Marran v. Marran

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 15, 2004
• Docket: 03-3018
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

7-15-2004

Marran v. Marran Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-3018

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004

Recommended Citation "Marran v. Marran" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 437. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/437

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. PRECEDENTIAL R. Nicholas Gimbel, Esq. (Argued) McCarter & English UNITED STATES COURT OF 1735 Market Street, Suite 700 APPEALS Philadelphia, PA 19103 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Counsel for Appellants

No. 03-3018 Gavin P. Lentz, Esq. Stephen E. Skovron, Esq. (Argued) Bochetto & Lentz RACHEL MARRAN; 1524 Locust Street CLAUDIA LIBRETT, Philadelphia, PA 19102

Appellants Counsel for Appellee Michael Marran

v. Walter F. Kawalec, III, Esq. (Argued) Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman MICHAEL MARRAN; & Goggin MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE 200 Lake Drive East OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH; Woodland Falls Corporate Park MONTGOM ERY COUNTY, PA Suite 300 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

On Appeal from the United States Counsel for Appellees Montgomery District Court County Office of Children and Youth; for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and County of Montgomery (D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-01709) District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

OPINION OF THE COURT Argued April 13, 2004

BEFORE: RENDELL, COWEN and COWEN, Circuit Judge. LAY*, Circuit Judges Claudia Librett (“Librett”) and (Filed July 15, 2004) Michael Marran (“Marran”) were involved in a protracted custody dispute over their daughter, Rachel. After the state *Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior proceedings had ended, Librett and Rachel United States Circuit Judge for the brought this action, based on the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. allegations of child abuse that had been made during the custody proceedings. They appeal the order of the District Court Rachel. Librett filed several complaints of dismissing their complaint under Rooker- abuse with the Montgomery County Office Feldman, Younger abstention, and Rule of Children and Youth (“OCY”). She also 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil filed petitions to modify and suspend Procedure. We will affirm the dismissal, Marran’s visitations. In response, the although on somewhat different grounds Court of Common Pleas suspended than those given by the District Court. Marran’s visitation rights, and OCY conducted an investigation into the I. allegations. OCY ultimately determined Librett and Marran cohabited for a that the allegations of sexual abuse were time in New York, but were never married. unfounded. Relying on these findings, the On May 21, 1999, while they were still Court of Common Pleas reinstated living together, Librett gave birth to Marran’s visitation rights. On January 9, Rachel, the couple’s only child. Shortly 2003, the Court of Common Pleas issued a after Rachel’s birth, Marran and Librett custody order in which it found that there were involved in an altercation that was nothing to substantiate Librett's became physical. As a result of that allegations that Marran had sexually altercation, Marran pled guilty to a state abused Rachel, and found that Librett was criminal charge of harassment in the intent on excluding Marran from Rachel’s second degree, and the parties separated. life. The court then awarded joint legal By consent as approved by the family custody to Marran and Librett, primary court in New York, Librett was granted physical custody to Librett, and partial sole physical and legal custody of Rachel, physical custody to Marran. Librett and Marran was allowed supervised appealed the orders lifting suspension of visitation with the child. Librett was also Marran’s visitation rights, denying a granted permission to move with Rachel to subsequent emergency petition based on Pennsylvania. the same events, and awarding custody. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed After Librett and Rachel moved to the orders, including those dealing with the Pennsylvania, Marran sought to modify his abuse allegations. An appeal to the visitations by filing a motion in the Court Pennsylvania Supreme Court is now of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. pending.1 Hearings in the matter began in October 2000 and continued through May 24, 2002. During this time, Marran was permitted 1 seven unsupe rvised visits, wh ich Since the custody order was issued, culminated in an overnight visit from Librett has continually failed to produce December 11 to December 12, 2001. Rachel for visitation with Marran, Sometime after May 2002, Librett began arguing that she should not have to to suspect that Marran had sexually abused because of the allegations of sexual abuse. She has not alleged any

