23CA1882 Marriage of Bogenrief 01-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1882 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR30924 Honorable Anita M. Schutte, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Asel Raushan Kizi Zakirova,
Appellee,
and
Brett David Bogenrief,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 2, 2025
Márquez Law, Jason A. Márquez, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Brett David Bogenrief, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Brett David
Bogenrief (husband) and Asel Raushan Kizi Zakirova (wife),
husband appeals the permanent orders regarding the property
division. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2022, after nearly two years of marriage, wife
filed a petition for dissolution. Following the parties’ separation,
husband remained in the marital residence. The district court
scheduled a permanent orders hearing for March 17, 2023. In the
meantime, the district court issued a temporary order that required
husband to vacate the marital residence by February 28, 2023.
¶3 At the permanent orders hearing, the district court granted
husband’s request for a continuance and then entered a dissolution
decree.
¶4 At the next hearing on August 8, 2023, wife appeared with
counsel, but although husband’s counsel was present, husband
was not. Husband’s counsel explained that husband had texted
that morning saying that he was not going to attend. Husband’s
counsel requested a continuance, which the court denied.
1 ¶5 Husband’s counsel then moved to withdraw, stating that he
had already sent husband a formal letter outlining his grounds for
withdrawal. The court granted the request. Husband’s counsel
said he would follow up with a written motion to withdraw along
with the letter.
¶6 The district court proceeded with the hearing. A real estate
appraiser and wife testified. At the end, the court issued an oral
ruling dividing the marital estate. As relevant here, the court (1)
awarded wife the marital residence, valued at $410,000, subject to
a mortgage of $391,291, leaving equity of $18,709; and (2) required
husband to pay $2,000 in insurance deductibles incurred because
of damage he caused to the marital residence while residing there.
¶7 Husband’s counsel later filed a written motion to withdraw.
On August 22, 2023, the court granted the motion to withdraw and
issued a written judgment tracking its oral ruling.
¶8 Husband now appeals. Husband’s opening brief violates the
appellate rules, making it difficult for us to understand his
contentions on appeal. Although we construe his briefing broadly,
we may not raise arguments on his behalf. See Arnold v. Brent,
2 2024 COA 104, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we have interpreted and
addressed all arguments fairly presented in his briefs to the best of
our ability.
II. Denial of Second Continuance
¶9 Husband contends that the district court erred by denying his
second motion for a continuance. We disagree.
¶ 10 A continuance of a hearing “shall be granted only for good
cause,” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-11, meaning that “there are unforeseen
and exceptional circumstances requiring a continuance.” Miller v.
Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App. 2009). The burden is on
the moving party to show good cause for a continuance. See In re
Marriage of Lorenzo, 721 P.2d 155, 156 (Colo. App. 1986).
¶ 11 The decision to grant or deny a continuance is a matter
entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, and the
court’s decision will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse
of that discretion. In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 814
(Colo. App. 2007); see People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.
A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unfair, or unreasonable or when it misapplies the law. E.B., ¶ 14.
3 In determining whether a court abused its discretion, the appellate
court must consider the totality of the circumstances as reflected by
the record. Id.
¶ 12 We conclude that husband failed to establish good cause for a
continuance. On appeal, husband says he could not attend the
August permanent orders hearing because he was living in Canada
and prioritizing his basic needs. However, he did not take any steps
before the hearing to address his inability to attend, such as
requesting a continuance or permission to appear remotely. Thus,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny
counsel’s last-minute request for a continuance after husband
failed to appear. See Rodrick, 176 P.3d at 814; see also E.B., ¶ 14.
III. Withdrawal of Counsel
¶ 13 Next, husband contends that the district court erred when it
allowed his counsel to withdraw at the second permanent orders
hearing. We see no reversible error.
¶ 14 At the permanent orders hearing, husband’s counsel said that
he had previously informed husband of his grounds to withdraw.
