24CA0930 Marriage of Barron 11-06-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0930 Boulder County District Court No. 22DR30321 Honorable Bruce Langer, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Samantha Weston,
Appellant,
and
Ira Barron,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Brown and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025
Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant
Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this case between Samantha Weston (wife) and Ira Barron
(husband), wife appeals several of the district court’s decisions from
the dissolution proceedings and in its permanent orders. She also
appeals the court’s order finding her in contempt and imposing
sanctions. We affirm and remand to the district court for the
determination of appellate attorney fees and costs.
I. Background
¶2 The parties married in 2004. In August 2022, wife petitioned
for legal separation from husband, which he later converted to a
petition for dissolution of marriage. A permanent orders hearing
was set for April 2023.
¶3 Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(3) and (g)(5), the parties’
disclosures and witness lists were due on February 6, 2023, and
their expert reports were due on February 13, 2023. Each party
filed timely witness disclosures. The parties endorsed Glenn
Fleckenstein as a joint expert retained to appraise four properties,
including the marital home (Mapleton). Husband also listed an
“unknown rebuttal real estate appraiser” and an “unknown
financial expert.” Wife listed an “unknown personal property
valuator.”
1 ¶4 On February 14, husband moved to extend the deadline for
expert reports, arguing that the large marital estate and his
separate property interests required an expert “to assist with
valuing the pre-marital and/or inherited value of the numerous
sizable accounts.” Wife objected, arguing that he did not identify
the type of expert or a reason for the delay. The district court
denied husband’s motion. Husband then endorsed William Kamin
as a rebuttal real estate expert and timely filed a rebuttal expert
report. See C.R.C.P. 16.2(g)(5).
¶5 Because the parties took little action in the case, the court
rescheduled the April 2023 permanent orders hearing for October
23. In late July, wife’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw, which
the court granted in early August. More than a month later, the
same attorney filed a limited entry of appearance to request a
continuance of the October 23 permanent orders hearing. The
motion requested a continuance because the parties had not
undertaken “formal discovery,” and husband’s documentation was
insufficient to trace or value his separate property. The court
denied the motion, finding no good cause. Wife then filed a pro se
motion to continue, which the court also denied.
2 ¶6 On October 10, four days after the court denied wife’s second
motion to continue, a new attorney entered a limited appearance for
wife and asked the court to reconsider her motion to continue the
permanent orders hearing. The court granted the motion,
reasoning that the marital estate was complex, neither party had
updated their financial disclosures, and husband’s separate
property would require tracing.
¶7 At an October 20 status conference, wife expressed concerns
about her ability to retain counsel given her ongoing mental health
challenges. She also expressed concerns about her original
attorney’s diligence and effort in the case, requesting more time to
secure experts. The court was sympathetic but explained that the
case had been pending for “a very long time, and . . . the deadline
for experts [wa]s long past.” As discussed in more detail in Part
II.B, the court noted that it would entertain arguments about
whether to extend deadlines but would not rule until it heard such
arguments. The court then set the permanent orders hearing for
February 2024.
¶8 On October 26, a third new attorney entered his appearance
for wife and, on November 15, moved to extend the discovery and
3 expert deadlines. The motion did not identify a proposed expert or
include an expert report but indicated that counsel had
“contemplated contacting an accounting expert to competently trace
[husband’s] assets.” Beyond stressing that counsel lacked
necessary information about husband’s assets and the marital
estate, the motion failed to make any specific discovery requests.
¶9 At a later status conference, the district court denied wife’s
motion to extend the deadlines. It explained that the case had been
pending “for well over a year. . . . [Wife] was represented . . . for
almost a year . . . , and a large amount of discovery and
endorsement of expert witnesses and expert reports . . . ha[d] been
done ad nause[a]m.” The court was also unsure as to what
necessary information wife sought, given that the parties had “over
a year to try to unravel th[e] [financials] and gather the
information.”
¶ 10 The permanent orders hearing occurred on February 27, 2024,
and the court issued the dissolution decree that day. Then, in
March 2024, as discussed further below, the court granted
husband’s motion to hold wife in contempt and imposed remedial
4 sanctions, including attorney fees. Finally, the court issued written
permanent orders in April 2024.
