24CA1874 Marriage of Al Flahi 11-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1874 Elbert County District Court No. 22DR30027 Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Kasarah Marie Al Flahi n/k/a Kasarah Marie Drake,
Appellant,
and
Tristan Ahmed Busanda Al Flahi,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Martinez* and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 20, 2025
Paige Mackey Murray, LLC, Paige Mackey Murray, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant
Grimaldi and Kinde, PLCC, Laura Kinde, Mark Grimaldi, Nicholas Trevino, Lauren B. Dutcheshen, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Kasarah Marie Al Flahi, now known as Kasarah Marie Drake
(mother), appeals the district court’s allocation of parenting time
entered in connection with the dissolution of her marriage with
Tristan Ahmed Busanda Al Flahi (father). We affirm the judgment
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on
mother’s request for section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025, attorney fees.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 Shortly after initiating this case, mother filed a “motion to
relocate” to Minnesota with the parties’ child. She explained that
(1) before the child was born, the parties lived in Minnesota; (2) her
and father’s extended families lived in Minnesota; (3) the cost of
living was lower in Minnesota; and (4) she could quickly obtain a
new job after moving.
¶3 In November 2022, the district court conducted a hearing on
mother’s motion. The court found that mother and father were
“wonderful parents,” they each had their own strengths when caring
for the child, and neither Colorado nor Minnesota was a superior
location for the child. The court then said that it wanted to “kick
this back to [the parents] . . . to try to figure this out” because it
believed they could come to a joint decision that was in the child’s
1 best interests. The court clarified that it was “not asking [them] to
develop . . . a permanent parenting plan. [And] if [they could]
file . . . even an interim [a]greement,” that would be “great.”
¶4 A few weeks later, the parties informed the court that they
were “unable to agree on whether [the child] should be allowed to
relocate and ultimately who would become the primary residential
parent based on whether [the child]’s relocation is allowed or not.”
Although they could not agree on whether the child would reside
primarily with mother in Minnesota or with father in Colorado, they
did agree to a general parenting time schedule. Under their
parenting plan, the child would reside with the “parent to whom
[the court] allocated primary residential parental responsibilities”
during the school year and visit the “non-primary residential
parent” one weekend per month. Then, during the summer, the
child would reside with the “non-primary residential parent” and
visit the primary residential parent one weekend per month. The
non-primary residential parent would also exercise parenting time
during fall, spring, and winter breaks.
¶5 The court authorized the parties to set “a final hearing on the
relocation” and described it as “a temporary orders hearing.” In
2 response, in an uncontested motion, mother informed the court
that the parties agreed “that no further litigation on the issue of
temporary relocation [was] necessary, and request[ed] . . . a
definitive order.” She also informed the court that “[t]he parties
were under the impression at the end of the hearing . . . that
evidence had closed on the contested matter of the relocation.”
¶6 In a December 2022 order, the court said it had “considered
all of the factors set forth in [section] 14-10-124,” C.R.S. 2025, and
determined that the child could move to Minnesota with mother.
The court explained that the child had spent more time with mother
and that many extended family members lived in Minnesota. The
court adopted the parties’ parenting time plan and designated
mother as the “parent to whom [the court] allocated primary
residential parental responsibilities.” Mother and the child then
moved to Minnesota.
¶7 The dissolution case was later assigned to a new judge, who
presided over the September 2023 permanent orders hearing. At
that hearing, the parties asked the court to make changes to the
parenting time plan set forth in the December 2022 order. After
mother’s testimony and father’s direct examination, neither of
3 which included evidence pertaining to changing the location of the
child, the court said, “There seems to be an understanding or
stipulation that [the December 2022] temporary orders were
permanent.” Then, the court asked whether the parties believed the
December 2022 order was a permanent or temporary order on the
allocation of parenting time. The parties agreed that the
determination on the child’s move to Minnesota was permanent.
