24CA1396 Marriage of Allen 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1396 Douglas County District Court No. 22DR258 Honorable Benjamin Figa, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Daniel J. Allen,
Appellee,
and
Cecelia J. Allen,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Román, C.J., and Grove, J., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
Aitken Law, LLC, Sharlene J. Aitken, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
Epstein, Patierno, LLP, Courtney J. Leathers Allen, Denver, Colorado; Anne Whalen Gill, LLC, Anne Whalen Gill, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Cecelia J. Allen
(wife) and Daniel J. Allen (husband), wife appeals the marital
property division portion of the permanent orders judgment. We
affirm and remand the case for further proceedings on wife’s
request for appellate attorney fees.
I. Background
¶2 The parties were married in 1998. They had four children. At
the time of this appeal, only the youngest child had not yet
emancipated. Husband petitioned for dissolution, and the district
court issued temporary orders.
A. Temporary Orders
¶3 The court’s temporary orders authorized husband to withdraw
funds from his Vanguard 401(k) account (the Vanguard account) to
pay the parties’ debts. The court ordered husband to “continue
paying all household expenses including but not limited to the
mortgage and utilities, bills, and insurance he paid during the
marriage.” And he was required to pay wife, for the first three
months, $2,166 monthly in temporary maintenance. After the first
three months, he was to pay her $2,639 in monthly maintenance
until permanent orders entered. Husband was also required to
1 transfer $10,000 into his attorney’s COLTAF account, to be used to
pay maintenance to wife for the first three months.
¶4 Four months after the court issued temporary orders, wife
filed a motion for a contempt citation against husband, alleging that
he had failed to comply with temporary orders. The court issued
the citation and combined the hearing on wife’s contempt motion
with the permanent orders hearing. As discussed further in Part
II.D below, the court ultimately denied wife’s contempt motion.
B. Permanent Orders
¶5 At the conclusion of the permanent orders hearing, the court
entered a decree dissolving the parties’ marriage.
¶6 Two days after the permanent orders hearing, the court made
its oral findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. In its
oral ruling, the court made findings regarding the value of the
parties’ assets and debts and allocated the marital property,
purporting to do so equally. Specifically, the court allocated to wife
the marital home; two cars; a bank account; and the marital
business, valued at $2,800; and certain personal property. The
court allocated to husband a second home in Florida; one car; a
second bank account; and certain personal property.
2 ¶7 The court allocated all marital debt to husband. This marital
debt included the outstanding attorney fees each party owed their
respective attorneys, as well as the full amount of five outstanding
promissory notes husband had executed in favor of certain family
members and friends.
¶8 In its oral ruling, the court said that it understood that “the
marital property that [it] allocated to [h]usband is substantially less
than” what it allocated to wife, so it ordered that, “to the extent that
there is a discrepancy or a difference” in the value of the marital
assets allocated between the parties, an equalization payment
would come from the Vanguard account. The parties stipulated
that the market value of the Vanguard account was $587,288 at the
time of the permanent orders hearing.
¶9 The court ordered both parties to prepare a spreadsheet
reflecting their respective understandings of the court’s findings
regarding valuation of marital property and debt and the court’s
orders allocating such property and debt. Both parties did so
within a week of the court’s oral ruling. The parties also agreed to
have the district court adopt the transcript of its oral ruling as the
permanent orders.
3 ¶ 10 The transcript of the oral ruling took four months to prepare.
In February 2024, three months after the transcript was prepared,
the court held a status conference, after which it entered the
written permanent orders, which included adopting husband’s
spreadsheet as part of those orders.
C. Post-Trial Motions and Notice of Appeal
¶ 11 At the February 2024 status conference, both parties agreed
that they would need a transcript of the entire permanent orders
hearing in order to prepare and file post-trial motions. Based on
this representation, the district court ordered that any post-trial
motions be filed within fourteen days of the parties’ receipt of that
transcript.
¶ 12 After receiving the transcript, wife timely filed a C.R.C.P. 59
motion to amend the court’s permanent orders (the April motion).
The district court summarily denied the April motion for lack of
conferral pursuant to C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(8).