¶ 11 Wife now appeals. She contends that the district court erred
by refusing to extend the expert and discovery deadlines. She also
argues that the court made several errors in its property
distribution. Finally, she challenges the court’s contempt sanction
awarding husband attorney fees. The court did not err with respect
to the deadlines or property distribution, and we affirm its contempt
finding. However, we first address and reject husband’s motion to
dismiss this appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Finality
¶ 12 After the parties filed appellate opening and answer briefs,
husband moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of finality. We
conclude that the issues on appeal arise from final, appealable
judgments and deny the motion to dismiss.
¶ 13 At the permanent orders hearing, wife’s counsel explained the
parties’ agreement that, within forty-five days of the court’s entry of
permanent orders, they would “mediate/arbitrate the division of
[their] personal property so the [c]ourt doesn’t have to deal with it.”
5 Husband’s attorney responded, “I believe [wife’s counsel] captured
it, Your Honor.” The court’s permanent orders divided all the
parties’ property except their personal property, noting that the
parties “agreed to submit the division of personal property to
mediation/arbitration . . . [and that] [t]he Court w[ould] enter no
additional orders regarding division of personal property.”
¶ 14 Husband later moved to compel arbitration concerning the
personal property division, explaining that the parties’ mediation
attempts were unsuccessful. A magistrate ruled on the motion,
ordering further mediation. Husband then asked the district court
to review the magistrate’s order, requesting the court to order the
parties to agree on an arbitrator.
¶ 15 Although the written permanent orders, permanent orders
hearing, and subsequent motions clearly evinced the parties’
agreement to arbitrate, the district court believed it lacked their
consent and therefore could not compel arbitration. But the court
concluded that the magistrate erred by ordering further mediation,
so it ordered an evidentiary hearing before the magistrate to resolve
the personal property division. Husband now argues that the
6 appeal is not final because the personal property division remains
pending.
¶ 16 Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing final judgments. L.H.M.
Corp., TCD v. Martinez, 2021 CO 78, ¶ 14; see § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S.
2025; C.A.R. 1(a)(1). A final judgment “ends the particular action in
which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court
pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of
the parties.” In re Marriage of Wiggs, 2025 COA 10, ¶ 7 (quoting
Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 46). “In dissolution
proceedings, an order generally is not final and appealable until the
district court has issued permanent orders resolving all outstanding
issues between the parties, including . . . maintenance, disposition
of property, and attorney fees.” Id. at ¶ 9; see In re Marriage of Hill,
166 P.3d 269, 272 (Colo. App. 2007) (Dissolution cases often
involve “intertwined issues” that are “part and parcel of dissolving
the marriage.”).
¶ 17 But there are “exceptions to the rule that a final order must
dispose of the entire litigation.” Wiggs, ¶ 10. For example, a
judgment is final as to a claim when it “completely resolves the
rights of the parties . . . with respect to [that] claim and no factual
7 or legal issues remain for judicial resolution.” Brody v. Bock, 897
P.2d 769, 777 (Colo. 1995). And an outstanding issue does not
“prevent finality when its resolution will not change or moot the
determinations contained in the order.” Hill, 166 P.3d at 271.
¶ 18 Here, the district court entered the decree of dissolution,
entered permanent orders, and explicitly stated that it would “enter
no additional orders regarding division of personal property,”
referring the matter to “mediation/arbitration.” Therefore, the
permanent orders left “nothing further for the court pronouncing
[the order] to do.” Wiggs, ¶ 7 (quoting Schaden, ¶ 46). And the
parties agreed to handle the personal property division separately,
such that it could “not change or moot the determinations
contained in the” court’s permanent orders. Hill, 166 P.3d at 271.
Accordingly, “no factual or legal issues remain[ed] for judicial
resolution” with respect to the permanent orders. Brody, 897 P.2d
at 777 (emphasis added).
¶ 19 Furthermore, when parties agree to arbitrate a particular
issue, “a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider that
issue.” In re Marriage of Roth, 2017 COA 45, ¶ 16 (citation omitted).
