Marriage of Atalla CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 9/16/26 Marriage of Atalla CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of JOSEPH MINA and CHRISTINE ATALLA.

JOSEPH MINA ATALLA, G064797

Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 18D010159)

v.

OPINION

CHRISTINE ATALLA,

Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julie A. Palafox, Judge. Affirmed Joseph Mina Atalla, in pro. per., for Appellant. Cindy Lee Cannon and Cindy Lee Cannon for Respondent.

Joseph Mina Atalla (Father) appeals from a dissolution judgment awarding sole legal and physical custody of minors K.A. and M.A. to his former spouse, Christine Atalla (Mother). He contends the trial court erred by striking the report and testimony of the child custody evaluator due to bias. Father further contends the court denied him a meaningful opportunity to present his case during the 15-day custody trial by improperly excluding his expert and video evidence, restricting his examination of witnesses, ignoring and misinterpreting evidence, and violating statutes governing findings and presumptions.

We deny Mother’s motion to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine and affirm the judgment. Mother’s request for judicial notice and both parties’ motions to augment the record are denied.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I.

PARTIES

Father and Mother married in January 2015. K.A. was born in June 2015 and M.A. was born in March 2017. Father and Mother separated in October 2018. Their contentious, high-conflict custody dispute began almost immediately, with competing requests for domestic violence restraining orders (both denied) and a child abuse allegation against Father (deemed unfounded).

II.

PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS A. First Custody Evaluation and Trial In February 2019, the trial court ordered joint legal and physical custody and set a schedule for Father’s monitored parenting time. The court also appointed Stacey White Kinney to prepare a custody evaluation

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pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 (section 730). In July 2019, Kinney recommended joint legal custody, sole physical custody to Mother, and therapeutic parenting interventions for Father. The court subsequently ordered Father and the minors to attend reunification counseling with therapist Jessica St. Clair.

St. Clair began working with the family in June 2020 and made a positive report to the trial court in July 2020. In a November 2020 report, St. Clair opined reunification had been successful and recommended increasing Father’s parenting time. She also recommended the minors attend individual play therapy.

The matter proceeded to custody trial on November 16, 2020.

After Father and St. Clair testified, the trial court provided a tentative ruling and continued trial for the parties to meet and confer and prepare a joint statement of remaining issues. The parties resolved some matters, but continued to dispute which parent should have primary physical custody.

Trial resumed June 17, 2021, after several continuances. On that date, the trial court ordered additional reunification therapy with St. Clair, individual therapy for K.A., and increased parenting time for Father.

In October 2021, St. Clair submitted a report expressing concern for the minors’ mental health and recommending parent-child interactive therapy (PCIT) for the family. After hearing additional testimony from Father, Mother, and St. Clair on November 8, 2021, the trial court found the parties failed to comply with the order for K.A. to attend therapy. The court further found the two-year-old Kinney custody evaluation was too stale to be of use and declared a mistrial.

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B. Second Custody Evaluation Following the mistrial, the trial court appointed a new section 730 custody evaluator, clinical psychologist Dr. Susan Jacob, Ph.D. The February 2022 order appointing Jacob and setting forth the scope of her evaluation is not in the appellant’s appendix. The court found Jacob “wrongly believ[ed]” the order directed her “to consult with Jessica St. Clair in formulating her opinions.”1 Jacob filed her confidential custody evaluation report in May 2022. Jacob relied on more than 800 pages of documents, “[h]undreds of photos and short video clips documenting the various changes in the children’s behavior,” St. Clair’s reports, in-person interviews with parents and the minors, and 16 “collateral interviews” with “doctors, therapists, teachers, court approved monitors, and family members.” Jacob concluded the minors, then ages seven and five, were “in crisis” and diagnosed them with dissociative identity disorder (DID)2 as well as “parent-child relational problem[s]” and “parental relationship distress.” To ameliorate the crisis, and restrict Mother’s ability to change or discontinue the minors’ therapies, Jacob

1 Father asserts in his opening brief “the court ordered Dr. Susan

Jacob, PhD [sic] to include Ms. Jessica St. Clair MS. LMFT” in the evaluation, but does not provide any record citations to support that assertion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) We disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record, even when a party is self-represented. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)

2 DID, formerly known as multiple personality disorder, is

characterized by “‘disruption in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception.’” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 848 fn. 6 [quoting (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000, text rev.) p. 519].)