¶ 13 In June 2024, wife filed a second motion to amend the court’s
judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 and 60(b)(1) (the June motion).
In the June motion, wife contended that she had properly conferred
before filing the April motion. Before the district court issued an
4 order resolving the June motion, wife filed a timely notice of appeal
in this court appealing the permanent orders.
¶ 14 The district court, in an order indicating it took no action,
concluded that, given the pending appeal, it lacked jurisdiction to
consider wife’s June motion. In August 2024, wife filed a motion to
reconsider this order pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 (the August motion),
which the court denied.
¶ 15 Wife then filed a motion to amend her notice of appeal to
include the court’s orders regarding her June and August motions.
She also filed a request for a limited remand for the court “to
consider the relief requested under Rule 60(b)(1) — that [w]ife’s
counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect regarding
conferral about the post-trial motion . . . should not negate the
[t]rial [c]ourt’s consideration of [w]ife’s timely [April motion].” A
motions division of this court denied these requests.
II. Issues on Appeal
¶ 16 On appeal, wife contends that the district court erred by
(1) not reopening the evidence to consider changes in asset values
in the seven months between the bench ruling and the entry of
permanent orders; (2) denying her post-trial motions; (3) adopting
5 husband’s spreadsheet, which double-counted some debt; and
(4) limiting time for the parties to present evidence at the combined
permanent orders and contempt hearing. Wife also requests an
award of her appellate attorney fees.
A. Reopening of the Evidence
¶ 17 Wife first contends that the court abused its discretion when it
declined to reopen the evidence to consider changes in the value of
certain assets during the seven months between the permanent
orders hearing and the court’s entry of written permanent orders.
We aren’t persuaded.
1. Relevant Law
¶ 18 Generally, property is valued as of the date of the decree or the
date of the hearing on the disposition of property, whichever is
earlier. § 14-10-113(5), C.R.S. 2025. Under certain circumstances,
a district court may reopen evidence. In re Marriage of Medeiros,
2023 COA 42M, ¶¶ 10, 16.
¶ 19 As discussed in Medeiros, a district court has the discretion to
consider a party’s request to reopen the evidence after the
permanent orders hearing but before the entry of permanent orders
based on changed economic circumstances. Id. In determining
6 whether to do so, it must consider certain factors, one of which is
“the length of the court’s delay in issuing permanent orders.” Id. at
¶ 22.
2. Analysis
¶ 20 Wife argues that the holding in Medeiros required the court to
reopen the evidence. We acknowledge that the facts from Medeiros
bear some similarities to this case. As in Medeiros, the final
judgment here had not yet been reduced to writing when wife’s
counsel asked the court to reopen the evidence. See also In re
Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1221 (Colo. App. 2006)
(concluding that a court may modify its oral findings or orders any
time before issuing a final order). As in Medeiros, many months
had passed between the permanent order hearing and the court’s
issuance of its final written orders. Medeiros, ¶ 2. And, in both
cases, the motion to reopen was based on allegations that the
opposing party had experienced “substantially changed” economic
circumstances. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 6.
¶ 21 The similarities end there, however. In Medeiros, after a
contested permanent orders hearing, the court didn’t issue an oral
ruling and took the matter under advisement for seven months. Id.
7 at ¶ 5. Here, on the other hand, just two days after the close of
evidence, the court set forth its permanent orders in an on-the-
record oral ruling, and, with the parties’ express agreement, it
informed them that the final order would be the adoption of a
transcript of that ruling. The delay in issuing the written order
hinged, in substantial part, on a delay in producing the transcript,
not on the court’s continued deliberation of the substance of its
ruling. Indeed, the court had already informed the parties of the
substance of its permanent orders. The final order was, therefore,
not substantially delayed as in Medeiros. Under these
circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s
determination that reopening of the evidence was unnecessary.
B. Post-Trial Motions
¶ 22 Next, wife contends that the district court erred by (1) failing to
resolve her April motion on the merits and (2) concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction over her June motion. She claims these errors
were “compounded” by the motions division’s denial of her motion
to amend the notice of appeal to include the denial of the June
motion. We perceive no error.