Here, the parties agreed to “mediation/arbitration,” which they
8 never disputed in the motion to dismiss or the response.1 After
their mediation attempts failed, arbitration was the next logical step
towards resolving the personal property dispute.2 Because the
court explicitly declined to enter further orders concerning personal
property, and the parties agreed to arbitrate that issue — leaving
nothing more for the district court to do — the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the personal property
disposition. See id.; Wiggs, ¶ 7. Thus, the court’s permanent
orders are a final, appealable judgment.
1 Because the parties do not raise or challenge the validity of their
agreement to arbitrate, we do not address it. See § 13-22-206, C.R.S. 2025 (validity of arbitration agreements). 2 To the extent that the district court’s review of the magistrate’s
order suggests otherwise, that order is not before us for review because neither party appealed the various arbitration-related orders. See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19, ¶ 35 (noting that, under the party presentation principle, parties “are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))).
9 B. Discovery and Expert Deadlines
¶ 20 Wife first contends that the district court erred by denying her
November 2023 motion to extend discovery and expert witness
deadlines.3 We perceive no error.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 21 A district court “has discretion to impose a reasonable
discovery deadline in managing its docket.” Frisco Lot 3 LLC v.
Giberson Ltd. P’ship, 2024 COA 125, ¶ 99 (citation omitted); see
also C.R.C.P. 16.2(f)(5) (courts may extend discovery deadlines for
good cause). District courts also have “broad discretion to
determine whether a party should be permitted to endorse
witnesses after the” deadline. Brown v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, 942
P.2d 1363, 1365 (Colo. App. 1997); see In re Marriage of Antuna, 8
P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. App. 2000). We review discovery orders for an
3 Throughout her brief, wife does not state whether any issues were
preserved and cites only to the “Location of the Ruling in the Record” without textual context. Our appellate rules require a statement (not a mere citation) of “whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the precise location in the record where the issue was raised and where the court ruled.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) (emphasis added). Wife’s record citations also do not follow the format detailed in our policy on record citations. See C.A.R. 28(e). We admonish counsel to review our appellate rules, which “are not mere technicalities.” Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.
10 abuse of discretion. Gateway Logistics, Inc. v. Smay, 2013 CO 25,
¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it misapplies the law. In
re Marriage of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 23.
2. Analysis
¶ 22 Wife makes various arguments as to why the court erred by
not extending the discovery and expert deadlines.4 First, she
appears to contend that her first attorney’s alleged negligence
excused her noncompliance with the deadlines and constituted
good cause for extending them. But the district court noted that
this attorney represented wife for nearly a year, giving the parties
ample time to conduct discovery. And “none of [wife’s] complaints
about [her] former counsel demonstrate an abuse of discretion by
the trial court.” Frisco Lot 3 LLC, ¶¶ 96, 101-02 (granting a
continuance but prohibiting further discovery or expert disclosures
was not an abuse of discretion).
4 Although the court continued the permanent orders hearing, this
continuance did not alter the original discovery and expert deadlines. See Todd v. Bear Valley Vill. Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 977 (Colo. 1999) (When a trial is continued for reasons unrelated to discovery issues, “the discovery deadlines associated with the original trial date remain in effect.”).
11 ¶ 23 Wife also contends that the court erred by not considering the
factors in C.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(F). C.R.C.P. 16.2, which governs
domestic relations cases, instructs courts to “grant all reasonable
requests for additional discovery for good cause as defined in
C.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(F).” C.R.C.P. 16.2(f)(4). But Rule 26(b)(2) governs
the scope, not the timing, of discovery; it limits the number of
depositions, interrogatories, examinations, and requests for
production and admission. And Rule 26(b)(2)(F) provides factors for
courts to consider before modifying those limits; it does not apply to
discovery deadlines. See DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum
Corp., 2013 CO 36, ¶ 9 (instructing courts to consider Rule
26(b)(2)(F)’s factors “to resolve a dispute regarding the proper scope
of discovery”).
¶ 24 Despite making several requests to continue the permanent
orders hearing, wife did not move to extend discovery or expert
deadlines until November 2023, over six months after the original
hearing date. Beyond citing a general lack of information, she did
not articulate in detail what additional discovery she intended to
seek. See Ammons v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 860, 864
(Colo. App. 1995) (denying additional discovery was proper when
12 the party did not identify the additional discovery it sought);
Makeen v. Hailey, 2015 COA 181, ¶¶ 30, 33 (denying a discovery
extension was proper when the party “had nearly eleven months to
conduct discovery” and failed to identify any prejudice).