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recommended sole legal and physical custody for Father, with limited monitored parenting time to Mother “to be reevaluated after eighteen months.” She further recommended the minors see a child psychiatrist to treat their DID; Father and the minors resume therapy with St. Clair and attend a reunification camp; and Mother participate in individual therapy and PCIT with the minors. C. Minors’ Psychiatric Assessment Following receipt of Jacob’s report and with parents’ agreement, the trial court appointed counsel for the minors. The court ordered minors’ counsel to arrange psychiatric assessments for them.

Dr. Lawrence J. Budner, M.D., assessed the minors in summer 2022. In addition to reviewing the previous custody evaluation reports and other records, Budner spoke with Father, Mother, and St. Clair and observed the minors in the presence of each parent. Budner observed positive interactions between the minors and each parent. He did not see the minors exhibit any dissociative symptoms. Both minors denied experiencing dissociative symptoms when asked in age-appropriate language; they also denied “a whole range of anxiety and depressive symptoms” and current parental attempts at alienation.

Budner disagreed with Jacob’s diagnosis of DID, though he found “her concern about the distress of the children seems warranted.” He opined the minors’ reported dissociative symptoms were “consistent with shifts in emotional state” rather than distinct personalities, and “were likely the result of the high-conflict divorce situation they were experiencing,” particularly “switches between homes.” Budner diagnosed both minors with “[a]djustment disorder (severe) with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct . . ., related to the stressor of living within a high-conflict divorce

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situation and frequent changes of residence.” Budner recommended PCIT for both minors. Father filed, but ultimately withdrew, a complaint against Budner with the Medical Board of California; he included confidential case documents with the complaint.

The trial court ordered PCIT in September 2022. The family attended five or six sessions before Father declined to proceed with the treatment.

In March 2023, the trial court admonished Father for disclosing confidential documents. In April 2023, it again ordered parents to comply with earlier orders to enroll the minors in individual therapy.

III.

INSTANT PROCEEDINGS

The second custody trial began September 25, 2023 and continued on September 26, 2023; October 16, 17, and 18, 2023; January 31, 2024; February 26, 28, and 29, 2024; April 9, 10, 15, and 16, 2024; and July 8 and 12, 2024. Father was represented by counsel for the first five days of trial and subsequently represented himself. Mother and the minors had counsel throughout trial. A. Evidence Presented Father and Mother both testified at length. Father also called St.

Clair, his office manager, and three of his friends. Mother called Budner, Jacob, and her brother and mother.

With agreement of all parties, the trial court took judicial notice of previous custody orders and findings and orders made after hearings. The court admitted a total of approximately 35 exhibits from both parents, including most of Father’s compilations of videos of the minors.

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B. Evidence Excluded 1. Jacob Report and Testimony Mother raised several concerns about Jacob’s custody evaluation in her trial brief. Mother subsequently filed a motion in limine to exclude the report and any testimony from Jacob as biased. Mother contended Jacob was not a neutral evaluator for numerous reasons, including her collaboration with St. Clair, reliance on evidence provided by Father and not disclosed to Mother, and psychiatric diagnosis of the minors. Father opposed the motion, asserting it would be “unjust” to exclude Jacob’s “well-analyzed” report at this late stage of the proceedings, and the trial court could weigh the evidence as it saw fit. The court took the motion under submission pending receipt of evidence.

Jacob subsequently testified she understood the trial court’s appointment order to require St. Clair to “help” her with the evaluation;3 she reviewed St. Clair’s reports and had “valuable” conversations with her. Jacob further testified she spent “a great deal of time” reviewing an 800-page packet of documents Father provided. Jacob assumed without confirming the packet had been prepared by both parents, and did not share its contents with Mother. Jacob additionally testified Father texted her approximately 100 photos and videos of the minors, which she also failed to disclose to Mother before they disappeared from Jacob’s phone around a year later.