8 ¶ 23 As to her first contention, the district court didn’t abuse its
discretion by denying wife’s April motion for a lack of conferral. The
court properly applied C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(8), which —
subject to limited exceptions not applicable here — requires
conferral before filing any motion. In her April motion, wife didn’t
indicate that she had conferred, nor did she point to anything in the
record indicating that conferral had taken place. Indeed, wife
admitted in the motion that “additional conferral was not
conducted.” And we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s
denial of the April motion on this basis. See C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-15(8)
(providing that “moving counsel . . . shall confer with opposing
counsel . . . before filing a motion” and “[t]he motion shall, at the
beginning, contain a certification that the movant in good faith has
conferred with opposing counsel . . . about the motion” (emphasis
added)); see also Walton v. People, 2019 CO 95, ¶ 13 (“‘Shall’ is
mandatory unless there is a clear indication otherwise.”).
¶ 24 Wife’s contention that the district court erred as a matter of
law when it denied wife’s June motion for lack of jurisdiction
doesn’t fare any better. Wife relies on C.A.R. 4(a) for her contention
that the court retained jurisdiction to rule on her June motion
9 notwithstanding that she had already filed her notice of appeal.
C.A.R. 4(a)(3) provides that “[t]he lower court continues to have
jurisdiction to hear and decide a motion under C.R.C.P. 59
regardless of the filing of a notice of appeal, provided the
C.R.C.P. 59 motion is timely filed under C.R.C.P. 59(a).” (Emphasis
added.) Wife’s contention fails because the June motion wasn’t
timely filed under C.R.C.P. 59(a). The only timely Rule 59 motion
that wife filed was her April motion, which, as discussed above, was
properly denied. Because the June motion wasn’t a timely
C.R.C.P. 59 motion — and it was filed after an appeal had been
perfected — the court properly declined to resolve the motion for
lack of jurisdiction. See Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 246
(Colo. 2006) (“Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal shifts
jurisdiction to the appellate court, thus divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction to conduct further substantive action related to the
judgment on appeal.”).
¶ 25 Accordingly, we perceive no error by the court in its
disposition of wife’s post-trial motions and, therefore, also reject
wife’s contention that the motions division’s denial of her motion to
10 amend the notice of appeal to include the denial of her June motion
compounded any error.
C. Husband’s Spreadsheet
¶ 26 Next wife contends that the court erred when it adopted
husband’s spreadsheet because by doing so the court “double-
counted” husband’s attorney fees, on the one hand, and the debts
evinced by the promissory notes to his friends and family members,
on the other hand. Specifically, wife contends that because there
was testimony at the permanent orders hearing that husband used
some portion of the proceeds from the personal loans to pay his
attorney fees, the court double-counted “some $60,000 in
[h]usband’s debt column” by counting both his attorney fees and
the promissory notes as marital debt. We disagree that the record
establishes that the court clearly erred by double-counting
husband’s attorney fees and the promissory notes as debt.
¶ 27 A district court has great latitude to equitably distribute
marital property based upon the facts and circumstances, and we
won’t disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Medeiros, ¶ 28. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is
11 manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a
misapplication of the law. Id.
¶ 28 Pursuant to section 14-10-113(1), a district court divides
marital property in such proportions as it deems just, considering
all relevant factors including the contributions of each spouse to
acquiring the property, the value of the property set apart to each
spouse, the spouses’ economic circumstances, and any increases or
decreases in a spouse’s separate property during the marriage or
depletions of separate property for marital purposes. In re Marriage
of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo. App. 2009). But it’s inequitable
for a court to count the same asset or debt twice when determining
an equitable division of marital property. Cf. In re Marriage of
Cardona, 2014 CO 3, ¶ 40 (Boatright, J. concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that it was inequitable for the district court
to count twice the accrued leave of an employee spouse, first as a
marital asset subject to division, and second as income for
purposes of maintenance and child support).