¶ 25 Even on appeal, wife fails to articulate what discovery she
would have sought, arguing only that she was forced to take
husband’s evidence “at face value . . . because [she] had no other
information and was denied discovery.” Yet it is not clear what
“other information” she wanted. Moreover, the court “never
prevented [wife] from obtaining discovery. . . . Rather, [it] declined
[her] request to reopen discovery, a decision well within the court’s
discretion.” Silva v. Wilcox, 223 P.3d 127, 134 (Colo. App. 2009).
And wife “had nearly eleven months to conduct discovery.” Makeen,
¶ 30. Her attorney’s failure to do so is not an error attributable to
the court. See Frisco Lot 3 LLC, ¶ 96.
¶ 26 Finally, even if the record does not support the court’s finding
that the parties conducted discovery and endorsed experts “ad
nause[a]m,” the court did not abuse its discretion by not reopening
discovery. The case had been pending for over a year, wife sought
multiple continuances without asking to reopen or extend discovery
13 deadlines, her motion did not articulate what specific information
she sought, and her third attorney filed the motion nearly three
weeks after entering his appearance.
¶ 27 Wife also argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied her request to extend the deadline for endorsing
expert witnesses. But her motion did not name a specific expert,
provide an expert report, or give any details about the expert
beyond stating that her counsel had “contemplated contacting an
accounting expert to competently trace the assets.” And her
original witness list only included a potential rebuttal personal
property valuator, not an accounting expert.
¶ 28 Moreover, wife objected to husband’s motion seeking an
extension of the expert report deadline so an expert could “assist
with valuing the pre-marital and/or inherited . . . accounts.” Not
only did wife later seek an extension for nearly identical reasons,
but her motion also did not identify an expert despite her objection
to husband’s motion on those same grounds. In these
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying wife’s belated request. See Brown, 942 P.2d at 1365.
14 C. Property Division and Maintenance
¶ 29 Wife next argues that, in awarding Mapleton to her, the court
misapplied the law and accepted erroneous valuations. She also
contends that the court erred by declining to award her
maintenance. We affirm.
1. Additional Facts
¶ 30 Before the marriage, husband purchased Mapleton, which
remained titled solely in his name. Both parties asked to be
awarded Mapleton, and the court considered appraisals from two
experts: (1) Fleckenstein, the joint expert; and (2) Kamin, husband’s
rebuttal expert. In its permanent orders, the district court accepted
Kamin’s 2023 valuation of $2.95 million but subtracted the
$420,274 mortgage, leaving equity of $2,529,726. It also accepted
Kamin’s valuation of $1,025,000 at the time of marriage, which it
found was the value of husband’s separate property interest. It
then awarded Mapleton to wife (ordering her to refinance the
mortgage to her name only) but noted that it accounted for
husband’s separate property interest in Mapleton in its overall
division. Finally, the court rejected wife’s request for spousal
maintenance.
15 2. Standard of Review
¶ 31 District courts have “great latitude to equitably divide the
marital estate,” and we will not disturb that division absent an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M,
¶ 28. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or a misapplication of the law.
Id. We review de novo whether the district court applied the correct
legal standard. In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024 COA 103M, ¶ 9.
¶ 32 We also review a district court’s maintenance award (or lack
thereof) for an abuse of discretion. See Medieros, ¶ 58.
3. Property Division
¶ 33 “When dividing the marital estate, the district court
determines whether an asset is marital and subject to division or
separate and shielded from division.” Medeiros, ¶ 49; see § 14-10-
113(1), C.R.S. 2025. Once the court distinguishes separate from
marital property, it must divide the marital property to “ensur[e] an
equitable, but not necessarily equal, division.” Capparelli, ¶ 9.