2 Rather than w ait for the abstain from exercising its jurisdiction, Pennsylvania courts to rule on the appeal, and that the complaint had failed to state a Librett filed this action in the District claim upon which relief could be granted. Court for the Eastern District of On June 12, 2003, the District Court Pennsylvania. Librett sought damages dismissed the complaint, holding that it from Marran on her own and Rachel’s lacked jurisdiction over all of the claims behalf, as well as an injunction prohibiting under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Marran from abusing Rachel. The Alternatively, the District Court held that complaint alleged claims for assault and Younger abstention was proper. Finally, battery, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the District Court held that the complaint implied contract, intentional infliction of had failed to state a claim against the emotional distress, and loss of earnings Montgomery County defendants. This during minority. In addition, Librett and appeal followed. Rachel brought a claim under the Civil II. Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Montgomery County defendants had As a preliminary matter, the v io l a t ed L i b r e tt’s and Rac hel’ s Montgomery County defendants have filed constitutional rights by failing to properly a motion to dismiss this appeal. They investigate the allegations of abuse. The argue that Librett is a fugitive from justice complaint sought monetary damages and a and should not be entitled to use this declaration that OCY’s findings regarding Court’s resources to promote her own the abuse allegations were null and void, ends, when she is unwilling to follow the and could not be relied upon for any Pennsylvania court’s custody orders. purpose. Although it is troubling that Librett would blatantly ignore another court’s orders Both Marran and the Montgomery while seeking relief before this Court, we County defendants filed motions to are not convinced that dismissal is dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the warranted, and will deny the motion. District Court lacked jurisdiction over the claims under the Rooker-Feldman The Supreme Court has recognized doctrine, that the District Court should that courts have the power to dismiss a fugitive’s criminal appeal. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) additional instances of abuse other than (a fugitive’s escape “disentitles the the ones deemed unfounded by OCY, defendant to call upon the resources of the and has produced no further evidence of Court for determination of his claims”). abuse. The Court of Common Pleas held The Supreme Court later held, however, Librett in contempt for violating two that a claimant’s failure to appear in a separate orders in the custody case and criminal case does not permit a district fined Librett $500 for each day she failed court to grant summary judgment to the to produce Rachel for visitation.

3 government in a related civil forfeiture underlying this case, they have no direct case. Degan v. United States, 517 U.S. effect on the processing of this appeal. 820, 829 (1996). In addition, it has held Even assuming that Librett is a fugitive that an appellate court does not have the from justice, the M ontgomery County power to dismiss an appeal when a defendants have not shown that her status convicted felon who fled after conviction as a fugitive would prejudice them in this but before sentencing was recaptured appeal. We also observe that the affront before the appeal. Ortega-Rodriguez v. was to the dignity of the Pennsylvania United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993). courts, not to this Court. Dismissing this The Supreme Court reasoned that, appeal under the fugitive disentitlement although the fugitive’s flight acted as an doctrine would expand that doctrine even affront to the district court’s authority, beyond the scope rejected by the Supreme permitting “an appellate court to sanction Court in Ortega-Rodriguez. Moreover, the by dismissal any conduct that exhibited fact that Librett is not acting solely in her disrespect for any aspect of the judicial own capacity, but is also representing system, even where such conduct has no Rachel’s interests, complicates the connection to the course of the appellate prospect of dismissal on this basis, as it proceedings,” would sweep to broadly. Id. would not be fair to penalize Rachel based The Court did, however, recognize that on her mother’s fugitive status. We will dismissal would be appropriate if the deny the Montgomery County defendants’ fugitive’s status in some way prejudiced motion to dismiss the appeal. the government’s status as a litigant, but III. found that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had not articulated such A. prejudice in dismissing the case. The District Court held that it In the state court proceedings, lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker- Librett has failed to produce Rachel for the Feldman doctrine. We exercise plenary visitations required by the custody order. review over the decision to grant the As a result, Librett has been held in motion to dismiss for lack of subject contempt by the Court of Common Pleas matter jurisdiction. FOCUS v. Allegheny of Montgomery County. Criminal charges County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d have also been filed against her in 834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996). Montgomery County for interfering with The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars child custody and concealment of the lower federal courts from exercising whereabouts of a child, in connection with jurisdiction over a case that is the her refusal to produce Rachel under the functional equivalent of an appeal from a custody order. Although the finding of state court judgment. Rooker v. Fidelity contempt and the criminal charges are very Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of troubling and relate in part to the events Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