3 The trial court appointed Jacob as a custody evaluator after a

previous evaluator became unavailable. The order appointing that evaluator stated, “The children are to take a break from therapy with Jessica St. Clair and for [sic] Jessica St. Clair to be a part of the [section] 730 process.” Jacob was provided with a copy of that order, which she interpreted as requiring her to collaborate with St. Clair. Jacob thought the order was unusual, as she had never collaborated with anyone on a section 730 evaluation before, but she did not seek clarification from the court.

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Jacob acknowledged her role as a custody evaluator did not necessarily encompass diagnosing the minors. She testified that although the minors did not experience any dissociative symptoms in her presence, she “became extremely concerned” when St. Clair, the minors’ teachers, and Father’s former visitation monitors reported completely different behavior from what she observed. Jacob did not consult with any medical doctors before making the diagnoses, and acknowledged, “in hindsight,” that she should have referred the minors to a psychiatrist. She explained she wanted to provide a wake-up call to ensure the minors received assistance.

Following Jacob’s testimony, the trial court granted Mother’s motion in limine and struck Jacob’s report and testimony. The court concluded Jacob’s “misunderstanding the [c]ourt order that [St. Clair] could be a collaborator was too prejudicial” and “tainted” Jacob’s report and testimony with bias. The court further found the scope of its appointment order was clear, and Jacob “stepped way out of her lane” by diagnosing the minors. In addition to exceeding the scope of the order, the court found Jacob “failed to operate within the limits of her training” and “made recommendations she was not qualified to make” when she diagnosed the minors with DID. The court concluded these “significant deficiencies . . . in total and collectively” left the court with “no alternative” but to exclude the report and testimony.

2. Shirin Testimony Prior to the first custody trial, Father retained Dr. Kim K. Shirin pursuant to Evidence Code section 733 to review and comment on Kinney’s section 730 report. Shirin concluded Kinney’s report was biased and opined it should be disregarded. The trial court later determined Kinney’s report was stale and appointed Jacob to conduct a new custody evaluation.

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During the second custody trial, Father included Shirin on his witness list and attempted to call him an expert witness. Mother objected Father had not responded to her demand for exchange of expert witnesses, which the trial court received into evidence. The court confirmed that was true, and further confirmed Father did not intend to call Shirin under Evidence Code section 733 to opine on Jacob’s report. The court sustained Mother’s objection, explaining to Father that he was required to “comply with the requirements of the demand for exchange of expert witness information” in Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.260. The court reiterated its ruling several trial dates later, when Father again attempted to call Shirin.

3. Other Evidence Father sought to introduce numerous videos of the minors he recorded while they were in his care. The trial court told Father it would “look at 30 minutes of videos” during trial. The court subsequently admitted Father’s exhibits 37, 38, and 38-B, video compilations the court described as “nearly two hours” of the minors “upset, crying, or dysregulating.” Father also introduced exhibit 39, which he represented was the “180 degree opposite” of the other video evidence and would show the minors “happy and at play.” The court admitted approximately 10 minutes of the 50-minute video, ruling additional footage of the minors playing would be cumulative under Evidence Code section 352.

Father also proffered his ex-fiancée as a witness who could testify about his background. The trial court told him that testimony was not necessary. Father replied, “That’s fine.” Father did not attempt to call several other witnesses identified on his witness list.

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C. Findings and Ruling The trial court set forth its credibility and factual findings and legal conclusions in a 37-page final statement of decision. The court found it was undisputed the minors loved and were bonded to both parents. It accordingly gave no weight to either parent’s witnesses on this point— Father’s friends and office manager and Mother’s family members.