2. Additional Facts
¶ 29 As noted above, the court allocated all of the parties’ marital
debts to husband. According to the spreadsheet, the amount of the
12 debt allocated to husband totaled $275,806.1 These debts included,
among other things, outstanding attorney fees for both husband
and wife and debts owed to various family and friends of husband,
as evinced by five promissory notes executed by husband.
¶ 30 Both parties were represented by multiple attorneys and law
firms during the course of the litigation. The court allocated each
party’s outstanding attorney fees as debt.2 The amount of debt
allocated to husband for wife’s outstanding attorney fees totaled
$55,647 and was listed on the spreadsheet under the heading
“Cecelia’s Attorney Fees.” From the record, it appears that this sum
1 This sum is the total marital debt exclusive of the two mortgages
encumbering the two marital homes. Each party was allocated one of the homes (along with the debt encumbering that home). 2 Although generally “[m]arital liabilities include all debts that are
acquired and incurred by a husband and wife during their marriage,” In re Marriage of Jorgenson, 143 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Colo. App. 2006), a debt for attorney fees associated with the dissolution proceeding incurred during the marriage shouldn’t be allocated as a marital debt, see In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550, 559 (Colo. App. 2001); In re Marriage of Rieger, 827 P.2d 625, 625 (Colo. App. 1992). Rather, such outstanding attorney fees should be apportioned in accordance with section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. See Burford, 26 P.3d at 559; Rieger, 827 P.2d at 625. On appeal, wife doesn’t challenge the propriety of the court’s allocating the parties’ outstanding attorney fees as debt; thus, we don’t offer any opinion regarding the propriety of the court’s allocating both parties’ outstanding attorney fees as debt.
13 was the aggregate of outstanding fees that wife owed to more than
one law firm that represented her during the course of the
proceedings.
¶ 31 The marital debt associated with husband’s outstanding
attorney fees was listed on the spreadsheet under the heading
“Sherman & Howard” and totaled $59,410. Attorneys from
Sherman & Howard represented husband at the permanent orders
hearing, but they weren’t the first attorneys to represent husband
in this case. And no other attorney fees paid or owed by husband
to any other attorney or law firm were listed or allocated as marital
debt.
¶ 32 The court also allocated to husband a total of $44,774 in debt
evinced by five promissory notes. Those promissory notes were
from husband to his
• mother for $18,350;
• older sister for $1,667;
• friend for $20,240;
• roommate for $850; and
• younger sister for $3,667.
14 3. Analysis
¶ 33 Wife contends that the court erred by adopting husband’s
spreadsheet because by doing so it “double counted” husband’s
attorney fees and the debts evinced by the promissory notes to his
friends and family members. Wife says this is so because the
record establishes that the proceeds of the loans evinced by the
promissory notes were used to pay husband’s attorney fees that the
court also counted as debt. We disagree.
¶ 34 To be sure, there was testimony at the permanent orders
hearing that husband used some portion of the proceeds of the
loans from family and friends to pay his attorney fees. But the
record doesn’t establish that the fees paid with the loan proceeds
were the same fees that the court allocated as debt (i.e., those owed
to Sherman & Howard). Instead, the record appears to support that
to the extent that husband used a portion of the loan proceeds to
pay his attorney fees, those were for fees paid to other attorneys
who represented him (or whom he consulted with) over the course
of the dissolution proceedings — not Sherman & Howard. Indeed,
husband testified that “the money I borrowed from them was for the
retainer for my first attorney.” (Emphasis added.) The friend who
15 loaned husband approximately $20,000 similarly testified that he
“believe[d]” that husband had used the proceeds of his loan to “pay
for his first attorney.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, based on the
evidence in the record, we can’t say that the court clearly erred by
“double counting” husband’s attorney fees and the debt evinced by
the promissory notes.
