Marquez v. State
This text of 563 So. 2d 152 (Marquez v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The defendant, Armando Marquez, appeals his conviction and sentence for vessel homicide. We affirm.
Initially, the State of Florida filed an information charging the defendant with vessel homicide in violation of Section 782.-072(1), Florida Statutes (1987).1 Subsequently, the State filed a new information charging the defendant with the original charge of vessel homicide and with manslaughter in violation of Section 782.07, Florida Statutes (1987). The case went to trial; however, before it went to the jury, the State nolle prossed the count charging the defendant with vessel homicide. The State, however, requested the trial court to instruct the jury that vessel homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter. The defendant was acquitted of manslaughter, but convicted of vessel homicide.
The charges against the defendant arose from a boating accident within the Miami Marine Stadium basin involving the defendant’s forty-one foot boat and a nine foot inflatable craft. The area where the accident occurred was congested due to a Jimmy Buffet concert at the stadium. There was conflicting evidence as to the speed at which the defendant’s boat was traveling and as to the manner in which the boat was being operated at the time of the accident. However, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant was operating his boat in a reckless manner.
At trial, the only evidence which pinpointed the defendant as the driver of the boat was the defendant’s statement given to an officer at the scene of the accident. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his confession into evidence. The defendant maintains that prior to admitting his confession, the State had to show that the defendant was the operator of the boat. We disagree with this contention, “[identification of the defendant as the guilty party is [not] a necessary predicate for the admission of a confession.” State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823, 825 (Fla.1976). A defendant’s conviction may not be based solely upon his confession; the State must also prove that the crime has been committed. Allen. The State, in the present case, has met this burden.
The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that vessel homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter.2 We disagree. The Supreme Court of Florida, in McCreary v. State, 371 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1979), held that “[t]he legislature, by enacting [the vehicular homicide statute], did not [154]*154intend only to reduce the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle to a third-degree felony identified as vehicular homicide, but rather intended and did create a lesser included offense with a lesser standard of proof required for conviction.” McCreary, 371 So.2d at 1026. The vehicular homicide statute and the vessel homicide statute are almost identically worded.3 Therefore, by analogy we find that it was the legislature’s intent that vessel homicide be a lesser included offense of manslaughter.
Defendant's remaining points lack merit.
Affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
563 So. 2d 152, 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 4053, 1990 WL 73198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marquez-v-state-fladistctapp-1990.