The trial court concluded the “primary issues” were the nature and causes of minors’ mental health struggles and what orders the court could make to alleviate them. The court found parents agreed the minors were struggling, but disputed the severity and causes of their symptoms. Father “insisted” Mother and her family were “brainwashing, coaching, and alienating the children,” whom he testified “‘act like zombies,’” “‘stare at him blankly,’” “make robotic and disturbing statements,’” or otherwise “go into altered states” approximately 20 percent of the time they are with him. Father described the minors’ mood swings as being “‘like an electrocution,’” or “‘hammers,’” or “‘spiking.’” Father believed the episodes were triggered by contact with Mother and were indicative of DID or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He accordingly refused to communicate or co-parent with Mother and was noncompliant with the court’s repeated orders to log into the Our Family Wizard app daily and use it constructively.

Mother denied the minors experienced mood swings or altered states while in her care. She believed the minors suffered from an adjustment disorder due to parents’ ongoing conflicts, and their symptoms were exacerbated by Father’s continual video recording, claims they suffered from DID, and failure to comply with trial court orders regarding therapy and coparenting .

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The trial court generally concurred with Mother’s assessment, finding Father’s videos “mostly showed young children who were upset, tired and emotionally overloaded” rather than “[z]ombies or in altered states as Father alleged.” The court’s “impression” was “the children were having trouble adjusting to Father’s home and routine as they missed their primary caretaker.” It further found Father “failed to recognize his young children’s needs for physical comfort and affection” and instead focused on “capturing footage to support his case against Mother.” It also found he failed to comply with the court’s orders regarding therapy for the minors, despite his insistence they were suffering from severe mental health conditions, because he believed therapy was “harmful” and PCIT was “‘weak science.’”

As previously noted, the trial court fully excluded Jacob’s testimony and report. The court also gave no weight to St. Clair’s testimony, finding her objectivity was compromised because she and Father “entered into their own consulting relationship” after the court suspended her services in 2021. The court accorded “the greatest weight” to Budner’s report and testimony, which ruled out DID, diagnosed severe adjustment disorders, and recommended PCIT and reducing the frequency of residence changes.

The trial court concluded parents were unable to respect one another as parenting partners, which placed the minors “in the middle of an ongoing loyalty battle” and left them with “significant emotional challenges.” The court found the “cumulative weight of the evidence” showed these challenges did not rise to the severe level of DID or PTSD, but rather were “parent child relationship distress” or “adjustment disorder” remediable by therapy. The court noted that it ordered various modalities of therapy “going back to 2019,” and Father’s “recurring violations” of those orders was “substantial evidence the [c]ourt cannot ignore.” The court also noted

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“Father’s unrelenting campaign to malign Mother by telling everyone who will listen Mother has a family history of mental illness and is the reason the children have DID and PTSD”4 and elevation of “his own judgment over all others,” both of which gave it “serious concerns about Father’s ability to act in the children’s best interests.”

The trial court concluded joint legal custody had “been unsuccessful the past six years” due to Father’s “unwillingness to engage” with Mother and “disagreement over the causes of the children’s mental health issues.” It found Father and Mother were “unable to co-parent, communicate, or collaborate effectively,” and their struggles “disrupted the children’s daily routine, structure, and consistent access to needed mental health services.” It therefore concluded joint legal custody “of any kind” was not in the minors’ best interests. Because Father “remain[ed] entrenched” in his beliefs that Mother brainwashed the minors and caused them to develop DID or PTSD despite “no competent evidence of either,” and refused to comply with court-ordered therapy, the court found it was in the minors’ best interests for Mother to have sole legal custody.

The trial court also awarded Mother sole physical custody. It found the minors’ needs for stability, consistency, and ongoing mental health treatment “outweigh[ed] an equal custody schedule.” Father failed to present evidence that limiting the minors’ contact with Mother was in their best interests, while Mother “understands the children are bonded to their Father and . . . is willing to share alternating weeks with the Father in the summer.” The court accordingly found it was in the minors’ best interests for Mother to

4 It is undisputed Father disclosed confidential case materials to

St. Clair, the Medical Board of California, and various personnel at the minors’ school.