Father’s lawyer specifically said that the “order on relocation was
permanent. We are not contesting the relocation.” She added that
“there are aspects of the parenting plan that the parties came up
[with] together and [the court] adopted as an order of the [c]ourt
that we do believe are at issue and are ripe for the [c]ourt to decide,
but not the matter of relocation.” The court indicated that the
permanency of the order could not be separated in that manner,
and it directed the parties to further discuss the issue.
¶8 At a status conference a few days later, the parties changed
their positions. Mother said that all aspects of the December 2022
order were permanent. Father said that the order was temporary.
¶9 After reviewing the record and the oral findings at the
November 2022 hearing, the court concluded that the December
4 2022 order was a temporary order on the allocation of parenting
time.
¶ 10 In light of that determination, the court held a new permanent
orders hearing. Then, in a September 2024 order, the court
determined that it was in the child’s best interests to reside in
Colorado with father, and it allocated to him primary parenting
time. Mother appealed, and the motions divisions of this court
stayed the district court judgment.
II. Standard of Review
¶ 11 The district court has broad discretion over the allocation of
parenting time. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8. We
will not disturb a court’s parenting time ruling absent a showing
that the court abused its discretion, meaning that it misapplied the
law or acted in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair
manner. Id. When reviewing the court’s ruling, we exercise every
presumption in favor of upholding it and will affirm the decision
when the record supports it. Id.
III. December 2022 Order
¶ 12 Mother contends that the district court’s September 2024
allocation of parenting time must be reversed. She argues that the
5 court erred by determining that the December 2022 order was a
temporary decision on parenting time. She further argues that
because the December 2022 order was a permanent determination
on the allocation of parenting time, the court’s September 2024
ruling that changed that allocation required the court to apply the
endangerment standard before modifying parenting time, which it
did not do. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that the December 2022 order was a temporary
ruling on parenting time, and, as a result, the court correctly
applied the best interests standard when determining a permanent
allocation of parenting time in the September 2024 order.
A. Applicable Legal Standards
¶ 13 A temporary order on parental responsibilities sets forth an
initial determination on the division of parenting time and decision-
making responsibility until the court renders its permanent orders.
In Interest of C.T.G., 179 P.3d 213, 221 (Colo. App. 2007); In re
Marriage of Fickling, 100 P.3d 571, 574 (Colo. App. 2004); see
§ 14-10-108(1), C.R.S. 2025. A court’s temporary order does not
vest a parent with parenting time rights, and it is not determinative
when the court decides the permanent allocation of parenting time.
6 See § 14-10-108(5)(a), (c); Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 163
(Colo. 2005); C.T.G., 179 P.3d at 221; Fickling, 100 P.3d at 574.
¶ 14 A permanent order on parental responsibilities grants a parent
vested parenting time rights based on the court’s consideration of
the child’s best interests. C.T.G., 179 P.3d at 221; see § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a). As applicable here, a court may not modify a
permanent allocation of parenting time when doing so changes the
parent with whom the child primarily resides unless the court finds
that (1) since issuing the permanent order, there has been a change
in circumstances and (2) the child’s present environment endangers
the child’s physical health or significantly impairs the child’s
emotional development. § 14-10-129(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 15 We review de novo the interpretation of a district court’s order.
See Andrews v. Miller, 2019 COA 185, ¶ 8. “Whether an order for
allocation of parental responsibilit[ies] . . . is temporary or final is
determined from the substance and effect of the order.” C.T.G., 179
P.3d at 221. We therefore look at the plain language in the order
and, when unambiguous, construe the order in harmony with the
generally accepted meaning of the words used. See Ad Two, Inc. v.
City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376 (Colo. 2000); see also
7 Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 (Colo. 1983) (stating that an
appellate court interprets an order to effectuate the district court’s
intent by applying the same rules of construction as when an
appellate court interprets a statute or contract).
¶ 16 But when the order is ambiguous, meaning that it is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we review
the record and the circumstances surrounding the order to
determine the court’s intent. Blecker, 672 P.2d at 528; see Ad.