4 U.S. 462 (1983). A case is the of state law that the state court was functional equivalent of an appeal from a required to reach in order to render its state court judgment in two instances: (1) decision.” Desi’s Pizza v. City of when the claim was actually litigated Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 421 (3d Cir. before the state court; or (2) when the 2003). Pennsylvania law requires that claim is inextricably intertwined with the courts consider “the preference of the child state adjudication. ITT Corporation v. as well as any other factor which Intelnet International Corporation, 366 legitimately impacts the child's physical, F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004). As we intellectual and emotional well-being” in recently noted, almost any claim that is determining custody. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § actually litigated will also meet the 5303(a). Ongoing sexual abuse, as well as inextricably intertwined test. Id. Unless continued association with a past abuser, the federal claims are identical to the state would unquestionably impact a child’s court claims, determining whether the well-being. In addition, the state court is claims have been actually litigated is more required to consider “each parent and adult difficult than determining whether the household member’s present and past claims are inextricably intertwined with violent or abusive conduct” in determining the state judgment. Id. at 211 n.8. Thus, custody. Id. at § 5303(c). In other words, we will begin by determining whether the the Court of Common Pleas had to current claims are inextricably intertwined consider and adjudicate the allegations of with the custody determination. sexual abuse in reaching its determination that Marran was entitled to joint legal A claim is inextricably intertwined custody and partial physical custody of with the state court adjudication when Rachel. “federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was Librett argues that the Court of wrong.” Parkview Assoc. v. City of Common Pleas refused to adjudicate the Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. issue of whether Rachel had been sexually 2000). “Rooker-Feldman applies only abused, because the judge in the custody when in order to grant the federal plaintiff matter deferred to the findings of the the relief sought, the federal court must investigation conducted by OCY, rather determine that the state court judgment than conduct a separate hearing on the was erroneously entered, or must take matter. In the custody order, however, the action that would render the state judge explicitly discounted the opinions of judgment ineffectual.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at Librett’s experts regarding the alleged 840. abuse, determined that reports of Rachel’s behavioral problems after the overnight To determine whether a particular visit were a result of Librett’s reaction to claim for federal relief is inextricably the visit rather than to any abuse, and intertwined with a prior state court discounted the idea that an incident of decision, this Court looks at “the questions

5 abuse took place during supervised visit. most straightforward application of In making these determinations, the judge Rooker-Feldman. Librett seeks damages considered the reports of a neutral third for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of party, the therapist chosen by Librett to implied contract, intentional infliction of supervise the visits between Marran and emotional distress, and “loss of earnings Rachel. In those reports, the therapist during minority.” All of these claims are noted that Rachel responded well to based on the alleged abuse of Rachel. In Marran and gave no indication that order for Librett to succeed on these anything was wrong. The judge further claims, the District Court would have to found that, although Marran may have find that the Court of Common Pleas erred made mistakes as a new father, the in deciding that the allegations of abuse program of supervised visitation and were unfounded. As such, the claims are therapy had made him a better father, and inextricably intertwined with the state a strong bond existed between him and court adjudication and the District Court Rachel. In addition, the judge referred to was correct in finding it lacked jurisdiction the findings of OCY that the allegations of over these claims. abuse were unfounded, and noted that no Libre tt also a rg u e s t h at new allegations of abuse had been made. Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claims The fact that no additional hearings were against Marran, because she and Rachel held does not mean that the issue was not are seeking an injunction against further adjudicated. Indeed, under Pennsylvania abuse and damages for past abuse, not law the judge was required to adjudicate modification of the custody order. Even the issue of whether the abuse had assuming that it is true that no occurred, because he was required to modification of the custody order would consider a parent’s abusive conduct in occur because of an injunction or an award making the custody determination. See 23 of damages, granting an injunction or Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5303(a). Whether the award of damages against Marran would judge erred in not holding a hearing, require this Court to find that the Court of accepting other evidence, or allowing Common Pleas erred in finding that the additional testimony after May 2002 is an abuse allegations were unfounded. issue that must be decided by the Rooker-Feldman bars all of Librett’s Pennsylvania courts through the appeals claims against Marran. process. Rachel’s claims against Marran The claims in this case fall into present a slightly more complicated issue. three categories: (1) Librett’s claims Generally, Rooker-Feldman does not bar against Marran; (2) Rachel’s claims claims by persons who were not parties to against Marran; and (3) the claims against the underlying state action. Valenti v. the Montgomery County defendants. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 297-98 (3d Cir. Librett’s claims against Marran present the 1992). As we have noted, “[t]his limiting