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have sole physical custody. The court awarded Father weekly parenting time and established a holiday and vacation schedule. D. Judgment and Appeal Father filed his notice of appeal from a minute order documenting the trial court’s amendment and adoption of its tentative statement of decision as its final ruling. The court subsequently entered judgment and an amended judgment.

DISCUSSION

I.

PENDING MOTIONS

A. Motions After Father filed his opening brief, Mother moved to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine due to Father’s previous and allegedly ongoing violations of trial court orders. In support of her motion, Mother filed a motion to augment the record with the court’s final statement of decision, the judgment, and the amended judgment. She also filed a request for judicial notice of postjudgment records from the Our Family Wizard app. Mother separately contends the appeal should be dismissed because it was prematurely filed from a nonappealable order.

Father opposes both requests for dismissal. He contends we should construe his appeal as properly filed under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d) and decline to dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. Father asserts disentitlement is an “extraordinary and narrow remedy” and is inequitable here, where the alleged misconduct will not interfere with this court’s ability to resolve the appeal and is remediable by the trial court. Father additionally asserts the motion improperly “relies on disputed facts and extra-record material,” though he did not file oppositions

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to Mother’s motion to augment or request for judicial notice. Father moved to augment the record with various trial exhibits and other case-related documents. Mother opposes that motion. B. Rulings 1. Motions to Augment Mother’s motion to augment is denied as moot. Mother included the documents at issue in her respondent’s appendix.

Father’s motion to augment is also denied. Although the record may be augmented “[a]t any time” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)), “[w]hether the motion is made within a reasonable time and is not for the purpose of delay . . . are among the factors the reviewing court may consider in ruling on such a motion.” (Advisory Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155.) Here, Father filed the motion two months after Mother filed her response brief and offered no explanation for the delay. We accordingly find the motion is untimely. Moreover, many of the proffered documents are not appropriate subjects of augmentation, either because they are confidential, already in the record, or filed after the appealed-from judgment. Father does not cite or discuss the documents in his reply brief, indicating they are not necessary for our resolution of this matter in any event.

2. Motion and Request to Dismiss We also deny Mother’s motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the disentitlement doctrine and related request for judicial notice. “Under the disentitlement doctrine, a reviewing court has inherent power to dismiss an appeal when the appealing party has refused to comply with the orders of the trial court.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265.) Disentitlement is discretionary and is applied where equitable concerns render it an appropriate sanction, particularly where the

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appeal arises out of the order the appellant has disobeyed. (See ibid.) Mother contends the balance of equities favors disentitlement here because Father’s repeated and allegedly ongoing violations of the trial court’s orders “directly endanger the children’s stability and well-being.” We disagree.

“‘In a noncriminal context, courts routinely decline to disentitle litigants on the basis of contempt, fugitive status, or noncompliance with court orders when the issues raised by the litigant entail interest beyond the personal of the individual petitioner, such as the welfare of minor children . . . .’” (In re L.J. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136–1137 [quoting Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 536].) We conclude the equities do not warrant dismissal of the appeal here, where the minors’ interests are paramount. Although we do not condone Father’s defiant behavior, it has not escalated to the point where disentitlement is appropriate, such as absconding with the minors or seeking to evade judgment. (See Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266 [providing examples where disentitlement applied].)

Finally, we deny Mother’s informal request to dismiss the appeal as premature. California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2) authorizes this court to “treat a notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment.” “In exercising our discretion, we liberally construe a premature notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency.” (In re Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369, 375.) It is clear from the notice of appeal that Father intended to challenge the trial court’s ultimate custody ruling, and there is no indication Mother was misled or prejudiced by his procedural misstep. (See ibid.) We accordingly proceed to the merits.

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II.

