stated, “Both [parties] were given adequate time and opportunity to provide receipts, images, appraisals, etc. to defend their position on character, value and possession.”

“ ‘ “[I]f the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)

Disposition

The order filed on April 4, 2025, entitled “ORDER FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY,” is affirmed. Husband shall recover his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J. McKAIG, J.*

* Superior Court of Ventura County, Ronda McKaig, Judge. (Assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art, VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)

Erin M. Childs, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Andrea Braff, in propria persona, for Appellant. Charles Braff, in propria persona, for Respondent.