¶ 34 Subject to certain exceptions, there is a statutory presumption
that property acquired during the marriage is marital. Medeiros,
¶ 49 (citing § 14-10-113(3)); Capparelli, ¶ 10. Property acquired
16 before marriage is generally not marital, In re Marriage of Corak,
2014 COA 147, ¶ 11, except to the extent that its value has
appreciated during the marriage, In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA
6, ¶ 13; § 14-10-113(4). Additionally, transferring separate property
to joint ownership during the marriage creates a presumption that
the donor spouse intended to gift the property to the marriage such
that it “is marital property absent clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.” Capparelli, ¶ 11.
¶ 35 Wife first contends that the district court was required, but
failed, to consider her contributions to Mapleton’s value. Under
section 14-10-113(1)(a), courts must consider contributions to
marital property. The court acknowledged wife’s argument that her
contributions rendered Mapleton’s total value marital. But it
explained that the parties’ “conduct and/or contributions” during
the marriage “d[id] not control the issue of a premarital separate
property interest,” finding that husband had a separate property
interest in Mapleton of $1,025,000. Because husband bought the
home before the marriage and never transferred it into joint
ownership, the court held that he did not intend to gift his
premarital interest to the marriage. See Corak, ¶ 11; Capparelli,
17 ¶¶ 10-11. We conclude that the court did not err by determining
the value of husband’s separate property interest in Mapleton.
wife’s contributions had no bearing on his separate property
interest. See § 14-10-113(1)(a).
¶ 36 We also reject wife’s argument that the court did not apply the
correct burden of proof “to rebut a presumption that property
acquired during the marriage [wa]s marital.” Mapleton was
acquired before the marriage, and it was never transferred into joint
ownership. See § 14-10-113(2), (3); Capparelli, ¶ 11. So any
burden to overcome a marital presumption does not apply. And
whether the parties paid the mortgage during the marriage with
joint or separate funds had no apparent impact on the court’s
award; it awarded the house to wife and awarded husband only his
18 separate property interest in it, which was unaffected by the parties’
conduct during the marriage.5
¶ 37 Wife next argues that the record does not support the court’s
acceptance of Kamin’s expert rebuttal evidence because the court
“neglected to address [the] unlikely contention that [Mapleton]
increased in value from [$546,800] when purchased [in 2000] to
[$]1.25 million” when the parties married in 2004. First, Kamin’s
2004 valuation was $1,025,000, not $1,250,000. Second, “[w]hen
dividing marital assets, the court may select the valuation of one
party over that of the other party or make its own valuation, and its
decision will be affirmed if the value is reasonable in light of the
5 Because husband did not cross-appeal, we do not address
whether the court committed legal error in awarding the marital home to wife. See Koinis v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 97 P.3d 193, 197 (Colo. App. 2003) (recognizing that an appellee “must file a cross-appeal in order to raise a contention that, if successful, would increase its rights under the judgment or order being reviewed”). In no way, however, do we endorse what the court did here — specifically, awarding husband’s separate property to wife. See In re Marriage of Mitchell, 55 P.3d 183, 185 (Colo. App. 2002) (holding that husband’s separate real property “could not be awarded to wife,” but the court “correctly classified the increase in value of th[e] property during the marriage as marital property, equitably divided that increase, and entered a monetary award to wife”); In re Marriage of Sarvis, 695 P.2d 772, 773 (Colo. App. 1984) (ordering husband to convey his separate real property to wife was error).
19 evidence as a whole.” Medeiros, ¶ 41. And wife never attempted to
impeach Kamin’s 2004 estimate or argue that it was unreasonable.
¶ 38 Considering the evidence as a whole, we conclude that the
court’s valuation was reasonable. See id. Kamin’s 2004 valuation
was $1,025,000, while Fleckenstein’s was $920,000. But
Fleckenstein’s report included a valuation range “from $841,360 up
to $1,113,840.” Therefore, Kamin’s $1,025,000 valuation fell within
the (higher) range of Fleckenstein’s valuation. The court was free to
accept Kamin’s valuation over Fleckenstein’s, and nothing in the
record suggests that Kamin’s valuation was unreasonable for a
Boulder home. See id. Accordingly, notwithstanding supra footnote
5, the court did not abuse its discretion by accepting Kamin’s
valuation of Mapleton when awarding Mapleton to wife.