EXCLUSION OF JACOB REPORT AND TESTIMONY Father contends the trial court erred by granting Mother’s motion in limine and excluding Jacob’s report and testimony. He argues the concerns about bias “go to the weight, not the admissibility” of the Jacob evidence. He further asserts the rulings “left Father without any expert support for his position,” tainted the fairness of the proceedings, and resulted in a final judgment “unsupported by any neutral, professional evaluation.” We reject these contentions. A. Standard of Review Both parties assert we should apply the abuse of discretion standard of review typically applied to evidentiary rulings concerning experts. (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 [“Except to the extent the trial court bases its ruling on a conclusion of law (which we review de novo), we review its ruling excluding or admitting expert testimony for abuse of discretion”].) In substance, however, Mother’s request and the court’s rulings were not merely evidentiary but concerned the removal of custody evaluator Jacob due to bias under California Rules of Court, rule 5.220.

“It is unclear what standard of review applies to a court’s ruling on a motion for removal of the evaluator.” (In re Marriage of Adams & Jack A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1543, 1564 (Adams); see also Leslie O. v. Superior Court (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1203–1204 (Leslie O.).) In both Adams and Leslie O., the two leading cases to have considered the issue, the trial court denied a motion to remove a custody evaluator for bias. (See Adams, at p. 1564; Leslie O., at p. 1203.) Both Adams and Leslie O. determined the “threshold inquiry” for purposes of appeal was whether the custody evaluator

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exhibited bias prior to the filing of the removal motion. (Adams, at p. 1563; Leslie O., at p. 1203.) After reviewing that factual finding for either substantial evidence (if disputed) or de novo (if undisputed) (see Adams, at pp. 1563–1564), both courts examined the totality of the circumstances and concluded the trial court erred under even the most deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. (See Adams, at p. 1564; Leslie O., at pp. 1204, 1212.)

Although we are presented with the opposite inquiry, whether the trial court erred by granting the motion, we apply the same approach. We first consider the court’s finding of bias. Then, we consider whether, on the totality of evidence before it, the court erred in concluding it was necessary to remove Jacob due to bias. We find no error, under even the most exacting de novo review. B. Analysis “In the area of child custody, judges ‘order evaluations to obtain a neutral mental health professional’s assessment of the family, each parent’s capacity to parent, and the children’s needs and capabilities.’” (Adams, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1562.) California Rules of Court, rule 5.220 governs child custody evaluators appointed under section 730 and requires them to “[m]aintain objectivity, provide and gather balanced information for both parties, and control for bias.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(j)(1).) “The mandate that an evaluator be fair and impartial is nonnegotiable.” (Adams, at p. 1565; see also id. at p. 1563 [“impartial objectivity is a critical requirement for a section 730 child custody evaluator”].) “[B]ias cannot be assessed on a sliding scale relative to the amount of work already expended on the evaluation.” (Id. at p. 1565.)

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Here, the trial court found Jacob “lost her objectivity and neutrality” in three ways, all of which are amply supported by the evidence. First, she impermissibly consulted with St. Clair, whom the court found lost her own objectivity and neutrality by continuing to work with Father after her court appointment ended. Father does not dispute the existence of either consulting relationship, though he asserts the court ordered Jacob to consult with St. Clair and an “evaluator’s compliance with the court’s own directive cannot, as a matter of law, supply the bias predicate . . . .” There is no evidence the court ordered Jacob to collaborate with St. Clair; the November 2021 order Father cites in his reply brief pertained to a previous evaluator and pre-dated Jacob’s February 2022 appointment.

Father also argues Jacob’s collaboration with St. Clair was authorized under California Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(2)(F), which provides that evaluators may “[c]onsult[ ] with other experts to develop information that is beyond the evaluator’s scope of practice or area of expertise.” It is not clear what information St. Clair, a therapist with less formal training than Jacob, a doctoral-level clinical psychologist, could provide beyond Jacob’s scope of practice or expertise. Jacob testified St. Clair shared information about her work with the family. That is the information Jacob herself was engaged to obtain in a neutral and balanced fashion.

Second, the trial court found Jacob exhibited bias by spending a substantial amount of time reviewing Father’s evidence “and fail[ing] to give Mother the same consideration, or even an opportunity to respond.” A custody evaluator is required to “gather balanced information for both parties.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(j)(1).) It is undisputed Jacob spent many hours reviewing approximately 800 pages of documents and 100 videos and photographs Father provided and did not do the same for Mother.