He added that the ability to “work together as a team [was]
4 obviously . . . unavailable” and that he could not proceed without
husband; he needed a “captive partner and participant.” Husband’s
counsel received a text message from husband a few hours before
the hearing indicating that husband would not appear. The district
court granted husband’s counsel’s oral motion to withdraw.
Husband had another opportunity to object to the withdrawal when
his counsel subsequently filed the written motion to withdraw, but
he did not. The court granted the written motion.
¶ 15 Under these circumstances, we conclude that husband cannot
object now. Cf. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law
Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (arguments not raised in or decided
by the district court will not be addressed for the first time on
appeal).
IV. Property Division
¶ 16 Husband contends that the district court erred by awarding
the marital residence to wife. We are not persuaded.
¶ 17 A district court has great latitude to make an equitable
property division based on the facts and circumstances of each
case, and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing of an
5 abuse of its discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,
¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 18 Here, the district court found that the marital residence was
jointly titled and worth $410,000 at the time of the dissolution
decree. The parties stipulated that the existing mortgage was solely
in wife’s name and had a balance of $391,291. The court ultimately
awarded the residence and the mortgage to wife.
¶ 19 The record supports the district court’s decision. Wife testified
that the marital residence was titled in both parties’ names and
purchased with marital funds during the marriage. The appraiser
testified that the residence had a fair market value of $410,000.
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23CA1882 Marriage of Bogenrief 01-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1882 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22DR30924 Honorable Anita M. Schutte, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Asel Raushan Kizi Zakirova,
Appellee,
and
Brett David Bogenrief,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 2, 2025
Márquez Law, Jason A. Márquez, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Brett David Bogenrief, Pro Se ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Brett David
Bogenrief (husband) and Asel Raushan Kizi Zakirova (wife),
husband appeals the permanent orders regarding the property
division. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2022, after nearly two years of marriage, wife
filed a petition for dissolution. Following the parties’ separation,
husband remained in the marital residence. The district court
scheduled a permanent orders hearing for March 17, 2023. In the
meantime, the district court issued a temporary order that required
husband to vacate the marital residence by February 28, 2023.
¶3 At the permanent orders hearing, the district court granted
husband’s request for a continuance and then entered a dissolution
decree.
¶4 At the next hearing on August 8, 2023, wife appeared with
counsel, but although husband’s counsel was present, husband
was not. Husband’s counsel explained that husband had texted
that morning saying that he was not going to attend. Husband’s
counsel requested a continuance, which the court denied.
1 ¶5 Husband’s counsel then moved to withdraw, stating that he
had already sent husband a formal letter outlining his grounds for
withdrawal. The court granted the request. Husband’s counsel
said he would follow up with a written motion to withdraw along
with the letter.
¶6 The district court proceeded with the hearing. A real estate
appraiser and wife testified. At the end, the court issued an oral
ruling dividing the marital estate. As relevant here, the court (1)
awarded wife the marital residence, valued at $410,000, subject to
a mortgage of $391,291, leaving equity of $18,709; and (2) required
husband to pay $2,000 in insurance deductibles incurred because
of damage he caused to the marital residence while residing there.
¶7 Husband’s counsel later filed a written motion to withdraw.
On August 22, 2023, the court granted the motion to withdraw and
issued a written judgment tracking its oral ruling.
¶8 Husband now appeals. Husband’s opening brief violates the
appellate rules, making it difficult for us to understand his
contentions on appeal. Although we construe his briefing broadly,
we may not raise arguments on his behalf. See Arnold v. Brent,
2 2024 COA 104, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we have interpreted and
addressed all arguments fairly presented in his briefs to the best of
our ability.
II. Denial of Second Continuance
¶9 Husband contends that the district court erred by denying his
second motion for a continuance. We disagree.
¶ 10 A continuance of a hearing “shall be granted only for good
cause,” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-11, meaning that “there are unforeseen
and exceptional circumstances requiring a continuance.” Miller v.
Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App. 2009). The burden is on
the moving party to show good cause for a continuance. See In re
Marriage of Lorenzo, 721 P.2d 155, 156 (Colo. App. 1986).