4. Maintenance
¶ 39 After considering various factors, a district court may award
maintenance only if the requesting party “lacks sufficient property,
including marital property . . . , to provide for his or her reasonable
needs and is unable to support himself or herself through
appropriate employment.” § 14-10-114(3)(d), C.R.S. 2025. Because
maintenance depends on the court’s property division, “the court
20 must first divide the marital property before deciding whether
maintenance is necessary to provide for the requesting party’s
reasonable needs.” In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 31.
¶ 40 Wife next contends that the court erred by awarding her “an
overvalued non-liquid asset while saddling her with the . . .
mortgage” without awarding maintenance.6 She also suggests that
the court erred by not awarding maintenance because it overvalued
the property awarded to her. She points to the court’s conclusion
that it awarded her over $5 million in assets, which included
$3,943,817 in specified assets, “plus an unknown amount of assets
that w[ould] be divided equally . . . because they could not be
valued.” She contends that the court erred by assigning value to
unvalued assets. We conclude that any error was harmless. See
C.R.C.P. 61.
¶ 41 Courts should generally provide for a spouse’s financial needs
through property disposition instead of maintenance. In re
6 Although wife apparently disputes Kamin’s 2023 valuation of
$2.95 million, Fleckenstein’s valuation was $2.85 million (less than a 5% difference). See In re Marriage of Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 893 (Colo. App. 2003) (“An error affecting only a small percentage of the overall marital estate is harmless . . . .”).
21 Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244, 252 (Colo. 1992). And the court
may award maintenance only when the requesting spouse cannot
meet their “reasonable needs.” § 14-10-114(3)(d). Here the court
noted that, although the parties were retired, wife’s award included
Mapleton, a separate rental property with no mortgage that would
produce income, and “investment accounts of more than $600,000,”
which would also generate income. It concluded that wife could
meet her reasonable needs without maintenance. We agree.
¶ 42 Even if there was no support for the court’s finding that wife’s
award exceeded $5 million, nothing in the record suggests that she
could not support herself or pay Mapleton’s mortgage with a $3.9
million award. Although she argues that she may need to “sell[]
assets or tap[] into her retirement accounts,” that does not mean
she cannot meet her reasonable needs. She was sixty-three at the
time of dissolution, so it would be reasonable for her to “tap[] into
her retirement accounts” in the near future. And while she
suggests that the court should have allocated Mapleton’s mortgage
to husband, she agreed during the permanent orders hearing “that
whoever gets awarded Mapleton should also be awarded the
mortgage on that property.” See Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611,
22 619 (Colo. 2002) (invited error applies when a party asks the court
to take a certain action — or acquiesces to an action — of which
she later complains). Finally, although wife argues that husband
received $2,661,394.90 in “liquid” assets, while she claims to have
only received $451,583.90 in liquid assets, much of husband’s
award included his separate property.7 See Medeiros, ¶ 49
(separate property is not divisible). And the court was not required
to equally distribute assets. See Capparelli, ¶ 9 (The court must
“ensur[e] an equitable, but not necessarily equal, division.”).
¶ 43 Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
Mapleton’s mortgage to wife without also awarding maintenance.8
7 The court’s conclusion that wife received over $600,000 in
investment accounts differs from wife’s calculation of the “liquid” assets awarded to her because she excluded business investments and retirement accounts from her calculation. 8 We also reject wife’s arguments that the court failed to consider
husband’s social security and potential dividend income; the court’s maintenance decision was based on wife’s ability to meet her needs, not husband’s ability to pay. See In re Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d 589, 595 (Colo. App. 2000) (“For purposes of maintenance, . . . the payor’s income is relevant to the extent that it is indicative of that spouse’s ability to meet his or her own needs while meeting those of the payee spouse.”).
23 D. Contempt
¶ 44 Wife argues that the district court erred by ordering her to pay
husband’s attorney fees because it did not impose a proper
remedial sanction after finding her in contempt. Specifically, she
argues that, because the court’s order did not include a “purge
clause,” it could not award attorney fees. We disagree.
¶ 45 The petition for legal separation included a clause restraining
the parties “from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any
way disposing of, without the consent of the other party or an order
of the court, any marital property, except in the usual course of
business or for the necessities of life.” § 14-10-107(4)(b)(I)(A),
C.R.S. 2025 (imposing an automatic statutory injunction in
dissolution cases).