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Father asserts this was not indicative of bias because: the documents were in the trial court file; the videos and photographs were relevant to the evaluation; and the scope of the evaluation expressly included “the effects of Father constantly videotaping the children in distress.” The issue is not with the scope of the evaluation but rather the one-sided nature of how Jacob obtained and reviewed the evidence for that evaluation. A child custody evaluator must “consider each party in comparable ways.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(2).) Jacob did not do that here. Her review of the nowvanished videos and photographs in particular gives rise to concern she “inappropriately stepped out of her role as evaluator and into the role of guardian of [Father’s] litigation interests.” (Leslie O., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210.)

Third, the trial court found Jacob’s report “deficient” because it concluded the minors “had dramatically different personalities based solely on Father’s testimony when Mother denied the different personalities in her home” and no collateral witnesses described “distinct and different personalities.” Jacob also denied witnessing the children engage in dissociative behavior. Custody evaluators are required to “substantiate (from multiple sources when possible) interpretations and conclusions regarding each child’s developmental needs.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(e)(2).) They also must “[o]perate within the limits of [their] training and experience.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.220(j)(6).) Jacob acknowledged she had limited experience with DID, had never encountered two siblings with the same manifestation of the disorder, and she should have referred the minors to a psychiatrist.

Father asserts, without citation to relevant authority, disagreement with an evaluator’s diagnosis “goes to the weight of an expert’s

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opinion, not to whether the expert was biased against a litigant.” The concern was the manner in which Jacob made the diagnosis, not its accuracy. This is analogous to Leslie O., which found biased an evaluator who relied on “illogical speculation of unqualified persons” and disregarded objective contrary evidence to suggest the mother suffered from Munchausen syndrome by proxy. (Leslie O., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1206, 1209.)

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded Jacob lacked the objectivity required of a neutral custody evaluator. “We recognize that evaluation is an art rather than a science, and that different approaches may be required in different cases.” (Leslie O., supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212.) Yet given the multiple serious infirmities in this case, and the importance of impartial professional assessments in custody determinations (see Adams, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1563), the court did not err in removing Jacob under any standard. (See id. at p. 1567 [a custody order resting even in part on a biased report must be reversed].)

III.

OTHER EVIDENTIARY RULINGS Father argues the trial court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings that denied him a meaningful opportunity to present his case. We review these claims in turn, for abuse of the court’s broad discretion. (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446–447.) We reverse evidentiary rulings only where the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd fashion. (Id. at p. 447.)

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A. Exclusion of Shirin Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his expert witness Shirin “based on procedural defects in expert designation.” We disagree.

“Following a demand for the exchange of expert witness information, each party must provide an ‘expert witness declaration’ . . . .” (Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 885 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210, subd. (b)].) “The declaration must include certain information, including ‘[a] brief narrative statement of the general substance of the testimony that the expert is expected to give.’” (Ibid. [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.260, subd. (c)(2)].) “A trial court must exclude from trial any expert testimony ‘that is offered by any party who has unreasonably failed to’ ‘[s]ubmit an expert witness declaration.’” (Ibid. [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.300, subd. (b).)

Although Father included Shirin on his witness list, he did not respond to Mother’s demand for the exchange of expert witness information. Father’s suggestion he should have been excused from doing so due to his self-represented status is not persuasive. “[S]elf-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.)

Father also contends the trial court’s exclusion of Shirin “contravenes the directive in Elkins [v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1366–1367] that family court procedures should not erect arbitrary barriers to presenting relevant evidence.” Elkins is not on point. As Elkins recognized, “marital dissolution trials proceed under the same general rules