¶ 35 Moreover, the sum allocated as debt husband owed to
Sherman & Howard appears to be the sum husband actually owed
to Sherman & Howard through the date of the permanent orders
hearing. The court’s calculation of $59,410 as the amount of
husband’s outstanding attorney fees appears to be based on a fee
affidavit executed by trial counsel a few days before the permanent
orders hearing. According to the affidavit, the $59,410 figure
included not only what husband had already been billed by
Sherman & Howard, but also the “estimated time to complete” the
proceedings through permanent orders. And the invoices appended
to the affidavit show that husband was carrying forward the full
amount he owed to Sherman & Howard each month. In other
words, the documents from Sherman & Howard reflect that the
16 entirety of that law firm’s bill remained outstanding.3 And because
the record reflects that husband hadn’t paid anything to
Sherman & Howard, we can’t say that the court clearly erred in
calculating husband’s debt. After all, husband couldn’t have used
loan proceeds to pay a debt he still owed. Simply put, according to
the evidence in the record, at the time of the permanent orders
hearing, husband owed $59,410 to Sherman & Howard and
$44,774 to friends and family. Accordingly, we don’t discern a
basis for reversal based on an alleged double-counting.
3 To the extent there was some evidence in the record that husband
may have paid something to Sherman & Howard from any of the personal loan proceeds, it was that he may have used a portion of the proceeds from the friend who loaned him $20,240 to pay a $10,000 retainer to Sherman & Howard. The evidence on this issue is unclear, so we can’t say that the court clearly erred by failing to account for it. But even assuming there was a $10,000 discrepancy, this would have affected the equalization payment by $5,000 (as the court stated it was dividing the marital estate equally). And because such an error would have affected the overall allocation of the $1.3 million marital estate by less than one half of one percent, such an error wouldn’t be grounds for reversal. See C.R.C.P. 61 (no defect in any ruling or order is ground for disturbing a judgment or order unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties); cf. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 36 (Colo. 2001) (“If . . . a trial court’s error affects only a small percentage of the overall marital estate, such an error may be deemed to have been harmless and thus does not require reversal.”).
17 D. Time Limitations at the Hearing
¶ 36 Wife next contends that the court violated her right to due
process by imposing and enforcing a time limit on the presentation
of evidence during the July 2023 hearing. We perceive no due
process violation.
1. Additional Facts
¶ 37 As previously discussed, after temporary orders were issued —
and allegedly violated — wife filed a motion for the issuance of a
contempt citation against husband. Wife alleged that husband had
failed to pay bills, paid incorrect amounts of temporary
maintenance to her, and failed to set aside $10,000 from the
Vanguard account to pay maintenance. She also alleged that
husband violated the mandatory injunction, see § 14-10-107(4)(b),
C.R.S. 2025, by “molesting or disturb[ing] the peace of [w]ife and
the two minor children throughout this case,” and by shifting the
deposit of his monthly salary from the parties’ joint bank account to
one in his own name without her permission.
¶ 38 Two and a half months before the permanent orders hearing,
the court set a hearing on wife’s contempt motion. At that time, the
court allocated one hour for each side to present their respective
18 evidence and argument. Two days before the scheduled contempt
hearing, however, the parties filed a joint motion to continue the
contempt hearing, which the court granted. In consultation with
the parties and without objection, the court combined the contempt
hearing with the permanent orders hearing. Before the combined
hearing commenced, the court informed both parties that they
would each be provided with two hours and twenty minutes to
present their evidence on both the permanent orders and contempt.
Neither party objected to these time limitations.
¶ 39 During the course of the hearing, the court tracked the parties’
time and periodically informed them of how much time each side
had remaining. After wife’s time ran out during her permanent
orders testimony, the court afforded both sides an additional
seventeen minutes to present their evidence. Wife’s time expired
before she presented any evidence in support of her contempt
motion.
¶ 40 After wife’s counsel had used all of her time without
presenting evidence related to the contempt, she requested more
time to present the contempt evidence (or that the contempt issue
be set over to another day). The court denied this request. Because
19 the court had not heard any contempt evidence, it denied the
citation for contempt against husband.
2. Relevant Law
¶ 41 The opportunity to be heard is an inherent element of due
process, In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 329 (Colo. App.
