Marr v. United States

8 F.2d 231, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3262
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 14, 1925
DocketNo. 6804
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 8 F.2d 231 (Marr v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marr v. United States, 8 F.2d 231, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3262 (8th Cir. 1925).

Opinion

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff in error, herein referred to as defendant or as Marr, was convicted on the first count of an indictment which charged him and others with devising a fraudulent scheme and using the post office in its execution. Penal Code, § 215 (Comp. St. § 10385). The record presented to us contains 2,441 pages, the greater part of which is a transcript of the proceedings during the progress of the trial. Questions to witnesses and their answers are set out in full, also many colloquies between counsel and between court and counsel. All of this is embodied in a so-called hill of exceptions extending from page 102 to- page 2418 of the printed record. As said in Linn v. United States, 251 F. 476, 483, 163 C. C. A. 470, the so-called bill of exceptions in this case is such in name only. We are painfully aware of the fact that such a practice has become too common. It is expensive to litigants and burdensome to the court. It ought not to be permitted. Only such parts of the trial proceedings which bear on the claimed errors of law committed below should be brought into the record by a bill of exceptions. Everything else is foreign to the issues here and confusing. There can rarely • be any reason given for embodying questions put to witnesses; and this is true even in eases, which sometimes occur, wherein it can be reasonably contended that the verdict is wholly without support, hence all testimony must be considered. That, confessedly, is [232]*232not this case. Notwithstanding this, we have spent many days reading this record, in an effort to find what bears on the errors assigned. The assignments- relied upon will be taken up after a statement of the case.

On July 7,1922, defendant executed a declaration of voluntary trust, and on the same day filed the same in the proper office of Union County, Arkansas, in which records of deeds for that county are kept. This declaration of trust is entitled, “The Trust Estate, The Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate.” The defendant therein declared that he was about to take title to certain oil and gas leases as trustee, that he would hold those leases and all other, property, real and personal, which might be conveyed or transferred to him as trustee thereunder, upon the trust thereinafter declared, that the beneficiaries in the trust estate would be the persons who might subscribe for and pay for certificates of $10 each to be issued by the trustee, but the declaration did not state what property or what leases the trustee intended or expected to' acquire for the trust estate. The form of these certificates to be issued was set out in the declaration. .The defendant reserved to himself unrestricted control, management and disposition; and that he or his successor in trust might terminate the trust estate by merger or reorganization in any manner or form whatsoever. It gave him power to manage and control the property of the trust estate according to his own judgment, and prohibited the holders of certificates that might be issued any participation therein. It provided that he might expend any portion of the trust funds or profits necessary in carrying out the trust, that he would keep all business transactions as trustee in record form in detail, and that he would be entitled to 25 per cent, of the profits and of the corpus of the trust estate, the certificate holders would be entitled to share prorata the remainder thereof. Defendant at once entered upon a campaign to induce the general public to take and pay for certificates to be issued by him. This was carried on by circular letters sent through the mails and newspaper advertisements. On August 19, 1922, he sent through the United States mails from El Dorado; Arkansas, a circular letter in which he said he had organized the Pat Marr Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate, that it had no capitalization, that it was operated on the actual cost plan, that he was out to raise only $32,400, with which he would drill oil wells in section 29 of the El Dorado field, that-he guaranteed that both of these wells would be gushers that would spout oil over the crown block, that he guaranteed to pay every person who invested with him 400 per cent, in dividends, that he expected to drill 20 gushers and to pay 4,000 per cent, instead of 400 per cent., that he had done this before many times and was out to do it again,that he was an oil man whose merit had been tried and proven in every oil field in the Great -Southwest, that he guaranteed two gusher wells and 400 per cent, in dividends. His advertising campaign resulted in his selling certificates to the amount of more than $177,000.

On September 23, 1922, he filed another declaration of trust identical in form with the one filed on July 7th preceding, which he called “Pat Marr’s Camden Syndicate No. 2.” This was followed up by a campaign of advertisement through newspapers and circular letters for subscribers for certificates, and he received something more than $255,000, for which he issued certificates of $10 each in Camden Syndicate No. 2. On December 11, 1922, he filed another declaration like the two preceding, wherein he created another trust estate which he called “The Pat Marr Company.” This was immediately followed up with another newspaper advertising and circular letter campaign, and he admittedly received $1,391,000 (the district attorney says $1,960,000), for which he issued certificates of $10 each in The Pat Marr Company. He acquired oil leases and lands supposed to be valuable for oil deposits and proceeded to develop them. Some of them were of great value and some were not. ’ On October 28, 1922, he declared another trust in the same form as those we have considered, under the title, “Pat Marr Oil Company,” but it does not appear that he sold certificates in that. He also organized and controlled several corporations, among them Marr Oil Corporation, under the laws of Maryland, with a capital stock of 1,500,000 shares of no par value, 25,000 thereof to be known as Class A, which were to manage and control the corporation, the remainder as. Class B. The record shows many assignments of leases and conveyances, some by Marr. as trustee to named persons, some by 'Marr as trustee to the corporations which he organized and controlled, and some by Marr as trustee to himself as trustee, but not indicating for what trust he was acting either as grantor or grantee; and there is no explanation in that respect. On November 27, 1922, acting as trustee for Pat Marr’s Camden Syndicate No. 2, he transferred to the Texas Company, a corporation, leases covering certain lands for a consideration of $250,000. He also [233]*233transferred’ to that company certain leases belonging to the Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate for $250,000, and thereafter he paid to the certificate holders in those two syndicates the sums which they had given in purchase of their certificates — to the certificate holders in the Double Barrel Gusher Syndicate $177,000 plus, and to those in the Camden Syndicate No. 2 $255,000 plus, as shown by the books kept for those syndicates. No money was ever paid to any other certificate holder. These payments were made in May, 1923, and each of those concerns was closed out as of the 31st of that month. The books did not show that either of them had any remaining assets, except a balance of $.1,9,000 standing to the credit of one and $20,000 to the credit of the other. They had each produced some oil.

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Bluebook (online)
8 F.2d 231, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 3262, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marr-v-united-states-ca8-1925.