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of procedure that govern other civil trials.” (Elkins, at p. 1345; see also id. at p. 1354.) Elkins accordingly held it was error for the trial court to impose a local rule restricting direct examination in dissolution proceedings and requiring litigants in those proceedings to file detailed evidentiary declarations prior to trial. (See id. at pp. 1346–1347, 1356–1360.) The mandatory procedural rules the court enforced here were mandated by statute and were not arbitrary. (See In re Marriage of Seagondollar (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1120 [“The rules of procedure for reaching family law decisions—contained in the Family Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the California Rules of Court, and local court rules—are not mere suggestions. The rules of procedure are commands which ensure fairness by their enforcement”].) B. Limitations on Video Exhibits Father contends the trial court prevented him from introducing video exhibits with “no coherent explanation.” This contention is not supported by the record. Despite ordering Father to limit his presentation of video evidence to 30 minutes, the court allowed him to play “nearly two hours” of videos depicting the minors in various states of distress. The court then limited Father to playing approximately 10 minutes of video depicting the minors having fun. It explained it was not “necessary to watch an hour video to know that the children can be happy too,” and emphasized it was “trying to get this case done today,” the tenth day of Father’s case-in-chief.

This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Evidence Code section 352 vests the trial court with discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . necessitate undue consumption of time . . . .” The court reasonably balanced the minimal probative value of the evidence against the significant

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amount of trial time it would consume. The court also allowed Father to play a portion of the video, despite recognizing that all parties had seen the video and could “all stipulate” it “shows the children are happy.” This was an appropriate balance for the court to strike. C. Other Alleged Restrictions Father contends the trial court “imposed severe restrictions on Father’s witness examination and case-in-chief,” by “truncat[ing] his ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses” and preventing him from calling several “favorable lay witnesses.” Aside from providing the names of the favorable witnesses he was allegedly prevented from calling, Father provides no information about the alleged restrictions and rulings he is challenging. “‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) Father has not done that with respect to these alleged evidentiary errors. “We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’” (Ibid.)

Even if we were to consider these claims, we would conclude they lack merit. Two of the favorable witnesses Father claims he was precluded from calling—Sherif Yacoub and Billie Jay—are not mentioned in the reporter’s transcript. Father told the trial court he was “having a hard time . . . reaching” another favorable witness, Jeanean Sapp, and did not call Nancy McNamara despite the court ruling he could. The court told Father he could not call only one of the witnesses he identifies here, Joelle Hayek, and Father responded, “That’s fine.” Father therefore forfeited any claim of error regarding that ruling. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 866 [“‘[A]

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reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court’”]; see also Evid. Code, § 354.) To the extent Father appears to contend the court should have admitted declarations or letters prepared by these witnesses, he has not demonstrated those documents would be admissible under the hearsay rule. (See Evid. Code, § 1200.) D. Other Evidentiary Contentions Father asserts the trial court improperly ignored certain clinical assessments and other reports, made unspecified misstatements and misquotations of various exhibits, and relied on fabricated and contradicted evidence offered by Mother. These claims of error are not properly developed or supported by citations to the record. We do not consider them. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)

IV.

FINDINGS AND PRESUMPTIONS Finally, Father contends the trial court failed to make statutorily required findings and apply statutorily required presumptions, and the statement of decision is deficient due to these omissions. We disagree.

Although parents made domestic abuse allegations against one another, the trial court denied both their restraining order requests and did not find domestic violence occurred. Family Code section 3044’s rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent found to have perpetrated domestic violence therefore was not implicated. (See Fam. Code, § 3044; Noble v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 567, 576 [“special considerations come into play under the Family Code” where a restraining order has issued or “there are other findings that domestic violence involving the parties has occurred”].) The court was not required to make findings

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under this statutory provision. Family Code section 6320, which governs protective orders, is equally inapplicable.

Father also claims the trial court failed to comply with Family Code section 3011, subdivision (a)(5)(A). That statute requires the trial court to make findings concerning minors’ best interests and safety if allegations of abuse are brought to its attention and it awards the alleged abuser sole or joint custody. (Fam. Code, § 3011, subd. (a)(5)(A).) The court did so here. Even though it found no evidence supporting Father’s allegations that Mother brainwashed or otherwise abused the minors, the court specifically invoked section 3011 and considered the minors’ best interests in its thorough and thoughtful 37-page statement of decision.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Mother is awarded costs on appeal.

SERVINO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P. J.

SCOTT, J.