6 principle of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine Ct. 2003). In Frank, the Superior Court ‘has a close affinity to the principles reasoned that “there is no need for a child embodied in the legal concepts of claim to intervene in his or her own custody and issue preclusion.’” Exxon Mobil proceeding” because the child’s interests Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industry Corp., 364 are the subject of the hearing, and allowing F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting such an intervention would be “ineffectual Valenti, 962 F.3d at 297). For example, as as being redundant.” Id. It then held that with claim preclusion and issue preclusion, the boys’ claims were barred by collateral Rooker-Feldman bars actions brought by estoppel, as they had already been parties in privity with the parties in the addressed and decided in the custody state action. Id. hearing. Id. Privity “is merely a word used to Other states have similarly held that say that the relationship between one who there is no need to make children parties to is a party on the record and another is the custody litigation, either through close enough to include that other within intervention or other means. See, e.g., the res judicata.” EEOC v. United States Auclair v. Auclair, 730 A.2d 1260, 1270 Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir. (Md. App. 1999); Miller v. Miller, 677 1990) (quoting Bruszewski v. United A.2d 64, 66-67 (Me. 1996); Hartley v. States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.)). “One Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 673-74 (Colo. relationship long held to fall within the 1994); Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So. 2d 444 concept of privity is that between a (Ala. 1975). In some of those cases, the nonparty and party who acts as the court relied on the availability of a nonparty’s representative.” Id. Even if a guardian ad litem to represent the child is not a party to a custody action her children’s interests. See e.g., Auclair, 730 federal claims will be barred if the child is A.2d at 1270; Miller, 677 A.2d at 66-67; in privity with the named parties (her Hartley, 886 P.2d at 673-74. In other parents). cases, no guardian ad litem was involved, and only the parents were parties to the Rachel was not a named party in the action. Leigh, 311 So.2d at 446-48 (court underlying custody proceeding. The did not err in not appointing guardian ad Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never litem, when none was requested and the ruled that a child is a party to her own nature of custody proceedings is already custody hearing, and it is unclear whether protective of the child’s interests). a child who is the subject of a custody hearing is in privity to her parents. A In all of the cases, the courts recent Superior Court decision has held, recognized that the child’s best interests however, that three boys could not were the guiding force in the custody intervene in their own custody action in determination and reasoned those interests order to assert their own interests. Frank were already adequately represented, v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 197 (Pa. Super. whether by an appointed guardian ad litem

