Marlin v. Marlin

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Marlin v. Marlin

192 So. 2d 778, 1966 Fla. App. LEXIS 4672

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 29, 1966

DocketNo. 66-172

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 192 So. 2d 778 (Marlin v. Marlin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Marlin v. Marlin, 192 So. 2d 778, 1966 Fla. App. LEXIS 4672 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant in a divorce proceeding appeals from the final decree and assigns as error the amount of the attorney’s fee allowed to the wife. There is no contention that the amount of the fee is unreasonable except as it relates to the earning power and financial ability of the defendant, husband, to respond. The appellant does not challenge the testimony upon the time expended or the value of that time.

Under these contentions it is necessary for us to determine whether the amount of the fee allowed was an abuse of the chancellor’s discretion. The appellant has presented us with a record which does not contain any of the evidence taken before the chancellor at the time the fee was allowed, nor does it contain all of the evidence [779]*779presented during the proceedings relative to the financial standing of the appellant. We must therefore affirm the decree as to the attorney’s fee. See Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 878.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

The defendant in a divorce proceeding appeals from the final decree and assigns as error the amount of the attorney’s fee allowed to the wife. There is no contention that the amount of the fee is unreasonable except as it relates to the earning power and financial ability of the defendant, husband, to respond. The appellant does not challenge the testimony upon the time expended or the value of that time.

Under these contentions it is necessary for us to determine whether the amount of the fee allowed was an abuse of the chancellor’s discretion. The appellant has presented us with a record which does not contain any of the evidence taken before the chancellor at the time the fee was allowed, nor does it contain all of the evidence [779]*779presented during the proceedings relative to the financial standing of the appellant. We must therefore affirm the decree as to the attorney’s fee. See Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 878.

Affirmed.

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192 So. 2d 778, 1966 Fla. App. LEXIS 4672, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marlin-v-marlin-fladistctapp-1966.

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