25CA0334 Marriage of Adams 12-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0334 El Paso County District Court No. 22DR31886 Honorable Catherine Mitchell Helton, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Sean R. Adams,
Appellant,
and
Serena Adams,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 31, 2025
Marrison Family Law, LLC, Catherine H. Ford, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
The Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Sean R. Adams
(father) and Serena Adams (mother), father appeals the district
court’s judgment allocating parenting time. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2024, the district court dissolved the parties’ nearly
nine-year marriage. In the permanent orders, the court ordered
that the parties’ two children reside primarily with mother in
California. The court granted father parenting time in Colorado for
most of the children’s summer breaks plus several long-weekend
visits in California. Father requested clarification of the parenting
time order, which the court denied. Father appeals.
II. Allocation of Parenting Time
¶3 Father contends that the district court erred by allowing the
children to reside primarily with mother in California. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶4 We review a district court’s parenting time determination for
an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107,
¶ 45. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or based on a misapplication of
the law. Id. We review de novo whether the court applied the
1 proper legal standard. In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M,
¶ 7. But a court has broad discretion over parenting time issues,
and we apply every presumption in favor of upholding its decision.
In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9.
B. Governing Law
¶5 When, as here, a party intends to relocate before permanent
orders are entered, the district court must accept that stated intent
and determine a parenting time allocation that serves the child’s
best interests. See Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161-64
(Colo. 2005) (district court must fashion a parenting plan that can
be exercised with the parties living in different states, if that is their
stated intention); see also Morgan, ¶ 17 (district court must allocate
parenting time consistent with the child’s best interests);
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII), C.R.S. 2025 (district court must consider
the parties’ physical proximity and its practical impact on parenting
time). In doing so, the court must consider “all relevant factors,”
including those listed in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), and must give
“paramount consideration to the children’s safety, and their
physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.” In re
Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 7. The court is not required
2 to make findings on every statutory factor. See Pawelec, ¶ 44. In
this context, the parties stand on equal footing, and either party is
as likely as the other to become the primary residential parent
under the best interests analysis. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163.
¶6 By contrast, when a party seeks to relocate after the entry of
permanent orders, a district court must apply the more demanding
standard found in section 14-10-129(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025, which
accounts for the parenting time rights already established by the
prior order. Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 161, 163; see In re Marriage of
Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2005). This standard requires
consideration of the section 14-10-124 best interests factors as well
as nine additional factors that specifically apply to relocation
modifications. § 14-10-129(2)(c); see Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163
(“[T]he goal of dissolution proceedings is to create a stable situation
between the new family units arising out of the divorce, whereas the
goal of a modification proceeding is to maintain this stability, if
possible, in the best interests of the child.”).
C. Discussion
¶7 Father asserts that the district court misapplied the law when
it ordered that the children would reside primarily with mother in
3 California. Specifically, he argues that the court did not adequately
consider the best interests of the children under section
14-10-124(1.5)(a) and instead erroneously focused on the factors in
section 14-10-129(2)(c), which he argues elevated mother’s interests
above all else. We discern no error.
¶8 The district court accepted mother’s planned relocation to
California and father’s opposition, recognizing that both parties
were equally likely to serve as the children’s primary parent. See
Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 164. The court then considered the section
14-10-124 best interests factors and made the following findings:
• Mother and the older child were suffering from
Hypermobility Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, and the younger
child was already displaying symptoms. See
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V) (directing the district court to
consider the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved).
• Mother wanted to relocate to California because their
symptoms were “exacerbated by the weather in Colorado.”
See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I) (directing the district court to
consider the parents’ wishes); see also In re Marriage of
4 Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1 (district court’s oral
findings supplement its written order). Father objected to
the move because he would be “cut out” of the children’s
lives. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I).
• The children expressed their desire to move with mother to
California. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II) (directing the district
court to consider the child’s wishes).
• Although there were concerns about mother’s “influence” on
the children’s views of father, the children remained bonded
with both parties. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III) (directing the
district court to consider the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with their parents, siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect their best
interests). Even so, father and the older child had a
strained relationship, and mother’s move would impact the
children’s relationship with father. See id.
• Mother had been the children’s primary caregiver. See id.;
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VII) (directing the district court to
consider whether the parents’ past pattern of involvement
with the child reflects a system of values, time commitment,
5 and mutual support). In the past, father had a “good
relationship” with both children. See § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(VII); Thorburn, ¶ 9 n.1.
• While there was no ongoing pattern of domestic violence,
each party had committed acts of domestic violence against
the other. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III.5) (directing the court
to consider domestic violence).
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25CA0334 Marriage of Adams 12-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0334 El Paso County District Court No. 22DR31886 Honorable Catherine Mitchell Helton, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Sean R. Adams,
Appellant,
and
Serena Adams,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 31, 2025
Marrison Family Law, LLC, Catherine H. Ford, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
The Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case involving Sean R. Adams
(father) and Serena Adams (mother), father appeals the district
court’s judgment allocating parenting time. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2024, the district court dissolved the parties’ nearly
nine-year marriage. In the permanent orders, the court ordered
that the parties’ two children reside primarily with mother in
California. The court granted father parenting time in Colorado for
most of the children’s summer breaks plus several long-weekend
visits in California. Father requested clarification of the parenting
time order, which the court denied. Father appeals.