Two, 9 P.3d at 376-77. The district court’s interpretation of an
ambiguous order becomes an issue of fact, and we defer to the
court’s factual determination when the record supports it. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Denver Classroom Tchrs. Ass’n., 2019 CO 5, ¶ 14;
Union Rural Elec. Ass’n v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 661 P.2d 247, 251 n.5
(Colo. 1983) (“Once a contract is determined to be ambiguous, the
meaning of its terms is generally an issue of fact to be determined
in the same manner as other disputed factual issues. Therefore, if
the present contract were ambiguous, any factual findings . . . on
the intent of the parties should be given deference on appeal under
the review standard for factual findings.”) (citation omitted).
8 B. Discussion
¶ 17 Reviewing the plain language of the December 2022 order, we
cannot conclude that the order was unambiguously a permanent or
temporary allocation of parenting time. On one hand, the order
referred to the factors in section 14-10-124, allowed the child to
move to Minnesota with mother, and directed a division of
parenting time based on the child’s out-of-state move, which taken
together could support a permanent ruling. On the other hand, the
parenting plan adopted by the court expressly stated that the cost
for the child to travel for parenting time was “divided equally
between the parties on a temporary basis, subject to reallocation at
[p]ermanent [o]rders.” In addition, neither the December 2022
order nor the parenting time plan expressly indicated whether the
ruling was a final decision on the allocation of parenting time or
merely an interim decision until the court could conduct a
permanent orders hearing.
¶ 18 In light of the order’s ambiguity, we next consider the
circumstances leading up to the December 2022 order and the
court’s resolution of those facts when determining that the order
was intended to be a temporary decision on parenting time. See
9 Blecker, 672 P.2d at 528; cf. Hefley Ranch, Inc. v. Stewart, 764 P.2d
415, 416 (Colo. App. 1988) (“The interpretation of a contract
requires the court to ascertain the parties’ intent at the time the
document was executed . . . .”). The record reveals that the court
and the parties were not consistent in their statements about
whether the decision was a temporary or permanent order. We,
therefore, defer to the court’s determination, supported by the
record, that the December 2022 order was temporary. See Sch.
Dist. No. 1, ¶ 14; Union Rural Elec., 661 P.2d at 251 n.5.
¶ 19 To begin, the court’s minute order described the November
2022 hearing, during which the parties focused on mother’s
“motion to relocate,” as “a temporary orders hearing.” Then, at that
hearing, mother acknowledged that she was asking for an “interim
recommendation” on parenting time “until permanent orders” were
entered. Mother also confirmed that, in connection with the child’s
move to Minnesota, she was asking the court to allocate to her sole
decision-making responsibility on a “temporary” basis and that this
allocation was subject to “reexamination at permanent orders.” The
court concluded the hearing by instructing the parties to discuss a
10 possible joint resolution but clarified that it was “not asking [them]
to develop . . . a permanent parenting plan.”
¶ 20 Following the November 2022 hearing, the court and mother
made additional comments indicating that the December 2022
order was intended to be a temporary allocation of parenting time.
After the court received the parties’ partial agreement on the
parenting plan, the court invited them to set a final hearing on the
child’s relocation, which it described as “a temporary orders
hearing.” Mother responded to that invitation by telling the court
that the parties did not desire another hearing “on the issue of
temporary relocation” and asked the court to rule on her motion.
And even after the December 2022 order, mother’s attorney referred
to the November 2022 hearing as a “temporary relocation hearing”
and the parenting plan as a “temporary agreement.”
¶ 21 Still, mother highlights that, at the September 2023 hearing,
the parties agreed that the December 2022 order as a permanent
decision on the child’s “relocation.” However, at the same hearing,
the parties asserted that the allocation of parenting time was not
permanent. The court considered these opposing positions as well
as all the other circumstances surrounding the order, and it
11 determined that the December 2022 order was not permanent. We
will not disturb the district court’s resolution of the conflicting
evidence when determining the intent of the December 2022 order.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1, ¶ 14; Union Rural Elec., 661 P.2d at 251 n.5; cf.