2007), and parties are entitled to be afforded sufficient time to make
an orderly presentation of their case, In re Marriage of Pawelec,
2024 COA 107, ¶ 29; In re Marriage of Finer, 893 P.2d 1381, 1389
(Colo. App. 1995). Still, the court may set a time limit on a hearing
from the outset and monitor the parties’ use of their time during the
hearing. Pawelec, ¶ 30; see also Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d
1097, 1102-05 (Colo. App. 2010); CRE 611(a) (“The court shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . avoid needless
consumption of time . . . .”). But “[t]he trial court’s interest in
administrative efficiency may not take precedence over a party’s
right to due process.” Pawelec, ¶ 30 (citing Hatton, 160 P.3d at
329).
¶ 42 Because due process is implicated, we apply a heightened level
of scrutiny to determine whether the district court’s time limits
20 constituted an abuse of discretion at two levels: whether the limits
were inadequate for the nature of the proceeding at the outset, and
if not, whether they became inadequate because of developments
during the proceeding. Id. at ¶ 31 (citing Maloney, 251 P.3d at
1102). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the
district court didn’t abuse its discretion in setting time limits or by
denying wife’s counsel’s request for additional time.
3. Analysis
¶ 43 First, nothing in the record suggests that the time limits the
district court imposed were inadequate for the nature of the
proceeding at the outset. The record suggests that, leading up to
the hearing, wife considered the amount of time set aside for the
hearing to be adequate. Specifically, wife didn’t dispute before the
district court, nor does she dispute here, that a one-day hearing
was sufficient time to address the issues related to permanent
orders and contempt. And she doesn’t dispute that the parties
agreed to the time limits the court imposed, both when the
contempt hearing was first set and when it was combined with the
permanent orders hearing. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1103
(considering whether time constraints resulted in unfair surprise).
21 ¶ 44 Second, nothing in the record suggests that the time limits the
court imposed became inadequate because of developments during
the hearing. Wife’s counsel was permitted to make her own
strategic decisions concerning witness presentation. See Pawelec,
¶ 32. Wife’s counsel called only one witness — wife — and was
reminded of her remaining time, including its impact on her ability
to present evidence related to the contempt issue.
¶ 45 Further, the district court adjusted the amount of time given
to both sides as the hearing progressed. The court afforded equal
time to both sides, and once the hearing was underway, it granted
both sides additional time. Cf. In re Marriage of Goellner, 770 P.2d
1387, 1388 (Colo. App. 1989) (concluding that the district court
abused its discretion by not granting wife additional time where
husband presented his case first and, after cross-examination, wife
had only thirty minutes to present her case-in-chief); see also
Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1104-05 (considering district court’s
flexibility).
¶ 46 For these reasons, we perceive no error in the length of the
hearing set by the court or the court’s denial of wife’s additional
request for more time to present her contempt case.
22 III. Attorney Fees
¶ 47 Husband contends that he is entitled to an award of his
appellate attorney fees pursuant to C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-
102(2), C.R.S. 2025, arguing that wife’s appeal is frivolous and
groundless. Although wife didn’t prevail, wife’s arguments on
appeal were neither frivolous nor groundless. See Mission Denv. Co.
v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1984) (“Standards for
determining whether an appeal is frivolous should be directed
toward penalizing egregious conduct without deterring a lawyer
from vigorously asserting his client’s rights.”); see also In re
Marriage of Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38 (“Fees should be awarded
only in clear and unequivocal cases . . . .”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.
Accordingly, we deny husband’s request for an award of his
appellate attorney fees. Husband, as the prevailing party, is,
however, entitled to an award of his appellate costs. See
C.A.R. 39(a)(2).
¶ 48 Wife also requests that we award her attorney fees incurred on
appeal. She cites section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, contending that
there is a significant disparity in the parties’ financial resources.
See In re Marriage of Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 30 (determining that a
23 court may consider the parties’ relative financial circumstances
when awarding attorney fees pursuant to section 14-10-119).
Because it is in a superior position to make this determination, we
remand to the district court to determine whether wife is entitled to
an award of her appellate attorney fees pursuant to section 14-10-
119, and, if so, in what amount. In re Marriage of Martin, 2021
COA 101, ¶ 42.
IV. Disposition
¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed, husband is awarded his costs on
appeal, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on wife’s
request for her appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119.
CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE GROVE concur.