Marriage of Behrend CA2/3

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 22, 2021
DocketB305380
StatusUnpublished

This text of Marriage of Behrend CA2/3 (Marriage of Behrend CA2/3) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marriage of Behrend CA2/3, (Cal. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinion

Filed 6/22/21 Marriage of Behrend CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of DAVID and B305380 ILLANA BEHREND. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD519416)

DAVID BEHREND,

Appellant,

v.

ILLANA BEHREND,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Emily T. Spear, Judge. Reversed. Kermisch & Paletz, Lauren M. Lookofsky and Eden C. Bautista for Appellant. Law Offices of Michael T. Frawley and Michael T. Frawley for Respondent. David Behrend (husband) appeals a postjudgment order (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2)) that increased his child support obligation to $10,658 per month and ordered him to pay $20,000 in attorney fees to counsel for Illana Behrend (wife). Wife’s DissoMaster report, which the trial court adopted, stated that her monthly income is only $2,625. However, that figure, from September 2019, was not reflective of her average income, was contradicted by the attachments to wife’s income and expense (I&E) declaration, and was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Further, wife’s I&E declaration was incomplete and lacked supporting documentation. Therefore, the order modifying child support and awarding attorney fees to wife is reversed. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The parties were married in 2003 and were separated in 2010. There are three minor children of the marriage, born in 2004, 2006 and 2008. The judgment of dissolution, entered in 2014, provided for joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the minors. With respect to child support, the judgment ordered husband to pay wife the sum of $989 per month, based upon his monthly earnings of $5,000. 1. Wife’s original request for an order (RFO) to modify child support. On May 6, 2019, wife, who was then self-represented, filed a request for an order (RFO) to modify the amount of child support from $989 per month to the amount of “the child support guideline.”

2 2. Husband’s order to show cause (OSC) re contempt. On May 31, 2019, husband filed an OSC and affidavit for contempt. He requested that wife be held in contempt for her alleged failure to pay $126,712 in reimbursements and attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the 2014 judgment. In opposition, wife argued that husband brought the OSC to retaliate against her for seeking increased child support, the statute of limitations within which to bring a contempt had expired, and husband’s requests for reimbursements and attorney fees had been discharged in her bankruptcy proceeding. On July 9, 2019, the trial court dismissed husband’s OSC re contempt with prejudice, finding the OSC was time-barred and that his claims against wife had been discharged in bankruptcy. 3. Husband’s RFO to quash wife’s RFO seeking increased child support. On June 4, 2019, shortly after filing his OSC re contempt, husband filed an RFO to quash wife’s RFO for increased child support. In this filing, husband contended that wife was disentitled from seeking affirmative relief due to her willful failure to comply with the judgment, which was the basis of the pending contempt. On August 21, 2019, after hearing the matter, the trial court issued an order denying husband’s motion to quash wife’s RFO. 4. Wife’s amended RFO to modify child support. On September 27, 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation to continue the hearing on wife’s RFO to modify child

3 support, then scheduled for hearing on October 18, 2019, to a later date, and that wife would re-file her RFO.1 On September 30, 2019, pursuant to the stipulation, wife, who was now represented by counsel, refiled her RFO, again seeking support for each child “based on the child support guideline.” Her papers include a DissoMaster report that set child support at $10,658 per month, predicated on husband’s monthly income of $91,922 and her monthly income of $2,625. Wife’s supporting declaration stated, inter alia: Husband’s income had increased substantially since the 2014 judgment, at which time he was earning $5,000 per month. This was evidenced by the fact that in 2018, husband purchased a home in Pacific Palisades for $2.9 million. Husband filed a loan application in February 2019 to refinance said property. In the loan application, a copy of which was attached as an exhibit, husband stated his monthly income is $74,809. In addition, husband earns $5,000 per month from Camden Realty Group (Camden) and an average of $12,630 per month as an Airbnb host, by renting out the lower level of his primary residence.2 With respect to her income, wife filed an I&E declaration that stated she is a self-employed freelance producer, her most

1 The stipulation also provided that any modification of support would be retroactive to May 6, 2019, the initial filing date of wife’s RFO. 2 Husband contends his income from Camden and Airbnb should not have been counted separately, as those sources of income are simply part of his total income. It is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to resolve whether husband’s income from Camden and Airbnb was improperly double counted by wife and by the trial court.

4 recent job ended on September 15, 2019, in the last month she had earned $2,625 and that her average monthly income is $5,250. 5. Husband’s response to the RFO. In opposition, husband contended that wife was disentitled from seeking affirmative relief because she remained in violation of the judgment that required her to pay reimbursements and attorney fees totaling $126,712. Husband also asserted the $74,809 monthly income shown on his loan application was incorrect, stating “[i]n order to obtain a loan, it was necessary to make this representation.” He stated his actual monthly income is $5,000 from Camden, plus $2,735 which was his net income from his properties and Airbnb. Husband further argued that wife’s RFO should be denied due to her incomplete I&E declaration and lack of supporting financial documentation. Among other things, the I&E declaration left blank the amount of wife’s job-related expenses, the date of her last payment on a loan from her mother, and the amount of business income she received from IAMI LLC. Under “employment” wife stated she was self-employed, but she failed to provide the required documentation, either a Schedule C or profit and loss statements. Husband’s papers also include a copy of a rental application by wife, in which she indicated that she was self-employed and was earning $12,000 per month, and stated “I am providing my company, IAMI of Style and Stone bank statements.” Further, according to “subpoenaed records, in August 2019 alone [wife] cashed checks from her business IAMI LLC in the amount of $10,000.” Husband’s exhibit 17 included copies of four checks from IAMI LLC, an entity located at wife’s home address, payable

5 to wife, dated August 2, 9, 16 and 23, in the amount of $2,500 each. 6. Wife’s reply papers. With respect to the $2,625 monthly income shown on wife’s DissoMaster, she denied that she had under-reported her income. She stated she had declared $12,000 in monthly income on her rental application simply to enable her to qualify for a lease on an apartment. Also, wife’s reply declaration denied that she owned a business or that she was self-employed. 7. Hearing and trial court’s ruling. On November 8, 2019, the matter came on for hearing. Both parties were present and were represented by counsel.

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