II. Allocation of Parenting Time
¶3 Father contends that the district court erred by allowing the
children to reside primarily with mother in California. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶4 We review a district court’s parenting time determination for
an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107,
¶ 45. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or based on a misapplication of
the law. Id. We review de novo whether the court applied the
1 proper legal standard. In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M,
¶ 7. But a court has broad discretion over parenting time issues,
and we apply every presumption in favor of upholding its decision.
In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9.
B. Governing Law
¶5 When, as here, a party intends to relocate before permanent
orders are entered, the district court must accept that stated intent
and determine a parenting time allocation that serves the child’s
best interests. See Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161-64
(Colo. 2005) (district court must fashion a parenting plan that can
be exercised with the parties living in different states, if that is their
stated intention); see also Morgan, ¶ 17 (district court must allocate
parenting time consistent with the child’s best interests);
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII), C.R.S. 2025 (district court must consider
the parties’ physical proximity and its practical impact on parenting
time). In doing so, the court must consider “all relevant factors,”
including those listed in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), and must give
“paramount consideration to the children’s safety, and their
physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.” In re
Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 7. The court is not required
2 to make findings on every statutory factor. See Pawelec, ¶ 44. In
this context, the parties stand on equal footing, and either party is
as likely as the other to become the primary residential parent
under the best interests analysis. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163.
¶6 By contrast, when a party seeks to relocate after the entry of
permanent orders, a district court must apply the more demanding
standard found in section 14-10-129(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025, which
accounts for the parenting time rights already established by the
prior order. Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 161, 163; see In re Marriage of
Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2005). This standard requires
consideration of the section 14-10-124 best interests factors as well
as nine additional factors that specifically apply to relocation
modifications. § 14-10-129(2)(c); see Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 163
(“[T]he goal of dissolution proceedings is to create a stable situation
between the new family units arising out of the divorce, whereas the
goal of a modification proceeding is to maintain this stability, if
possible, in the best interests of the child.”).
C. Discussion
¶7 Father asserts that the district court misapplied the law when
it ordered that the children would reside primarily with mother in
3 California. Specifically, he argues that the court did not adequately
consider the best interests of the children under section
14-10-124(1.5)(a) and instead erroneously focused on the factors in
section 14-10-129(2)(c), which he argues elevated mother’s interests
above all else. We discern no error.
¶8 The district court accepted mother’s planned relocation to
California and father’s opposition, recognizing that both parties
were equally likely to serve as the children’s primary parent. See
Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 164. The court then considered the section
14-10-124 best interests factors and made the following findings:
• Mother and the older child were suffering from
Hypermobility Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, and the younger
child was already displaying symptoms. See
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V) (directing the district court to
consider the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved).
• Mother wanted to relocate to California because their
symptoms were “exacerbated by the weather in Colorado.”
See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I) (directing the district court to
consider the parents’ wishes); see also In re Marriage of
4 Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1 (district court’s oral
findings supplement its written order). Father objected to
the move because he would be “cut out” of the children’s
lives. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I).
• The children expressed their desire to move with mother to
California. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(II) (directing the district
court to consider the child’s wishes).
• Although there were concerns about mother’s “influence” on
the children’s views of father, the children remained bonded
with both parties. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III) (directing the
district court to consider the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with their parents, siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect their best
interests). Even so, father and the older child had a
strained relationship, and mother’s move would impact the
children’s relationship with father. See id.
• Mother had been the children’s primary caregiver. See id.;
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VII) (directing the district court to
consider whether the parents’ past pattern of involvement
with the child reflects a system of values, time commitment,
5 and mutual support). In the past, father had a “good
relationship” with both children. See § 14-10-
124(1.5)(a)(VII); Thorburn, ¶ 9 n.1.
• While there was no ongoing pattern of domestic violence,
each party had committed acts of domestic violence against
the other. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III.5) (directing the court
to consider domestic violence).
• Mother struggled with encouraging a relationship between
father and the children. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI)
(directing the district court to consider each parent’s ability
to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact
between the child and the other parent). Both parties
disparaged the other in the presence of the children. See
id.; § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VII). And mother had improperly
involved the children in this case. See § 14-10-124(1.5)
(directing the district court to consider all relevant factors).
• There was very little mutual support between the parties.
See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VII).
• If mother relocated to California, a long-distance parenting
plan would be necessary. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII).
6 • Mother had a significant amount of extended family in
California. See § 14-10-124(1.5).
¶9 From the above findings, which have record support, we
conclude that the district court considered the section 14-10-124
best interests factors and thus applied the correct legal standard.
True, the court also made findings related to the relocation
modification factors in section 14-10-129. But the court was not
precluded from considering such factors because, under a best
interests analysis, the court must consider all relevant factors. See
§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a); Collins, ¶ 7. In any event, father admitted the
court weighed “every single” section 14-10-129 factor in his favor.
¶ 10 Father also asserts that the court’s “analysis of the best
interest factors” and evidence compels a different outcome. We
decline his invitation to reweigh the statutory factors or evidence in
his favor and substitute our judgment for that of the district court.
See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing
for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the
record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”); see also In
re Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App. 1995) (when the
7 district court resolves the conflicting evidence in one party’s favor,
we may not reweigh that evidence or substitute our judgment for
that of the district court); In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504
(Colo. 1989) (an appellate court may presume that the district court
considered all of the evidence admitted).
¶ 11 In sum, we cannot say that the district court exceeded its
broad discretion by determining that the children’s best interests
were better served by designating mother their primary parent in
California. See Pawelec, ¶ 45; Badawiyeh, ¶ 9.
III. Disposition
¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.