7 or by the parents and court. Courts have he r cons titutiona l rights to th e generally recognized that a child’s companionship, care, custody, and interests in a custody dispute are management of Rachel by failing to represented by the parents, even when the conduct an adequate investigation into the child makes no motion to intervene. See allegations of sexual abuse. She also generally, Smith v. Organization of Foster alleges that this failure to investigate the Families for Equality and Reform, 431 allegations adequately caused emotional U.S. 816, 842 n. 44 (1977) (in litigation, a distress to both Librett and Rachel. She child’s rights are generally represented by seeks damages under § 1983, as well as a a parent or guardian, because the child declaration that the investigation was herself lacks the capacity to represent her inadequate and a declaration that the own interests); In re Tamara R., 764 A.2d findings “are null and void and may not be 844, 849 (Md. App. 2000) (“Unless a relied upon for any purpose.” (App. at guardian ad litem is appointed, the 19). children's interests are presumed to be The District Court reasoned that the represented by their respective parents.”). Montgomery County defendants were in In Frank, the Superior Court did not privity with Marran, and as such, the explain whether the boys’ claims were claims against them were barred by estopped because they were deemed Rooker-Feldman. Although it is not parties to the action or because they were entirely clear how the District Court found in privity to one or both of their parents, a privity relationship between Marran and who were parties to the action. The the Montgomery County defendants, precise distinction is unnecessary to our privity is not required. As we recently analysis, however, as Rooker-Feldman noted, “we have never deemed Rooker- bars both the parties to the state action and Feldman inapplicable based on the non- persons in privity with those parties from participation in state court of a party relitigating in federal court the issues asserting the jurisdictional bar.” ITT decided in a state court. We therefore hold Corporation, 366 F.3d at 216 n.19. that Rooker-Feldman bars a minor child Instead, the question must be whether the from relitigating in federal court the issues issues underlying the claims against the concerning the child that were adjudicated Montgomery County defendants were in a state custody determination. Rachel’s actually litigated in or are inextricably claims against Marran are barred, for the in t e rt w i n e d w i t h t h e cu s t o dy same reasons that Librett’s claims against determination. Marran are barred. We have held that Rooker-Feldman The claims against the Montgomery deprived a district court of jurisdiction County defendants are even more over an attorney’s challenge to the involved. Librett alleges that the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Montgomery County defendants violated Court disbarring him. Stern v. Nix, 840

8 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1988). The attorney in unconstitutional without attacking the Stern framed the claim as a constitutional judgment of the state court that Centifanti challenge to certain rules governing had violated those rules. Id. at 1430. attorney discipline, and sought an The declaratory judgment that injunction barring the Pennsylvania Librett seeks against the Montgomery Supreme Court from disbarring himself County defendants is akin to the injunction and other similarly situated attorneys if sought in Stern. She seeks a ruling that the those rules were applied. Id. at 212. We findings are null and void and may not be recognized that, at first glance, the relied upon for any purpose. This relief is challenge appeared to be a general barred under Rooker-Feldman, because it constitutional challenge to the rules and is an indirect attack on the custody not barred by Rooker-Feldman, but then determination already adjudicated in state went on to reason that the nature of the court. The Court of Common Pleas injunction sought indicated that “Stern’s deferred to OCY’s findings that the abuse complaint is simply a skillful attempt to allegations were unfounded, and based its mask the true purpose of the action, which custody determination on those findings. essentially is to reverse the judicial A declaration by this Court that those decision of the Supreme Court of findings may not be relied on necessarily Pennsylvania, in contravention of implies a finding that the Court of Rooker-Feldman.” Id. Common Pleas was in error. This is the In a later case, we held that a type of indirect appeal of a state court similar challenge to the Pennsylvania rules d e t e r m i n a t io n i s p r o h ib i t e d b y governing attorney discipline was not Rooker-Feldman. barred by Rooker-Feldman. Centifanti v. Despite the fact that Librett and Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3d Cir. 1989). Rachel attempted to seek relief prohibited Centifanti alleged that certain rules were by Rooker-Feldman, the § 1983 claim unconstitutional on their face, and sought itself is not barred by Rooker-Feldman. In an injunction barring the prospective Ernst v. Child & Youth Services of application of those rules. Id. at 1426. Chester County, which also involved child The district court, citing Stern, dismissed custody matters, a custodial grandmother Cen tifani’s complaint under alleged that Child and Youth Services Rooker-Feldman. Id. We reversed, (“CYS”) had improperly formulated and however, stating that the prospective made recommendations to the state court nature of the injunction meant that it was in a dependency proceeding regarding her not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at granddaughter. Ernst v. Child and Youth 1429-30. We also found that the federal Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486 claim was not inextricably intertwined (3d Cir. 1996). We held that with the state claim, because a federal court could find that the rules were [t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine did