In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 45 (“We are not at liberty
to re-evaluate the conflicting evidence and set aside findings
supported by the record.”).
¶ 22 Moreover, a court’s ruling that allows a child to move out-of-
state with a parent is not a determination independent of the
allocation of parenting time; although it is intertwined with the
court’s allocation, nothing dictates that it must be decided at the
same time as the allocation of parenting time. See § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(VIII); see also § 14-10-106(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring a
court to allocate parenting time for any marital children when
dissolving a marriage); § 14-10-129(2)(c) (discussing a post-
permanent orders request to relocate with a child as a modification
of the court’s parenting time allocation); Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 161-
64 (describing a parent’s request to relocate with a child as a
determination concerning the allocation of parenting time). Thus,
until the court resolves the allocation of parenting time, it can
12 change its determination on where a child lives. See Collins, ¶ 79
(recognizing that the court may revise any order or judgment at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of all the parties). But see In re Estate of
Walter, 97 P.3d 188, 191 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that a second
judge may modify a prior ruling if new facts, changes of law, or
other persuasive circumstances warrant such modification).
¶ 23 Mother also argues that the district court improperly relied on
the absence of findings in the December 2022 order concerning the
section 14-10-129(2)(c) relocation factors to support its
determination that the order was temporary. True, a court does not
need to consider the section 14-10-129(2)(c) relocation factors when
determining an initial allocation of parenting time. See Spahmer,
113 P.3d at 163-64. But the court did not ultimately rely on the
absence of those findings to determine that the December 2022
order was a temporary ruling on the allocation of parenting time.
The court merely noted the lack of those findings when discussing
its concerns about the order. We therefore are not persuaded that
the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
13 December 2022 order was a temporary decision on the allocation of
parenting time.
¶ 24 Given our conclusion, we necessarily reject mother’s related
contention that the district court erred by not applying the
endangerment standard set forth in section 14-10-129(2)(d) when it
modified the purported permanent allocation of parenting time set
forth in the December 2022 order. The district court decided that
the December 2022 order was temporary, and, when issuing the
September 2024 order, the court then rendered a permanent
determination on the allocation of parenting time based on the
child’s best interests. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a); Spahmer, 113 P.3d
at 163-64; Fickling, 100 P.3d at 574.
IV. Allocation of Parenting Time
¶ 25 Mother next contends that even if the December 2022 order
was temporary, the district court abused its discretion by allocating
parenting time primarily to father in Colorado in its permanent
orders. We disagree.
¶ 26 The district court thoroughly considered the child’s present
circumstances and the statutory best interests factors, and it found
that it was in the child’s best interests to reside in Colorado and
14 allocated primary parenting time to father. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a).
The court explained that, as a whole, mother and father were good
parents and that each could support the child. Then, the court
found that “none of the reasons” the court relied on in 2022 to allow
the child to temporarily relocate to Minnesota had “materialized,”
“arguably things [had] worsened” since the child had moved, and
the child was “not in a better position as a result of the move out of
Colorado.” The court found that the primary reason the court
allowed the child to move to Minnesota in 2022 was due to the
increased connection the child could have with his extended family
in Minnesota. But it was troubled by mother’s failure to facilitate
any visits for the child with father’s extended family and her belief
that she did not bear any burden to arrange those visits. The court
also found that mother had recently moved to a new home in
Minnesota, which “forced” the child to change schools, and that she
did not discuss changing the school with father, even though they
shared joint decision-making responsibility. The court further
found that, since moving to Minnesota, mother was not involving
father in decisions concerning the child, she “seemed offended” that
15 she would have to consult with father on decisions, and their ability
to make joint decisions concerning the child had deteriorated.
¶ 27 Mother argues that the court’s findings did not sufficiently
justify an allocation of parenting time that directed the child to
move back to Colorado after spending the last two years in
Minnesota. However, the court weighed the conflicting evidence
and considered all the statutory best interests factors, including the
child’s presence in Minnesota, before it concluded that the child’s
best interests would be served by moving back to Colorado with
father.