¶ 46 In November 2023, husband asked the court to hold wife in
contempt for violating this provision. He alleged that wife
unilaterally received and retained money from one of the parties’
rental properties, which she deposited into a new bank account in
her name. In total, husband alleged that wife improperly retained
24 $19,626.85, which he argued should have been deposited into the
parties’ joint account.
¶ 47 The court held a contempt hearing in March 2024. After the
hearing, the court made oral and written findings, holding wife in
contempt. The court ordered wife to transfer $6,200 to the joint
account and deposit all future rent payments there. It also noted
that it would equitably distribute the funds in wife’s new account
when it issued the permanent orders. Its remedial contempt
sanction included an award to husband of $5,300 in attorney fees
and costs.
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 48 Contempt findings are within the district court’s discretion
“and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” In re
Estate of Elliott, 993 P.2d 474, 478 (Colo. 2000). A court abuses its
discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unfair or when it misapplies the law. Sheehan, ¶ 23.
¶ 49 C.R.C.P. 107 governs contempt citations and sanctions, which
may be remedial or punitive. Remedial sanctions are “imposed to
force compliance with a lawful order or to compel performance of an
act within the person’s power or present ability to perform.”
25 C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). If a district court finds a party in contempt and
orders remedial sanctions, its order must “describ[e] the means by
which the person may purge the contempt and the sanctions that
will be in effect until the contempt is purged.” C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2).
The court may also, in its discretion, impose “[c]osts and reasonable
attorney[] fees in connection with the contempt proceeding.” Id.
3. Application
¶ 50 Wife argues that the court’s order improperly omitted a purge
clause. In support, she contends that the court said in its oral
findings, “I’m not sure that . . . I can actually remedy anything by
having her move the money from one account to another. The
money exists. The money will be taken into consideration when I
do the final division of property.” And in its written order, the court
explained that it would distribute the funds from wife’s individual
account in its permanent orders. But the written order clearly
instructed wife to deposit $6,200 into the shared account and “to
deposit all future rent payments into the [shared] account.”
Therefore, the court properly described the means by which wife
could purge the contempt. See id. Because the court imposed a
proper remedial sanction that included a purge clause, it was
26 authorized to award attorney fees. See In re Marriage of Webb, 284
P.3d 107, 110 (Colo. App. 2011). Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s award of husband’s attorney fees as a remedial contempt
sanction.
III. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 51 Husband requests appellate attorney fees and costs. First, he
argues that wife’s appeal is frivolous under section 13-17-102(2),
C.R.S. 2025, because (1) she failed to properly cite the record;
(2) the court’s property division and maintenance conclusion are
plainly correct; and (3) wife’s contentions regarding the discovery
and expert deadlines are issues “for the Attorney Regulation Office
against Wife’s prior counsel.” But appeals are not frivolous except
in “clear and unequivocal cases when the appellant presents no
rational argument, or when the appeal is prosecuted for the sole
purpose of harassment or delay.” Good Life Colo., LLC v. WLCO,
LLC, 2025 COA 8M, ¶ 106 (citation omitted). And while we rejected
most of wife’s arguments on appeal, “we cannot say that [they] were
so lacking in legal support that they were not rational” or that her
appeal sought harassment or delay. Id. at ¶ 107.
27 ¶ 52 Husband also seeks his appellate fees and costs under
C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2). We agree that costs and fees incurred in
connection with an appeal of a contempt order are costs and fees
incurred “in connection with the contempt proceeding.” Madison
Cap. Co. v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557, 562 (Colo. App.
2009) (quoting C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2)); see In re Marriage of Dean, 2017
COA 51, ¶ 33. However, husband is entitled only to his attorney
fees and costs incurred with respect to the contempt portion of the
appeal. See Madison Cap. Co., 214 P.3d at 562. We therefore
exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 and remand for the
district court to determine an award of husband’s reasonable
appellate attorney fees and costs incurred for defending the
contempt portion of the appeal.
IV. Disposition
¶ 53 The judgment is affirmed. We remand the case so the district
court may determine an appropriate award of reasonable appellate
attorney fees and costs in accordance with this opinion.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.