9 not preclude the district court from B. deciding those claims, because a The District Court went on to find ruling that the defendants violated that abstention was proper with respect to Ernst's rights to substantive due the § 1983 claims under the principles process by mak ing enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. recommendations to the state court 37 (1971). We exercise plenary review out of malice or personal bias over the question of whether the elements would not have required the court required for abstention exist. FOCUS, 75 to find that the state court F.3d at 834. If all of the elements are judgments made on the basis of present, we review the District Court’s those recommend ations were erroneous. Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiffs from raising a First Amendment Id. at 491-92. Likewise, in this case, a challenge in federal court, even though it finding that the Montgomery County had never actually been litigated at the defendants violated Librett’s or Rachel’s state court level. Valenti, 962 F.2d at substantive due process rights in 296. In Valenti, the plaintiffs had investigating the allegations of abuse challenged an election law on equal would not require a finding that the Court protection grounds, but did not raise a of Common Pleas erred in relying on the First Amendment challenge. Id. We report stemming from the investigation. held that the claim was barred, because it This is not to say that such a determination could have been raised in the state would not have an effect on the custody matter. We later explained, however, determination. Armed with such a that such claims were barred only if they judgment, Librett may be in a position to were inextricably intertwined in the state seek reconsideration of the custody order. court proceedings. Parkview Assoc., 225 Nevertheless, Rooker-Feldman is not F.3d at 326-29. Thus, a constitutional implicated, and the District Court erred in claim is only barred if finding merit in dismissing this claim for lack of the claim would require a finding that the jurisdiction.2 state court was wrong. Id. at 326. In this case, a finding that the underlying investigation conducted by OCY was 2 The Montgomery County defendants constitutionally insufficient would not also argue that the § 1983 claims are indicate that the state court wrongly barred, because Rooker-Feldman bars relied upon OCY’s recommendations. It constitutional claims that could have would merely mean that OCY did not been but were not raised during the state properly perform its job. As such, the court proceedings. This is not exactly challenge is not inextricably intertwined the case. We have held that with the custody proceedings.

10 decision to abstain for abuse of discretion. courts to stay, rather than dismiss, actions for damages that were not cognizable in Younger established that federal ongoing state proceedings. Deakins, 484 courts should abstain from enjoining state U.S. at 202. In Quackenbush, the Supreme criminal prosecutions, because of Court held that, in cases removed from principles of comity and federalism, unless state court, remand under abstention certain extraordinary circumstances exist. principles was proper only when Younger, 401 U.S at 49-54. This holding discretionary relief, such as an injunction has been expanded over time to apply to or declaratory judgment, was sought. noncriminal judicial proceedings that Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730. These implicate important state interests. cases seem to indicate that abstention Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. under Younger principles is not proper Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 when damages are sought. (1982). “A federal court will only consider Younger abstention when the Even if Younger abstention is requested equitable relief would constitute proper in suits for damages, it was not federal interference in state judicial or appropriate for the District Court to quasi-judicial proceedings.” Marks v. abstain from the § 1983 claims in this case. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1994) While it is true that litigation regarding (emphasis added). The proponent of custody is still ongoing in the state court, abstention must show that “(1) there are there are no ongoing state proceedings ongoing state proceedings that are judicial regarding the adequacy of OCY’s in nature; (2) the state proceedings investigation. When there are no pending implicate important state interests; and (3) state proceedings, Younger abstention is the state proceedings afford an adequate inappropriate. FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 843.3 opportunity to raise federal claims.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 3 1989). Librett argues that Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992), The Supreme Court has never precludes a federal court from ever explicitly decided whether Younger declining jurisdiction under Younger abstention covers actions for damages as principles when the case involves well as equitable relief. See Deakins v. domestic relations, unless the plaintiff Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988); see directly asks for a divorce, custody, or also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 alimony decree. This is simply not true. U.S. 706, 719 (1996). In Deakins, the In Ankenbrandt, a mother sued a father Court reserved the question of whether a on behalf of their children, seeking federal court could decline to exercise damages for abuse. Id. at 691. The jurisdiction over a claim for damages district court found that it lacked under the principles in Younger, but jurisdiction over the action because of approved of this Circuit’s rule requiring the “domestic relations” exception to