¶ 11 The decision to grant or deny a continuance is a matter
entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, and the
court’s decision will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse
of that discretion. In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 814
(Colo. App. 2007); see People in Interest of E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14.
A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unfair, or unreasonable or when it misapplies the law. E.B., ¶ 14.
3 In determining whether a court abused its discretion, the appellate
court must consider the totality of the circumstances as reflected by
the record. Id.
¶ 12 We conclude that husband failed to establish good cause for a
continuance. On appeal, husband says he could not attend the
August permanent orders hearing because he was living in Canada
and prioritizing his basic needs. However, he did not take any steps
before the hearing to address his inability to attend, such as
requesting a continuance or permission to appear remotely. Thus,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to deny
counsel’s last-minute request for a continuance after husband
failed to appear. See Rodrick, 176 P.3d at 814; see also E.B., ¶ 14.
III. Withdrawal of Counsel
¶ 13 Next, husband contends that the district court erred when it
allowed his counsel to withdraw at the second permanent orders
hearing. We see no reversible error.
¶ 14 At the permanent orders hearing, husband’s counsel said that
he had previously informed husband of his grounds to withdraw.
He added that the ability to “work together as a team [was]
4 obviously . . . unavailable” and that he could not proceed without
husband; he needed a “captive partner and participant.” Husband’s
counsel received a text message from husband a few hours before
the hearing indicating that husband would not appear. The district
court granted husband’s counsel’s oral motion to withdraw.
Husband had another opportunity to object to the withdrawal when
his counsel subsequently filed the written motion to withdraw, but
he did not. The court granted the written motion.
¶ 15 Under these circumstances, we conclude that husband cannot
object now. Cf. Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law
Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (arguments not raised in or decided
by the district court will not be addressed for the first time on
appeal).
IV. Property Division
¶ 16 Husband contends that the district court erred by awarding
the marital residence to wife. We are not persuaded.
¶ 17 A district court has great latitude to make an equitable
property division based on the facts and circumstances of each
case, and we will not disturb its decision absent a showing of an
5 abuse of its discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,
¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 18 Here, the district court found that the marital residence was
jointly titled and worth $410,000 at the time of the dissolution
decree. The parties stipulated that the existing mortgage was solely
in wife’s name and had a balance of $391,291. The court ultimately
awarded the residence and the mortgage to wife.
¶ 19 The record supports the district court’s decision. Wife testified
that the marital residence was titled in both parties’ names and
purchased with marital funds during the marriage. The appraiser
testified that the residence had a fair market value of $410,000.
Wife, a foreign national, testified that selling the residence would
result in a net loss due to foreign investment tax implications and
associated selling costs. She requested to keep the residence and
agreed to assume responsibility for the taxes and costs in the event
of a future sale. The evidence showed that husband could not
assume financial responsibility for the mortgage: in his August
2023 financial statement, he averred that he no income. Given
this, we cannot say that the district court erred by allocating the
6 home to wife. See Collins, ¶ 19; see also In re Marriage of Amich,
192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (the district court can believe
all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).
¶ 20 Husband also asserts that the district court erred by requiring
him to pay $2,000 in insurance deductibles. We disagree. Wife
testified that upon arriving at the marital residence the day after
husband’s departure, she found it “uninhabitable” due to extensive
water damage resulting from his negligence. She indicated that she
submitted two insurance claims to address the damage. As she
explained, under the “best case scenario,” she was “out of pocket”
$2,000 for the deductibles. Under the “[w]orst case scenario,” the
insurance company could deny coverage for “some or lots of the
damages or the repairs.” Because the record supports the court’s
decision, we will not disturb it. See Collins, ¶ 19.
¶ 21 We decline husband’s invitation to consider certain “exhibits”
because they are not part of the appellate record. See In re
Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App. 2006) (“Only
facts appearing in the record can be reviewed . . . .”).
7 V. Disposition
¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE KUHN concur.