¶ 28 The record supports the court’s determination, and we
therefore will not disturb it. See Collins, ¶ 8. In particular, father
testified that (1) before moving to Minnesota, the child had “lived his
whole life” in Colorado; (2) moving to Minnesota had adversely
impacted the child; and (3) living in Colorado was in the child’s best
interests. Father further explained that, since the parties’
separation in 2022, mother had changed the child’s school three to
four times, which included schools in Minnesota and Colorado, and
that mother was not involving him in decisions concerning the
child, including the child’s medical care and school. Mother also
16 admitted that she had changed the child’s school in Minnesota, she
had not discussed this change with father, the child had not seen
father’s extended family in Minnesota, and she had earned a lower
income in Minnesota.
¶ 29 While mother believes that the court should have placed more
weight on the child’s time in Minnesota, the court properly
determined a permanent allocation of parenting time based on the
child’s best interests. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a). The court was not
obligated to place more weight on the December 2022 order’s
decision for where the child would temporarily live. See § 14-10-
108(5)(a) (“A temporary order . . . [d]oes not prejudice the rights of
the parties or the child which are to be adjudicated at subsequent
hearings in the proceeding.”). We will not reweigh the conflicting
evidence or set aside the court’s allocation of parenting time when,
as here, the record supports it. See Collins, ¶ 8; see also In re
Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (noting that credibility
determinations and the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of
the evidence, as well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn
from the evidence, are matters within the district court’s sole
discretion).
17 ¶ 30 Mother also challenges a few discrete findings by the district
court that, according to her, lacked record support. Specifically,
she asserts that the court improperly found that she moved “several
times,” when, in fact, she had only moved once since going to
Minnesota. She asserts that the court incorrectly found that she
expected to get a better paying job in Minnesota, when she never
made that claim in her “motion to relocate.” And she asserts that
the court incorrectly found that she “promise[d]” to maintain the
child’s connection to father’s family, when she only indicated that
she would try to do so. Even if we assume, without deciding, that
these few findings mischaracterized the evidence, as we explained
above, the record supports the court’s many other findings in
support of its overarching determination that it was in the child’s
best interests to allocate primary parenting time to father in
Colorado. See Collins, ¶ 8. And mother does not show that any
error by the court concerning the few findings she highlights
“substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the
basic fairness of the trial.” In re Parental Responsibilities
Concerning E.E.L-T., 2024 COA 12, ¶ 30; see also C.A.R. 35(c)
(directing the court to disregard any error that does not affect the
18 parties’ substantial rights); People in Interest of A.C., 170 P.3d 844,
845 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that an alleged error, without a
valid allegation of prejudice, is not grounds for reversal).
¶ 31 The court thus acted within its broad discretion to allocate
parenting time primarily to father in Colorado.
V. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 32 Mother requests her appellate attorney fees under section
14-10-119 based on the purported disparity in the parties’ financial
resources. The district court is better equipped to address the
factual issues associated with this request, and we therefore
remand this issue to the district court. See C.A.R. 39.1; Collins,
¶ 86.
¶ 33 Father requests an award of appellate attorney fees under
C.A.R. 38(b), arguing that mother’s appeal is frivolous. Even
though unsuccessful, we do not agree that mother’s appeal
warrants such an award. See Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021
CO 77, ¶ 70 (noting that we award such attorney fees only in clear
and unequivocal cases of egregious conduct where no rational
argument is presented).
19 ¶ 34 Father also seeks attorney fees under C.A.R. 39. But C.A.R.
39 does not authorize an award of attorney fees; it addresses costs.
However, costs are taxed in accordance with C.A.R. 39(a)(2).
VI. Disposition
¶ 35 We affirm the judgment. The case is remanded to the district
court to consider mother’s request for appellate attorney fees under
section 14-10-119.
¶ 36 Additionally, on November 18, 2024, a motions division of this
court entered an order granting mother’s motion to stay the district
court’s September 2024 order. Upon issuance of the mandate, the
stay is lifted.
JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.