11 C. the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is still not entitled to relief. Bd. Although the District Court erred in of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863 dismissing the § 1983 claims under both Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention, 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2003). To make out a dismissal was still proper under Rule prima facie case under § 1983, the plaintiff 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss for failure must demonstrate that a person, acting to state a claim may be granted only if, under color of law, deprived him of a accepting all well-pleaded allegations in federal right. Berg v. County of the complaint as true and viewing them in Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000). “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights and does not provide diversity jurisdiction. Id. In the redress for common law torts–the plaintiff alternative, the district court found that it must allege a violation of a federal right.” would abstain from exercising Id. jurisdiction under the principles of Younger. Id. “Local governing bodies . . . may be The Supreme Court confirmed sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, that a “domestic relations” exception to declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . diversity jurisdiction did exist, but that it the action that is alleged to be was only applicable in a narrow set of unconstitutional implements or executes a circumstances not present in that case. policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or Id. at 703. The Court then examined the d e c i s io n offic ia l l y a d o p t e d an d alternative holding under Younger and promulgated by that body's officers.” found that abstention was inappropriate Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. in that case, because the father’s rights 658, 690 (1978). In addition, local had already been severed and there were gov ernm ents can be sued for no ongoing proceedings in state court. “con stitutional deprivations visite d Id. at 705. Ankenbrandt does not stand pursuant to governmental ‘custom.’” Id. at for the proposition that Younger 690-91. Local governments are not liable abstention is never appropriate in cases “unless action pursuant to official policy involving domestic relations. It held that of some nature caused a constitutional Younger abstention is inappropriate in tort.” Id. at 691. In other words, a county domestic relations cases when there are (or its agencies) may not be sued under a no ongoing proceedings. Id. at 705. In respondeat superior theory. Therefore, a this case, the District Court relied on prima facie case against a county must Rooker-Feldman in finding that it lacked involve an allegation of a policy or custom jurisdiction over Librett’s and Rachel’s that directed or caused the constitutional claims. The “domestic relations” deprivation. exception to diversity jurisdiction was Librett alleges that OCY’s failure not relied on.

12 “to consult even one of the mental health The District Court’s order of June professionals to whom Rachel Marran 12, 2003, dismissing the complaint will be described the sexual abuse she had affirmed. experienced at the hands of her father . . . denied Ms. Librett her constitutionally protected rights in the companionship, care, custody, and management of her daughter Rachel” and caused severe emotional distress to both Rachel and Librett. (App. at 46.) Assuming, arguendo, that Librett properly alleged a constitutional violation, Librett did not allege that a policy or custom of OCY or Montgomery County led to the violation. This is an essential part of a § 1983 claim against a county. Without an allegation of a policy or custom, Librett has not stated a prima facie case, and the District Court properly dismissed the claim without permitting discovery. IV. The claims against Marran and the attempt to seek declaratory judgment that OCY’s findings are null and void and may not be relied upon for any purpose are an attempt by Librett and Rachel to relitigate an issue already decided by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The District Court properly dismissed them under Rooker-Feldman. In addition, the remaining claims against the County lacked a policy requiring Montgomery County defendants were reasonable investigations, or that it had properly dismissed for failure to state a such a policy, but that the policy was claim, and Librett has conceded that she is breached in this case. Even if she were unable to properly state a claim.4 allowed to amend her complaint to include such allegations, she would still fail to properly state a claim against the 4 Librett asserts that, in the § 1983 Montgomery County defendants under § claim, she would claim that Montgomery 1983.