Marlon Simmons v. Lynda Taylor Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of the State of Missouri

195 F.3d 346, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26468, 1999 WL 959589
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedOctober 21, 1999
Docket98-3082
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 195 F.3d 346 (Marlon Simmons v. Lynda Taylor Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of the State of Missouri) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marlon Simmons v. Lynda Taylor Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, 195 F.3d 346, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26468, 1999 WL 959589 (8th Cir. 1999).

Opinion

*347 BOWMAN, Chief Judge.

Marlon Simmons appeals from the order of the District Court 1 denying his habeas corpus petition. This Court granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: “(1) whether the use of a police photo and admission of testimony that the detective obtained the photo from the police records unit was a denial of due process, and (2) whether appellant was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel when he was tried in jail clothing.” We affirm.

I.

In February 1994, Investigator Lee Richards, an undercover officer with the Kansas City Police Department, made three purchases of cocaine. On each occasion, the purchase occurred in Investigator Richards’s car, allowing him an unobstructed view of the dealer. On the day of the second purchase, Officer Bradley Thomas conducted a pedestrian check of an individual matching the general description of the dealer in order to ascertain his identity. The individual claimed to be Marlon Simmons. After the final sale, Detective Ginger Locke obtained a photograph of Simmons from the police records unit and placed it in a photo lineup. Investigator Richards identified Simmons as the dealer.

Simmons was charged with three counts of the sale of a controlled substance in circuit court in Jackson County, Missouri. Although Simmons appeared at trial in “obvious jail garb,” counsel made no objection on the record. 2 Counsel also made no objection when Detective Locke testified that she obtained the photograph of Simmons from the police records unit. The jury found Simmons guilty on all three counts.

Simmons filed a notice of appeal and a Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.15 motion for postconviction relief. The Missouri Court of Appeals suspended the direct appeal pending the outcome of the 29.15 motion. Among other things, Simmons alleged in his 29.15 motion that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his being tried in jail clothing. Finding that Simmons “failed to allege facts which, if true, would warrant relief or are allegations which are refuted by the record,” the motion court denied the 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing. 3 Simmons then appealed the denial of his 29.15 motion, and the state court of appeals consolidated his 29.15 appeal with his direct appeal.

*348 At the state court of appeals, Simmons argued 1) that the trial court erred in allowing a detective to testify that she obtained the photograph of Simmons used in the photo lineup from police records and 2) that the motion court erred in denying the 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Although Simmons failed to preserve the error for appeal, the state court of appeals conducted plain error review on the evidentiary issue. Finding no plain error on the first ground and no merit to Simmons’s second argument, the state court of appeals affirmed.

Simmons raised both issues again in his pro se habeas corpus petition in the District Court. The District Court reached the merits of both issues but found neither sufficient for relief under the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court then granted a certificate of appealability on both issues.

II.

Simmons first argues that Detective Locke’s testimony that she obtained the photograph of Simmons from police records violated Simmons’s due process rights. Simmons first raised this argument on direct appeal before the Missouri Court of Appeals. When a state appellate court conducts plain error review on an issue that was not preserved for appeal, there is some question within this Circuit whether the issue has been procedurally defaulted. See Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1152 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1010, 118 S.Ct. 1197, 140 L.Ed.2d 326 (1998). We need not belabor this question, however, because we find that the state court’s decision was not “contrary to ... clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Harris v. Wyrick, 634 F.2d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir.1980) (per curiam) (holding that “limited references in the record to police photographs and mugshots, unaccompanied by anything suggesting previous criminal activities, do not appear sufficiently prejudicial so as to be considered fundamentally unfair”), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916, 101 S.Ct. 1994, 68 L.Ed.2d 308 (1981).

III.

Simmons next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when he was tried in jail clothing. 4 The facts relevant to this claim have not been fully developed because the state court denied Simmons’s motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. See Smith v. United States, 182 F.3d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir.1999) (remanding federal ha-beas case for evidentiary hearing on whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when appellant was tried in jail clothing).

In this case, Simmons was found by the state courts to have procedurally defaulted his opportunity for an evidentia-ry hearing in the state postconviction proceeding by failing to allege facts sufficient to support his claim. Simmons does not challenge the adequacy or the independence of this state procedural ground for the denial of an evidentiary hearing. We must determine, however, whether Simmons is entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing despite this procedural default. Simmons does not contend that there was cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default. With the exception of an unsupported claim that he is actually innocent, Simmons does not claim that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (requiring “new reliable evidence” of actual innocence to meet fundamental miscarriage of *349 justice exception). Moreover, even if an evidentiary hearing were held and Simmons were able to show that his trial counsel’s failure to object to Simmons’s appearing in jail clothing fell below the constitutional standard that the Sixth Amendment requires, the overwhelming weight of the state’s evidence of Simmons’s guilt would make it impossible for him to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cargle v. Mullin
317 F.3d 1196 (Tenth Circuit, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
195 F.3d 346, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26468, 1999 WL 959589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marlon-simmons-v-lynda-taylor-jeremiah-jay-nixon-attorney-general-of-ca8-1999.